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


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1782



VIEW OF GIBRALTAR.

1. Moorish Castle.

4. The Lower Lines.

5. The Garrison on Moorish Point.

C. THE TOWN. D. SEASIDE.

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THE HISTORY OF GIBRALTAR

AND OF
ITS POLITICAL RELATION
TO
EVENTS IN EUROPE;


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FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE MOORISH DYNASTY IN SPAIN
TO THE LAST MOROCCO WAR.

WITH
ORIGINAL AND UNPUBLISHED LETTERS
FROM THE PRINCE OF HESSE, SIR GEORGE ELIOTT, THE DUC DE
CRILLON, COLLINGWOOD, AND LORD NELSON,

AND AN ACCOUNT OF THE
FOURTEEN SIEGES THE ROCK
HAS SUSTAINED SINCE IT BECAME A FORTRESS.

BY
CAPTAIN SAYER,
CIVIL MAGISTRATE AT GIBRALTAR.



LONDON:
SAUNDERS, OTLEY, AND CO.,
66, BROOK STREET, HANOVER SQUARE.

1862.





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TO

MAJOR-GENERAL THE RT. HON. JONATHAN PEEL, M.P.,

THIS BOOK IS

MOST RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED

BY

THE AUTHOR.



ERRATA.

Page 7, seventh line from bottom, *for on read or*

„ 8, line 12, *for Gazangos read Gayangos.*

„ 34, last line, *for posts read hosts*

„ 35, note, *for Tortosa read Tolosa.*

„ 79, line 4, *for Ahama read Alhama.*

„ 258, line 7, *for 1729 read 1749.*

„ 445, line 3, *for 450 read 850.*

„ 494, line 4, *for 1350 read 4000.*

Title to engraving facing page 421, for Town read Tower.

Engraving facing page 444, for Town read lower.



PREFACE.

SEEING that we possess no historical account of one of the most remarkable dependencies ever held by the British Crown, I have endeavoured (however unworthily) to fill what appeared to me to be a vacancy upon the book-shelf of our colonial histories.

It has been my object to chronicle faithfully the events with which Gibraltar has been connected since its first occupation by the Moors in 711, and to sketch the influence which this coveted stronghold has exercised over the political state of Europe, more especially during the last two centuries. The records of its early history under Mohammedan rule, which I have collected from the works of Gayangos, Condé, Ayala, Montero, and others, are necessarily but crude and disjointed chronicles, almost impossible to connect in the form of a continuous narrative.

The Egerton, Leake, Kings, and other MSS. in the library of the British Museum have supplied much interesting information relating to the sieges of the Rock since its seizure by Admiral Sir George Rooke.

From papers in the Colonial Secretary's office here I have made use of some correspondence of value.

The original letters from the Prince of Hesse, the Duc de Crillon, Sir George Eliott, Collingwood, and Nelson, are published for the first time.

For the details relative to the various negotiations for the restoration of Gibraltar to Spain, I am indebted to Coxe's History of the Bourbon Kings of Spain, his Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole, and the Correspondence of Pitt, Earl of Chatham.

Drinkwater's account of the celebrated siege of 1779—1783 is justly regarded as a standard history of that prolonged attack and defence, but there are many other sources of information, hitherto overlooked, of which I have been able to avail myself.

Though I am fully sensible of the many blemishes to be found in the following pages, it is far from my intention to shield myself from criticism under the mask of apology; but in extenuation of some errors which would not otherwise have occurred, it is right to mention that during the progress of this work through the press, I have had to combat difficulties which have been necessarily entailed by an absence from England.

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THE HISTORY
OF
GIBRALTAR.

CHAPTER I.

GIBRALTAR was known to the ancients as Mons Calpe, one of the Pillars of Hercules. Ptolemy first determined its latitude, and the correctness of his calculation is corroborated by the observations of the present day. The conspicuous form and isolated position of this rocky promontory, which stands like Nature's monument with all its rugged steeps at the entrance to the Mediterranean Sea, made its name familiar to ancient navigators, and we find the Rock referred to and described by both Greek and Roman writers. Pomponius Mela, who, having been born at Tangier, had opportunities of becoming acquainted with remarkable places in the vicinity, gives a more than superficial account of the wonders of the mountain, its caves and precipices. Strabo, too, has

sketched its curious form and structure. Ptolemy refers to it as the "column of the inner sea." None of these writers mention that Calpe was occupied by any town or settlement during their times, and little doubt exists that the Rock was not inhabited until the Mohammedan invasion. It was not until then that Gibraltar first occupied a place in the history of the world.

On this Rock the first footsteps of the great Moslem host were planted; it was from here that streamed the mighty armies which crushed a powerful monarchy, and established an infidel dynasty in Spain for upwards of 800 years; and it was from here, when the might of Christian arms had again revived, that the last remnant of a once glorious empire took flight for the shores of Barbary.

At the beginning of the 8th century, the western provinces of Africa, which had succumbed to the successful arms of the Saracens, were ruled over by a celebrated chief, the Wali Ibn Nosseyr.

With the exception of Ceuta, which still remained attached to Spain, under the government of Count Ilyan, a Christian knight, all the ports along the northern coast were in the hands of the Wali; and a garrison of 10,000 men, Arabs and Egyptians, commanded by Taric Ibn Zeyad el Nefici, was maintained at Tangier.

Spain, then under the sway of the Visigoths, was ruled over by Roderic, who on the deposition of

Wittiza had usurped the crown. The history of the invasion of Spain by the Saracens and the subsequent catastrophes to the Christians, resulting in the overthrow of the Gothic dynasty and the establishment of the Moorish dominion, is wrapt in the mist of fable. To accept as true the romantic narratives of the Arabians or to trust to the traditions of the Christians, would be equally fallacious.

Repudiating as fabulous the tale of the violation of Count Ilyan's daughter,* we may conclude that the cupidity and restless ambition of the chieftain Musa Ibn Nosseyr, encouraged by discontented traitors who desired the fall of Roderic, were the causes which led to the expedition that overran Spain, and eventually crushed one of the most powerful monarchies of the world. That Ilyan † was a traitor to his country, and aided Musa in the accomplishment of his scheme, admits of little doubt; the Count, who is referred to in every narrative of the Mohammedan conquest, whether of Arabian or European origin, is said to have been a descendant of the Roman people, who at one time

* Called Julian in the Spanish Histories. See Gayangos, vol. i.

A traditional tale is told that Roderic having gained possession of Count Ilyan's daughter by violence, the father, goaded by revenge, planned the invasion of Spain and the destruction of the Visigothic throne.

† Ilyan was a deputy from the Court of Toledo, and was intrusted with the government of Ceuta, from whence he had every opportunity of conspiring with the Moors.—Gayangos, vol. i. p. 539. Some historians make him a Goth and relative of Roderic, others a Greek, and some an independent prince.

possessed most of the fortified towns and ports on the northern coasts of Africa.

Aware of the inclinations of Musa and his ambition to conquer the fertile coasts that lay beyond the narrow sea, Ilyan sought an interview with the Wali, and represented in rapturous strains the glories and the riches of the fruitful land, the few miles that spanned the intervening water, and the facility for a successful invasion. To use the words of the Arabian historian,*—“He described Andalus (Spain) as an extensive kingdom, filled with treasures of all kinds, whose inhabitants would make handsome slaves, a country abounding in springs, gardens, rivers, and a land yielding every description of fruits and plants.”

Musa, secretly captivated by these allurements, was too prudent to acquiesce until he had more certain proofs of the sincerity of Ilyan's intentions and the reality of his descriptions. With the object, therefore, of testing his honesty, he proposed that the Count should first make an incursion into the opposite country, at the head of his own troops. To this Ilyan willingly assented, and collecting a few men he crossed the straits in two vessels, and landed at Jezirah-al-Khadra, Algeciras, from whence, after ravaging the coasts, he returned laden with spoil on the following day. Immediately the success of this expedition was made known, Musa wrote to the Khalif entreating his permission to undertake the invasion

* Al-Makkari. Gayangos.

of Andalus. The Khalif, however, was not yet convinced of the prudence of the undertaking, and replied to Musa in the following words: "Let the country be first explored by light troops, to overrun it, and bring the news of what it contains. Be prudent, and do not allow the Moslems to be lost in an ocean of dangers and horrors."

To which Musa answered: "It is not an ocean, but only a narrow channel, whose shores are everywhere distinct to the eye."

"Never mind," replied the Khalif, "even if it be so, let the country be first explored."

In order to carry out the instructions of the Khalif, Al-Walid, Musa prepared an expedition of 400 foot and 100 horse under command of Tarif-abú-Zarah, a freed man and a Berber.*

The number of men composing this expedition is differently stated by the various chroniclers, some writing 500, as above; and others 1000, and even more. In September, A. D. 710, Tarif set sail with his followers, and landed on the opposite coast at a spot which has ever since borne his name,—Tarifa.

From thence he ravaged the country, pillaging and murdering the inhabitants. Having collected a

* Gayangos says, vol. i. page 517, note 7: "Tarif-abú-Zarah has often been confounded with Tarik-Ibn-Zeyad by Christian historians, notwithstanding their being two distinct individuals, and their having invaded Spain at different times. The similarity of their names led, no doubt, to the mistake."

mass of spoil, including numerous women, he returned to Africa and reported his success to Musa.

The Emir, no longer doubtful of the riches to be obtained from Andalus, and perceiving that success had attended both the expeditions, again wrote to the Khalif for permission to attempt the conquest of the territory. This time the Khalif did not withhold his consent, and preparations were immediately commenced for the invasion.

A fleet was collected at Ceuta* for the transport of the army ; Count Ilyan providing many of the vessels.

The command of the expedition was intrusted to Tarik-Ibn-Zeyad,† a native of Persia, and a freedman of Musa-Ibn-Nosseyr. The army consisted of 7000 men, principally Berbers and slaves, very few being genuine Arabs.

Everything being prepared, the expedition crossed the straits from Ceuta and landed, April 30th, 711, at the foot of a mountain opposite to Ceuta, which thenceforward received the name of Gebal-Tarik, or the Mountain of Tarik.‡ It is certain that the first

* Some say Tangier, but this is obviously an error.

† The origin of this man is obscure.

‡ In Gayangos' translation of the narrative of Al-Makkari there is the following description of Gibraltar. "Another of the districts which acknowledges the jurisdiction of Seville is that of Gebal-Tarik, which stands as a lasting testimonial of the conquest of Andalus (Spain) by the Moslems. This mountain was called after Tarik, freedman of Musa-Ibn-Nosseyr, who was the first Moslem who landed upon it ; it is also called

incursion into Spain was made by Ilyan, who landed at Algeciras for a few hours. The second by Tarif, who landed at the present Tarifa. The third and final one by the expedition under Tarik, who disembarked at Gibraltar.

Some authors assert that Tarik did not land at Gibraltar, but at Algeciras; quoting, in support of their argument, passages from Arabian writers, in which an expedition is described as disembarking on Al-Jezirah.

Gebalu-ab-Fatah (the mountain of the entrance or victory). The sea surrounds the mountain of Gibraltar on almost every side, so as to make it look like a watch-tower erected in the midst of the sea, and facing Algeciras." A certain Granadian poet alludes to Gibraltar in the following distich :

"The mountain of Tarik is like a beacon spreading its rays over the seas, and rising far above the neighbouring mountains. One would say that its face almost reaches the sky, and that its eyes are watching the stars in the celestial tracts."

And this is by no means exaggerated, for when travellers approach it coming from Ceuta, they see it at a distance shining as bright as a lamp. "I sailed once," says Abu-l-Hasan Ibn Musa Ibn Said, "with my father from Ceuta to Gibraltar, and had an opportunity of verifying the truth of this assertion. When we came near the coast my father told me to look in the direction of Gibraltar; I did so, and saw the whole mountain shining as if it were on fire."

In an Arabic MS. entitled the "Book of sufficiency on the History of the Khalifs," translated by Gayangos, there occurs the following allusion to the landing of Tarik :

"Before Tarik left Africa a large number of volunteers flocked under his banners. He first went to Ceuta, and having embarked in vessels he cast anchor close to a mountain, which received his name, and was ever since called Gebal-Tarik."

These writers could not have been aware that Al-Jezirah translated signifies "an island," or piece of land surrounded on three sides by water; and that the term is constantly applied to the whole of Spain, and is even used when describing Tarifa. The modern Algeciras is always referred to by the Arabian chroniclers as Jezirah-al-Khadra—the Green Island.*

The detailed accounts of the invasion in the Arabian chronicles are very various and contradictory, though there is a similarity in the description of the main and most important features.

The following is an account selected from Gazan-gos' translation of an Arabic Chronicle :

"Musa sent for his freedman Tarik-Ibn-Zeyad, and gave him the command of 12,000 men, Arabs and Berbers. He then commanded him to cross the straits and invade Andalus, bidding Ilyan also accompany the expedition with his own troops. Before Tarik left Africa a great number of volunteers flocked under his banners; he first went to Ceuta, and having embarked in vessels he cast anchor close to a mountain, which received his name, and was ever since called Gebal-Tarik, the mountain of Tarik. This event took place in the year 93 of the Hegira.

* No doubt exists that Gibraltar derives its name from a corruption of Gebal-Taric; nevertheless some authors hold a different opinion. Thus, Montero, *Hist. de Gibraltar*, page 87, traces the origin of the name to the two Arabic words *Gebal-al ali*, which signifies a lofty mountain.

“When Tarik was about to land he found some of the Rúm* posted on a commodious part of the coast where he had intended to disembark, who made some show of resistance. But Tarik, giving up that spot, sailed off from it at night and went towards another part of the coast, which he contrived to render flat by means of the oars and by throwing over them the saddles of the horses; and in this way he managed to effect a landing unobserved by the enemy, and before they were aware of it.”†

Tarik had no sooner landed his army in safety than he advanced towards the interior, pillaging and ravaging as he went along. Theodimir, a chief of the Goths, was at this time in the neighbourhood of Gebal-Tarik with a tolerable force, and he speedily became engaged in a series of encounters with the Moors, but with no success.

Tarik continued to advance, having, it is related, burnt his ships in order to invest his men with the courage of desperation. “He thus,” says the Arabian chronicler, “addressed his army, as he led them against the Christian host: ‘Whither can you fly? the enemy is in your front, the sea at your back. By Allah! there is no salvation for you but in your courage and perseverance. Consider your situation,—

* The original signification of this word is “Romans,” but it was used generally by the Arabs when speaking of the inhabitants of Spain.

† Gayangos, vol. ii. p. 47.

here you are on this island like so many orphans cast upon the world. You will soon be met by a powerful enemy surrounding you on all sides like the infuriated billows of a tempestuous sea, and sending against you his powerful warriors drowned in steel. What can you oppose to them? You have no other weapons but your swords, no provisions but those that you may snatch from the hands of our enemies; . . . do not think that I impose upon you a task from which I shrink myself, or that I try to conceal from you the dangers attending this our expedition; but know that if you only suffer for awhile you will reap in the end an abundant harvest of pleasures and enjoyments.'"

Theodomir, defeated and disheartened, retreated towards Seville, intending to form a junction with the main army. At the time of Tarik's landing, Roderic, king of the Goths, was in the north of Spain, quelling an insurrection in the Basque provinces. Immediately the news of the invasion reached him, he hastened southward with a powerful army of 60,000 men. Halting for a short time at Cordova to complete his preparations, he advanced to meet the Moorish force, which had already reached the neighbourhood of Xeres.

On the 19th July, A. D. 711, the two armies came in sight of each other on the banks of the Guadalete near Medina Sidonia.*

* Gayangos gives ample reasons for his assertion that this battle was fought near the sea, not far from Medina Sidonia, and not, as generally supposed, in the plain of Xeres.

At dawn of day both chiefs prepared for battle. King Roderic came in the midst of his troops borne on a litter, covered with a canopy to protect him from the rays of the sun, and surrounded by warriors cased in steel with fluttering pennons.*

The Moorish soldiers were differently arrayed ; their breasts were covered with armour of mail, they wore white turbans on their heads, the Arabian long-bow slung across their shoulders, their swords suspended to their girdles, and their long spears grasped in their hands.

It is related that previous to the fight commencing, Roderic, anxious to obtain information of the strength and character of the invaders, sent one of his men as a spy on some pretence to the Moorish camp. The man did as he was commanded, reached the enemy's lines in safety, and was taken before Tarik. That artful chief, comprehending the object of the Christian's visit, resolved upon a device to strike terror into the man's heart, and to spread fear through Roderic's army. He ordered the flesh of the slain to be cut up piece-meal in the man's presence, and to be cooked as if for food. The dead bodies were dissected, and the flesh cooked in large cauldrons, the whole operation being witnessed by the terrified Christian. In the mean

*-All the Arabian chronicles agree that Roderic was carried on a throne or litter. Some add that it was drawn by mules ; and others minutely describe the magnificence of the king's dress and the jewels that he wore.

time the wholesome meat of sheep and oxen had been secretly prepared in another part of the camp, which was privily substituted for the human stew. The unfortunate messenger was compelled to partake of the meal, and doubted not that he had fed upon human flesh. On the first opportunity he returned to his master, and told his tale of horror, to the consternation of Roderic and his army.*

The engagement commenced soon after daybreak, and was continued without any decided advantage on either side till nightfall. Next morning the action was renewed, and lasted with unabated fury till the seventh day, when the Christians gave way, fled in disorder, and were pursued without mercy by the relentless Moors.

Roderic disappeared in the midst of the battle, and nothing was afterwards heard of him. It is said that his horse, a milk-white steed, bearing a saddle of gold sparkling with rubies, was found plunged in the mud of the river, leaving it to be inferred that the rider had perished in the stream. The spoil when collected was immense, and was divided by Tarik's orders into five portions, one of which he retained, and distributed the rest among his followers.

With this protracted and bloody struggle ended the dynasty of the Goths, and for 800 years Christian power in Spain. Tarik, flushed with victory and

* Gayangos, vol. i. p. 49.

success, rapidly overran the country, and penetrated to Toledo the capital, which he captured and sacked.

City after city surrendered to him, and ere the year had closed the Moorish dynasty was established.*

Passing over a long period of years, during which we have no authentic history of the events that occurred at Gebal-Tarik, or in its neighbourhood, though we know that the adjacent provinces were the scenes of constant strife and commotion, we find Gibraltar in 1086 in possession of Yusef ben Taxfin, a Caliph of the Almoravides.†

Unable to cope with the overwhelming forces brought against them by Alfonso of Castile, the Spanish Moors in an evil hour had implored aid from Africa. Yusef, who at that time commanded the Moslem troops in Africa, was then occupied with the siege of Ceuta. This chief no sooner received the invitation than, perceiving the advantage to be gained, he pushed across the straits with a powerful army, and advanced to the assistance of his brethren.†

* The account of the Moorish expeditions into Spain is variously given by different authors. Ayala, *Hist. of Gibraltar*, page 3, confounds Tarik with Tarif, and transfers to the latter the glory of the conquests. Condé makes Tarik command both expeditions. Lafuente is more correct. † Condé.

‡ Gayangos, p. 273, v. ii. The Arabian chroniclers relate that Al-mu-Tamed, the chief of the Spanish Moors, was repeatedly warned of his error in asking aid from Africa. Said one prophet, "A kingdom without heirs, and one long sword, do not find room in the same scabbard." To this Al-mu-Tamed replied, "Better be a camel-driver than a driver of pigs,"

Alfonso, who was then in the territory of Badajoz, had taken up a position with an immense army, of which more than 80,000 were cavalry, at Zalacca, about four leagues from the city of Badajoz. Here he was met by the Moorish host under Yusef and the King of Seville. A bloody encounter ensued between the two foes, which ended in the rout of the Christians and the destruction of their army. The slaughter was enormous. 35,000 men of Alfonso's force were killed, and their heads having been collected, piles were heaped up with them, over-topping the longest lances, and resembling lofty towers.*

This battle utterly destroyed the little remaining power of the Christians.

It was after this event that Yusef's real intentions became developed. He was not slow to perceive the weakness and imbecility of the Spanish Moors, and he resolved to wrest from them the glorious country they possessed.

For a time his deeply-laid designs were not fully matured. He returned to Africa, and being for a third time called into Spain to assist in the Sacred War, he landed at Algeciras, and, throwing off the mask, avowed his intention to conquer the country.

He advanced with a powerful army. Tarifa, Gibraltar, Algeciras, surrendered themselves to his victo-

meaning that he would rather be Yusef's prisoner and guard his camels in the desert, than become the captive of Alfonso and feed his swine in Castile.

* Condé.

rious troops. Granada and Seville were taken after a severe struggle, and Badajoz and Zaragoza shortly after submitted.

But the Spanish Mohammedans did not rest tamely under the oppression of the usurper. Assembling all the forces they could muster, they marched against Algeciras and re-took it, and afterwards laid siege to Gibraltar with success.

For many subsequent years no events of importance took place at Gibraltar, but in 1309 the Rock was for the first time exposed to a regular siege. During the reign of Mohammed III. Algeciras was attacked by Ferdinand IV. King of Castile; but every effort to reduce this place proved abortive in consequence of the facilities afforded by Gibraltar for succouring and relieving the garrison. Unable to interrupt the communication with the Rock by sea, Ferdinand became aware that success before Algeciras was impossible as long as the Moors held possession of Gibraltar. He resolved, therefore, to dislodge them; and abandoning for a time active operations against the stubborn walls of Algeciras, he directed a large portion of his army under command of Alonzo Perez de Guzman (el Bueno) against the defences of the Rock.

The garrison at the time did not exceed 1200 men, who, although unable to stand against the overwhelming forces sent against them, fought with the greatest gallantry and determination. The attack was directed

principally upon two points, the north front and the heights above the castle,—the Archbishop of Seville and Don Juan de Nunez commanding the assaulting divisions.

The courage of the besieged protracted the operations for a considerable time, but at length, after many sanguinary engagements, the garrison surrendered. Impressed with the value of the prize, and believing that, in a strategical point of view at least, Gibraltar was of infinitely greater consequence than Algeciras, Ferdinand consented to abandon the siege of the latter city on consideration of the restoration to his dominions of Quesada, Quadros, and Belmar, together with an indemnity of 5000 gold pistoles.

Turning his attention to Gibraltar, he commenced to repair the damaged fortifications, to construct new defences, and to arrange the government. One of his most trusted officers, Alonzo de Mendoza, was appointed governor; and with the object of securing a numerous Christian population, and as rapidly as possible, the King issued proclamations granting special and valuable privileges to all who would become inhabitants of the city. Amongst other provisions, all “swindlers, thieves, murderers, or woman escaped from her husband,” who fled to Gibraltar, were to be free from the punishment of death. All malefactors, not traitors, residing for a year and a day were to receive a free pardon, and no duty could be

levied upon any goods passing in or out. Thus Gibraltar became the refuge of every villain from the surrounding neighbourhood.

The population, however, did not increase so rapidly as Ferdinand had expected. Though the dread of attack from the Moors no doubt deterred many from isolating themselves upon the Rock, yet the natural reluctance of peaceable persons to associate themselves with a society of murderers, thieves, and disreputable people, materially checked the progress of the immigration.

Mohammed had no sooner purchased peace from Ferdinand IV. by the terms before alluded to, than a conspiracy against his life was discovered in Granada. Hastening back to his dominions in the hope of crushing the rebellion, he found the majority of the populace already in arms against him, and his brother Nassir Abul Geiox proclaimed king.

Though he lost no time in reaching Granada, the tide of rebellion was already turned impetuously against him, and the mob infuriated at the losses he had sustained in the south, and the concessions he had made to the Christians. His minister was slain before his eyes, his palace plundered, and himself compelled to renounce his throne.

The effect of this revolution was to dissolve all former treaties with the Christians. In 1312 Ferdinand died, and was succeeded by Alonzo XI., and in the same year Nassir Abul-Geiox, who like his brother



had fallen a victim to conspiracy and revolt, was replaced upon the throne of Granada by Ismail ben Ferag, a religious chief, who prosecuted the war against the Christians with the courage of fanaticism. In 1315 he laid siege to Gibraltar, but after an attack of short duration he reluctantly abandoned his efforts to regain the position which was already recognized as the key of Spain.

CHAPTER II.

THIRD SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR, BY MOHAMMED IV.

IN the year 1324, Ismail ben Ferag was assassinated at the entrance to the Alhambra by Mohammed of Granada, son of the Wali of Algeciras; the cause of his death is said to have been a dispute concerning a Christian maiden of great beauty, who was captured at the taking of Martos. Perceiving her in the hands of Mussulmen soldiers who were quarrelling for her possession, Ismail ordered her to be taken to his harem, in spite of the efforts of Mohammed to effect her rescue. The latter prince, enraged at the interference of Ismail, planned his death, and stabbed him mortally the following day.*

* The death of this prince is described differently by the Arabian chroniclers, who narrate it thus: On the 22nd June, 1325, Ismail marched to Martos, which he invested and took after a short siege. Shortly after his return from that expedition, Ismail was assassinated by a cousin named Mohammed, who was the son of Ismail, better known as Sahibu-l-Jezirah (the Governor of Algeciras). Mohammed had been present at the siege of Martos; having whilst there been guilty of some misdemeanour, he was summoned before his sovereign, who, in

Ismail was succeeded by his son Mohammed IV. During the early part of his reign, the Christians who invaded Andalusia met with unvaried success. They captured Vera, Pruna, Ayamonte in succession, and, with the assistance of an army from Africa, they signally defeated Mohammed, taking Algeciras, Ronda, and Marbella.

These misfortunes, which would have been sufficient to break the spirit of a less chivalrous prince, only served to stimulate Mohammed to greater efforts. He besieged the fortress of Baena with success, and marched his army against Gibraltar. At this time a Gallician knight, Vasco Perez de Meira, was governor of the fortress. He enjoyed some military reputation, but he was a victim to insatiable avarice and a dominant desire to amass sufficient wealth to enable him to become the possessor of extensive properties and estates, through which he might hand his name down to posterity. During his term of office as governor he had embezzled the greater portion of the money devoted by the king, his master, for the defences of the fortress and the supply of arms, ammunition, and provisions; so that, when Moham-

the presence of the assembled courtiers, severely reproved him for his conduct. Mohammed resented the insult, and swore to revenge it. On his return to Granada, he watched his opportunity, and, with the aid of his relatives and servants, attacked and murdered Ismail, as he was going from his palace to a temporary throne which had been erected for the purpose of his administering justice to his subjects.

med appeared before the city, the fortifications were in a state of decay, only a few rounds of ammunition remained, and the store of provisions was almost exhausted.

The Mohammedans, aware of the unprepared condition of the garrison, seized immediately upon the most important positions of the fortress. The arsenal fell into their hands, and they succeeded in establishing themselves upon more than one part of the Rock. The small supply of provisions within soon began to fail, and the governor would have been compelled to capitulate without even a show of resistance, had not a vessel laden with grain been accidentally cast ashore, whose cargo supplied the troops with bread for a short period. During the last weeks of the siege the suffering of the soldiers was extreme, and hunger compelled them to devour the leather off their shields. Though suffering such privations, their courage remained undaunted. Vasco de Perez, surrounded by a few followers, still held the castle, and though resistance in the face of certain starvation was vain, he held out till the very last moment.

But, even when compassed by these trials and calamities, he was unable to free himself from the cursed yoke of his ruling passion. Aware that a heavy ransom would be offered for the Moorish prisoners whom he had captured, and believing that the sum would be regulated considerably by the condition in which they were delivered up, he

collected them within the castle, fed them with the best of the almost exhausted stores, and treated them with more solicitude than he bestowed upon his famished and devoted troops.

After four months and a half of extreme suffering, the garrison weakened in numbers and prostrated with famine and disease, Perez determined to capitulate. This he did upon favourable terms, and the fortress was surrendered once more to the infidels, on condition that the garrison and inhabitants should march out unmolested with all their goods and chattels.—A. D. 1333.

Mohammed immediately took possession, the Rock having been in the hands of the Christians for twenty-two years. Stung with mortification, and fearful of the anger of his master, Vasco de Perez fled to Africa, where he remained and died in obscurity.

Alfonso, who had up to this time been engaged in quelling rebellious commotions in Castile, now hastened to Gibraltar, and again took the field against his former adversary. Alarmed at the warlike preparations of Alfonso, Mohammed applied to the King of Fez for aid, and an African army immediately crossed the straits to his assistance.

No sooner, however, had the African chief been admitted with his troops into Gibraltar, than he assumed an arrogant and offensive tone towards the Spanish Moors under Mohammed, who composed the

garrison. Too late Mohammed perceived his error in calling to his assistance men whose character was notoriously treacherous and perfidious. But his critical position compelled him to avoid the quarrels and contentions that were urged upon him by his wily ally, and he suffered patiently the unconcealed indignities to which he was subjected.

In the mean time Alfonso, who was unaware of the surrender, having collected a sufficiently powerful army, marched southward, to relieve the fortress and raise the siege. The Castilian Admiral Josef Tenorio, at that time in Seville, was ordered to watch the straits with his squadron, and letters were sent from the king to Vasco Perez, entreating him to hold out until the very last extremity. Instructions were also sent to the Grand Masters of Santiago, Alcantara, and Calatrava to unite all their forces together, and to march to the assistance of the besieged.

Arrived at Valladolid, Alfonso proclaimed his intention of proceeding at once to Gibraltar, and invited the nobles and their dependents to accompany him on his mission against the infidels.

As he journeyed southward he borrowed large sums of money from the towns of Valladolid, Burgos, and Toledo. Having reached Seville, a royal council was held, and plans concerted for the safety of Gibraltar. Unfortunately the opinions of the council were divided, and a delay of a week ensued before the expedition continued its march. In five days

the king reached the banks of the Guadarete near Xeres, from whence he despatched messengers to the Admiral and to Vasco Perez.

After a lapse of two days these men returned, bringing intelligence that the place had long since surrendered, and that the standards of the Moors floated from the walls. The receipt of this disastrous news alarmed but did not dishearten Alfonso. A council was again assembled, and it was resolved to besiege the Rock and to recover it from the enemy. The next morning the army was again in motion, and in three days appeared in sight of the walls.

Approaching the Rock, and while passing over the Sierra de Carbonera (Queen of Spain's chair), the king was attacked by a large body of Moorish cavalry, but by a successful retrograde movement the infidels were put to the rout with no quarter, and 1500 of them slain. On the following day the fleet anchored in the bay, and arrangements were completed for the attack. It was determined, in the first place, to effect a landing southward of the town, upon an undefended spot called the Red Sands, and for this purpose a body of men under Rui Lopez and Fernan de Meira was embarked in some armed row boats, which pushed off from the fleet and pulled towards the shore. The landing was easily effected, and had common prudence been observed the attack might have been successful. But those who were first ashore, elated at meeting with no resistance,

rushed up the hill towards the castle without waiting for their comrades, or taking any precautions to protect their retreat. The Moors, perceiving the error, burst forth from the castle in overwhelming numbers, killed both the leaders and the greater portion of the assailants, and drove the remainder on to the shore, where, with the exception of some who concealed themselves among the rocks, they were either slain or taken prisoners.

Alfonso beheld with mortification the failure of this attempt, and called a council to decide upon the course to be adopted. Personally, he was unwilling to leave his men who had been taken prisoners without an effort to recover them; but the critical situation of his army and the scarcity of his commissariat dictated the necessity of a retreat. The day following, therefore, the army began to retire, but had proceeded only a short distance when the reluctance of the king to abandon the prisoners became so evident, that a proposal was made by the generals to return with a portion of the troops, and to attempt the rescue of the captives. The king joyfully agreed, and the order was issued to countermarch on the next morning. Joy spread through the army. The men, hitherto disheartened by the unexpected failure and retreat, recovered their ardour and their courage. Full of hope for the future, they turned their faces once more towards the Rock, determined to retrieve their late reverse.

A landing was again effected on the Red Sands by a numerous body of men under command of Don Jaime de Jerica, and the brothers Laso and Sancho de Rojās.

Profiting by experience, order was strictly maintained, and a junction effected with the party of Christians left behind on the former occasion, and who had remained concealed and unmolested by the enemy.

Seizing upon the heights in the vicinity of the castle, Alfonso prepared to lay siege to the Torre del Homenage, the principal point of defence. Simultaneously, an attack was directed by the Admiral Josef Tenorio upon the arsenal, and an attempt made to burn the shipping. Though this project was undertaken with the greatest skill and courage, it was met by such determined opposition on the part of the Moors, who had placed massive wooden booms across the entrance to the arsenal, that the assailants were driven back with the loss of two celebrated chiefs and a large number of men.

After the failure of the attack by sea, Alfonso directed his efforts exclusively against the Torre del Homenage, whose parapets and turrets already showed symptoms of destruction. Every kind of machine applicable in those days to warfare was brought against the walls. Battering-rams were thrust against the outer defences. Machines called "Cadalsos," or scaffolds, were erected, similar to the vineæ of the Romans, two or three stories in height, and running on wheels, by means of which they were rolled along-

side the tower. From the uppermost stage heavy stones and other missiles were hurled on to the parapets, while the soldiers in the stages beneath attempted to undermine the walls of the defences.* Powerful engines, on the principle of the catapult, were dragged up on to the rugged heights which overhung the castle, and attempts were made to destroy the enemy's galleys as they lay in the arsenal, by pitching stones upon their decks from the rocks above. But the Moors covered in their vessels with heavy casings of wood, and the missiles fell harmless upon the massive roofing.

The siege had now been carried on for sixteen days without any sign of success on the part of the besiegers; and a strong easterly wind, which had for a long time prevailed, kept back the fleet which was conveying supplies to the army. Provisions became scarce, and the army was threatened with famine. To add to the difficulties which beset Alfonso, numbers of his men began to desert, in spite of every effort to prevent them, while many were taken prisoners, and sold as slaves to the Moors at Algeciras. At the same time he received intelligence of the death of his eldest son, of internal commotions in his own

* The attack with these machines was conducted by Alonzo Fernandez Coronel. But though large rewards were offered to the men if they succeeded in undermining the walls of the castle, the stratagem failed through the ingenuity of the Moors, who poured burning pitch from the battlements, and set fire to the scaffolding.

kingdom, and of the taking of the Castle of Benamexi, with much loss to the Christians. Still even under these accumulated misfortunes he prepared to prosecute the siege with renewed vigour.

He ordered a narrow fosse or ditch to be cut across the isthmus from the western beach to the shore of the Mediterranean for the protection of his rear from attack, and so desirous was he to free his army from the perilous position in which it was placed, that he could scarcely be restrained from sallying forth with his whole force to bring on an engagement with the Moors, and thus to risk his fate upon one decisive battle.

The monotony of the siege, which, since the suspension of active operations, had become most irksome, was broken by an incident that roused the drooping spirits of Alfonso's men, and had some influence upon the more speedy termination of the blockade. In order to guard against surprise the Christians had posted a picket of men about two miles or more from the Rock, who concealed themselves amid the brushwood and watched the approaches to the camp.

One day there came along the western beach a renowned Moorish chief, accompanied by 300 horsemen, apparently unaware of the position of the Christian detachment. As they approached the spot where the guard was concealed, Diez Sanchez the commander fell upon them with his troops, utterly routing them, and killing most of their numbers. Amongst the latter was the celebrated Arabian his-

torian Mohamed Ben Ali, a native of Ceuta, who had accidentally joined the party.

Though the sufferings of Alfonso's army daily increased, the Moors were, if possible, in a more miserable position. By sea they could receive no provisions or assistance, and all the approaches by land were occupied by the Castilians. Both armies were reduced to the utmost misery ; and proposals for peace would have been received with joy on either side. Preparations were already being made for the retreat of the besiegers, when a Moorish envoy arrived in the Christian camp and stated that he had power to treat for a cessation of hostilities with the Castilian monarch. Alfonso immediately assembled his council, who, considering the peril of their position, were unanimously in favour of peace, and a conference was arranged to take place on the morrow between the hostile chiefs. Shortly afterwards a truce was agreed to between Alfonso, Abdul-Malek, and the King of Granada, for four years, the latter engaging to pay annually to Alfonso 10,000 gold doubloons ; and permission being extended to the Moors to purchase cattle, as formerly, for the supply of the garrison from the neighbouring province. Costly presents were exchanged between the kings, and thus terminated the fourth siege of Gibraltar, the fortress still remaining in possession of the infidels.*

* Ayala.

CHAPTER III.

ALFONSO, anxious to settle the disturbances in his kingdom, marched with his army towards Seville, while Mohammed sent his troops back to Granada, retaining only a small escort to accompany him on a journey to Africa, whither he was going on a visit to the King Abu-l-Hassan.

The unfortunate monarch was ignorant of a plot among the soldiers of Abdul-Malek to assassinate him. The ostensible cause of this treason and subsequent tragedy was an offence given by Mohammed to the sons of Ozmin, but the more probable reasons were jealousy on the part of the African chief, and the natural treachery of the African Moors. Ignorant of the fate that awaited him, the king was preparing to set out on his journey, accompanied only by a small escort, when his murderers set upon him in a narrow defile a few miles from the gates of the fortress, and put him to death. He was succeeded on the throne by Yussuf ben Ismail, then 16 years of age.*

* The Arabian chroniclers thus describe the death of Mohammed:—

The news of Mohammed's death reached Alfonso when he had proceeded but a short distance on his march. Fearful of the consequences, his generals anxiously pressed him to hurry on to Seville; but the king perceived the danger of a forced and fatiguing march, and refused to expose his army to the peril. By easy stages, and in good order, he reached Seville, where he prepared to negotiate and provide for the safety of his kingdom with Mohammed's successor. His first act was to forgive the payment of the tribute agreed upon at the termination of the siege of Gibraltar.

Abu-l-Hassan was at this time king of Morocco. Though secretly he had designs upon Alfonso's dominions, he found it desirable to maintain for the present friendly relations with that monarch, and anxious to propitiate him, he sent large and valuable presents of gold, precious stones, elephants, and all the rarest treasures of Africa. But his dissimulation did not continue long. In 1338 he embarked masses of infantry and cavalry, with provisions for a campaign, and landed them at Gibraltar, though the

“Soon after the Christians had raised the siege of Gibraltar, the Sultan Mohammed was assassinated by some African officers to whom he had rendered himself obnoxious. As he was one day about to embark, he was assailed by a party of horsemen, who lay concealed behind a projecting rock, and put to death. His mangled body, stripped of everything, remained exposed on the ground, but was afterwards carried to Malaga and interred in the public cemetery.”—Gayangos, vol. ii.

four years of truce had not yet expired. During the time that had elapsed since the siege, the fortress had been considerably strengthened, a massive wall had been constructed at the foot of the Rock, surrounding it on all sides, "as the halo surrounds the crescent moon."*

Alfonso, aware of the coming storm, immediately took measures to meet it. He called together his nobles, who were at this time divided into rancorous parties, and urged upon them the necessity of smothering all private feuds among themselves in order to overcome the common danger.

In October, 1339, he set out from Seville with a powerful army, accompanied by Don Gil de Albornoz, Archbishop of Seville, and Don Juan Manuel, and Don Juan Nunez de Lara, who at one time had been conspicuous as rebels to the throne. Active demonstrations were made against the Moors all along his frontiers, a force was sent into the kingdom of Granada, and military posts established at Arcos and Xeres. At the same time a combined squadron from Aragon and Portugal under Admirals de Cruillas and Josef Tenorio arrived in the straits. But this small squadron was unable to prevent the passage of troops from Africa, and large hordes of Moors landed along the Spanish coast.

The first action fought ended in favour of the Christians, and augured well for future successes.

* Al-Makkari's narrative.

The chief, Abdul-Malik, son of Abu-l-Hassan, who was in possession of Algeciras, had maintained himself and his army during the winter months by ravaging the neighbouring country. In one of these foraging expeditions he met a Castilian force under Gonzalez Martin de Oveido, which fell upon his troops and routed them with immense loss, Abdul-Malik himself being among the slain.

Enraged at this success, and determined to avenge the death of his son, Abu-l-Hassan sent orders for fresh levies of troops from all the African tribes, and large reinforcements again crossed the straits; the King of Granada also increased his army, and a terrible struggle was evidently at hand. It was of paramount importance to Alfonso to maintain possession of the straits by sea, and for this purpose the fleet composed of the Castilian and Aragonese squadrons lay off the coast.

Unfortunately, however, one of the Admirals, Gilabert de Cruillas, was imprudent enough to disembark a small force on the coast of Algeciras, and to attack a superior body of the enemy, an error which deprived Alfonso of his co-operation, as he was wounded severely and compelled to relinquish his command.

At this very time the fleet of Abu-l-Hassan, consisting of two hundred and fifty sail, was approaching the Bay of Gibraltar. The Castilian squadron, commanded by Josef Tenorio, numbered only twenty-seven galleys in bad condition, and six large ships,

with some transports. An engagement with such unequal forces could have only one result. But the Admiral, knowing that his conduct was watched suspiciously by those in authority at Seville, and smarting under a calumnious insinuation against his honour, resolved to give battle to the enemy. The consequences were, as might have been expected, disastrous; Tenorio, after covering himself with glory, was killed, and five galleys only escaped out of the whole fleet. Thus the command by sea fell into the hands of Abu-l-Hassan, who hastened to take advantage of his success by transporting reinforcements, arms, and provisions across the straits. Alfonso did all in his power to repair this disaster. He applied to the King of Portugal for assistance, and a Portuguese fleet, commanded by Admiral Manuel Pezano, sailed for Cadiz. He also procured 12 galleys from Aragon, commanded by Pedro de Moncada, and 15 from Genoa. Orders were given for the repair of the five ships saved from the former fleet, and the whole were placed under the command of Ortiz Calderon, who took up his anchorage in Tarifa bay. At this time the African army, amounting to 200,000 men, including 70,000 horse, was in the vicinity of Tarifa. Towards the end of October, 1340, Alfonso, reinforced by an army under the King of Portugal in person, advanced to meet the enemy. The Spanish authorities make the Christian forces less than one-fourth of the Moorish posts, but it is pro-

bable they did not exceed 60,000 men. On the 27th October, 1340, the two armies came in sight of each other on the banks of the Salado, near the very spot where 500 years afterwards was fought the battle of Barrozza. It was arranged that the King of Castile should engage the African division, while the Portuguese army was to attack the wing under the King of Granada. The first movement was the passage of the river; this was confided to Don Juan Manuel, who, either through gross incapacity or cowardice, imperilled the success of the advance. Fortunately, as he was about to retire, reinforcements under more able leaders came up, a bridge was quickly constructed with wooden stakes, and a portion of the army crossed over and held their ground in spite of every effort to dislodge them. Alfonso was everywhere distinguished by his daring, and his reckless courage would have caused his death had he not been checked by the Archbishop of Toledo, who seized the reins of his horse and held him back from a single-handed onslaught upon a body of the enemy.*

The army had no sooner effected the passage of the river, than the garrison of Tarifa, as previously arranged, sallied out and attacked the centre of the African division. This movement decided the success of the day; already disheartened by the gradual

* Alfonso of Castile was saved from death and defeat in a similar manner by the Archbishop of Seville, at the famous battle of Tortosa, A.D. 1211.

advance of the Christians, and the increasing disorder in their own ranks, the Mussulman host gave way, an irresistible panic seized the whole army, and a bloody rout ensued. Innumerable prisoners were taken, including the son of Abu-l-Hassan and the whole harem. The number of slain was fabulously large. The remnant of the defeated army crossed in haste to Africa, Yussef fled to Marbella, and Abu-l-Hassan took refuge in Gibraltar. An African historian relating this memorable event, so deplorable to the Moors, thus describes it:—*

“Having crossed the straits for the laudable purpose of waging war against the infidels, and helping the Moslems of Granada in their desperate struggle with the Christian power, as had once been the custom of his noble ancestors, as well as of almost all the sovereigns of the different dynasties that ruled over western Africa, Abu-l-Hassan landed on the coast of Andalus with an army amounting to upwards of 60,000 men, and was immediately joined by the forces of Granada, under command of Abu-l-Hejáj. Alas! God Almighty, whose decrees are infallibly executed upon his creatures, had decided in his infinite wisdom that this proud armament should be dispersed like the dust before the wind, and that Abu-l-Hassan himself should return to his dominions vanquished and fugitive; that the sharp-edged sword of the infidel should shine over his head, and those of

* Narrative of Al-Makkari.

his men. We will not inquire how it happened ; but the fact is, that thousands of Moslems won that day the crown of martyrdom, that the ranks of doctors and theologians were frightfully thinned, the law of the sword being executed upon their throats. The Sultan's own son and all his harem fell into the hands of the victorious enemy, his treasures became the prey of the idolaters, who from that day thought of nothing short of subjecting the rest of Andalus to their abominable rule. The battle of Tarifa was fought on Monday, the 7th of Jumáda, the 1st of the year 741 (October 29th, 1340)."

Encouraged by the victorious result of the battle of Salado, Alfonso prepared to lay siege to Algeciras ; and on the 3rd August, 1342, he sat down before it with 2500 cavalry and 5000 foot.

The army was commanded by Don Gil de Albornoz, the Archbishop of Toledo, the Bishop of Cadiz, and other distinguished men. The town was carefully and strongly fortified,—the Moors having always considered its possession necessary to the safe keeping of Gibraltar. It was divided into two divisions—the old town and the new ; separated from each other by massive walls. The city was situated upon a gentle slope leading to the sea-shore, and the ground in rear of the city rose rapidly to a very considerable elevation.

The garrison consisted of 12,000 archers and 800 horse. The fame of the battle of Salado had by this

time spread over Europe ; and the contest then waging in the south of Spain had attracted the attention of every Christian nation. The tide of fortune which hitherto had rolled irresistibly against the Christians seemed about to turn, and many valiant men, eager to defend the cause of their religion, hurried to join the fray. Henry, Duke of Lancaster, set out from England, accompanied by Lord Derby and the Earls of Salisbury, Lincoln, and Leicester. Numerous celebrated knights arrived from France, from Italy came large bodies of Genoese, who did good service ; while the King of Navarre, accompanied by a division of troops, marched forward to the siege in haste. So great was the interest of Europe in the annihilation of the Moorish dynasty:

Dreading the result of an attack, the Moors endeavoured by treachery to paralyze the efforts of the Christians. Emissaries chosen from among desperate fanatics were sent into the camp with instructions to assassinate Alfonso, whose name was so terrible to the Moorish host. But they were discovered and put to death.

The siege was worthy of the distinction of the besiegers.* The Moors defended themselves with tenacious gallantry ; and the month of September had nearly passed away, and the heavy autumnal rains set in, without any signs of capitulation or distress. The sufferings of the Christians soon commenced. The

* During this siege the Duke of Lancaster was wounded by an arrow in the face.

rains fell in torrents, and continued until November. The water poured in cascades from the mountains behind. The king, whose quarters were in a small hut roofed with tiles, was driven from his shelter by the force of the waters; and the soldiers, who were exposed to all the fury of the constant tempest, succumbed to cold and sickness. Nor did the besiegers alone suffer. The storms that raged along the coast kept back all supplies and assistance from the city, the garrison was reduced to great privation, while the Christians attacked and harassed them unceasingly.

The month of February (1343) passed away, and the Moors still held out without any symptoms of surrender. The troops of the besiegers, weakened with suffering, began to despair, and Alfonso already contemplated retiring from an enterprise which held out no prospect of success. Fortunately, at this critical period reinforcements arrived; Don Juan Nunez de Lara and Don Juan de Manuel reached the camp with fresh troops, arms, and ammunition.

Encouraged by this addition to their strength, the Christians regained hope, and the operations rapidly progressed. Hitherto, the Moors had received supplies at intervals by sea, as it was found impossible to close the entrance of the port. Perceiving, however, that as long as provisions could be thrown into the town the siege might be protracted and eventually unsuccessful, the king resolved to blockade the port. Galleys were stationed at the

entrance to protect the workmen at their work, and after considerable labour a boom was constructed of stakes, beams, and barrels filled with earth, which formed an obstacle impenetrable by the enemy's ships.

Several pitched battles were fought in the open fields outside the walls, where the whole force of the besiegers was engaged; but these combats were indecisive, and victory declared itself neither for one side nor the other.

The siege was prosecuted with unflinching vigour, and machines were constructed resembling great wooden towers, which were reared against the walls, loaded with armed men. These machines the Moors destroyed by casting huge masses of stone upon them from above, and by hurling against them, from engines charged with nafta,* red-hot balls of iron, which utterly destroyed them.†

Alfonso, as the year progressed, found himself surrounded with difficulties. His exchequer was exhausted, and the troops, especially the Genoese

* Thundering nafta.—Condé.

† In the narrative of Al-Makkari, the Arabian historian, speaking of the siege of Ashkar, close to Baeza, mentions the use of cannon (A. D. 1324) thus: "As its defences were strong, and the walls very thick, he attacked it with his largest engines loaded with naphtha, by means of which he threw into the place large iron balls. One of these fell on the top of one of the towers and destroyed it completely; upon which the garrison were so terrified that they instantly surrendered."—Gayangos, vol. ii. page 352. Condé, *Los Arabes in España*.

levies, were clamorous for their pay. His crown was already pledged for the value of the gold, and all his private plate melted down to supply money for his troops. But even these sacrifices failed to relieve him from his distress. The King of Granada had approached with a powerful army as far as the river Guadiaro, and repeatedly threatened the rear of the Christian position. Harassing skirmishes fatigued the troops, and were frequently attended with severe losses. Added to this, insubordination and discontent manifested themselves among the soldiers and their leaders. Fortunately at this time, when the want of money was a stubborn obstacle to success, the King of France sent a present of 50,000 florins, to which Pope Clement VI. added a loan of 20,000. With these resources the King was enabled to silence the complaints of the Genoese. Ten galleys also arrived from the King of Aragon, when they were most urgently required.

When the King of Granada had reached the river Palmones, a short distance from Algeciras, he was made aware of the desperate situation of the besieged. Entreaties for succour were conveyed to him during the duskiess of the night by small boats, which managed to escape from the boom-bound harbour.

Influenced by these entreaties, he determined at once to strike a blow, and if possible raise the siege. With the object of surprising the Christian camp, the

attack was ordered to commence before daybreak, when the enemy was least likely to expect it.

Before day had well broken the Moslems began the advance, and rushed impetuously upon the ranks of the besiegers. But they were met by deep and impassable ditches, lined with defiant stockades, which arrested their advance, and enabled the Christians to mow down their troops. Finding that defeat was certain they eventually retired.

During the trials and difficulties that beset him, Alfonso presented a noble example to his men. He shared on every occasion their dangers and privations; his covering was no better than the rude roof that sheltered the meanest soldier, and he fared no better than his troops.

Nineteen months of privation and toil passed ere his perseverance was rewarded with success. Since the closing of their communication by sea the Moors had become gradually disheartened. No supplies could reach the town, and starvation stared them in the face. With this prospect before them, and when no hope remained, they reluctantly sent emissaries to Alfonso to sue for peace. The king, weary of his protracted labours, readily agreed to the propositions of the infidels, and preliminary conditions were executed. A truce was settled for ten years, the King of Granada paying a tribute of 12,000 doubloons annually during that period, and acknowledging himself a vassal of Castile. Algeciras was surrendered to

the Christians, the garrison was set at liberty, and their property protected.

On the 27th of March, 1344, the ratifications of the treaty having been exchanged, Alfonso entered the city. His standard was hoisted on the walls, and the celebrated siege of Algeciras, which had continued for twenty months, was at an end.

Five years of the truce had scarcely expired before Alfonso, wearied with a life of inactivity, and unable to restrain his military inclinations, made known to the Cortes his intention of again laying siege to Gibraltar. The moment was especially favourable to the enterprise, for his old enemy, Abu-l-Hassan, was engaged in a contest with his rebellious son for the recovery of Fez ; and the King of Granada, availing himself of the opportunity, was occupied in attacking the possessions of Abu-l-Hassan, and besieging Ronda and Marbella.

Since the siege of Algeciras the population of Gibraltar had considerably increased, great numbers of Moors who were compelled to leave the former city when it was surrendered having migrated to the Rock, glad to avail themselves of a stronghold presenting such facilities for a flight to Africa in case of necessity. The fortifications and defences had during the last few years been considerably increased and strengthened ;* the walls had been repaired, a citadel built, and magazines erected.

* No sooner had Abu-l-Hassan reduced Gibraltar under

In August, 1349, Alfonso appeared before the place with his army, and having previously burnt and laid waste the crops and gardens in the vicinity, sat down before it. The attack, which was not long delayed, commenced with great fury, every description of warlike machine being employed against the walls.

The moment appeared to have arrived when the Christians should once more wave their victorious banners from the heights of the oft-disputed prize. The Moorish force was comparatively small, while the Christian army consisted of numerous levies, well provisioned and thoroughly equipped. The rear of the position, which on former occasions had been continually assailed, and which it was almost impossible to protect, was now unmolested, and the king was enabled to occupy his whole strength in pressing on the siege. Unfortunately, his last campaign had swallowed up nearly all his monetary resources, and now, when victory was almost in his grasp, his efforts were paralyzed by the want of means to pay his troops. But the man, who in another moment of trial and necessity could submit even his crown and royal treasures to the melters to extricate himself from the difficulty, and save his army from disaster, was not his sway, than he began to give his attention to repairing its buildings, increasing its fortifications, spending immense sums of money in building houses and magazines, as well as a yami or principal mosque, and erecting new towers, and even a citadel.—Gayangos, vol. ii.

now likely to be deterred by any sacrifice from procuring means to insure success. Gibraltar was of far more value to him than the greater part of his dominions, and it was with little regret that he formed the resolution to obtain what he so earnestly required by the sale of a portion of his territory. On the 10th of January he handed over to Don Perez de Guzman, the Count of Niebla, for the sum of 130,000 maravadies, the villages of Villa Alba and Palma, with all the rights, jurisdictions, and powers he possessed therein. With the means thus obtained, and with the timely reinforcement of ten galleys from the King of Aragon, he was enabled to continue the siege.

Finding, however, that it would be impossible to take the place by assault, Alfonso prepared to turn the siege into a blockade, and to starve out the garrison. With this intention he collected all his forces on the isthmus (north front), where the gardens and cemetery were situated. Here he pitched his camp, consisting of commodious tents, some richly furnished for the accommodation of the women and distinguished persons of his retinue. The month of February, 1350, arrived, and still the besieged held out. At this time there appeared in the camp that terrible plague which had already devastated Europe, and to which the Kings of Leon and Estremadura had recently fallen victims.

Terrified by the well-known horrors of this dreadful pestilence, the generals and nobles were paralyzed

with fear. Alfonso alone remained calm. In vain he was urged by every entreaty to raise the siege, and escape with his army from certain death. In vain were the prayers of the women and supplications of his council; his reply was characteristic of his undaunted mind. Drawing his sword and thrusting himself through the crowd of suppliants that thronged his door, he swore never to move from the limits of his tent till Gibraltar was in possession of the Christians. But his valour caused his death. On the 26th of March, 1350, he was seized with the plague and died, in the thirty-eighth year of his age, and the twenty-seventh of his great and glorious reign. His death spread grief through every Christian land. His many victories, his desperately contested sieges, his renown, not only as a warrior but as a wise and successful ruler, had rendered his name famous throughout Europe: and not only did the Christians honour his virtues and his valour; Yusef and his followers, together with his whole court, appeared in mourning for their illustrious foe, and many of the Moors went unarmed to the camp to attend the funeral ceremony.

Sad and disheartened, the army prepared to return to Seville, carrying with them the corpse of their beloved leader. The King of Granada, who by this time had reached the banks of the Guadiaro with a force intended for the relief of Gibraltar, issued stringent orders that under no pretence whatever

should the Christian army be molested on its melancholy march.

The body of the deceased monarch was taken, in the first instance, to the chapel of the Kings at Seville, where it remained until it was interred in the tomb at Cordova, by the side of the corpse of the king's father.

Alfonso was succeeded by Don Pedro, who was proclaimed King of Castile and Leon.*

Gibraltar continued in possession of the Kings of Morocco; and after the death of Abu-l-Hassan, his son, who succeeded him, appointed Isa-ben-Al-Hassan governor of the fortress. This Wali had no sooner taken up his command than he proclaimed himself King of Gibraltar. His conduct, however, was so tyrannical that a rebellion was excited against him, and he was compelled to take refuge in the castle with his son, who was more hated than himself. Unable to protect themselves, they were seized by the rebels and transported, loaded with chains, to Ceuta, where they both died, after being put to dreadful tortures. In 1354 Yusef, King of Granada, the old and valiant opponent of Alfonso, was assassinated by

* King Alfonso is thus described in Condé: "He was of the middle height, but of well-proportioned figure and of dignified appearance. His complexion was red and white; his eyes had a tinge of green, with a grave and serious expression. He was of robust person, strong, and of a healthy constitution; very elegant and graceful in manner; resolute, brave, noble, and sincere."

a mad-man while at prayers in the mosque of his palace.

His death is thus described by the Arabian authorities : "As Abu-l-Hejaj was performing the last prostration of his prayer, a mad-man rushed upon him and wounded him with his yataghan. The assassin was immediately secured. The Sultan, who had been mortally wounded, made some signs as if he wished to speak, but after uttering a few unintelligible words he was carried senseless to his palace, where he died shortly after his arrival. The assassin in the mean time was given up to the infuriated mob, who murdered him and burned his body. Abu-l-Hejaj was interred on the evening of Sunday within the Alhambra. He left three sons ; Mohammed, who succeeded him, Ismail, and Kays."

Yussef was one of the most enlightened sovereigns of the Nasserite dynasty. In his days justice was administered with an even hand ; literature and science flourished, and public order prevailed. It would be impossible to enumerate all the benefits which this great man bestowed upon his country. The practice of religion was improved, many abuses were abolished, a system of police instituted, and the laws revised. Finally, it is to him we owe some of the most splendid architectural monuments in Granada.*

He was succeeded by his son Mohammed V.

* Condé.

This unfortunate prince soon fell a victim to the jealousy of his brother Ismail's mother.

“Mohammed had scarcely reigned five years,” says the historian Ibnu-Khaldun, “when a half brother of his, named Ismail, assisted by another of his relatives, revolted in Granada; and taking advantage of the absence of the Sultan, who was then residing at a country place out of the Alhambra, scaled at night the walls of that fortress, and made himself master of it, after putting to death the Vizir of Mohammed. This took place on the 23rd of August, 1359, and on the following day Ismail Abu-l-Walid was proclaimed by the troops and citizens. The dethroned Sultan escaped to Guadix, where he established his authority.”

Though we have no authentic records, it is probable that during these years Gibraltar was in possession of the kings of Granada. The first act of Ismail was to send an embassy to the King of Castile with offers to renew the treaty of peace then existing between the two countries. Don Pedro, happening then to be at war with the people of Barcelona, readily assented to the proposition. Ismail, however, did not long enjoy his power. Within six months after he had been proclaimed he was assassinated, together with his brother Kays, by directions of the very man who had raised him to the throne (A. D. 1360). Abu-Abdillah, Mohammed VI., the murderer of Ismail, was declared king, and reigned for about two years,

when he was put to death in cold blood by the hand of Don Pedro himself, while on a visit to that monarch at Seville.*

We must turn for a moment to Mohammed V., who, after he had been deposed by Ismail, passed over to Africa, embarking at Marbella, and landing at Ceuta in 1359. From thence he went to Fez, where he was received with welcome by the king.

On the 29th of August, 1361, he returned to Andalus, remaining at Guadix, whose inhabitants had remained faithful to him during his absence.

He no sooner received intelligence of the death of Abu-Abdillah, than he set out for Granada with the intention of reclaiming his dominions. The contemptible mob who a few years since had shouted over his downfall and applauded the usurper, now greeted him with acclamation. On the 6th April, 1362, he made his triumphal entry into Granada, and was once more proclaimed king. Aware of the value of an alliance with Castile, and being in fear of the ruthless monarch who could with his own hand assassinate an unsuspecting guest, he sent Pedro, in return for the head of Abu-Abdillah, presents of horses richly caparisoned, scimitars set with precious stones, and all the unransomed Christian prisoners in his kingdom.

In 1369, Don Pedro, having been defeated at the

* Abu-Abdillah is referred to by Condé and others as Abu-Said, but I have followed the reading of Gayangos, as more probably correct.

battle of Montiel, fell a victim to assassination, a death not unfitted to his atrocious character. The Count of Transtamara seized the throne, assuming the title of Henry II. At first Mohammed refused to agree to any overtures for peace with the new king; he declared war against him, and collected an army and marched against Algeciras, which he found totally unprotected. Knowing that he would be unable to retain possession of the city if he occupied it, he resolved to destroy it. This he did most effectually, burning and demolishing the walls, with every house and building in the place; and to such a miserable condition was this once celebrated city reduced that it became in future only the habitation of a few miserable fishermen. After the destruction of Algeciras, 1370, a peace was concluded between Henry and the King of Granada, which continued till the death of the latter in 1390 or 1391.

In 1379 Henry of Castile died suddenly at a banquet, and was succeeded by John I., who died in 1390, and was in his turn succeeded by Henry III., then eleven years old. It was at this time that Mohammed V. expired, and the throne of Granada was seized by his younger son, the elder Yussuf-ben-Yussuf being imprisoned in the fortress of Salobrena. Immediately after his accession a peace was renewed with the Christians. However willing the two monarchs may have been to avoid hostilities, their unruly subjects provoked such constant quarrels that the

preservation of peace was hopeless. In 1405, the Mohammedans attacked and took Ayamonte, and in the following year a battle was fought on the Guadiara, which ended in the defeat of the Christian army. Several minor engagements occurred with varied results, until, in 1407, Fernando, regent of Castile, turned success in favour of the Christians, and re-took Ayamonte with several other fortresses. Tired of these harassing campaigns, both monarchs agreed to a truce, and Mohammed returned to Granada. He had scarcely arrived there when he was seized with a mortal illness. Fearful, even in death, that his brother who was in exile would succeed him, he wrote the Alcalde of Salobrena the following letter :

“Alcalde of Salobrena, my servant, as soon as Ahmed-ben-Xarac, officer of my Guards, shall deliver thee this writing, thou wilt put to death the Cid Yusef, my brother, and send his head by the same messenger. I rely on thy zeal to serve me.”*

Arrived at Salobrena, † Ahmed found Yusef playing at chess with the Alcalde. Perceiving the troubled looks of the messenger, the prince rose and demanded the object of his mission. In reply he showed the letter of Mohammed. The prince calmly read the fatal words, and asked a few minutes' respite to bid farewell to his family. This was refused. “At least then,” said he, “give me time to finish my game with

* Lardner, Condé, and Montero.

† Or Xalubania.

with the Alcalde, and perhaps I shall lose that as well as my head." Yusef resumed his seat with the greatest composure, and more than once corrected the terrified Alcalde for the carelessness with which he moved the pieces. The game was just concluded when a mounted messenger appeared at the gates to announce the death of the King of Granada, and the accession of Yusef III., A. D. 1408.

Released by the sudden death of his brother from his protracted imprisonment and threatened assassination, the king repaired to Granada to enter upon his government. Subjected as he had been to adversity and privation, he appreciated the value of peace, and with the view of renewing the truce with Castile, he sent an embassy to Don Fernando with proposals for a truce. The despotic conduct of the tyrants who ruled in the fortress of Gibraltar had long fanned the smothered embers of rebellion among the people. In 1411, unable any longer to endure their sufferings, the inhabitants sent to the King of Morocco and implored his protection, offering at the same time to deliver up the city to him and to become his vassals. The king, well aware of the value of Gibraltar, gladly accepted the offer, and immediately set out with his army to take possession. When he appeared at the entrance of the fortress, the gates were opened by the people, and the city was occupied without a struggle.

Yussef no sooner heard of the occupation of Gibraltar by the African Moors than he marched to retake it. He soon after invested it, and, after a short siege, recovered possession of the place, which remained attached to the kingdom of Granada for many subsequent years.

CHAPTER IV.

SEVENTH SIEGE.

DURING several years Gibraltar remained in the undisturbed possession of the kings of Granada; until the lawless conduct of the Moors, who, under protection of its fortifications, made continual incursions into the country, pillaging and destroying the property of the inhabitants, aroused the anger of Don Henry de Guzman, second Count of Niebla, who possessed extensive estates in the neighbourhood.

This nobleman had suffered great losses at the hands of the marauders, who by their frequent ravages almost put an end to the extensive and productive tunny fisheries established on the coast. Determined to crush these systematic depredations, and actuated, no doubt, by a desire to imitate the glory of his grandfather, Guzman the Good, the first Christian conqueror of Gibraltar, the Count resolved to besiege the city. In 1436, he collected a numerous and powerful army, which counted among its chiefs many knights from Cordova, Ecija, and Xeres. These nobles brought with them troops, vessels, and pro-

visions, which greatly increased the efficiency of the expedition. A number of armed vessels were also got ready in the harbour of Sanlucar, the whole preparations being conducted with the utmost secrecy. Everything being arranged, the command of the army, which numbered 2000 cavalry and many companies of infantry, was bestowed upon Don Juan de Niebla, the Count's eldest son. Under his orders the expedition set sail from Bonanza and arrived in safety before Gibraltar. In spite of the extent and importance of the offensive armament, the Count had imagined that the garrison was not aware of his hostile intentions, and he therefore planned his attack on the basis of a surprise. It was proposed that one portion of the army should effect a landing on the Red Sands at the foot of the western face of the Rock, and instantly seize upon the city, while another division attacked and occupied the heights and castle from the north front. But the Moors were not unprepared as De Guzman supposed. Timely notice had been given them of the intended assault, and both supplies and reinforcements had been sent them from Africa and Granada; the landing at the Red Sands had been rendered almost impossible by extensive fortifications in rear, and the whole fortress had been put in a complete state of defence. The Count, unaware of the difficulties opposed to him, persisted in his original plan of attack, and led the storming party against the city in person. The

troops, having reached the sands in armed row-boats, were permitted to disembark without opposition, the enemy being conscious of the futility of any attack at that point.

The place of landing was upon a narrow strip of sand washed by the sea, and faced by a high wall of stone. On to this small space the besiegers crowded, and the boats which had conveyed them thither returned to the fleet. This was an error fatal to the expedition, and followed by a melancholy disaster.

When the assailants attempted to advance and scale the walls, the Moors crowded upon the ramparts, and hurled every kind of missile upon the helpless crowd beneath. Hundreds fell, struck down by the showers of stones and arrows. The mass became disorganized, and resistance was vain. The tide, which when they landed was on the rise, had gradually surrounded the spot on which they stood, and the waves already washed their feet. To retreat was impossible; and their prayers and entreaties for mercy were answered only by shouts of derision from the infidels, who crowded on the walls. The attention of De Guzman, who was on board his ship superintending the artillery* of the fleet, was speedily called to the terrible position of his men on shore.

Orders were given, though too late, for all the

* This was the first siege in which artillery was used against Gibraltar.

boats of the squadron to go to their assistance, the Count himself hastening to the rescue. By this time many of the miserable creatures had sunk to rise no more, and the waves were fast overcoming the exhausted strength of the few that remained. The boat in which De Guzman was soon reached the spot where the drowning men were struggling with the waves, and her crew having rescued as many as she was able to hold, pushed off again to the fleet. They had proceeded but a few strokes when the Count heard the voice of an old and valued friend calling upon him in the agonies of death to return and save him. De Guzman, who was as humane as he was brave, steered the boat towards the drowning man, in spite of the remonstrances of the crew, who saw the danger. Scarcely had they reached him, and dragged him over the side in safety, when the gunwales of the boat were seized by a crowd of drowning wretches maddened with despair. Already overloaded, the small craft capsized and sunk, carrying with her the Count of Niebla and upwards of forty noblemen of Spain.

In the mean time, the attack from the north front had met with no success, and Don Juan de Guzman, observing that all efforts against the fortress from the land side would be useless, was preparing to go to the assistance of his father, when the news of the Count's death and the disasters attending the attack by sea reached him. Overcome by this intelligence,

and finding that the troops were despairing and disheartened, he gave the order for retreat, and the expedition retired to Vejer, while the fleet sailed for San Lucar.

The body of the unfortunate Guzman was found and recognized by the Moors, who, in spite of every entreaty and the offers of large sums of money, refused to restore it to the Count's son, Don Juan. It was placed in a coffin and suspended from one of the turrets of the castle, where it remained until the city was finally captured by the Christians in 1462.*

The failure of this siege is not surprising when we consider the careless manner in which the attack was arranged, and the unprepared state of the expedition. The idea was to capture the place by surprise and sudden assault. Both the army and fleet were, therefore, organized under all the difficulties and disadvantages of secrecy, and no information could be gained as to the strength and position of the defences by means of reconnoissances, without alarming the enemy. The old system of attack by landing on the Red Sands was insisted upon, under the impression that the defences at that point were as weak as they were 100 years before, when Alfonso's troops found no difficulty in gaining possession of the heights.

For a few years the incessant contests between the Moors and Christians, which had devastated south-

* This was a common practice with the Moors when they gained possession of the body of any chief of the enemy.

ern Spain, were suspended. But the enjoyment of tranquillity was of short duration. In 1454, Juan II. of Castile died, and was succeeded by his son Henry IV., surnamed the "Impotent," a distinction which he appears most undoubtedly to have deserved. At this time Mohammed X. was on the throne of Granada.

Anxious to preserve the truce which had existed for the last few years, he sent an embassy with presents to the new king, and solicited a renewal of former treaties. The disposition of Henry, however, did not accord with the proposals of Mohammed, and the offer was rejected. As a reply to the overtures for peace, an army of 30,000 men, headed by the king himself, entered the Moorish dominions, devastating and destroying everything in their path. Fortunately for the Moslems Henry's character was not that of a courageous prince, and the operations of the army were strictly confined to ravaging the country. These marauding incursions into the kingdom of Granada were again repeated in 1456-7, during which time the Christians took possession of Ximena, Antequera, and Estepona. After various endeavours to obtain a truce, an arrangement was made for the cessation of hostilities, by which Mohammed consented to become a fief of Castile, and to pay an annual tribute of 12,000 pistoles of gold. In spite of this covenant, however, it became evident that the deadly and hereditary hate which existed between the infidel and the Christian population was a bar to the

continuance of tranquillity. Petty strifes and contests raged all along the frontier, until in 1462, an opportunity favourable to the enterprize having unexpectedly presented itself, Gibraltar was again besieged.



CHAPTER V.

EIGHTH SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR.

THE crescent of the Moslems, which for so many years had shone over Spain with the lustre of victory and success, had long given indications of its departing glory. The Moorish dynasty, which during 750 years had supplanted Christianity, and instituted an era of war with all its horrors, had begun to show symptoms of decay, and was now rapidly drifting to its final dissolution. The King of Granada had already lost the greater portion of his dominions, and his frontiers were confined within narrow boundaries.

The fortress of Gibraltar, under whose walls so much gallant blood had flowed, and in whose defence such feats of chivalry had been exhibited, was so miserably garrisoned and provisioned that it offered itself as a prey to the ever-watchful enemy.

In the month of August, 1462, a Moor, named Ali-el-Curro, who had been converted to Christianity, made his escape from the Rock and fled to Tarifa,

where he presented himself before the Alcalde, Alonzo de Arcos. To him he represented, with every appearance of sincerity, and with great minuteness, the condition of the garrison and the weakness of its resources. Convinced by the man's manner and protestations of fidelity that his story was true, the Alcalde, unwilling to lose so favourable an opportunity of gaining military renown, resolved to attack the place without delay.

Having left a small body of his troops for the defence of Tarifa during his absence, he set out with 80 horsemen and 120 foot-soldiers, guided by Ali-el-Curro, and arrived before Gibraltar the same night. Meditating an assault upon the fortress at break of day, the party concealed themselves in the vicinity of the Rock. In the morning, however, three soldiers of the garrison were captured on guard outside the walls, and from these men, by means of torture, the Alcalde extracted such important information that he deemed it expedient to delay the assault, and to send to the districts of Xeres, Medina-Sidonia, to the Count of Arcos, and Don Juan de Guzman, inviting them to come and assist at the capture of Gibraltar.

A large force soon began to arrive,—troops from Castellar and Ximena, towns in the immediate neighbourhood, first reaching the scene of action,—followed by Gonzalo de Avila with a large body of infantry and 400 horse.

But Alonzo de Arcos was too impatient of attack

to wait until all these reinforcements arrived ; contrary to advice he made a general assault upon the city and castle, with the assistance only of the troops from Ximena and Castellar. The strength of his forces, however, was insufficient for the enterprise, and the project failed. The Moors valiantly repulsed the storming parties, and the troops retired with considerable loss. Disheartened at this defeat, the army became insubordinate and discontented. A council of war was held to consider upon the course to be pursued. At this the majority of the chiefs were in favour of immediate retreat, in spite of the remonstrances of the Alcalde, and the protestations of the Moor "El Curro." In the midst of their deliberations, and just when the siege was about to be abandoned, a deserter from the garrison made his appearance in the Christian camp, and gave such a deplorable description of the losses and sufferings of the Moors during the late attack, that the Alcalde, with the concurrence of his subordinates, determined to send into the city propositions for the surrender of the place. But before the messenger bearing this proposal had left the camp, emissaries arrived from the garrison to make overtures for peace. They offered to surrender the Rock on certain conditions, namely, that the garrison should march out unharmed, taking with them all the goods they could carry. Alonzo de Arcos received the emissaries with every courtesy ; but as the besiegers were divided into

several parties, each commanded by independent chiefs jealous of one another, it was impossible to arrive at any conclusion.

A reply was consequently sent to the emissaries, that without consulting a higher authority, these propositions could not be acceded to. The negotiations were in this position when Don Rodrigo, Ponce de Leon, son of the Count of Arcos, accompanied by a body-guard of 300 lancers, arrived in the camp. His coming was hailed with satisfaction, and the state of affairs was immediately made known to him. The arrival of this chief having been announced to the Moors, another emissary in the person of Mohammed Kab, their leader, presented himself to Rodrigo, and urged upon him the former propositions for the surrender of the city. Rodrigo, however, declared his inability to sign any treaty until he had consulted the count his father and the Duke of Medina-Sidonia, who at that time had not reached the camp. Dissensions, however, arose among the independent chiefs, which hastened the necessity of taking possession of the place at once.

The foundation of these disputes was a question as to who had the right to receive the surrender of the fortress,—each separate chief claiming the privilege. Seeing that the disputes would be endless, and that the present opportunity was favourable, Don Rodrigo took advantage of the moment, and, without waiting for the arrival of the Duke of Medina-Sidonia, or

consulting the other leaders, seized suddenly upon the fortress.

The Moors, unable to resist, abandoned the town, but intrenched themselves in the castle, and prepared to defend their position. At this time the Duke of Medina arrived, intending to accept the surrender in his name; and his anger was great when he found Rodrigo already established in the city. A violent dispute arose between the two chiefs, each claiming the right of possession; but an arrangement was ultimately arrived at, by which it was agreed that both should enter the castle at the same time, and hoist their standards simultaneously. Accordingly the surrender of the place was accepted, and on the 20th August, 1462, after a comparatively bloodless siege, Gibraltar reverted to the dominion of the Christians.

The success of this siege, and the important event of the annexation of Gibraltar to Spain, is attributable principally to Alonzo de Arcos. It was he who originated the expedition, procured the troops, and animated the men by his example when they were disheartened by defeat. His services were not forgotten by the nation, and he was afterwards appointed chief magistrate of Seville by the king. He died in 1477, and was buried in the vault of the Carthusian monastery at Seville. On his tomb was engraved the following inscription:

“ Here lies interred the much-honoured Alonzo de Arcos of Tarifa, who recovered Gibraltar from the enemies of our holy faith. He departed this life in the year 1477, having been a great benefactor to this holy house.”

Many distinguished soldiers sprang from this celebrated man. Amongst others, General Alonzo de Arcos, who defended Cuba against the English in A. D. 1747 ; and Don Francisco de Arcos, who distinguished himself at the capture of Minorca.

The intelligence of the glorious success and surrender of the already world-renowned stronghold having been sent to the king, he directed the Duke of Medina-Sidonia to remain in possession of the fortress. The first care of the duke was to provide an honourable burial for the corpse of his father, De Guzman, which had been retained by the Moors after the last siege.

Aware of the value of Gibraltar, King Henry did not hesitate to annex it to the crown of Castile, and, to the joy of the nation, this act was publicly announced. The Duke of Medina-Sidonia, however, who from the moment of the surrender had obstinately asserted his claim to the possession of the Rock, showed an inclination to resist the royal decree. The king, who in this instance exhibited more firmness than usually marked his public acts, took every precaution to repel the aggression of the duke, who, per-

ceiving that resistance would be vain, and unwilling to enter upon an unsuccessful contest with his sovereign, delivered up the fortress.

Like his predecessor, Ferdinand IV., the first care of the king was to promote the increase of the Christian population in the city and in the neighbouring district. Pedro de Porras was appointed Alcalde of the town, and a royal order was issued declaring the annexation of the ruined city and the district of Algeciras to the territory of Gibraltar. This royal order, dated December 15, 1462, declared, that as, "by the grace and assistance of God, the city of Gibraltar was taken from the Moors, enemies of our holy catholic faith, and is now belonging to me and my royal crown, and as the city guards the straits so that there may not pass to the king or kingdom of Granada assistance in men, horses, arms, nor provisions; and as the said city has but few inhabitants, and that to people it I ought to bestow grace and favour on those who choose to go and dwell there, and remain continually with their wives and families, so that they may be the more disposed to serve me, and defend and protect the said city and guard the straits; it is therefore by my favour," Here follows the list of privileges which the king was pleased to grant. No sooner was this important annexation announced than the measure was received with considerable dissatisfaction by the neighbouring cities, more especially by

the authorities of Xeres, who complained of the injustice of the act. No disturbance, however, took place, and the district of Algeciras remained connected with Gibraltar.

In 1464, King Henry, desirous of becoming acquainted with his new acquisition, already famous throughout Europe, set out from Seville to visit the fortress. On his arrival, hearing that Alonzo V., King of Portugal, was at Ceuta returning from his expedition against Tangier, he sent an invitation for him to come to Gibraltar. The king accordingly crossed over and was received with great cordiality.

For eight days the two monarchs remained together hunting in the mountains of Almoraima not far from the Rock. After the departure of Alonzo, Henry employed his time in arranging the future government of the city, the office of Alcalde being transferred from Pedro de Porras to the king's favourite Beltran de la Cueva, and the lieutenancy to his cousin Estevan de Villacreces, appointments which gave fresh cause of complaint to the Duke of Medina, who strongly protested against them. From Gibraltar the king was suddenly recalled to his capital by seditious outbreaks in his dominions.

For a long time he had been troubled with conspiracies and even open rebellion among his barons and courtiers. A powerful party of the nobles were intriguing to procure the proclamation of the Infante

Alfonso as Prince of Asturias and successor to the throne, to the exclusion of the Infanta Juana or the "Beltraneja," * the pretended offspring of the king.

Plot upon plot was prepared to carry this project into effect, until eventually Henry, unable to stem the torrent of opposition, assented to the propositions of the faction, and (A. D. 1465) declared Alfonso his heir, thus admitting the illegitimacy of Juana. At the same time it was arranged that the Infante should marry the Beltraneja.

* The Infanta was reputed to be the daughter of Beltran de Cueva, the king's favourite.

CHAPTER VI.

NINTH SIEGE.

DURING the few years that Alfonso lived, the kingdom was the victim of deplorable troubles; the two factions, the partizans of Henry and the unprincipled protectors of the Infante, were ever at war, and complete anarchy prevailed throughout Castile. All government was abolished, and the laws of the country were powerless; the highways were seized by bands of brigands; villages and towns were sacked by ruthless marauders, and the inhabitants were compelled to form themselves into armed bodies for the protection of their lives and property.

Taking advantage of this state of confusion, the Duke of Medina applied to the Infante Alfonso for letters-patent, granting to him and his heirs for ever the city of Gibraltar, with its castle, fortifications, and jurisdictions, with all the rights and privileges appertaining to it. This document he succeeded in obtaining, and no sooner was the gift and settlement decided, than he prepared to take possession of the Rock by force if necessary. With this object he assembled a

considerable body of men, fully armed and equipped. At this time Estevan de Villacreces, the Lieutenant-Governor, was in command of the garrison.

A truce having been recently concluded with the Moors, no fear was entertained by Villacreces of an attack from that quarter, and the idea of any hostile movement from the Christian frontier was never contemplated. When the intentions of the Duke, therefore, were made known to Villacreces he was overwhelmed with astonishment. Though at first unable to comprehend such audacity, he quickly recovered from his surprise, and immediately prepared to defend his trust. He despatched letters entreating succour both to the king and to his relative Don Beltran de la Cueva, informing them at the same time of the impending attack.

The king, completely occupied by revolutionary troubles, was unable to send any assistance, but issued an order desiring the inhabitants of the neighbouring district to place their aid at the disposal of the Alcalde. Finding that the strength of his force would be utterly inadequate to the defence of the extensive boundaries circling the city, Villacreces abandoned the town and retired to the castle.

Arrived before the Rock, the Duke of Medina-Sidonia ordered the city to be taken possession of, a movement which was effected without any loss, as the royal troops offered no opposition. He then began an attack upon the castle, A. D. 1466.

For ten months the besieged held out with heroic courage (1467), notwithstanding the repeated attacks of the enemy and the scarcity of provisions. Enraged at the obstinacy of the defence, and resolved to conquer, the Duke, in February, 1467, sent his son, Don Enrique de Guzman, from Seville with reinforcements of men, arms, and provisions. Reanimated by these powerful succours the besiegers redoubled their efforts, and, making good use of their artillery, several breaches were opened in the walls, and the castle was eventually taken by assault. Villacreces, who even in this extremity remained undismayed, continued to dispute the advance of the enemy, and retired with his men to the inner tower of the Calahorra, where, in the face of innumerable difficulties and repeated assaults, he maintained himself for five months. At length the besieged were reduced to the most terrible privations. Grass and roots were their only food, and when these were consumed they had recourse to their shoes and leather girdles. His men, prostrate with despair, began to desert, and thus, finding himself without a bare hope of success, or a chance of relief, this brave man delivered up (June, 1467) the fortress to Don Enrique de Guzman, after a most memorable defence.

In 1468, the Infante Alfonso died, and the affairs of King Henry assumed for a moment a more peaceful aspect.

At this time an event occurred of memorable im-

portance in the history of Spain, and affecting materially the final expulsion of the Moorish dynasty.

Juan II. of Aragon, a shrewd and intelligent monarch, had long desired to connect his kingdom with that of Castile, not resorting to the hazards and miseries of conquest, but by the more peaceful policy of a matrimonial alliance. It required no remarkable sagacity to foresee the benefits to be derived from the concentration of these two monarchies. They spoke the same language, lived under the same laws, sprung from the same race, and singly were unable to repel the aggressions of their turbulent neighbours ; while together they would form a powerful and influential state.

To accomplish this union, which was destined to open a fresh æra in the annals of Spain, Juan formally solicited the hand of Isabella of Castile for his son Ferdinand, King of Sicily.

This prince, who was then about eighteen years of age, was endowed with a judgment and talents far beyond his years. In person he was handsome, and his frame, which was muscular and well proportioned, was invigorated by the toils of war and chivalrous exercises. Aware of the advantages which Ferdinand possessed, it is not surprising that the Infanta was not unwilling to accept the propositions of King Juan.

But Henry and his queen, jealous of the powerful support which the cause of the Infanta would receive

by her connection with Aragon, offered every obstacle to retard and intercept the progress of the marriage negotiations. Already they had other projects in contemplation : amongst them, the marriage of Isabella with Alfonso of Portugal, or the Duke de Berri ; alliances not unnaturally distasteful to the Infanta. Finding, however, that the proposal of the King of Aragon was favourably received by Isabella, Henry resorted to every species of oppression and persecution to prevent the marriage. Harassed by continued ill treatment, subjected to the observation of spies, and virtually imprisoned in Madrigal, whither she had retired pending the negotiations, Isabella almost wavered in her resolve, and was on the point of acceding to the wishes of her brother, when the Archbishop of Toledo arrived to her assistance, both with good counsel and an armed force. From her perilous situation in Madrigal she was removed to Valladolid, where she was met by Ferdinand, and the nuptials were secretly performed without interruption in October, A. D. 1469.

To return to events at Gibraltar. In 1468 the first Duke of Medina, third Count of Niebla, died, and was succeeded by his son Don Henrique.

Anxious to secure his right to the possession of Gibraltar, the young duke solicited from King Henry a formal acknowledgment of the gift of the city, fortress, and territory to him and his heirs for ever. Unable to maintain a refusal, on the 3rd June, 1469,

the king issued a Royal Decree, declaring the duke and his heirs to hold by right for ever Gibraltar, with its fortifications, boundaries, territory, and possessions. In this document the declaration of the gift is prefaced by a recapitulation of the manifold services of the house of De Guzman. "Bearing in mind," it says, "how Don Enrique de Guzman my uncle, Conde de Niebla, your grandfather, copying the fidelity and good intention of his ancestors and descendants of the royal race from which he sprang, went with all his knights and retainers at his own expense to besiege and attack the city of Gibraltar, then held by the Moors, to redeem it to the faith and service of our Lord, and to subject it to my royal crown; how that at that siege there fell a great number of knights and people of his house, and that he himself was buried in the fortress of the said city; and the same desire being renewed in Don Juan de Guzman your father, to conquer the said city, he finally got possession and reduced it to our holy faith and to obedience to me, that he peopled it, fortified it, and provided it with supplies in case of need.—All of which being taken into consideration, I do bestow"

No sooner was the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella announced than King Henry attempted to secure the crown of Castile, if possible, to the Beltranaja; the effect of this scheme was a civil war of the most terrible and disastrous character; all government was abolished, the barons of the contending

factions made war indiscriminately upon one another with deadly animosity, and Castile was again plunged in desolation.

At length, in the year 1474, death terminated the reign of Henry IV. and put an end to the troubles that had accompanied his rule. His character, weak and helpless beyond comprehension, rendered him the tool of favourites and factions, who were perhaps more responsible for the sad events of his reign than the feeble-minded monarch himself. Speaking of the condition of Castile at the period of the king's death, a distinguished historian thus sums up his remarks :

“Dismembered by faction, his revenues squandered on worthless parasites, the grossest violations of justice unredressed, public faith become a jest, the treasury bankrupt, the court a brothel, and private morals too loose and audacious to seek even the veil of hypocrisy ; never had the fortunes of the kingdom reached so low an ebb since the great Saracen invasion.” *

On the 13th December, 1474, Isabella was proclaimed at Segovia. During these events the Duke of Medina-Sidonia, not forgetful of the importance of Gibraltar, had occupied himself with taking every precaution to preserve it in his possession. Military regulations were established ; an Alcalde was appointed to command the castle, people were invited to settle within the territory, lands being

* Prescott, vol. i. p. 246.

allotted to them in proportion to their means, and by letters-patent from the king, all duties and imposts of any kind whatsoever were abolished.

On the accession of Ferdinand and Isabella, the duke, not contented with the ample concessions of King Henry, applied for and obtained the title and dignity of Marquess of Gibraltar, which was conferred upon him on the 30th September, 1478, in consideration of his own merits and the services of his ancestors. This act of royal favour was not lost upon the marquess. During the wars that ensued between Ferdinand and the Moors, de Guzman, who had always warmly supported the cause of Isabella, rendered signal service to the king.

The accession of Ferdinand and Isabella, and the consolidation of Aragon with Castile, was the signal for the destruction of the Moorish dynasty in Spain. Ridding himself with all haste from his troubles with Portugal, that he might act with greater power against the infidels, Ferdinand, in 1489, took the field at the head of 50,000 foot and 12,000 horse, and with this formidable force marched against the enemy. The Moors, whose power as we have seen had gradually been on the wane, were utterly helpless against such an overwhelming army.

Town after town submitted to the Christian monarch, until scarce a city besides their long-cherished capital remained to them. The two grandees, Henrique de Guzman, Duke of Medina, and the Marquis

of Cadiz, Ponce de Leon, smothered their hitherto deadly feuds and joined to crush the common foe to their country and religion. Velez-Malaga, Comares, Malaga, Almeria, and Ahama submitted to the victorious Christians, and in 1491 the great city of Granada, the pride of Moorish Spain, was invested by 60,000 men. It would be beyond my object to recount the bloody struggles, the many feats of valour, and the famous events that marked the progress of this memorable siege. Worn out with sickness and famine, opposed to an overwhelming force, bowed down with despair, and conscious that the last link which bound together the fragments of their ancient kingdom was already shattered, the vanquished remnant of that once glorious dynasty succumbed to the Christian arms, and with a deep sigh of woe surrendered their cherished capital to a triumphant enemy.*

On the 4th January, 1492, Abu Abdalla went out to meet Ferdinand, and delivered up the keys of the city. On the same day the victorious army entered the gates, and the banners of Christendom floated from the towers of the Alhambra.

Though Isabella, in the early part of her reign, had, as we have seen, transferred Gibraltar to the Duke of Medina as a gift for ever, yet she had long desired to regain that important fortress, and to annex

* In Granada there is a carefully cherished spot, called to this day, "El ultimo suspiro del Moro."

it to her dominions. With this view she opened negotiations with the duke, offering in exchange for the Rock the City of Utrera (Ayala). But De Guzman rejected the proposition, urging that all his possessions, which were of great extent, were situated in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar, including the extensive and valuable tunny-fisheries, which had been established along the coast in the vicinity. Matters stood thus until he died, on the 25th of August, 1492, about eight months after the siege of Granada, where he had been distinguished for his gallantry and the assistance he had rendered to the king.

He was succeeded by his son, Don Juan, third Duke of Medina-Sidonia, who instantly applied to his sovereign for a renewal of the grants and privileges conferred upon his father.* But this occasion appeared to Isabella singularly opportune for the recovery of Gibraltar from the De Guzmans, and she therefore replied that every other right and privilege would be confirmed, provided Gibraltar were restored to the Crown of Castile. Against this unexpected demand the duke earnestly protested, pleading the injustice of the measure, which would deprive him of a possession fought for and gained by his ancestors, and subsequently granted by the Crown. Isabella, anxious to avoid any contest with this powerful subject, and taking into consideration the loyal services of his

* Don Rodrigo, Ponce de Leon, Duke of Cadiz, the ancient rival of the De Guzmans, died three days afterwards at Seville.

father and his ancestors, reluctantly consented to allow the duke to retain the fortress.

For 34 years Gibraltar remained under the dominion of the Duke of Medina-Sidonia, and in A.D. 1497, when the expedition against Melilla (in Africa) was undertaken by Ferdinand, the place became of great service as a depôt for provisions and munitions of war.

Isabella, however, had not abandoned her long-cherished project of annexing Gibraltar to the Crown. In the year A.D. 1501 the question was again mooted, and on this occasion without opposition on the part of the duke. "On the 22nd December, 1501, a Royal Decree was promulgated at Toledo, appointing Garcilaso de la Vega, Knight of Castile, to be Governor of Gibraltar, and ordering him to take possession of the place in the King's name. In January, 1502, Garcilaso arrived at the fortress, and made known the object of his mission to the authorities, who were assembled in the Orange Court-yard, in front of the principal church. The Royal Decree was read ordering the immediate surrender to their Majesties of the city, fortress, and district of Gibraltar, together with all the archives and emblems of justice and authority. The ceremony, accompanied by shouts of "Long live the King," was solemnly performed, the wands of office were presented to Garcilaso, and he forthwith took possession of the castle. The keys of all the forts, towers, and gates

were surrendered, together with the stores, arms, and ammunition, and all other articles, including the wooden coffin of Henry de Guzman, the Duke of Niebla, who perished under the walls of the fortress. Garcilaso next assembled the magistrates of the city, and authorities, and nominated Diego Lopez de Haro to be his lieutenant, and alcalde of the castle." *

Following the instructions of his sovereign, all officers were confirmed in the appointments which they held at the time of the annexation, and Garcilaso obtained from the authorities a formal acknowledgment of the surrender of the church and city of Gibraltar, together with all its civil and military jurisdiction, to the Crown of Castile.

At the request of the inhabitants, by whom the annexation was regarded with delight, their Majesties (10th July, 1502) granted a coat of arms to the city, which, in consideration of Gibraltar being a fortress, and the key of the Spanish dominions, consisted of a castle with a golden key pendant, with the following inscription, "Seal of the noble city of Gibraltar, the key of Spain." † The privileges granted to the city by Henry IV. were renewed, and the principal church almost entirely rebuilt.

Soon after its surrender Gibraltar was made a penal settlement, and great numbers of criminals were

* Ayala. Hist. de Gibraltar. 1782.

† The deed of grant is preserved in the archives at St Roque, signed by Ferdinand and Isabella.

sent there to assist in extending the fortifications and repairing the defences.

On the 26th November, 1504, Queen Isabella died, after a memorable and glorious reign. In her will appeared the following clause relating to Gibraltar:—

“It is my will and desire, inasmuch as the city of Gibraltar has been surrendered by Don Henry de Guzman, has been restored to the royal Crown, and been inserted among its titles, that it shall for ever so remain. I ask and require of the kings, my successors, that they may hold and retain the said city for themselves and in their own possession; and that no alienation of it, or any part of it, or of its jurisdiction, civil or criminal, shall ever be made from the Crown of Castile.”

The Infante Juan, only son of Ferdinand and Isabella, having died in 1497 without issue, the succession to the throne devolved upon the offspring* of their second daughter, Juana, wife of Philip, Archduke of Austria. As the young king was but an infant, and the queen, Juana, of too weak a nature to undertake the cares of government, Isabella had appointed her husband, Ferdinand, regent until Charles should attain his twentieth year.

The death of Isabella had scarcely been announced, when those deplorable dissensions, which had for so long a time distracted Castile, broke out again with

* The celebrated Charles V.

renewed violence,—Philip, the husband of Juana, claiming his right to the regal title, and a share in the administration of the government, an assumption which was strenuously opposed by Ferdinand.

In 1506 Philip fell ill and died at Burgos, and fresh difficulties arose in the settlement of a regency. The queen Juana declined to act, and a council of the nobles assembled to decide upon the course to be adopted.

It was ultimately resolved to recall Ferdinand, who had left the kingdom, and thus save the state from inevitable anarchy and ruin. In 1507 that prince reached Castile and assumed the regency, which he retained until his death, an event that took place on the 23rd of January, 1516.

During the regency of Ferdinand, Don Juan de Guzman, Duke of Medina, still dissatisfied with the loss of Gibraltar, again urged his claim to the fortress, and even had recourse to arms. In 1506 he sent instructions from Seville to his son Enrique to besiege the place and recover it at any risk. Timely notice was sent to Gibraltar of the intended attack, and active measures were taken for its defence. The whole population, without distinction of rank or position, was called upon to take up arms against the besiegers, and appeals for assistance were sent to the Marquis de Mondijar, Captain-general of Granada, and to other nobles of influence. For four months the siege con-

tinued, though it had early assumed rather the character of a blockade than of an active attack.

The contests between the two parties were few and bloodless, and the losses, except from sickness, insignificant. At length, seeing no symptoms of surrender, and influenced by the arguments of the Archbishop of Seville, the duke broke up his camp and retired from the 10th siege of Gibraltar.

On the death of Ferdinand, his grandson, Charles V., eldest son of Philip and Juana, was proclaimed king. In order, however, to silence the dissatisfaction of some members of the Council of State, who contended that Juana alone could claim the Crown, both she and her son were proclaimed at the same time and in the following terms :—

“Donna Juana y Don Carlos, Reyna y Rey de Castilla.”

In 1519, a vacancy having occurred in the succession to the imperial throne of Germany, by the death of Maximilian, the crown was offered to Charles, who, in spite of the opposition of his rival, Francis I., king of France, readily accepted it.

By no means blind to the importance of such a fortress as Gibraltar, Charles speedily took measures to secure its safety and increase its means of defence. In 1520, the year succeeding his accession to the imperial throne, he appointed Don Rodrigo Bazan corregidor and alcalde of the Rock ; and having delivered

to him letters containing expressions of his appreciation of the loyalty and fidelity of the garrison, he ordered him to proceed from Worms, and immediately enter upon his duties. Under his rule Gibraltar enjoyed an immunity from those terrible disturbances which had for so many years harassed the population. Relieved from the miseries and barbarism of continual war, the inhabitants began to turn their attention to the improvement of the city and the restoration of the public buildings. In 1528 the monastery of St Francisco was restored, and with the aid of a government grant of land and money a magnificent friary was built and endowed. In 1535 the alcalde Rodrigo de Bazan was succeeded by his namesake, Don Alvaro de Bazan.*

Speaking of the administration of affairs by this alcalde, Ayala says:—“The town was exposed to

* There appears to be some doubt whether this was the celebrated Marquis of Santa Cruz, admiral of the fleet, and so famous for his talents and successes as a naval commander, or only a person of similar name. Ayala and Monti both say that he was merely a youth of no ability, and unfit for his office. Montero, on the other hand, without quoting authority, identifies him with the admiral, explaining that he was permitted to retain both commands, in consideration of his great abilities and loyal services. I am inclined to follow the authority of Ayala; for had an able and experienced man held the government of the fortress at this time, it is not probable that the defences would have been permitted to remain in a condition so ruinous and incomplete as that in which they were found by the pirate Turks five years afterwards, in 1540.

any sudden attack, the wall, particularly on the south side, being greatly dilapidated; few artillery were mounted, and the number of troops and military stores less than had been assigned to it. . . .” “The long continuance of peace had lulled the Government into too great belief of security, and the city was shortly to experience the evil consequence of neglect, and to suffer the misfortunes hereafter recounted.” *

At the time of which we speak, the Mediterranean was scourged by hordes of Turkish pirates, under the celebrated Hayradin Barbarossa, who, constantly landing and devastating the various coasts, had rendered themselves masters of the sea, and the terror of the bordering countries.

The isolated position of Gibraltar, the weakness of its defences, and the spoils that would be the reward of a successful attack, had not escaped the notice of these unprincipled marauders.

Being in constant communication with Moors who had escaped from the Rock, and who were well acquainted with the defences and facility of an invasion, Barbarossa had often resolved to make the attempt. Occupied however by other plans, he was not able to put his project into execution, but his idea had long been known to his followers, who, with his sanction, and led by one of his most renowned captains, sailed in 1540 from Algiers with the bold design of taking the fortress by assault.

* Ayala. Hist. de Gibraltar.

Don Alvaro de Bazan, the admiral of the Spanish fleet, had at his earnest request been relieved from his command in 1537, and the navy was under the orders of Don Bernardino de Mendoza, who, with his squadron, was cruising near Sicily.

The pirate expedition was organized by Azenaga, the viceroy of Algiers, who having conferred with Barbarossa, and obtained the assistance of Dali-Hamat as commander of the galleys, and of a celebrated chief, Caramani, as leader of the troops, speedily fitted out the fleet, consisting of sixteen sail, at a cost of 25,000 ducats, which sum was to be defrayed from the plunder and spoils of the enemy.

Every care was taken to insure the success of the enterprise: the officers were selected for their skill and courage, the galleys were manned by 1000 Christian slaves at the oars, and 2000 soldiers to sustain the attack by land. On the 20th of August, 1540, the expedition set sail, and, taking every precaution to avoid the Spanish squadron, directed its course towards Gibraltar.

In the mean while, intelligence of the impending invasion reached the garrison, but, through the apathy of the authorities, no measures were taken to resist the attack. Despising to prepare for the repulse of an unorganized horde of freebooters, the walls of the city remained unprotected and open to the approach of an enemy, whilst the castle, neglected and defenceless,

was formidable only from its almost impregnable position.

After a cautious passage of ten days the hostile fleet came in sight of the Rock, and shortly afterwards the pirates landed on the southern shore, where they met with no opposition. The inhabitants, terrified and unable to resist the furious energy of the bloodthirsty corsairs, shut themselves up in the city, and prepared as well as they were able to protect their property and families. Elated with their success, the Turks rapidly advanced, plundering on their way the Hermitage of the Virgin of Europa, and, passing through the district of the Turba, made their way towards the castle. Here the few troops left on the Rock and most of the more courageous inhabitants located themselves, and resolved to defend themselves to the last. Well aware of the fate which awaited them, if they were captured or submitted to a surrender, they fought with the courage of despair. In vain Caramani led his men, greedy for plunder and thirsting for blood, against the beleaguered Christians; his efforts were futile, and the castle still held out. Enraged at the obstinacy of the defence, the wretches overran the city, seizing and sending on board the galleys as captives all who came in their way, including several men of rank and wealth. At length, finding that there was no prospect of overcoming the resistance, and satisfied with the plunder and number of prisoners they had secured,

they retired to their ships and re-embarked. But instead of shaping their course for Africa, they endeavoured to add to their spoils by a descent upon the coast near Algeciras. Passing triumphantly across the bay, they again landed at the Orange Grove, and pillaged, murdered, or took prisoners all who resisted them. The country along the shore was laid waste, the cattle destroyed, and the vineyards burnt.

After this havoc they became wearied with their success, and prepared to embark with their plunder for Algiers. But the Christians, heart-broken at the loss of their relatives and friends who remained in the hands of the pirates, sent a flag of truce by Alvaro de Piña, to make offers of a ransom for the recovery of the prisoners. It was arranged that Francisco de Mendoza, a captive of rank, should be delivered up on payment of 1000 ducats, and the remainder were to be released for 6000 ducats; all prisoners on either side were to be surrendered, and other conditions favourable to the Turks were agreed to. A long delay, however, ensued in making arrangements for the payment of this heavy ransom, and, as it was found impossible to raise the whole sum in Gibraltar, an appeal for a loan was sent to the Marquis of Tarifa. But this delay suggesting an intention of treachery, the Turks set sail with their captives on the 12th September, and proceeded on their way to Algiers.

Fortunately Don Bernardino de Mendoza was at this time in Carthagená with his fleet, and news of the

disasters at Gibraltar had already reached him. In the hopes of falling in with the piratical galleys, he put to sea, and soon came in sight of the Turkish squadron. A desperate engagement ensued, Caramani was killed, Dali-Hamat taken prisoner, and the pirates dispersed. 437 Turks remained in the hands of the victors, and 837 Christian slaves were liberated.

It was long before Gibraltar recovered from the disastrous effects of this predatory incursion. But the lesson was not without ultimate advantage.

On the representation of Don Alvaro de Bazan, who had resumed command of the fleet, and the urgent petition of the inhabitants, the Emperor Charles ordered that a more complete system of defence should be prepared as rapidly as possible. The old works were strengthened and properly armed. The Land Port gate was rebuilt, and a battery constructed with a deep ditch, facing the approach from the north front.

In 1552 a celebrated engineer, Juan Bautista Calvi, arrived, by direction of the Emperor, from Milan, to trace out various works and carry out any measures he might consider necessary for the protection of the fortress. Aware, from the result of the recent attack by the Turks, of the defenceless condition of the city on the south side, he projected two walls, one commencing at the South Port gate, and running up the Rock for a distance of 1000 feet, the other springing from a scarped precipice and

reaching to the summit of the hill.* By means of these walls the city was entirely inclosed, and approach from the south rendered almost impossible.

Other works of some magnitude were planned for the protection of the landing at the Red Sands, and the defence of other parts of the Rock, but in consequence of the negligence of the governor these were not completed.

In 1556 the Emperor Charles V. abdicated the throne, and resigned the crown into the hands of his son, Philip II.

In 1558 Gibraltar was again threatened by the pirates, who still infested the coasts of the Mediterranean. On the 8th August, five galleys, conveying a number of these corsairs, approached the shore in the neighbourhood of the Rock, evidently with the intention of plundering and desolating the coast; but before any damage was done the enemy were repulsed and the galleys driven off. In 1575, Philip II., anxious to increase the strength of the fortifications, sent an Italian engineer, by name "el Fratino," to report upon the defences of the place. This officer, who, not unlike men of science in the present day, was self-opinionated and prejudiced against any work the result of a rival genius, condemned the system carried out by Don Juan Calvi and substituted plans of his own. He ordered one of the walls already referred

* The upper wall was built subsequently by another engineer.

to to be removed, and altered the construction of the other.* Several batteries were commenced, including the bastion of Santa Cruz, now "Jumper's Bastion," and that of the Rosario at South Port: another, where "King's Bastion" now stands, was erected more to the northward, on the Line wall, a portion of the curtain intervening having been removed. In the centre of this curtain was situated an ancient Moorish gate, commonly called the Gate of Algeciras. Among the rich ornamental work which covered the doorway was the emblem of a *Key*;† a sure proof, says Ayala, of the importance which the Moors attached to the possession of Gibraltar.

In 1598 the son of Philip succeeded to the throne, and it was during his reign that the last remnant of the Moorish dynasty was expelled from Spain. Urged by an infatuated clergy and influenced by the bigotry of his wife, he gave orders in 1609 for the expulsion of the whole Moorish race from Valencia, Andalusia, New Castile, and Granada. 150,000 were driven from Valencia alone, and transported to the opposite coast. In spite of every opposition on their part, upwards of 600,000 were forcibly expelled from the various provinces, and from Gibraltar, where, nine centuries before, Tarik had

* These alterations were not carried out; but the upper wall was completed under this engineer.

† The key was a common emblem used by the Moors as an ornament to their gates.

landed with his victorious host, a fleet of galleys embarked the last of the exiles, and cast them destitute upon the shores of Africa.

Thus, after the lapse of 900 years from the time when the battle of the Guadalete extinguished the Visigothic dominion, and substituted the rule of the Infidels, the last trace of the great Mohammedan dynasty was swept from Spain.

During 40 years from this time (1609), no events sufficiently remarkable to be separately noticed occurred in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar.

The Turkish pirates frequently appeared hovering on the coast, and often occasioned alarm to the inhabitants; but, in order to check the possibility of their landing unobserved, watch-towers were erected all along the shore, from the most eastern point of the kingdom of Granada up to the commencement of Portugal, at regular intervals. These towers are still in existence, but more or less dilapidated.

In 1618 the Torre del Puerto and other works, including the old mole, were strengthened and repaired. In the course of a tour of instruction through his dominions King Philip visited Gibraltar, but the incident is devoid of interest except for the following anecdote which is related of his entrance into the city.

On arriving at the Rock, the governor and civil authorities went out to meet the king, but when attempting to enter the place with his carriage it was

found impossible to pass the narrow and tortuous approach to the gate. The king, who was in his carriage, was compelled to dismount and enter the garrison on foot; while the vehicle, which was jammed in the narrow way, had to be taken in pieces. This untoward occurrence occasioned some sharp remonstrances from the royal attendants, who expressed their surprise that the entrance had not been widened previous to the king's arrival, to which the governor with some wit replied, "that the gate was not made that carriages might come in, but that the enemy might be kept out."

In 1649, an epidemic disease of terrible virulence broke out in the city and destroyed great numbers of the inhabitants. It has been supposed that this malady resembled in some respects the destructive fevers which in after-times decimated the population.

During many years Gibraltar continued in a state of tranquillity; the sound of war ceased, peace with all its blessings had apparently established itself, and the citizens were enjoying the benefits of increasing civilization; the plains, which extended over a considerable district in the vicinity, and which but yesterday were the arenas of battle and bloodshed, were now trodden by numerous herds, or clothed with the fruitful vine. Agriculture flourished, and though the fields as yet afforded but a small supply of corn, the abundant fisheries along the coasts offered a ready means of exchange for wheat and grain.

During the scarcity of bread a regulation was established, that for every cart-load of fish taken from the shore, one of corn or oil should be given in exchange. In the city itself vast improvements were carried out, buildings, public and private, were restored, substantial edifices erected, and as a precautionary measure many new fortifications were traced out. But scarcely had the population been lulled into a confidence in security, when in July, 1693, the batteries which had so long been silent were again engaged with an enemy.

Since 1689, Spain, now in alliance with England and the Dutch, had been at war with France.

In the early part of the year 1693, a fleet of 400 merchantmen, bound to Smyrna and the Levant, left England under convoy of a British and Dutch squadron of 21 sail, commanded by Admiral Sir George Rooke. On June 17th, when within about 60 miles of Cape St. Vincent, they came in sight of the French fleet, under command of Marshal Tourville. Being considerably inferior to the enemy in strength and numbers, the British admiral called a council of war to consider what course should be taken. As the wind was blowing fresh and westerly, and therefore favourable for the escape of the merchant-fleet into Faro, St Lucar, or Cadiz, it was resolved to occupy the attention of the enemy till nightfall, when the merchantmen might sail away under cover of the darkness.

About six o'clock in the evening, however, the French admiral, comprehending his adversary's object, brought on an engagement, by attacking with eleven sail of the line the leeward division of the squadron, which consisted of three Dutch men-of-war. After a short but desperate engagement, the Hollanders struck to superior numbers.

While this was occurring, the Dutch merchantmen, taking advantage of the occasion, made all sail towards Cadiz; but being perceived, they were followed by the leading ships of the enemy's fleet, an error on the part of the French admiral that saved the remainder of the British squadron from destruction. His strength being now divided, Tourville was unable to finish the action decisively before night, and during the darkness the squadron, together with most of the merchantmen, got away, Sir G. Rooke sailing for the coast of Ireland. In the mean time those vessels which had made for Cadiz, pursued by the French fleet, changed their course and ran for Gibraltar, where they arrived on the 10th July. They were closely followed by the French, but the garrison, having been made aware of the state of affairs, opened fire upon the ships in chase and compelled them to retire from an attempt to cut out the merchantmen.

Foiled in this, the admiral commenced to bombard the city, causing the greatest consternation among the inhabitants, who fled for safety to the south

of the Rock. Several fire-ships were launched among the vessels in the bay, which destroyed 19 merchantmen, and damaged some others. After continuing the fire against the place for nine days, the French squadron retired, the fortifications having suffered very little damage.

In 1697, the Spanish arms having met with many reverses, and Barcelona having surrendered to the French, it was deemed advisable to conclude the campaign; and, though in fact it amounted merely to an armistice, a treaty was signed at Ryswick between England, France, Spain, and Holland.

In 1700 Charles II. of Spain died, leaving no issue, but declaring Philip of Anjou the successor to the Crown.

The accession of Philip was almost immediately followed by war. Though reluctantly acknowledged by William III. as the rightful heir to the throne, his accession was regarded with jealousy and distrust by both England and Holland; and the fear of a coalition between France and Spain,—a coalition which, considering the power and ambition of Louis, would have been a misfortune to Europe,—prompted the celebrated alliance between England, Austria, and Holland, in 1701, which resulted in the memorable War of the Succession. This war, which had for its ostensible object the substitution of Charles, archduke of Austria, upon the throne of Spain, and the preservation of the

balance of power in Europe, ceased with the Peace of Utrecht, after a long and profitless campaign.

But although at least one object of this prolonged and bloody contest was defeated, and the peace which followed was far from being creditable to the allies, the page which these events occupy in history, distinguished as it is by the brilliant victories of Marlborough and the capture of Gibraltar, will be ever memorable in the annals of Great Britain.

The war commenced in Italy, where the Emperor attacked the French, and the outbreak of hostilities was followed by the conclusion of the Grand Alliance, signed on September 7th, between England, the Emperor, and the Dutch.

The alliance against France and Spain had scarcely been entered into when William III. died, and Queen Anne succeeded to the throne.

Queen Anne, upon her accession to the throne, announced, in a wise and moderate speech to her Privy Council, her determination to maintain the Protestant succession, and her intention to support her allies in the war against France.

Vast preparations were made for the campaign. Marlborough was appointed Captain-General of the forces, and to Sir George Rooke was given the office of Vice-Admiral of England.

The war had continued about two years with varied successes, when, in the spring of 1704 it was

considered desirable that a demonstration should be made on the Spanish frontier of Portugal by the Archduke Charles (at that time in Holland), in conjunction with the King of Portugal. With this object a fleet was prepared at Spithead to convey the Archduke to Lisbon, and Sir George Rooke was appointed to the command. On the 12th of February the fleet set sail from St. Helens, and arrived at Lisbon on the 25th, after a favourable passage. Four days after his arrival at Lisbon, Sir George sent a squadron of 17 sail, under Admiral Dilkes, to cruise off Cape Spartel. On the 9th March, the admiral himself went to sea, and remained cruising for a month.

About the middle of March, Admiral Dilkes, who had separated from his main body, with three third and two fourth rates, came up with a Spanish squadron of four sail. He immediately engaged, and, after a smart action, two vessels of 60 guns, the *Porta Coeli* and the *St Theresa*, struck. After this success the admiral made for Lisbon, where he arrived on the 25th March, after losing the *St Theresa* at the entrance to the harbour.

Shortly afterwards Sir George Rooke also reached Lisbon, and found awaiting him orders to sail through the Straits of Gibraltar and to proceed to the relief of Nice and Villafranca. On the other hand he was urged by the entreaties of the Archduke to make for Barcelona, with the troops he had on board under Prince George of Hesse, and to take advantage of the

disaffection which was supposed to exist among the Catalans. Perplexed by these conflicting interests, Sir George committed the fatal mistake of endeavouring to satisfy all parties. He intimated to the Prince of Hesse his willingness to convey the troops to Barcelona, and to assist in any demonstration that might be made at that place. Having arranged his convoy, he set sail, and on the 18th May arrived before the town. The Dutch ships immediately bombarded the city, and about 2000 men were landed to join the anticipated insurrection.

After remaining on shore all night, and perceiving no symptoms of a rising among the inhabitants, the prince found himself deceived, and hastily re-embarked his forces. On the 21st May, Sir George Rooke sailed away to the westward, and on his passage appears to have passed the French fleet, without being able to bring them to an engagement.

Well aware of the imputations and calumnies to which he would be subjected if he allowed the summer to pass away without achieving something of importance with the powerful armament under his command, the admiral, on the 17th July, when within a few leagues of Tetuan, hove to the squadron and called a Council of War on board the flag-ship "The Royal Catherine." This Council was attended by the Prince of Hesse Darmstadt, Sir George Rooke, Rear-Admiral Byng, Sir Cloudesley Shovel, Sir John Leake, Sir Thomas Wishart, and the Admirals of the

Dutch division, Collingberg, Vassenaer, and Vanderdussen.

Several schemes were proposed, amongst them a second expedition against Cadiz, which was condemned on various grounds. After a protracted discussion it was resolved to make a sudden attack upon Gibraltar, for the three following reasons:—

First. Because the place was so indifferently garrisoned that there was every probability of the attack succeeding.

Secondly. Because the possession of such an important fortress would be of infinite value during the war.

Thirdly. Because the capture of the place would add a lustre to the queen's arms, and would be likely to dispose the Spaniards in favour of the cause of the Archduke Charles.

Four days were spent in making the necessary preparations, and on the 21st July the fleet, consisting of the following vessels, anchored in the Bay of Gibraltar.

ENGLISH.

First Division.

Ships.	Guns.	Men.	Commanders.
Somerset,	80	500	Capt. Price.
Essex	70	440	Capt. Hubbard.
Triton	50	230	Capt. Trevor.

Ships.	Guns.	Men.	Commanders.
Dorsetshire	80	500	Capt. Whittaker.
Ranelagh	80	553	{ Adm. Byng. Capt. Cole.
Torbay	80	500	Capt. Caldwell.
Centurion	50	280	Capt. Herne.
Kingston	60	365	Capt. Acton.
Firm	70	440	Capt. Wild.
Grafton	70	440	Sir A. Leake.

Second Division.

Nassau	70	440	Capt. Dove.
Montague	60	365	Capt. Cleveland.
St George	96	680	Capt. Jennings.
Royal Catherine,	90	730	{ Adm. Sir G. Rooke. Capt. Scaley.
Eagle	70	440	Lord Hamilton.
Monmouth	70	440	Capt. Baker.
Panther	50	280	Capt. Bartie.
Shrewsbury	80	500	Capt. Crow.
Bedford	70	440	Sir T. Hardy.
Swallow	50	280	Capt. Haddock.
Suffolk	70	440	Capt. Kitton.
Royal Oak	76	500	Capt. Elwes.

Third Division.

Kent	70	400	{ Adm. Dilkes. Capt. Harman.
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Ships.	Guns.	Men.	Commanders.
Cambridge	80	500	Capt. Lestock.
Monk	60	365	Capt. Mills.
Leopard	50	280	Capt. Culliford.
Burford	70	440	Capt. Rossy.
Warspite	70	440	Capt. Loades.
Nottingham	60	365	Capt. Whittaker.
Assurance	66	440	Capt. Hancock.
Orford	70	440	Capt. Norris.
Barfleur	96	710	{ Adm. Sir Cloudesley
			Shovel.
			Capt. Stuart.
Namur	96	680	Capt. Mings.
Swiftsure	70	440	Capt. Winn.
Tilbury	50	280	Capt. Delaval.
Lenox	70	440	Capt. Jumper.

Fourth Division.

Newark	80	500	Capt. Clark.
Antelope	50	280	Capt. Legg.
Boyne	80	500	Capt. Dursley.
Prince George	90	700	{ Adm. Sir J. Leake.
			Capt. Martin.
Berwick	70	440	Capt. Fairfax.
Norfolk	80	500	Capt. Knapp.
Tiger	50	280	Capt. Cavendish.
Yarmouth	70	440	Capt. Hicks.
Hampton Court	70	440	Capt. Wager.

FRIGATES.

Ships.	Guns.	Ships.	Guns.
Charles Galley	32	Tartar	32
Lark	40	Roebuck	40
Newport	24	Garland	40

FIRE-SHIPS.

Hunter.	Griffin.	Vulcan.
Phoenix.	Firebrand.	
Lightning.	Vulture.	

HOSPITAL-SHIPS.

Jefferies.	Princess Anne.
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BOMB VESSELS.

Hare.	Terror.
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YACHT.

William and Mary.

On the evening of the same day, a body of about 1800 or 2000 marines, under command of the Prince of Hesse, were landed on the Isthmus at the North Front, for the purpose of intercepting any reinforcements or supplies that might be conveyed to the garrison by land. A summons to surrender was next day sent to the city by the Prince of Hesse.

The Governor of Gibraltar at that time was Don

Diego de Salinas, a man of considerable energy and talent, who had long been aware of the defenceless state of the fortress, and who had already represented to the Court of Madrid the impossibility of successfully resisting a powerful enemy, should a sudden attack be made upon the place.

The garrison was miserably weak, and the fortifications in very bad repair. Nevertheless, the governor resolved to defend it to the last extremity. On receipt of the summons to surrender, a council of the city magnates was assembled to deliberate upon the reply that should be given.

The letter from the prince, which was to the following effect, was read to the council :—“ that before proceeding to the extremity of warfare he took occasion to express a hope that the city would be governed by a sense of justice and its true interests ; that the cause in which he was engaged was alone sufficient to create a desire to be employed in it, and that he hoped on sight of the royal letter they would obey the summons of His Majesty King Charles, as might be expected from so noble and loyal a city.” A reply was without delay agreed to and transmitted to the prince in the following words :—“ that having taken an oath of fidelity to Don Philip V., as their natural lord and king, they would as faithful and loyal subjects sacrifice their lives in the defence of the city and its inhabitants, and that consequently no further reply to the contents of the letter was

necessary." Anticipating the immediate commencement of hostilities, De Salinas arranged his plans of defence. There were not more than 150 regulars inside the walls, very few of whom were artillerymen; and the whole force that could be mustered, including the armed citizens, did not exceed 500 men. Nevertheless, so strong was the fortress by position and natural defences, that even with this feeble garrison, aided by the efforts of the inhabitants, there was some prospect of a prolonged though not successful resistance.

The fortifications consisted at that time of a strong Line wall compassing the town from north to south, and terminated at either extremity by two moles, the southern one termed the new, the northern the old, mole. These were armed with heavy ordnance. A few hundred yards north of the new mole was a bastion, also heavily armed. The Line wall was mounted with artillery along its whole length.

The batteries at the old mole were confided to the care of 200 armed citizens, under the command of Don Bartolomi Castano. The new mole was defended by 20 men of the militia, eight military invalids, and some armed inhabitants, the whole commanded by Don Francisco Torbio de Fuentes. 60 invalid soldiers, under direction of Don Diego de Avila, had charge of the Land Port gate, and the castle was garrisoned by 62 men, including

six belonging to the artillery and six dismounted cavalry.*

On the morning of the 22nd, orders were issued to the ships which had been appointed to cannonade the town to take up their positions before the Line wall; but the wind being contrary, they were not able to get into their places.

In the mean time, in order to occupy the attention of the enemy, Captain Whittaker was sent with some boats to burn a French privateer of 12 guns, at the old mole.

Though the reply to the summons to surrender was couched in such energetic terms of refusal, Sir George Rooke still believed that, awed by the presence of such a powerful armament, the garrison would be intimidated, and would capitulate on the commencement of active proceedings. To test the firmness of their intentions, he gave orders at day-break on the 23rd, for a few shots to be fired into the city, and waited the result, previous to commencing the terrible bombardment which he had in contemplation. The fire was, however, instantly returned by the besieged, upon which, signal was made by the admiral to prepare for action.

As had been previously arranged, the attacking squadron consisting of 12 third-rates, four fourth-rates, and six ships of the Dutch, under Admirals Byng

* Monti, Hist. de Gibraltar. Montero, ib. Ayala, ib.

and Vanderdusen, got under weigh, and took up a station extending along the Front or Line wall, from the new to the old mole head. At the same time Captain Hicks, with the Yarmouth, Tiger, and Hampton Court, moved to the westward of the new mole, against which point the principal attack was directed.* The cannonade then commenced all along the line, and was kept up with unabated fury for six hours, during which time not less than 15,000 shot were thrown into the town.

The intensity of the fire soon drove the enemy from their guns, and the effects of the bombardment upon the fortifications became apparent. Captain Hicks, who with the Yarmouth, Tiger, and Hampton Court had poured a concentrated fire into the defences on the new mole, silenced the guns at the mole head after a few volleys, and the enemy were compelled to abandon the works at that point. Perceiving this, Sir George Rooke resolved to take the defences in flank, by effecting a landing on the abandoned works.†

Orders were instantly sent to Captain Whittaker to arm all the boats of the fleet, to provide himself with a sufficient force, and to make himself master of the new mole head.‡ Captain Whittaker was at this

* London Gazette. 1704. Lives of the Admirals.

† Despatch from Sir G. Rooke.

‡ "The admiral, considering that by gaining the fortifications at the south mole head he could of consequence reduce the town, ordered Captain Whittaker, with all the boats

time in the Nottingham, 60 guns, at the northern extremity of the line, and nearly a mile from the spot where he was ordered to land. Whilst he was preparing to execute his orders as rapidly as possible, the signals conveying his instructions were kept flying, and were made out by Captain Hicks, who with his ships was within 500 yards of the new mole head. Risking the displeasure of the admiral, he resolved to anticipate Captain Whittaker, and gain possession of the abandoned works himself. Accordingly, the pinnaces were lowered and manned with sailors and marines, under command of himself and Captain Jumper, of the Lennox, and the boats pushed off for the shore without opposition, before Captain Whittaker could arrive. Scarcely, however, had the men set foot upon the land, when the enemy sprung a mine under the ground on which they stood, blowing two officers and 40 men into the air, wounding 60, and capsizing seven of the boats.* At this juncture, Captain Whittaker came up, and landing with his men kept possession of the works, notwithstanding the fleet armed, to endeavour to possess himself of it; which was performed with great vigour and success by Captains Hicks and Jumper, with their pinnaces and other boats.

The order was no sooner issued for Captain Whittaker to arm the boats, than Captains Hicks and Jumper, who were nearest the mole, pushed to shore with the pinnaces, and seized the fortifications before the rest could come up."—(Boyer's Annals of Queen Anne.)

* Montero describes this explosion as having taken place at the *old* mole, but he is mistaken.

withstanding the opposition of the Spaniards, who made a vigorous sortie. After a moment's delay the whole party advanced along the Line wall, northward, towards the town, seizing on their way a small work, now called Jumper's Bastion.

Overcome with terror, the men, women, and children fled from the city and escaped to the south, where they took refuge in the sanctuary of the Virgin de Europa. The defences along the Line wall being taken in flank by the advance of Captain Whittaker's party, the guns were abandoned, and the whole of the south district fell into the hands of the English.

In the mean time, the marines on the Isthmus, and the ships opposite the north-west face of the city, had not been idle. A heavy fire had been kept up against Fort Leandro, at the old mole head, which resulted in the destruction of the battery and the capture of the mole.

Beaten at every point, the two principal positions of defence taken, the Line wall in possession of the enemy, and their artillery destroyed, the besieged saw the futility of prolonging the contest. The fire from the fortress ceased, a flag of truce was displayed, and the governor expressed a desire to capitulate. At a Council of War, articles of an honourable capitulation were drawn up, which were forwarded to the Prince of Hesse, who signified his willingness to agree to them; and the garrison surrendered upon the following conditions:—

Article I.

The officers and soldiers shall be allowed to march out with their baggage, and the soldiers may take what they can carry with them : the officers, the magistrates, and gentlemen are allowed to take their horses : and for those without baggage who choose to depart by water vessels shall be provided.

Article II.

Three pieces of brass cannon of different sizes may be carried away, together with twelve rounds of ammunition to each gun.

Article III.

A supply of bread, meat, and wine for six days' march shall be provided.

Article IV.

The trunks containing the baggage of the officers, magistrates, and gentlemen, shall not be examined. The garrison shall march out within three days : the effects that cannot in that time be removed shall remain in the place to be sent for when convenient, and no obstruction shall be given to the carts conveying them.

Article V.

To the inhabitants, soldiers, and officers, who may choose to remain in Gibraltar, shall be conceded

the same privileges they had in the time of Charles II. ; the religion and all the tribunals shall remain intact and without alteration, it being understood that the oath of fidelity to H. M. Charles III., as legitimate lord and king, is to be taken.

Article VI.

All the magazines of powder and of implements of war are to be pointed out,—all useless arms, and all the provisions that exist in the city.

From this capitulation the French and all subjects of His C. Majesty are excluded. They shall remain prisoners of war, and all their property will be at the disposal of the conquerors.

(Signed)

GEORGE,

Landgrave of Hesse.

July 24th, 1704.

On the 24th July, 1704, the Prince of Hesse took possession of the fortress ; the Imperial standard was raised, and the Archduke Charles proclaimed as the rightful owner of the city. *

* All the Spanish authors give the 4th August, 1704, as the day on which Gibraltar surrendered to Rooke, and they seem to have been unable to understand why all the English historians agree that the 24th July was the day on which the place fell. Montero, Hist. de Gibraltar, page 265, says :

“Es singular que todos los historiadores ingleses del siglo pasado hayan equivocado la fecha de este sitio asegurando haber

But Sir George Rooke was too well aware of the value of Gibraltar to the English nation as the key of the Mediterranean, to acquiesce in the transfer of so important a fortress to the precarious sovereignty of Charles III. By his orders the Imperial banner was hauled down and the royal standard of England hoisted in its stead. The city was then taken possession of in the name of Queen Anne, and 1800 English seamen were landed to occupy the place. The loss of the allies in the action was two lieutenants, one master, 57 sailors, killed; one captain, seven lieutenants, one boatswain, 207 sailors, wounded.

The inestimable importance to Great Britain of the capture of Gibraltar appears to have been little appreciated at the time, and contemporary history speaks of the event as of questionable advantage to the nation.

Bishop Burnet, writing on the subject, says: "It has been much questioned by men who understand these matters well, whether our possessing ourselves of Gibraltar, and our maintaining ourselves in it so long, were to our advantage or not. It has certainly put us to a great charge, and we have lost many men in it;

sido en 21 de julio la llegada de la escuadra á la Bahía y la toma el 24."

The apparent discrepancy is however very simply accounted for by the fact that the Gregorian calculation was adopted in Spain before the year 1704, while it was not introduced into the English calendar till long afterwards.

but it seems, the Spaniards, who should know the importance of the place best, think it so valuable that they have been at a much greater charge, and have lost many more men while they have endeavoured to recover it, than the taking and keeping it has cost us. And it is certain that in war, whatsoever loss on one side occasions a greater loss of men or treasure to the other, must be reckoned as a loss only to the side that suffers most.”*

It is worthy of remark that but few inhabitants of the city availed themselves of the provisions of the 5th article of the capitulation. Though the simple form of taking the oath of allegiance to Charles III. would have protected them and their properties from molestation, the citizens with honourable resolution preferred to abandon their homes, their comforts, and their fortunes, rather than submit to a foreign dominion.

On the day of the surrender the authorities and town-council addressed the following letter to King Philip V., announcing that they had been compelled to capitulate.

“Sire,

“The loyalty with which this city has served all the preceding kings, as well as your Majesty, has ever been notorious to them. In this last event, not less than on other occasions, it has en-

* Burnet's History of his own Times.

deavoured to exhibit its fidelity at the price of lives and property, which many of the inhabitants have lost in the combat; and with great honour and pleasure did they sacrifice themselves in defence of your Majesty, who may rest well assured that we who have survived (for our misfortune), had we experienced a similar fate, would have died with glory, and would not now suffer the great grief and distress of seeing your Majesty, our lord and master, dispossessed of so loyal a city.

“Subjects, but courageous as such, we will submit to no other government than that of your Catholic Majesty, in whose defence and service we shall pass the remainder of our lives; departing from this fortress, where, on account of the superior force of the enemy who attacked it, and the fatal chance of our not having any garrison for its defence, except a few poor and raw peasants, amounting to less than 300, we have not been able to resist the assault, as your Majesty must have already learnt from the governor or others.

“Our just grief allows us to notice no other fact for the information of your Majesty, but that all the inhabitants, and each singly, fulfilled their duties in their several stations; and our governor and alcalde have worked with the greatest zeal and activity, without allowing the horrors of the incessant cannonading to deter them from their duties, to which they attended personally, encouraging all with great devo-

tion. May Divine Providence guard the royal person of your Majesty, &c. &c.

“Gibraltar, August 5th (N. S.), 1704.”

The exodus from the city was an affecting and melancholy spectacle.

Overwhelmed with their misfortune, houseless and without resources, the faithful citizens, both poor and rich, both old and young, the vigorous and the infirm, passed through the gate of their home, and dispersed, whither they knew not, in search of a refuge and a habitation. Numbers fell by the way, victims to hunger and fatigue; some reached Tarifa, Medina-Sidonia, Ronda, and other towns in the neighbourhood; while many, especially the authorities, remained at St Roque, keeping with them the archives of their ancient city. During this time Sir George Rooke was occupied in restoring tranquillity in the garrison, arranging the government, and landing a force for the protection of the fortress. The Prince of Hesse was appointed governor, with 1800 sailors and two Dutch battalions under his command.

It has been the object of Spanish historians to detract as much as possible from the glory of this conquest, by representing the garrison and defences of Gibraltar at the time of the attack to have been in a state of feebleness and decay amounting to powerlessness. Though it is undoubtedly true that both

in numbers and effectiveness the force available for the service of the guns was inadequate, yet we may believe that, including the Spanish regulars and the sailors from the French privateer which was burnt in the Bay, there could not have been less than 200 disciplined men to man the batteries. Besides these, were many merchant sailors and some militia, numbering in all not less than 200 more, exclusive of those who took up arms on the day of the action.

The town consisted of 1200 houses; "and supposing," says James, "that one man in each house was able to bear arms, the garrison would have consisted of 1500 men, a force sufficient to have held out against the allies for a longer time than six hours, though final success was not to be expected." *

But whatever may have been the circumstances under which Gibraltar fell into our hands, whether through the courage of our seamen or the defenceless condition of the garrison, the event was of inestimable importance to Great Britain, establishing as it did her power and supremacy in the Mediterranean. Yet so little was the value of the conquest understood at the time, that many objections were urged against England keeping possession of the Rock, and the most strenuous supporters of Sir George Rooke scarcely ventured to urge the capture of Gibraltar as a reason for granting him those rewards for his services which through party feeling were so long withheld.

* History of the Herculean Straits, by Colonel James, 1777.

Throughout his career as an admiral, he had experienced the most bitter persecution from the Whigs a circumstance which may be accounted for by the part he assumed in favour of the Tories while he sat in the House. Bishop Burnet, who was his sworn enemy, sedulously underrated and misrepresented his services, and the reverend prelate's writings exhibit a virulent malice in all his comments upon the conduct of the Admiral.

CHAPTER VII.

BATTLE OF MALAGA.

ON the 9th of August, Sir George Rooke sailed again with his fleet from Gibraltar, after he had provided for the defence and supply of the garrison. The following day the Admiral came in sight of the French fleet, under Count de Toulouse, High Admiral of France, consisting of 52 sail and 24 galleys.

When first descried, the enemy were about 10 leagues distant. A council of flag-officers was called, and it was determined to lay to east of the Rock, to receive and engage them. During the night, however, they crept away to the eastward, and finding that they were endeavouring to shun fighting, Sir George gave orders to chase with press of sail.

On the 11th, one of the enemy's ships was run on shore and burnt. On the morning of the 12th, the French fleet was out of sight, and it was feared that the weather being calm they had crept back to the westward with the aid of their galleys. Another council of war was assembled, when it

was resolved that if the enemy were not seen before night the fleet should return to Gibraltar.

On the morning of Sunday the 13th, the French appeared in sight, off Cape Malaga, and not far from shore. They immediately brought to in order of battle, with their heads to the southward, the wind easterly. The line was strongest in its centre, and weakest in its van and rear. In the centre was Mons. de Toulouse with the White squadron, the White and Blue led the van, and the Blue brought up the rear. Each admiral had his vice and rear admirals.

The British fleet consisted of 53 ships, but the Swallow and the Panther, two fourth-rates, with a fifth- and sixth-rate and two fire-ships, were ordered to lie to windward, in case they should be required to engage the enemy's fire-ships. Shortly after 10 o'clock in the morning, the British fleet, with Sir George Rooke and Rear Admirals Byng and Dilkes in the centre, Sir Cloudesley Shovel and Sir John Leake in the van, and the Dutch in the rear, bore down upon the enemy in order of battle. The French instantly set all their sails, seemingly with the intention of getting the weather-gage; but Sir G. Rooke ran up the signal for action, and the engagement became general. The Royal Catharine, flag-ship, St. George, and Shrewsbury suffered severely; but about two in the afternoon, the enemy's van, which was opposed to Sir C. Shovel, gave way. Unfortunately the British fleet was scantily

supplied with ammunition, 25 rounds per gun only being on board each ship, of which 10 rounds per gun were expended in the first hour's fighting. Sir Cloudesley Shovel, in the van, closed to within pistol shot of the enemy before he fired a gun, when, pouring in a tremendous fire, he completely broke that part of the line opposed to him, and would have captured the Admiral of the White and Blue, had not the Frenchman managed to outsail him. The action continued with unabated fury till nightfall, when the enemy got away to leeward by aid of their galleys. The loss on both sides was very heavy. The French counted among the killed the Bailiff of Lorraine, commodore of a squadron, the Sieurs de Beleisle and de Troard, five captains, seven lieutenants, and six sea ensigns,—among the latter, the son of Marshal de Chateau Renaud. Among the wounded were the Count de Toulouse, shot in three places, Commodore du Casse, the Count de Relingues, the Marquis de Herhault, the Count de Cominges, the Count de Phillipeaux, and 140 other officers. The total of killed, wounded, and missing, was 3048.

On the side of the English the total loss was 2719,—Sir Andrew Leake, one captain, four lieutenants, and two warrant officers killed; five captains, 13 lieutenants, and 13 warrant officers wounded.

During the night after the action, the two fleets lay to repairing defects and plugging the shot holes. Scarcely a spare topmast was left in the fleet, and 10

jury masts were up before the morning.* Before break of day the wind shifted to the westward, and the enemy taking advantage of the breeze stood away to the northward, followed by the confederate

* Letter from Sir Cloudesley Shovel:—"This brings news of my health and that we are on our way homewards: that which sends us home is a sharp engagement we have had with the French. Our number of ships that fought in the line of battle were pretty equal: I think they were 49 and we 53. I judge they had 17 three-decked ships and we but seven. . . . We having the weather gage, gave me an opportunity of coming as near as I pleased, which was within pistol shot, before I fired a gun, through which means and God's assistance the enemy declined us, and were on the run in less than four hours, by which time we had little wind, and their galleys towed off their lame ships and others as they pleased. . . . The ships that suffered most in my division were the *Lenox*, *Warspite*, *Tilbury*, and *Swiftsure*; the rest escaped pretty well, and I the best of all, though I never took greater pains in all my life to be soundly beaten; for I set all my sails, and rowed with three boats a-head to get alongside with the Admiral of the White and Blue; but he, out-sailing me, shunned fighting and lay alongside of the little ships: notwithstanding, the engagement was very sharp, I think the like between two fleets never was seen in any time. . . . After the fight we were two days in sight of the enemy preparing for a second engagement, but the enemy declined, and stood from us in the night."

A medal was struck in Paris in commemoration of this so-called victory.

Spain is represented sitting, her arm leaning on a pillar with victory over her head; the legend thus:

"*Oræ Hispanicæ securitas.*" On the exergue,—

"*Anglorum et Batavorum classe fugata ad Malagam. xxiv. Augusti, MDCCIV.*"—*Lives of the Admirals.*

fleets, but without coming to an engagement. The 16th was hazy, and no signs of the French could be discovered, so Sir George Rooke, supposing that they had made for Cadiz, bore away for the westward, and put in to Gibraltar, where he learnt that the enemy had not passed the Straits. In the meantime the Count de Toulouse, finding his ships thoroughly disabled, made for Toulon, where he remained many months to refit.

This memorable battle was claimed as a victory by both sides—though it cannot be questioned that the French Admiral sailed away from his enemy the day after the action and kept on his course for Toulon, while Sir George Rooke continued in chase and offered every temptation for a renewal of the engagement. The French fleet was completely disabled, and for months unfit to go to sea; the English, on the contrary, soon repaired their damages in the Bay of Gibraltar, and in eight days the fleet went to sea, leaving a squadron under Sir John Leake for the protection of our interests in the Mediterranean. Though the result of this action therefore was not decisive, the advantage rested with the English; and if there was no victory to claim, it was because the French Admiral was careful not to risk the chance of losing one.

After the action off Malaga the English fleet sailed for Gibraltar, where it remained eight days to refit. Having supplied the garrison with men and provisions, Sir George Rooke left for England, leaving

Sir John Leake with 18 vessels to watch the Straits and the coast of Portugal.

Upon his arrival at home, he was at first received with marks of favour and gratitude, but party spirit in those days crushed all sense of justice; and consideration for the reputation or reward of public men was smothered by political prejudice and fury.

In consequence of an injurious zeal on the part of Sir G. Rooke's friends, the battle of Malaga was compared with the victory of Blenheim, fought in the same year. Sir George belonging to the Tory party, and having sat in parliament as a Tory member, a spirit of rivalry at once sprang up between the partisans of Marlborough and the friends of Rooke; the Whigs taking care to extol the services of Marlborough, while the claims of the Admiral were sneered at and disparaged. Rival addresses reached the Queen from all parts of the country, and the excitement of political rivalry spread through the nation.

In spite of every opposition, the House of Commons passed a resolution congratulating the Queen on the victory at sea, but the House of Lords remained obstinately silent. The Commons, determined to carry the point, moved another address praying Her Majesty to reward the troops and seamen who had so greatly distinguished themselves.

A collision between the Lords and Commons seemed imminent. But at this critical juncture, Sir George Rooke, with a magnanimity which proved far



more forcibly than all his victories the greatness of his character, appeased the rising clamour, by resigning all his appointments and retiring into private seclusion.

Burnet's continual falsehoods recoiled partially upon his own head; for in a great debate in the Lords, in 1740, the Duke of Argyle, who in former times had sat in the House with him, declared that "with regard to what he says against Admiral Rooke, I know I have heard it from those who were present that the greatest part of it is a downright lie. The Bishop, it is well known, was no friend to that Admiral, and therefore he easily gave credit to every malicious story he heard against him."

For the capture of Gibraltar, one of the greatest services ever rendered to this country, Sir George Rooke received no reward.

When, previous to his retirement, memorials in his favour were presented to the Ministry, the success at Gibraltar was urged as a sufficient claim for reward, in terms sufficiently apologetic to show that the Government were supposed to be but slightly acquainted with the value of the acquisition.

In a MS.* entitled "A Narrative of the proceedings of Sir George Rooke," which is apparently a letter in defence of his conduct addressed to one of the ministers, the writer, after explaining why the French fleet was not attacked on the voyage from Barcelona, proceeds to say,—“Rooke returned into the Mediterra-

* MS. British Museum.

nean, where, pursuant to such orders as he had received from the Kings of Spain and Portugal, to attack the enemy in Andalusia, he immediately, in prosecution of that design, attempted and took the strong town and fortress of Gibraltar, an acquisition of so great renown to Her Majesty's naval strength in those remote seas, of so much disappointment and mortification to the Spaniards, who have always reckoned that place (as it truly is) as one of the keys of the kingdom, that as by their attempt to recover it in the present weak state of their army, concurring with the unlucky circumstances of the French king's affair, from whom alone their succours must come, their frontiers may by such a division be so weakened and exposed that there is fair probability that Her Majesty and her allies on that side may gather such fruit from that fortunate action as to think it well worth recording among the articles of praise and thanks due thereby to the merits of the fleet, and therein principally and justly to the Commander in Chief."

Sir George Rooke survived his unjust treatment only a few years. He died in 1708, in his 58th year, and was buried in the cathedral at Canterbury.*

* Authorities:—Lives of the Admirals, vol. iii. Letter from Sir. C. Shovel. Burnet's History of his own Times. Quincy, *Histoire Militaire*.

CHAPTER VIII.

TWELFTH SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR.

ALTHOUGH the British Government had expressed so little satisfaction at the capture of Gibraltar, Spain was fully alive to the importance of the place, and had no sooner lost it than she attempted its recovery. The more certainly to attain her object, she abandoned her operations on the frontiers of Portugal, and, withdrawing the troops, directed the whole energy of her resources against Gibraltar. The expedition was composed of 12,000 men, 9000 Spaniards and 3000 French, the whole under the command of the Marquis de Villadarias, a brave and able soldier. A French squadron, consisting of 12 ships-of-the-line, and seven frigates, under Commodore Pointé, also co-operated.

The divisions of the Spanish army were commanded by the most distinguished men in Spain, amongst them General Count d'Aguilar, the Duke d'Ossuna, the Conde de Pinto, and the Marquis de Aitona. The French were led by General Cavanne.

The garrison of the fortress did not exceed 3000

men, and many of these were in an undisciplined state; amongst them, says Ayala, many vagabonds from Spain and deserters from the Spanish army.

Since the place had been in the hands of the English some additions had been made to the defences. Several bastions had been constructed, and the Land Port gate defended with 20 pieces of cannon; a tower was armed to command the enemy's camp, and the inundation, which still forms one of the most formidable obstacles to an advance upon the city from the north, was constructed.

On the 9th of October, 1704, the enemy opened their trenches at about 400 *toises* distance from the Rock, and on the 15th opened fire from a battery of three guns, which destroyed the round tower.

Sir George Rooke, who did not arrive in England until the 24th September, had been charged by Sir John Leake, who was then at Lisbon, to represent the necessity of refitting the squadron, and providing for the relief of Gibraltar should it be attacked.

Sir George lost no time in pressing these services upon the Government; and on the 30th September, Admiral Leake was apprized of the willingness of the Admiralty to send him supplies. A letter dated Windsor, 30th September, 1704,* says,—

* Egerton MSS. British Museum. The signature to this letter is so indistinct that I have been unable to decipher it.— It is dated Windsor, and is evidently official.

“ Sir,

“ I take this opportunity to owne the receipt of your letter of the 5th, O. S., with the copie of the orders you had from Sir George Rooke. That letter came before Sir George Rooke, who did not arrive at St Hellen’s (?) till the 24th, and I took care to send him one, which you enclosed for him, thither. Sir George has acquainted the Prince* with y^r want of Navall stores, upon which His Royal Highnesse has directed the Navy board to send you a hundred coil of rope if possible, and as many sayles for 4th and 5th rates as can be gott ready to goe wth this convoy.

“ I need say nothing of the order that comes with this for y^r supplying the garrison of Gibraltar, which the Queen thinks it is very much for her service to keep, tho’ at an expence to her, which should indeed be borne by the two Kings of Spain and Portugal.

“ To Sir John Leake,
“ Lisbon.”

The Admiral had scarcely received this letter, before a despatch reached him from Prince George of Hesse, informing him of the situation of affairs at Gibraltar. †

* Prince George of Denmark, Lord High Admiral of England.

† Prince George of Hesse to Sir John Leake, October 4th, 1704. Leake MSS. British Museum.

“ Sir,

“ I despatch this express to give his Catholic Majesty and you an account of a squadron of French ships which came into the bay this evening, the number of which are 19, great and small, and of the line of battle, as you will find by the opinion of the sea officers herein enclosed.

“ Their design is to besiege us by sea and land, having on board 3000 men to put a-shore, and the rest proportionable to that attempt; therefore I desire the favour of you to take it into consideration and to make all the speed you can, and as you shall judge properest for the publick service and the relief of this place.”

Upon the receipt of this communication the Admiral prepared to sail to the assistance of Gibraltar. Before he started, the “Lark,” which had been sent in charge of Captain Fotherby to reconnoitre the Bay, returned to Lisbon with intelligence as follows :

“ Captain Fotherby’s account of the enemy at Gibraltar.

“ Lark. Lisbon River,

“ October 8th, 1704.

“ On the 30th September, in the morning counted two-and-twentie French men-of-war frigatts and tenders, at an anchor off of old Gibraltar:*

* On the west side of the bay.

one of 90 guns, four as bigg as our 70 gun ships, and nine from 66 to 50 guns, the rest frigatts and tenders. About ten of the clock in the morn, the Rear Admiral, with eight of the biggest ships, loosed their fore-top-sailes in the top, the biggest ship excepted, who made no signal (?).

“At twelve at night, warped my ship out of the new mould, and at one got under sail, and was chased for about an hour by two ships, which came from the southward. It was the opinion of most of the officers there, that they did not much fear what the enemy could do them, except they attacked them at a time both by sea and land, which if they did, said they, they must be forced to divide their men into too many parties, that they would never be off of duty, and that they had provision till the beginning of December, but knew not whether they meant old stile or new. The prince told me one day that he was afraid if the enemy should attack him both by sea and land for any time, that they might want powder. The fleet has landed, as our officers imagined by their way of encampment, to the number of 3000 men, two of which they took to be Neapolitants, out of their galleys, and 1000 French marines; and as we believe were landing of their cannon, but had mounted but one small piece, which fired in their camp to set their watch: and everybody thought they might be between 8000 and 9000 horse and foot. They were encamped

about a mile further from the town than our marines were when the town was taken.

“The prince had planted all two-and-thirty pounders on the battery at the new mould, as also at the round tower at the head of the old mould, the guns of the latter being carryed and carrying to a new battery which was making on the point of the rock above the monastery, from which they tell you they shall be able to dismount the enemy's cannon when they come to batter the towne, and of mightie service to them when they shall be attacked.

“Did not see but there was abundant of cheerfulness in both officers and souldiers, and that they were resolved to hold it out as long as they had any ammunition.” *

On the 28th of October, the enemy opened fire from a battery of seven guns, directed against the Bastion St Paul, with some effect, and Count Newgent, Governor of the city, was mortally wounded.

The enemy's camp rapidly increased, six battalions of the French were landed, two battalions of the Duke of Anjou's guards joined the Spaniards, and an artillery park was established.

From the fortress a constant and well-directed fire was sustained upon the advanced works, and so active was the garrison that the besiegers made but little progress.

* In Egerton MSS. British Museum.

Taking advantage of the commanding heights, cannon and mortars were dragged up the steeps of the Rock and brought to bear with success upon the trenches below.*

On the 29th October, Admiral Leake sailed into the Bay, and surprised a French squadron which lay off the town. Unable to escape, the commodore ran

* "Gibraltar, October 24, 1704, N. S.

"Sir,

"I have sent several accounts by different ways to you about the condition of this place, which I don't know if any has had the good fortune to reach your hands. . . This I sent you by another conveniency, to let you know the French, having landed six battalions and the number of Spanyards being increased to eight battalions, whereof there are two of the Duke of Anjou's guards, and their horse consisting of nine squadrons, . . . and having likewise brought together a good number of artillery and mortars with all the necessarys for a siege, they opened their trenches the 21st, at night, from the furthest mill, and when my last letter was sealed they were very little advanced. . . But since that they have advanced 100 paces nearer to the towne, notwithstanding we obliged them to goe on but very slow, by our mortars and cannons, having brought upon the top of the hill three twelve-pounders with some long three-pounders, all brass, which overlook them all. That we are in no manner of concerne, only that we have not powder enough for a lasting siege.

"GEORGE,
Prince of Hesse.

"Sir John Leake, Knt."

Leake MSS. Brit. Museum.

his vessels * ashore, where they were set on fire by the Admiral.

By this time the trenches were considerably advanced. Notwithstanding the heavy fire kept up from the Rock, several offensive batteries were unmasked, and a damaging cannonade was opened against the Land Port gate and curtain. †

The arrival of Sir John Leake with his squadron

* Two men-of-war, 36 guns each; one frigate, 16 guns; one fireship, 24; two English prizes, and other craft. The *Estola* French frigate got away, but was taken by the *Swallow*.

† “H. R. H. Prince George of Denmark, Lord High Admiral of England and Ireland and of all Her Majesty’s Plantations, and Generalissimo of all Her Majesty’s Forces.

“Her Majesty having taking y^r letter of this month into her consideration, together with a resolution of a Council of Warr held by you the day before at Lisbon, and the copy of the Letters from Prince George of Hesse and Captain Fotherby of the Lark dated the 23rd of last month at Gibraltar, which you sent hither by the Tartar, and thinking it very much to her service to prevent the Towne and garrison of Gibraltar from falling into the Enemy’s hands; I doe therefore in pursuance of Her M.’s pleasure hereby direct and require you to endeavour to attempt the relief of that place, in case it is besieged, if it shall be thought practicable by a Council of Warr, and to take, sink, burn, or otherwise destroy all the Enemy’s ships that you shall meet with.

“ October 24th, 1704.

“ GEORGE.

“ To Sir John Leake,
“ Vice Adml. of the Blue Squadron of Her Majesty’s Fleet.”

compelled the besiegers to discontinue for a time their operations on the western side of the north front, as the guns of the fleet raked the trenches and rendered them untenable. Despairing of success through the slow and regular operations of a siege, the enemy conceived the bold and desperate idea of scaling the precipice of the Rock and falling upon the garrison by surprise. The danger and indeed hopelessness of such an enterprise must have been unknown to the gallant men who volunteered to attempt it. Early in November a goatherd, by name Simon Susarte, a native of Gibraltar, who was intimately acquainted with the paths and passes on the Rock, came to the Marquis of Villadarias, and made known to him the possibility of reaching the summit of the hill by a pathway on the eastern side but little known, and termed the "Senda del Pastor:" the Marquis, too cautious to risk the lives of his men on the mere statement of the goatherd, sent an officer accompanied by Susarte to examine the road.

This officer reported that the project was feasible. Accordingly, on the night of the 31st October, 500 men, under the command of Colonel Figueroa, were selected for this forlorn hope, and having taken the sacrament, marched with cautious step from the advanced trenches round the eastern side of the Rock. Following their guide, the goatherd, they crept silently up the narrow and precipitous track by the pass of locust trees, and reached St Michael's cave in

safety. Here they secreted themselves until morning. Shortly before daybreak they emerged from their concealment and advanced to the signal station, where they surprised and massacred the guard, and with the assistance of ropes and ladders succeeded in pulling up from the steep declivity on the eastern side many of the party who had been left behind. In the mean time the alarm was given to the garrison below, who were astonished at the appearance of an enemy on the very summit of the Rock. A regiment of grenadiers under Prince Henry of Armstadt was ordered to dislodge them. Advancing under great disadvantages, having to climb up a steep and stony ascent, they lost many men before they could close with the Spaniards, who with an inaccessible precipice behind them, and left to their fate without support, fought with desperate energy. But courage would not avail them. Their ammunition, which did not exceed three rounds per man, soon failed them, and after losing 160 of their number, they surrendered unconditionally. A few, including the guide Susarte, fled by the pathway up which they had advanced, and having reached the camp in safety related the disaster.

Though it is extremely improbable that under every favourable circumstance this surprise would have been successful, yet through the misconduct of the Marquis Villadarias, its failure was insured. It had been arranged that upon the morning when the little band of volunteers reached the cave above

the summit of the hill, a vigorous attack should be made from the north front and all along the line, to distract the attention of the besieged, while at the same time another body of volunteers was to ascend the Rock and join their comrades. But a contemptible misunderstanding arose between the Spanish general and the French general, Cavanne, which resulted in the abandonment of the gallant party and the failure of the enterprise.*

Fresh batteries having been opened, the enemy succeeded in destroying the Bastion of San Pedro, which flanked the curtain of the Land Port gate.

To assist in making fascines, clearing away rubbish from the ditches, and dragging guns and mortars up the hill-side; sailors and marines were landed from the fleet.

Towards the close of November, the enemy's fire

* It is remarkable that this daring attempt is scarcely referred to either by the Prince of Hesse or others who were present at the siege. In a letter to Sir John Leake (then in the bay) the Prince merely remarks that the enemy made an attempt to scale the heights; and in the "Journal of an Officer who was present during the whole Siege" (British Museum) is the following entry, dated Oct. 31st:—

"Five hundred Spaniards attacked the Middle Hill, but by the diligence and bravery of our officers were soon repulsed, and 200 men with their commanding officer taken; the rest were killed by our shot, or in making their escape broke their necks over the rocks and precipices, which in that place are very many and prodigiously high. In this skirmish Prince Henry was wounded."

became most destructive, all the guns which had been mounted on the heights of the Rock were destroyed, and provisions for 14 days only remained.*

Happily at this critical juncture intelligence arrived from Lord Methuen, our ambassador at Lisbon, announcing that 2000 effective men, with a full complement of officers, and provided with engineers' tools, would sail immediately for the Rock, and that a further reinforcement of 1000 men would leave as soon as ships to convey them should arrive from Ireland. Moreover, 500 men were ready to embark at Lagos, and Sir John Leake was requested to send three men-of-war to take them on board.†

The promise of such ample succour raised the drooping spirits of the garrison and alleviated the privations they endured. But disease was already rife among the troops and thinned the ranks with a fatal rapidity. Medicines became scarce, and the supply in the hospitals on shore having become exhausted, the surgeons were dependent upon the fleet for drugs. Shoes too were worn out and could not be replaced. Sandals were made of hay and straw.

By the 6th of December the garrison had reached the extremity of want, few men remained fit for duty, and the damaged parapets were left unrepaired.

* Prince of Hesse to Sir John Leake, Nov. 25th, 1704.

† Lord Methuen to Sir John Leake, Lisbon, Nov. 16th, 1704. Leake MSS.

Having become aware of the state of things within the walls, the enemy harassed the troops incessantly, day and night. The breaches were constantly attacked, but, although only 1300 healthy men were available for duty, the assaults were successfully repulsed.

On the 7th of December, to the inexpressible joy of the garrison, nine ships came in bringing troops, provisions, and munitions of war.

Off Cape Spartel they met with the French fleet under Commodore Pointé, and had a narrow escape from being captured, for the enemy hoisted English and Dutch colours, a stratagem which was fortunately observed before the fleet bore down upon them.

Encouraged by the reinforcements, a sally upon the advanced works was projected, and carried into execution on the night of the 12th with most complete success ; a great number of gabions were destroyed and the works demolished.*

On the 20th the garrison made another sally, which is described in the following letter from the Prince of Hesse.†

“By the Newcastle’s sailing to join the squadron under y^r comand I would not let pass so good an oportunity to acquaint you how this evening we resolved to make a sally, which succeeded to our

* Journal of an Officer during the Siege. British Museum.

† Prince of Hesse to Sir J. Leake, Dec. 23rd, 1704. Autograph, British Museum.

expectations, by ruining the enemy's two next trenches to our pallisadoes, so that it will be some days' work before they can make it up again; as for the rest, the bearer and Captain Legg, I do not doubt, hath given you a full account of our succours' happy arrival, and now it is hoped most of the rest is safe. I hope you will pardon the freedom I have taken in detaining this ship so long here for reason all the garrison wanting of fresh provisions. I desired him to convoy two of the transports to Tetuan which would not be ready sooner. In the mean time I hope you will be here soone,* that some dispositions might be taken how to drive the enemy quite out of their trenches, which only can be the securer executed by good assistance. Pray pardon this my ill whriting, being without a Secretary. I am with all sincerity,

“Y^r most humble sert.,

“GEORGE,

Prince of Hesse.”

On the 26th January, 1708, the Spaniards, having received reinforcements, made an attack upon the work at the extremity of the King's lines with a few grenadiers, but they were repulsed with the loss of two officers and many men; next day the assault was repeated with a force of 600 men, all French and Irish, supported by 1000 Spaniards. The object

* Sir John had sailed for Lisbon.

of this attack was to storm the breach in the round tower at the extremity of the King's lines, and another which had been made in the intrenchment on the hill; * the latter was defended at night by a captain, three subalterns, and 90 men, but 60 men were usually withdrawn at daybreak. The round tower † was garrisoned by a lieutenant-colonel and 180 men. By the means of intelligence from deserters, the Spanish general had become aware of the strength of these posts, and arranged the attack accordingly. The assaulting party told off for the breach in the intrenchment on the hill succeeded in climbing the Rock unobserved, and secreted themselves among the stony clefts until daybreak, when the 60 men had as usual been withdrawn from the guard.

At sunrise they burst from their concealment, assaulted the breach, and hurling hand-grenades over the wall, drove back the few men that remained to defend it. At the same moment 300 Spaniards attacked the breach in the round tower, which was gallantly defended by Lieutenant-Colonel Barr; notwithstanding that the enemy having passed the upper breach took him in flank, and caused him some loss by throwing down heavy stones and hand-grenades. At length, overwhelmed by numbers, the English were compelled to abandon the tower; but by this time the

* The line of communication between the round tower and Salto de Lobo.

† I suspect this was Fort San Pedro, before mentioned.

garrison had become alarmed, and 500 men, under command of Colonel Moncal, were sent to recover the position and drive out the enemy. This was easily effected, and the tower was retaken, after having been in possession of the Spaniards for about an hour.

Since December the besiegers had suffered terribly from the incessant rains and tempestuous weather. The trenches were filled with mud and water, and disease of a malignant type broke out in the camp. In consequence of the floods and rising of the rivers, the convoys of provisions from the interior could not reach the lines, and the soldiers endured horrible sufferings.

The siege had now lasted nearly five months, and in spite of the repeated assurances of the Marquis Villadarias, there appeared no prospect of success. Dissatisfied with the delay, and doubting the capacity of his general, King Philip availed himself of the offer of the French Court, and appointed Marshal Tessé to the command-in-chief of the combined army.

On the 8th February, the Marshal arrived before Gibraltar, bringing with him a reinforcement of 4000 men, which, in addition to four companies from the garrison of Oran and 1000 grenadiers who had arrived previously, recruited the besiegers and enabled them to recommence operations with fresh ardour.

The day before Marshal Tessé reached the camp a breach had been opened by the advanced batteries in the curtain-wall of the Land Port, and the Marquis

Villadarias, anxious to secure the honour of success by some brilliant action before the Marshal could arrive, gave orders to assault the place, although the practicability of the breach was doubtful.

At daybreak 18 companies, preceded by a number of grenadiers, advanced against the wall, but at a critical moment the French detachment gave way, leaving the Spaniards to sustain the assault alone. Unable to hold their ground against the terrible fire from the walls and the batteries on the hill above, the enemy retired in good order, leaving nearly 200 men in the ditch.

On the 28th February, the French fleet came into the bay, and a combined attack by sea and land was contemplated; the arrangements were completed, and a body of men was selected to land at the south of the Rock, with the intention of taking the defences in reverse, when fortunately a stiff gale sprung up, and the scheme was frustrated.

Tessé had no sooner arrived before the Rock than he became aware of the hopeless prospects of the army. The Spanish expedition was deficient in every requisite to sustain so great a siege. Writing on the 2nd January, 1705, to the Prince of Condé, he says:*

“Here I am before the Pillars of Hercules; and this siege, which has been undertaken with more

* Mémoires de Tessé.

perseverance and spirit than means of insuring success, would have been happily terminated if those means had been provided. But in Spain, to use the old proverb, we live only from day to day, and think not of remedies till evils appear. I found the siege indeed further advanced than I had reason to expect, notwithstanding the supplies of succours to the besieged, one instance of which I had the misfortune to witness. The English set us an example in keeping the sea in all seasons with as much tranquillity as your swans at Chantilly. But when the breaches had been rendered practicable, and only a few days were required to batter down what remained, our ammunition failed, and our useless artillery could not be changed. The squadron of Baron Pointé, without which the reduction cannot be completed, was detained by contrary winds. No convoy made their appearance, no cannon arrived, and as a mere point of honour a few shots only were fired every hour. Thus the enemy had time to repair their damages, while our army is almost annihilated.

“I was told on my arrival here that I should find 20 pieces of artillery and 300,000 pounds of powder: but the cannon are still at Cadiz, and I have no intelligence of the powder which was to have been forwarded from Toulon.

“If you ask why we do not raise the siege? I reply, the cannon and stores cannot be carried away

by land, and we have no means to convey them by sea. In a word, notwithstanding all the measures said to be adopted for obtaining money and other requisites, they are still in the same wretched condition at Madrid as we are here."

Immediately Sir John Leake was made aware of the arrival of Commodore Pointé in the Bay of Gibraltar he set sail from Lisbon, the fleet having been reinforced by a squadron of five third-rates, and some sloops under Admiral Sir Thomas Dilkes, making a total of 30 sail. On the 10th March about half-past five in the morning the fleet came abreast of Cabrita Point, the south-western extremity of the Bay of Gibraltar. In the mean time Pointé had been made aware of the approach of the squadron, and being afraid to risk an action, had on the previous morning sent a portion of the squadron to the eastward, intending to follow with the rest of the ships on the next day.

As Sir John Leake rounded Cabrita Point he came in sight of five French vessels, under command of the Commodore, beating for the eastward and endeavouring to round the southern point of the Rock. Observing that the batteries at Europa opened on the ships as they passed, he concluded that the garrison was safe, and immediately gave chase to the French squadron. After a short run he came up with the "Arrogant," 60 guns, which struck without resistance; he next captured the "Ardent," 56 guns, and

the "Marquis," 56 guns, while the "Magnanime," 74, and the "Lis," 86 guns, flag-ship of the Commodore, were run ashore near Marbella and burnt. Sir John continued sailing eastward, in the hope of falling in with the rest of the enemy's fleet, which was making for Toulon, but failing to come up with it, he returned to Gibraltar.

The French fleet having thus been dispersed, and the garrison reinforced and provisioned, Marshal Tessé became convinced of the futility of continuing the siege, and sent Colonel Renaud of the engineers to the King of France, to inform him of the hopelessness of his position, and his intention to abandon active operations, and convert the siege into a blockade. During the attack the enemy had lost not less than 10,000 men, principally from disease, occasioned by the wet and inclement weather and the scarcity of provisions.

On the 18th April, 1705, the siege was raised, a small force of Spaniards only remaining to preserve the blockade.* Marshal Tessé had from the commencement been conscious of the hopeless cause in which he was engaged. The Council of Spain were altogether unable and unwilling to meet the exigences of a slow and wearying siege. No master hand held the helm of the government; indolence and procrastination, the too frequent sources of disaster in Spain,

* During the siege the enemy threw 70,000 shot and 8000 shell into the place.

left the expedition in helpless misery during a tempestuous and inclement winter ; no money was forthcoming to pay the troops, the munitions of war were defective and scantily supplied, and orders as contradictory as imbecile were issued to the army from Madrid.

Writing to his master King Louis, a week after he had raised the siege, Tessé says :

“I received between Xeres and Seville the honour of your Majesty’s letter. I admire your Majesty’s firmness and goodness ; for if you had scolded us all, beginning with the king, your grandson, you would not have treated us according to our deserts. Never, to use the old proverb, was a plough so ill harnessed as this country, where everything passes without order, without precaution, without decision, without money, without objects ; in a word, without anything which is the support of states. If it was intended to ruin the monarchy, nothing could have been done more to the purpose.

“Your Majesty will have seen from my letters to Chamillard, the strange situation of what is here called war, troops, money, magazines, and preparations. God grant that the arrival of Orri may be a remedy for so many disorders ; at least that one person may be found near the King of Spain who can give orders. . . . We have failed before Gibraltar for want of method and precaution, and of those

arrangements with which no one is better acquainted than your Majesty.

“The unfortunate loss of your ships only happened because they do not comprehend at Madrid either the effect or practicability of what they order; they one day destroy what they do another.

“The general spirit of the Spaniards, even of the most zealous, is to foresee nothing,* to think that they are exculpated from the misfortunes they bring on themselves, by yielding to superior power. The king himself seems occasionally to desire that chance should furnish what can only be hoped for from the best-combined precautions, and his specific orders have an air of obstinacy which must injure his service.

“As to the funds which your Majesty commands me to establish for the subsistence of the troops, they have never laid before me anything but impossibilities; and the troops are neither paid nor recruited. In a word, sire, all things are in a miserable state.”

Spanish writers blame Marshal Tessé † for having

* In a letter to Amelot, (*Mémoires de Tessé*), he says :

“I would not trust a Spaniard, however brave, with the defence of a steeple; they fight duels, but as a body, and for their country, is an idea which never enters their heads.”

† A note to Campbell's *Lives of the Admirals*, reign of Queen Anne, says, referring to the attack on Gibraltar :

raised the siege, and attribute to his mal-administration the failure of the attack. But the only error that Tessé appears to have committed, was in not suspending operations immediately he arrived before the place. He found the army destitute, unpaid, ill fed, and despairing. The magazines were empty, the cannon useless, and sickness had struck down thousands.

To prosecute an arduous siege with such an army must have resulted in worse than defeat, in ruin. At that moment, Spain could ill afford to leave her troops to melt away before the stubborn defences of an inaccessible Rock.

For a moment the French general attempted to retrieve the fortune of the day, but in vain; then, choosing the lesser evil, he acknowledged defeat, and withdrew with the remnants of the expedition from a hopeless contest.

It is remarkable that the events of this siege did not open the eyes of the English cabinet to the importance of Gibraltar. They had witnessed the impatient anxiety of Spain to effect its recovery, they

“The obstinacy of the two courts in obliging their generals to continue this siege, when they were thoroughly sensible that it was to no purpose, proved the ruin of their affairs in Spain, at least for that campaign, and if it had not been for the accident of the Earl of Galway’s losing an arm by a cannon-shot, which occasioned the raising of the siege of Badajoz, King Philip in all probability had been driven out of Spain.”

had seen all her extensive military plans resigned, her forces withdrawn from a threatened frontier, and the assistance of a powerful ally called to her aid, for one grand object, the subjection of Gibraltar. But although the ministry depreciated the value of the possession, the people began to form a just estimate of its importance. The gallant defence during the recent siege was a military achievement that excited the popular admiration, and Gibraltar became valuable in the eyes of the public, when its name was associated with British gallantry and blood. It is not to be forgotten that had it not been for the "people," Gibraltar would now have been the stronghold of some other power. As we shall presently see, it was the dread of popular indignation that deterred subsequent cabinets from bartering with Spain for the restitution of the Rock.

Stanhope, whose familiarity with the secret policy of the Court of Madrid should have given him a clearer judgment, did not perceive that England could gain any advantage by its possession. Townshend held a similar opinion, and even the elder Pitt was willing to surrender it, had he not feared the storm of public wrath.

How dearly it was prized by Spain is proved by her unceasing efforts to recover it either by force of arms or by diplomacy, and it is worthy of remark that no single system of foreign policy was conceived

by any of her most famous ministers which did not include as one of its most important objects the restoration of Gibraltar.*

The siege which had closed in 1705 destroyed the hopes which Philip had cherished for the recovery of the fortress by force, and when in 1711 the war of the Succession ceased, and the Archduke Charles acquired the throne of Germany, the Catholic King resorted to the shifts and artifices of diplomacy with sanguine expectations of success.

During six years after the cessation of hostilities before Gibraltar, the struggle of the Succession continued. Amongst other enterprises in favour of the archduke a second expedition was sent against Barcelona, the fleet being commanded by the famous Earl of Peterborough, and the land forces by Prince George of Hesse, who embarked at Gibraltar. On this occasion the attack succeeded, but Prince George was killed in the assault.

The death of the Emperor Joseph, in April, 1711, put an end to this sanguinary campaign; and two years subsequently, at the celebrated conference of Utrecht, a treaty of a general peace was signed by the sovereigns of England, Spain, France, and the other allies, with the exception of Austria.

By this treaty the security of the Protestant suc-

* Vide The Foreign Policy of Alberoni, Ripperda, and Florida-Blanca.

cession in England was insured. The French and Spanish crowns were disunited, Spain was deprived of half her possessions in Europe, and Gibraltar was finally ceded to Great Britain in the following terms :

“The Catholic King does hereby for himself, his heirs, and successors yield to the Crown of Great Britain the full and entire propriety of the Town and Castle of Gibraltar, together with the Port, fortifications, and forts belonging thereto. And he gives up the said propriety to be held and enjoyed absolutely with all manner of right for ever without any exception or impediment whatsoever.” . . . “And Her Britannic Majesty does consent and agree that no leave shall be given under any pretence whatever either to Jews or Moors to reside or have their dwelling in the said Town of Gibraltar. . . . And in case the possession of Gibraltar should hereafter be alienated, it is covenanted that a preference, to the entire exclusion of all other pretenders, shall be given to the Crown of Spain.”

CHAPTER IX.

1715—1727.

To unravel the mysteries which shroud the negotiations for the surrender of Gibraltar to the Spanish Crown, negotiations which in the first instance extended over a period of 11 years, and were conducted with the greatest secrecy and caution, is no easy task.

The proposal seems first to have been suggested by the British cabinet to Spain in 1715, and was from time to time renewed until the outbreak of hostilities in 1726. During these 11 years scarcely a single overture for the settlement of a satisfactory peace was made by Spain to England which was not founded upon the surrender of Gibraltar, either unconditionally, or upon the guarantee of an equivalent.

The history of the political relations of the two countries during those 11 years exhibits a constant train of negotiations for the restitution of the fortress, and the discussions arising from the proposals were interminable.

In 1715 George I. appears to have suggested to

the Court of Spain, through the medium of the Regent of France, the possibility of the restoration of Gibraltar upon certain conditions.

But fresh complications which arose in Europe after the peace of Utrecht interrupted any negotiations on the subject, and the promise, or rather the offer, was cancelled.

Scarcely had the treaty of Utrecht re-established peace, ere Spain, guided by the ambitious hand of Alberoni, alarmed all Europe by the magnitude of her warlike preparations. A powerful armament was organized for the invasion of Sicily, and 30,000 men were successfully disembarked within a few miles of Palermo.

The awakening power of Spain aroused the apprehensions of the European powers, and rapidly hastened the conclusion of the Quadruple Alliance.

Every effort was made to induce Spain to join the treaty, but in vain. For a moment Alberoni feigned compliance; but after the success in Sicily, the situation of affairs rapidly assumed the gravest importance, and it was agreed that no sacrifice would be too great to check the aggressive spirit of Spain. At this juncture it was resolved once more to try that tempting bait, the restoration of Gibraltar. The offer was made, the only condition involved being the accession of Philip to the Quadruple Alliance. But the king, inflamed with the victorious news from Sicily, and influenced by the tempting promises of his ministers,

indignantly rejected the proposal. The news of the destruction of the Spanish fleet off Palermo by Admiral Byng had not at that time reached Madrid. When the intelligence arrived it created the greatest consternation, and bitter were the remonstrances addressed to the British Government against the alleged outrage. From that moment the haughty demeanour of Spain began to subside. Unable to carry out his ambitious designs by force of arms alone, Alberoni entered into subtle intrigues with Russia and Sweden for the invasion of England, and caballed against the throne of the Regent.

The plot for the subversion of the French monarchy was discovered before it could be put into execution, and hostilities, disastrous to Spain, ensued; in Sicily the army suffered misfortunes and reverses, the schemes for the invasion of Britain failed, and the short-lived power of Spain rapidly declined. These reverses were quickly followed by the downfall of Alberoni, whose dismissal from Madrid in disgrace was followed by the accession of Philip to the Quadruple Alliance.

Having at length complied with the desire of the allies, and renewed the peace of Europe, the first act of the king was to demand the restoration of Gibraltar. The negotiation was conducted through the Regent, who, desirous of cementing his alliance with Spain, undertook to promise that he would induce England to comply with Philip's wishes.

Eager for the accomplishment of his expectations, the king urged the immediate cession of the fortress, with such vehemence that the English Government, which was not yet prepared for the surrender, was compelled to renounce the obligation which Philip affirmed had been contracted for its restoration. This disavowal irritated the Spanish Court; and the Regent, reproached with faithlessness, found it expedient to send an envoy to England to explain how deeply he was committed to the promise of the surrender of Gibraltar. The British cabinet, hitherto ignorant of the favourable expectations that had been held out to Spain by the Regent, was perplexed with the situation; on the one hand, threatened the indignation of the people if the fortress were given up; on the other, the probability of the loss of the Regent's alliance with a war as its consequence. In this dilemma the Government decided upon sounding the temper of the people, by bringing forward a motion in Parliament relative to the restoration of the Rock. No sooner was the real nature of the question understood, than the proposition was met by an universal outburst of indignation.

“We have made a motion,” says Lord Stanhope in a letter to Sir Luke Schaub, “relative to the restitution of Gibraltar,* to pass a bill for the purpose of

* Lord Stanhope to Sir Luke Schaub. Paris, March 28th, 1720.

leaving to the king the power of disposing of that fortress for the advantage of his subjects. You cannot imagine the ferment which the proposal produced. The public was roused with indignation at the simple suspicion that at the close of a successful war, so unjustly begun by Cardinal Alberoni, we should cede that fortress. One circumstance greatly contributed to excite the general indignation, namely, a report, insinuated by the opposition, that the king had entered into a formal engagement to restore Gibraltar, which was deemed a sufficient ground to attack the minister. Many libels have been published to alarm the nation, and to excite them rather to continue the war than cede a fortress of such importance. We were accordingly compelled to yield to the torrent, and to adopt the wise resolution of withdrawing the motion; because, if it had been pressed, it would have produced a contrary effect to what is designed, and would perhaps have ended in a bill which might for ever have tied up the king's hands. Such being the real state of this business, you will endeavour to explain to the Court of Madrid that if the King of Spain should ever wish, at some future day, to treat concerning the cession of Gibraltar, the only method of succeeding would be to drop the subject at present. We are much concerned that France should have interfered on this occasion; the extreme eagerness which she testified was of great detriment. Some letters and memorials on that sub-

ject seemed even to threaten a rupture. The alarm was indeed so strong that people began to suspect France was meditating a change of system, and made Gibraltar a pretext to adopt other measures. The little alacrity she discovered in hastening the evacuation, her profound silence in regard to her negotiation with Spain, and the extraordinary language held by some persons in high estimation here, seemed to confirm these opinions, and was the cause of my coming to Paris."

The publicity that the transaction had by this time acquired led to further and searching inquiries into the exact position of England in the question, and the public dissatisfaction was further provoked by well-founded rumours that the king was pledged to the unconditional restoration of the fortress. Seizing upon the favourable moment, and profiting by the general excitement, the opposition* put malicious

* Three years later the opposition attempted to embroil the Cabinet with the Spanish minister, by suggesting secretly that Gibraltar might without difficulty be restored, and intimating that if Townshend's administration could be removed the wishes of the King of Spain would be complied with.

Pozobueno, writing to Ripperda, London, May 30, 1726, says,—

"Palm further says, that Pulteney afterwards treats of the restitution of Port Mahon and Gibraltar to Spain, without entering into the difficulties which he knows are made respecting it by the ministry, rather for their own private ends than on account of the impossibility of his Britannic Majesty's fulfilling his promise, which, he says, might be done with the

reports in circulation, and encouraged the publication of virulent pamphlets, with the object of rousing the passions of the people.

Under these circumstances the king determined upon sending Lord Stanhope to Paris, to explain to the regent the impossibility of pressing the restitution during the existing ferment, and to urge upon him the expediency of allowing the question to rest for a short season at least.

The letter which Stanhope carried with him from the king was firm and decided in its language; it acknowledged that an offer of cession had been made, but said that the offer was dictated only by a desire to avoid a rupture, and that Spain might have accepted it had she then acceded to the proposed conditions.* That it was now too late to revive the demand, as the King of Spain had proved himself the aggressor. It could never be understood that a voluntary offer of this nature, to prevent war, was binding as a preliminary of peace.

The king concluded by observing that he had never given his consent, since the rupture, to the renewal of the offer, and had received no communication from the regent of any intention to bring it forward.

consent of the nation provided the present ministry were changed."—*Walpole Correspondence*.

* *Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole*, vol. i.

Lord Stanhope's mission was entirely successful, and the Regent at once consented not to press the demand any further at that time.

Sir Luke Schaub, then at Madrid, was deputed to appease the irritation of the Spanish Court. But this was no light task.

"Gibraltar," says an eloquent historian (Lord Mahon), "was a question nearly touching the Spanish pride. It is almost incredible what deep and deadly resentment had been raised in that haughty nation, who had extended their conquering arms so far, to see a fortress upon their own shores held and garrisoned by England. They viewed it with still more bitter feelings than the French had formerly our possession of Calais, and there was scarcely a Spanish statesman of this period who might not have applied to himself the saying of Queen Mary, and declared that when he died the word *Gibraltar* would be found engraven on his heart."*

King George, still anxious to conciliate the Spanish monarch, proposed that the question should be referred to the approaching congress at Cambray, and so desirous was the British Cabinet to close satisfactorily this tedious and irritating negotiation, that Lord Stanhope in the mean time laid before the Lords Justices a suggestion that Gibraltar could be

* Mahon, History of England, vol. ii. p. 192.

ceded to Spain honourably and advantageously, if Florida or a part of St Domingo were given as an equivalent. Stanhope was convinced of the inexpediency of permitting the subject to be discussed at the congress. He was aware that the Regent, though apparently acquiescing in the views of England, would in all likelihood support Spain in her demand for Gibraltar,—“Dès que nous lui proposerons de traiter avec nous,” he says, “il nous proposera de son côté la cession de Gibraltar; et si nous la lui refusons, il renverra notre traité au Congrès où il sera sûr d’être appuyé dans cette demande par la France, et peut-être encore par d’autres Puissances. Ce point donc doit être déterminé avant que nous commencions à négocier avec l’Espagne.”* Urging upon Secretary Craggs the advisability of obtaining a settlement of the question at once, he says,—

“Reasons have induced His Majesty to order me to lay before the Lords Justices, for consideration, whether they ought not to profit by the strong desire that the King of Spain evinces to recover Gibraltar, to endeavour to obtain an equivalent advantage to our commerce. . . . In this case it seems to His Majesty that Gibraltar would not be regretted by us.

“The King of Spain, after having opened his mind to our minister concerning the reasons that make him

* Earl Stanhope to Secretary Craggs, Hanover, October 1st, 1720. Lord Mahon, Appendix.

wish for Gibraltar, added some which would prove that the preservation of the place is of little importance to us. He says that in time of peace we should have the use of it without the expense, when it is in his hands; and that in time of war he could take it from us with little trouble, or render the port useless to us by erecting batteries on his own ground. As to the use we can get out of Gibraltar in time of war, whatever it may be, it must be weighed not only against the equivalent that England will try to obtain, but also remembering the certainty that by the concession we can prevent for a long period Spain uniting herself with France to make war upon us.”*

Upon the proposal for the surrender of the place, with the promise of an equivalent being laid before the Lords Justices, it was met by a stormy discussion. Townshend, fearful of the temper of Parliament, was at first violently opposed to the measure, but at length gave his sanction, provided Florida were the equivalent granted.†

* Translated from the French. Stanhope to Craggs, 1st October, 1720.

† “My Lord Townshend n’a pas osé désapprouver entièrement la lettre de my Lord Stanhope. Il dit même qu’en gros il est du même sentiment, mais que les équivalens qui sont avancés ne contenteront pas le Parlement: et que si l’on obtenait du Roi d’Espagne un équivalent en terre, alors il ne faudrait pas balancer de céder Gibraltar.” Sir Luke Schaub to Mr William Stanhope. Madrid. London, Nov. 17th, 1720.

Fortunately for England Philip obstinately refused to cede any equivalent whatever for the restoration of the Rock ; he insisted upon his right to its possession, and declined to be shackled by any condition whatsoever.

He asserted that his sole reason for having acceded to the Quadruple Alliance was the promise of the restitution of Gibraltar, and he complained that he had been duped into agreeing to a peace which had created dissatisfaction among his subjects, by the offer of inducements which had proved fallacious.

It was certainly true that in Spain the peace was regarded as dishonourable. It was a maxim established throughout the length and breadth of the land, that no treaty could be honourable to the country which did not include the cession of Gibraltar to Spain. Indignant as the people of England were when its restoration was proposed, the rage of the Spaniards was no less violent when they found that it was not mentioned in the treaty.

Townshend, to whom, on the death of Stanhope, in February 1721, the management of this complicated affair was confided, had scarcely had time to trace out a solution of the question, when an application was received from the Catholic King, stating that so turbulent were his subjects in consequence of the terms of the peace that he requested, as an ostensible vindication

of the treaty, a letter from King George conveying a promise to restore Gibraltar.

Acting under the advice of Townshend and Carteret, the king complied with this demand, and a letter couched in discreet terms was written on the 29th of April:—"I no longer balance," said the king, "to assure your Majesty of my readiness to satisfy you with regard to your demand touching the restitution of Gibraltar, *upon the footing of an equivalent*, promising you to make use of the first favourable opportunity to regulate this article with consent of my Parliament."

When this letter was presented at Madrid by the British minister it was received by a volume of objections; these, with one exception, were eventually overcome, but the word "*equivalent*" was declared inadmissible, and with such a condition the letter was pronounced useless. Finding it would be impossible to overcome the dogged obstinacy of the king and queen, the minister consented to recommend that another letter should be written, in which the obnoxious clause would be omitted. Urged on by the representations of Townshend, who had already adopted the views of Earl Stanhope, and now regarded Gibraltar as of little value to the nation, King George agreed to write a second letter, believing at the same time that the document, even with the clause omitted, placed the affair entirely in the hands of Parliament, who might

either refuse to part with Gibraltar upon any terms, or demand an equivalent. But Philip viewed the letter in another light, and in all future negotiations maintained that it implied a positive promise of restitution.*

For two years this letter formed the subject of a bitter controversy, Philip always maintaining that the promise was unconditional, the king asserting that it rested with the discretion of his Parliament. To overcome the obstinacy of the Spanish Court, Mr Stanhope, the British Envoy at Madrid, was desired to obtain an interview with Philip, and to endeavour by the force of argument to convince him of the restricted terms of the promise. Accordingly Mr Stanhope put himself in communication with the Marquis de Grimaldo, with whom he held a preliminary conference. Grimaldo recognized the reasonableness of the views of the English cabinet regarding Gibraltar, and assured the minister that he held

* “ King George 1st to King Philip.

“ Sir,—My Brother,

“ I have learnt with extreme satisfaction, by means of my ambassador at your Court, that your Majesty has at length resolved to remove the obstacles which have for some time retarded the entire accomplishment of our union. . . . I do not delay in assuring your Majesty of my readiness to satisfy you as regards the restitution of Gibraltar, promising you that I will avail myself of the first favourable opportunity of settling this point, with the intervention of my Parliament.”

the same opinions on the question, and that the difficulties which had arisen owed their origin not to him or any other of the ministry, but proceeded solely from the king himself, whom he had never known so immoveable upon any point as upon the restitution of Gibraltar.

By advice of Grimaldo, Stanhope sought an audience with the king. At this interview the conversation, after relating to topics of minor importance, was turned to the subject which both speakers had so deeply at heart.

In reply to a demand upon what terms King George would enter upon a treaty, Stanhope said, that the confirmation of all treaties subsisting at the time of the rupture would be a sufficient basis, and that the questions of Gibraltar and the equivalent could be reserved for a future opportunity. To this latter proposition the king instantly demurred, repeating all those arguments which had so often been used before, and affirming that his accession to the Quadruple Alliance had depended solely upon the unconditional promise he had received from the Regent that Gibraltar should be restored.

When the British minister reminded him of the power of the Parliament, the king replied that if they would have consented to part with the place two years before to prevent a war, he did not understand why they should not be guided by the same argument at that time; that if they would not now hear of

parting with Gibraltar for the sake of peace, and the restoring of their commerce, he could not imagine they would ever be prevailed upon to do so. After a further discussion, in which Stanhope pointed out the difficulty of complying with the king's demands while the popular feeling in England was so opposed to them, it was decided to refer the question to Grimaldo, and a final answer was promised in a few days. When this reply came it proved, as might have been expected, directly unsatisfactory. It evaded the question of an equivalent, and was in fact a renewal of the king's resolution to demand the cession as a right.

Two reasons appeared to influence the king in his obstinate determination. First, the feelings of the nation, to whom it had more than once been publicly declared that Gibraltar should be restored. Secondly, the opinion he held that Parliament would for the sake of British commerce eventually accede to his demand.

“It is very unfortunate,” says Mr Stanhope, “that our hands are tied as to Gibraltar, so as not to take advantage of this immoderate desire the King of Spain has to obtain it; for were it otherwise, notwithstanding the pretended promise of it, I am fully persuaded we might yet sell it for double its worth, in advantages to our commerce.”*

* William Stanhope to Sir Luke Schaub, Madrid, Jan. 18, 1721.

Townshend had been of opinion that if Florida were offered as an equivalent, the popular voice would not be raised against the exchange, and Stanhope was instructed to sound the Spanish ministry upon the question. But it was found that such a proposal would meet with insurmountable obstacles; the Spaniards dreaded the establishment of any foreign influence in their West Indian possessions. The subject was mooted by Stanhope to Grimaldo, but the latter was as obstinately opposed to this measure as the King of Spain was to the grant of any equivalent whatever. Thus the British minister's endeavours to settle this tedious and irritating question failed at all points.*

During the next few years active negotiations appear to have ceased, and the question was suffered to slumber.

In 1725, the sudden espousal of Louis XV. with Maria of Poland, and the dismissal of the Infanta from Paris, brought on hostilities between France and Spain; the congress at Cambray was broken up, and the negotiation regarding Gibraltar remained unsettled. Six weeks had not elapsed since the departure of the Infanta before Europe was alarmed by the announcement of a treaty between Spain and the Emperor, signed on the 30th April, at Vienna. This treaty contained several most important articles, but

* Coxe's *Memoirs of Kings of Spain*; *Memoirs of Sir R. Walpole*; *Mahon's Hist. of England*.

another, a secret one, was concluded on the 1st of May, which in substance amounted to an offensive alliance. In it the Emperor pledged his good offices to obtain the recovery of Gibraltar and Minorca, and other engagements, aimed against the tranquillity of Great Britain, were arranged.

Before the intelligence of the conclusion of this treaty had reached Madrid, it had been openly asserted at Vienna that England would be compelled to restore Gibraltar, or it would be wrested from her by force. Mr Stanhope was instructed to demand from Grimaldo whether this declaration was made by authority from the King of Spain. Philip at first disavowed the statement, and the British minister was about to transmit the reply to his court, when a note arrived from Grimaldo demanding *the immediate restitution of Gibraltar*, with the alternative of a declaration of war.

Unable to comprehend this sudden revolution of the king's resolve, Stanhope hurried back to the palace, and in an audience remonstrated against the inconsistency of such a sudden claim, and represented that Parliament was not then sitting, without whose sanction the question could not be discussed.

The queen sharply interrupted him: "No!" she exclaimed, "then let the king your master return instantly to England, and summon a Parliament, a measure we have a right to expect from his repeated offers of friendship. I am fully convinced that the

proposal would not meet with a single negative in either House. To give more weight to the demand let this short argument be used,—either relinquish Gibraltar, or your trade to the Indies; the question will not admit of a moment's delay.”*

In addition to this secret engagement in the treaty of the 1st of May, Ripperda,† the envoy employed by the Court of Madrid to negotiate the peace, was assured by the Emperor that every assistance would be given for the recovery of both Gibraltar and Minorca, if necessary, by force of arms.

The existence of any understanding upon this point between the two Courts was afterwards distinctly denied, but there is sufficient evidence to warrant the belief that the information subsequently given by Ripperda to Mr Stanhope was in substance correct. If

* Mr Stanhope to Lord Townshend, Aug. 6, 1725. Coxe's Mems. of Kings of Spain.

† This remarkable man, whose career was marked by the romance of fiction, had no sooner concluded the treaty with the Emperor than he found himself Prime Minister of the country with a Dukedom. But his sudden elevation was followed by acts of ridiculous extravagance. Altogether deficient in every quality that is required to make a statesman, he made himself contemptible by his loud and vain-glorious boasting, while his folly and insolence brought upon him the displeasure of all parties; and he soon had for inveterate enemies, not only all the ministers, but the whole Spanish nation. His fall was as rapid as his rise. One morning, 14th May, 1726, without any previous warning, he was dismissed from office, and was compelled to take refuge from an infuriated mob in the house of the British Ambassador.

there was no secret article, there was, as we shall see, at least a private arrangement.

The treaty of Vienna had been concluded but a few months when rumours calculated to give rise to alarm reached the British Government. Hints were circulated that the Emperor had bound himself to espouse the cause of the Pretender, and secret clauses touching the restoration of Gibraltar were affirmed to exist.

In February, 1726, these rumours were in part confirmed by the confessions of Ripperda himself, who informed Mr Stanhope that a second treaty between the King of Spain and the Emperor had been concluded, and that it would shortly be made public. This treaty, he said, consisted of three particular articles, besides the general one of a perpetual alliance, offensive and defensive: viz.—

1st. An engagement on the part of Spain to support and maintain the Company of Ostend.

2nd. An engagement on the part of the Emperor (as an equivalent for the former) to procure Gibraltar for the King of Spain, by good offices if possible, but if they prove ineffectual by open force.

3rd. The adjustment of the succours to be reciprocally furnished in case of a war, viz. on the part of the Emperor 30,000 men, to be actually sent by him into Spain. On the part of Spain, money to be sent for the payment of the like number of troops



wheresoever the Emperor should think fit to employ them.*

The indiscretion committed by Ripperda in divulging this important information to Stanhope is inexplicable.†

The intelligence was instantly forwarded to England, and also communicated by the Dutch ambassador to his Government. To the dismay of Ripperda, it immediately became public, and formed the subject of parliamentary discussion.

As the spring of 1726 advanced the situation of affairs at Madrid assumed a gloomier aspect. With

* William Stanhope to the Duke of Newcastle, Madrid, Feb. 4th, 1726. *Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole*, vol. ii.

† The following anecdote related by Count Rottembourg to Mr Walpole furnishes additional proof of the existence of secret engagements between the two Courts.

“Count Rottembourg mentioned a very remarkable thing. In speaking of me to their Catholic Majesties, he told them I had wrote Mr Keene word, in one of my private letters, that I had such an opinion of their veracity, that if it was possible to ask them the question, and they would declare there was no other treaty between the Emperor and Spain than that which was public, I would freely own that all the measures taken by England were wrong and unjustifiable. Having said this to their Catholic Majesties, they made him no manner of answer; and, observing their countenances, the queen looked upon the ground and the king coloured extremely. But Her Catholic Majesty having recovered herself, said to the king, Sir, you never did make any treaty against England. The king, however, continued silent and said nothing.” *Coxe's Memoirs of Kings of Spain*, vol. ii. p. 338.



such a minister as Ripperda at the head of affairs, it was impossible to conjecture what a day might bring forth. Destitute of veracity, a stranger to the dictates of honour, intoxicated with his rapid rise, assuming an insolence that became intolerable, and guided by no fixed policy, he entangled the affairs of the nation in hopeless confusion.

Though placing no confidence in his promises and protestations, Stanhope endeavoured by every means to conciliate him and to avoid a misunderstanding. He made use of every argument to show what reasonable grounds the king his master had to be dissatisfied with the affront and injuries offered to him by the secret offensive alliance, and he intimated that the British nation would never submit to such an insult.

In reply, Ripperda denied that the secret treaty complained of was intended to disturb the peace of Europe, an assertion which he endeavoured to prove by affirming that the King of Spain and the Emperor were desirous of removing any bitter feelings that might have been caused by the articles relating to Gibraltar, and he remarked, that although the Emperor had agreed to assist the Catholic King in recovering that place, the terms of the treaty specified "*Amicabiliter si fieri potest.*" But upon being pressed by Stanhope and the Dutch ambassador, he confessed that the several articles of the secret alliance were couched in the same language in which he had previously communicated them to the British minister.

After proposing that the question of the Ostend Company and Gibraltar should be referred to a congress, a course repudiated by Stanhope, he ended by declaring that nothing could induce the Emperor to revoke his patent given to the Ostend Company, nor would the King of Spain desist from his demands upon Gibraltar. Within a month after he had made this declaration Ripperda was a prisoner in Segovia.

Before leaving Madrid, and while concealed in the house of the British minister, Ripperda had disclosed to Mr Stanhope the plans and intrigues of the Spanish Court, and, anxious to secure the protection of England and to effect a safe flight from Spain, had communicated the most private secrets of his administration.

He again gave the history of the secret alliance. Whilst making these discoveries, says Mr Stanhope, he appeared to be in the greatest agony, and cried like a child.

When more certain intelligence of the secret alliance reached England it caused the greatest indignation ; and the subsequent disclosures of Ripperda increased the agitation. It was recognized that Spain had resolved to regain Gibraltar, and from the activity of her preparations it was feared she would have recourse to arms. But her ministers and those of the Emperor still denied any such intention. In reply to a query put by Mr Stanhope in September, 1726, the Marquis de la Paz assured him that—

“ As for the false confidence which the Duke de

Ripperda made last winter to your Excellency, that an offensive alliance had been concluded by which the Emperor had expressly engaged himself for the recovery of Gibraltar, His Imperial Majesty has already sufficiently endeavoured to undeceive His Britannic Majesty; the intention being *only to remind* His Britannic Majesty of the promises he has made on this head, which neither His Majesty nor the Spanish nation can ever renounce.”

As the year wore on and the plans of Spain had become more matured, these solemn denials were succeeded by more honest avowals. In December, the Marquis de Pozobueno, the Spanish ambassador in London, informed the Duke of Newcastle that everything which had been said to Mr Stanhope, both by word of mouth and in writing, relative to the good understanding between the two nations depending upon the immediate restitution of Gibraltar, was true; further, that the Catholic King renewed his demand for the restoration, and founded his claim upon the *positive promise* which had been given to him. The ambassador continued to affirm that the cession which His Catholic Majesty had previously made at the peace of Utrecht had become null and void, because of the infraction made in the conditions on which the English garrison was permitted to remain in possession of Gibraltar; seeing that, contrary to all the protestations made, they had not only extended their fortifications, by exceeding the limits prescribed and stipu-

lated, but had also, contrary to the express literal tenor of the treaties, permitted Jews and Moors, enemies to the Catholic religion, to reside in the city.

The contents of this letter, which soon became known, heightened the popular excitement, and when Parliament met on the 17th January, 1727, the King's Speech was awaited with anxiety. Its delivery realized the worst fears of the nation.

The king said :—

“ I have received information on which I can entirely depend, that the placing the Pretender upon the throne of this kingdom is one of the articles of the secret negotiations at Vienna ; and if time shall evince that the giving up the trade of this nation to one power, and Gibraltar and Mahon to another, is made the price and reward of imposing upon this kingdom a Popish Pretender, what an indignation must this raise in the breasts of every Protestant Briton ! ” He added, “ That the Spanish minister insists upon the restitution of Gibraltar, ” and announced that “ His Catholic Majesty is now making preparations to attack and besiege Gibraltar. ”

The Speech aroused the indignation of both Houses ; in the Lords an address was voted saying that,

“ The peremptory demand of the restitution of Gibraltar, which place, and the island of Minorca, being both of the *utmost consequence to your people*, were yielded up by the present King of Spain him-

self, and do indisputably belong to the Crown of Great Britain by the most solemn treaties. . . . we will to the utmost of our power enable your Majesty to assert and defend your right to Gibraltar and the island of Minorca, which are of the greatest importance to the preservation of the commerce and naval strength of Great Britain.”

In the Commons an address was also agreed to by an overwhelming majority (251 to 81). The army was raised to 26,000 men, a vote was given for 20,000 seamen, and supplies to the amount of £3,000,000 was granted. During the debate in the Lords, the king's celebrated letter to Philip, hinting at the restitution of Gibraltar, was the subject of some discussion. Lord Bathurst denied there was any reason for a war with Spain,—that although Ripperda might have dropped some indiscreet expressions, these had been disavowed by His Catholic Majesty, that the Spanish ambassador ascribed the present crisis to the conduct of the English ministers, and mentioned that a positive promise had been made by the king for the restoration of Gibraltar.

In reply, Lord Townshend affirmed that no promise to cede Gibraltar had been given.

In the Commons a warm debate ensued on the address. Mr Hungerford declared that he had in his pocket the purport of the secret article in the Treaty between Spain and the Emperor, which stated,—

“That in case the King of Spain could produce a

positive promise from Great Britain to restore Gibraltar, his Imperial Majesty would engage to become a *mediator* and guarantee for the performance of such promise."

Mr Shippen believed that some such promise had been made, and Sir Robert Walpole in reply said, that, " *If* such a promise had been made, it was not whilst he was in the administration, and he durst aver that it was conditional, and made void and invalid by the King of Spain's refusing to comply with the conditions upon which it was made, and that when the performance of these promises was mentioned to him he always delivered it as his fixed opinion that Gibraltar would not be given up without the consent of Parliament."

This evasive and unsatisfactory statement increased the suspicion that the king had been induced to make some promise, and on the 8th February Mr Sandys moved an address to the king, praying that the declaration, letter, or engagement on which was founded the assertion of Marquis de Pozobueno, that a promise to restore Gibraltar existed, might be produced.

Sir William Wyndham, Mr Hungerford, and Pulteney supported the motion, while Mr Pelham, Mr Broderick, Mr Walpole, and Sir Robert opposed it. The motion was lost by 204 against 97.*

* Parliamentary History.

The King's Speech gave great offence to the Court of Vienna, and Mons. Palm, the ambassador of the Emperor in London, was desired to present a memorial to the king denying the truth of the assertions relative to the secret alliance, and afterwards to publish it to the nation.

The terms of this memorial were bold and unscrupulous; it was declared that the king had spoken falsely, that the treaty of Vienna was based upon the Quadruple Alliance, that no secret engagement had ever existed, and that the statement relating to the Pretender and Gibraltar was absolutely untrue. The excitement caused by the insolence of this memorial hastened the rupture between Spain and England. All parties united in the condemnation of the course adopted by the Emperor.

In Parliament, not a single member lifted his voice in palliation of it, and even Pulteney and his party joined the Government, in an address to the king, expressing "the highest resentment at the affront offered to His most sacred Majesty by the memorial delivered by Mons. de Palm, the Emperor's resident, and at his insolence in printing and dispersing the same throughout the kingdom."

Palm was ordered to quit the country, and a war became inevitable. In the mean time Spain had been maturing her preparations for a campaign.

An army destined for the siege of Gibraltar was organized. Philip had always been convinced that the

fortress might easily be taken, but this opinion was not shared by those who knew its strength. The Marquis de Villadarias, a brave and honest soldier, who in 1705 had been driven defeated from before its walls, urged upon the king the folly of a siege, and even refused to accept the command of the expedition. The king, irritated at this obstinacy, desired him to comply with his wishes, or resign his commission and emoluments. The old soldier remained firm in his resolve, and retired into poverty and seclusion.

The opinion of the Marquis de Villadarias was so much respected and had such influence in Spain, that Philip found a difficulty in procuring any general to head his army. Numerous councils were held, and many proposals made without any result, until at length the Condé de las Torres, an officer distinguished in the war of the Succession, and then viceroy of Navarre, offered his services, and boasted that in six weeks he would plant the standard of Spain upon the Rock. Like most Spaniards, he was a man of many words but few deeds.

CHAPTER X.

THIRTEENTH SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR.

THE hostile intentions of Spain were no sooner declared, than an expedition was directed against Gibraltar. Admiral Sir Charles Wager was at this time with the fleet in the Mediterranean, and the fortress was in charge of General Gaspar Clayton, in the absence of the governor, the aged Earl of Portmore.

Early in January, 1727, the movements of the Spaniards in the neighbourhood of the Rock aroused the suspicion of Admiral Wager, who, observing considerable activity in the usually tranquil camp at St Roque, sent home an express to inform the Cabinet of what was occurring. Great quantities of provisions and stores were brought on ship-board into the bay and landed on the northern shore, guns and munitions of war arrived from Cadiz, and everything assumed a warlike aspect.*

* Sir C. Wager to Duke of Newcastle, Jan. 10th, 1727. King's MSS., British Museum.

As early as the 7th of December, Mr Stanhope had apprized the authorities at Gibraltar of the danger with which they were threatened. Despatches to that effect had been sent by Colonel Dunbar, who was also charged with secret information for the governor and admiral. Proceeding by way of Malaga, Dunbar there procured a vessel to carry him to Gibraltar, and had proceeded four leagues on his voyage when he was pursued by a Spanish man-of-war, arrested on no charge, and thrown into the common gaol. This outrage (war was not then declared) roused the indignation of our minister at Madrid, and every effort was made to convince the Spanish Government of the enormity of the act, and to obtain the release of the prisoner. Such remonstrances, directed as they were to a Government blind to all sense of right and wrong, met with no redress. The colonel was still detained, and even subjected to more degrading treatment. No person was permitted to see him; pen, paper, and books were forbidden him; and he was confined with all the rigour of a felon. He remained in prison upwards of a month, and neither during that time nor subsequently was any crime alleged against him.*

The despatches which Colonel Dunbar carried were fortunately saved and transmitted to the admiral at Gibraltar. These despatches apprized the

* King's MSS., British Museum. Mr Stanhope to Admiral Hopson.

authorities of the hostile attitude of the Spanish court, and recommended that, as the recovery of Gibraltar was the dearest object of the Catholic King, that fortress should be placed in a complete state of defence.*

On the 15th of December, further and more important information was received from Mr Stanhope, to the effect that the place was to be attacked by a powerful army, not through the tedious stages of a siege, but by a "sudden push on the sea line and by scaling ladders, encouraged by the weakness of the garrison." †

At the same time it was discovered that ovens to supply 23,000 men were being constructed on the plain at the head of the bay. By the 25th of the month, large bodies of troops had begun to assemble, vast preparations were being made, and great anxiety was experienced lest a general assault should at once take place. Urgent appeals were addressed to the admiral, begging him to land marines from on board the fleet. But the Spanish army remained quiet, apparently engaged in completing their arrangements.

On the 18th of January, information was received from the consul at Malaga, that the whole of the militia of the province were under orders to set out for the camp at St Roque, each man to carry a bill-hook and hatchet instead of arms. These men were

* Stanhope to Admiral Hopson, December 7th, 1726. King's MSS.

† Governor Kane to Admiral Hopson, Dec. 15th, 1726.

to be employed working in the trenches, and preparing gabions and fascines. The heavy artillery, nearly all brass, of a new and in those days formidable pattern, was sent forward from Cadiz by land; but the means of transport were so inadequate, and the roads so bad, that before the siege train had advanced four leagues on the journey it was stuck fast in the mud, and could be moved neither backwards nor forwards.

This, the commencement of misfortunes, was soon aggravated by ill-concealed discontent betraying itself in the camp; no money was forthcoming to pay either the officers or men, and such was the state of the Spanish exchequer that even the smallest and most common charges could not be liquidated.*

Finding the roads impassable, the Spaniards employed boats to convey their iron cannon and ammunition from Cadiz to Algeciras. As many as 40 vessels sailed in one day. To complete the siege train every available gun was taken from Cadiz, and, in spite of the remonstrances of the governor, the walls were stripped of heavy cannon, and old nine-pounders mounted in their stead.

To swell the ranks of the army the garrison, too, was drained, so that not sufficient men were left to mount the city guards. Yet, while all these difficulties

* British Consul, Malaga, to Admiral Hopson. King's MSS.

were arising at the very outset of the campaign; Las Torres braggingly wrote to the king to say that he would hand over Gibraltar whenever His Majesty pleased.*

Early in February, the expedition, with the exception of the brass siege train, had approached completion; 3000 peasants were called in from the country to assist in cutting fascines and making huts; and Las Torres, with all his staff, was indefatigable, urging on the construction of batteries at the head of the bay (Punta Mala), and superintending their progress in person.

Immediately the Government at home became aware of the hostile intentions of Spain, orders were sent to Minorca desiring Colonel Kane to proceed to Gibraltar, and to take with him any reinforcements that could be spared. Fortunately a regiment was at that time embarking for England, which, by Kane's instructions, sailed immediately and reached the Rock early in February. On the 14th of January, a squadron of six ships, under Admiral Sir Charles Wager, arrived from England, having on board three companies of Colonel Anstruther's, eight companies of Colonel Disney's, and six of Colonel Newton's regiment, which raised the strength of the garrison to about 1500 men.

On the 13th of February, 1727, the Spanish army,

* Consul Cayley, Cadiz, to Colonel Kane, Jan. 31, 1727.

consisting of nearly 20,000 men, marched into the campamento of San Roque in the immediate vicinity of the Rock.

General Clayton had already received notice from Admiral Wager that it was the intention of the enemy to provoke hostilities by throwing up a battery within forbidden distance of the fortress.

On the 17th, a courier arrived in the camp from Madrid, bringing the king's orders for the commencement of operations.

The Spanish expeditionary army was constituted as follows:—

Commander-in-Chief,—Count de las Torres.

Lieut.-Generals, Marquis d'Alonches.

Marquis de Verboom.

Count de Glimes.

Count de Montemar.

Don Francisco de Ribadeo.

Eight Major-Generals. Nine Brigadier-Generals.

Names of the Regiments.

	No. of battalions.		No. of battalions.
Spanish Guards	3	Batadoli	1
Valloons	3	Irish Brigade	2
Savoy	2	Voltonia	1
Granada	2	Naples	2
Badajos	1	Limerick	1
Victoria	2	Corsica	1

	No. of battalions.		No. of battalions.
Sicily	1	Lacomeria	1
Flanders	1	Swiss	1
Antwerp	1	French dragoons	} 1
Mons	1	dismounted	

17 squadrons of Cavalry.

Six companies of the Corps of Carbineers.

Total,—Cavalry	720
Infantry	18,550
	<hr/>
	19,270

On the 22nd February, the enemy broke ground by commencing a battery on the western beach, which attracted the attention of General Clayton. He immediately addressed the following remonstrance to the Spanish general :

“ Having observed this morning that your Excellency has opened a trench in order to attack this fortress, which act I hold to be contrary to the treaties existing between our sovereigns, no declaration of war yet having reached my knowledge, I therefore inform your Excellency, that if you do not forthwith order the works to cease I shall be obliged to take necessary measures in consequence. I transmit this to your Excellency by my secretary, to whom I beg a reply may be delivered.

“GASPAR CLAYTON.

“Gibraltar, Feb. 22nd, 1727.”

To this Count las Torres replied :

“ Sir,

“ I received your Excellency’s letter of to-day’s date, and regarding the trench which has been opened as you say to attack the city of Gibraltar, I hereby answer, that what has been done has been on our own ground, to fortify those places where our batteries might be of good service, and as there belongs nothing to that fortress beyond its fortifications, as appears by the very treaties your Excellency alludes to ; and your Excellency having taken possession of the towers within our jurisdiction, your Excellency may be fully assured that unless they are immediately abandoned, I will act in the manner your Excellency insinuates to *me*, acquainting you at the same time that for besieging that fortress works less distant will be constructed, as you will learn in due time.

“ COUNT LAS TORRES.

“ Campo de Gibraltar, Feb. 22nd, 1727.”

This reply was accepted by General Clayton as a declaration of hostilities, but, anxious to have right clearly on his side, he withdrew the outlying picquets, and fired one shot over the battery as a signal for the enemy to desist. After the lapse of an hour, finding that the work continued, he opened fire from the guns at the old mole and Willis’s batteries.

Although General Clayton had been informed on

undoubted authority that the Spaniards intended to provoke a breach of the peace by breaking ground on neutral territory and by assuming a hostile attitude in the vicinity of the fortress, yet he felt the heavy responsibility he had assumed in firing the first shot of the war. Through Admiral Sir Charles Wager a report explaining his reasons for having assumed the offensive was sent to the Government, and elicited the following reply from the Duke of Newcastle.*

“The governor did certainly no more than his duty in firing upon the Spaniards when he discovered them erecting a new battery within half cannon-shot of our fortifications. The king’s moderation and desire to avoid a rupture had been sufficiently shown by suffering the enemy to go on with their former works, by permitting their vessels with artillery stores and provisions to pass by unmolested, and even by the governor’s giving their General notice, in so prudent and gentle a method, that this last attempt of his was contrary to the treaties of peace and friendship subsisting between the two nations. The Spaniards by persisting in it became the aggressors, and far from the governor having incurred blame by his using force to obstruct their finishing that battery, every man who has the least notion of those matters must allow that, had he suffered them to go on undis-

* Duke of Newcastle to Sir C. Wager, March 7th, 1727. King’s MSS.

turbed with a work within the reach of his cannon, he would have deserved a very severe censure."

The Spaniards opened the siege under gloomy auspices. The expeditionary army was ill-prepared to carry on laborious and extensive operations, the artillery was deficient, fascines, timber, and materials for constructing the batteries were wanting; and, what was of even graver consequence, differences arose among the chiefs of the expedition.

An impression had prevailed from the very commencement that the enterprise was quixotic, and would prove disastrous; and a memorial had been addressed to the king by most of the principal officers of the army, representing the folly of entering upon an undertaking of such magnitude with such deficient means.

Among the most dissatisfied were, the Count de Glimes, Don Lucas Spinola, Don Francisco Ribadeo, Don Tomas Idiaquez, and Don Prospero Verboom, chief of the artillery. These men did not conceal their doubts as to the practicability of the enterprise, which they ridiculed as impossible; and had it not been for the conciliatory efforts of the Count of Montemar, and the tact and firmness of Las Torres, these disputes would have brought premature disaster upon the army.

At daybreak on the morning of the 23rd, the enemy opened fire upon the squadron in the bay,

from a battery at Punta Mala. Two shot struck the "Portland," but the rest of the fleet were too distant to receive any damage.

On the morning of the 22nd of February, instructions were issued to the army in the following general order.

"Marquis Spinola, general of the day; Rodrigo Pelalta, the Marquis de la Torre, major-general of the trenches; officers of the piquet, Don Francis Carilla Casabeo, Estorga and Juan Dios:—By divine assistance this day is to be put in execution the opening of our works and batteries against the garrison from the Devil's Tower through the centre of the sands to the western beach.

"The parade of arms is to be established on the eastern beach near the Genoese Cove, the men from which are to communicate with each other as far as the battery nearest to them, and the remainder are to lie in the main trench for a guard. The troops to mount in the trenches are the battalions following:

Spanish Guards 1st batt.

Valloons 1st batt.

First regt. of Granada. First regt. of Naples.

And the regiment of Flanders.

All under the conduct of Marquis Spinola.

"The said battalions are to stand to their arms, without beat of drum, exactly at four o'clock in the afternoon, and to march in front of the Spanish brigade, and from thence to their respective guards

whereto they shall be detached, and there strictly observe the orders that shall be given them for their march under the foot of the hill. A quarter guard only to be left in camp to take care of their tents.

“The Grenadier companies are to be formed in front of the detachment to cover their movements. 1200 workmen to be warned to parade at the same time at the park of artillery and there receive their tools. The brigadier-general to run his trench from the Genoese Cove till he joins the situation of the first battery.

“One colonel and 300 men to proceed from the Devil’s Tower to the battery, in front of them are to march 100 Grenadiers. 50 French dragoons and 40 horse, to remain at the western beach, to observe any attack that may be made.”

In accordance with these instructions, the Spaniards, under General Spinola, opened the trenches on the night of the 22nd, the first parallel running from the Devil’s Tower on the eastern beach along the base of the Rock, to the inundation. The operations were carried on by five battalions of foot, a brigade of engineers, and 1000 workmen. At daybreak on the 23rd, the English discovered the near approach of the enemy, and opened upon them with a heavy fire of artillery, musketry, shells, and grenades.

Observing that their eastern flank was entirely unprotected, Sir Charles Wager sent the Tiger and the Dursley galley round to the eastward of the

Rock, with orders to rake, if possible, the enemy's trenches.

The same night that these two vessels went to their station, the Spaniards advanced 2000 men close up under the northern face of the Rock, screened from the batteries, but exposed to fire from the sea. When day broke, these men were discovered by the ships, which had already anchored off the shore.

Afraid to retreat over the open ground, they huddled themselves together behind the low banks of sand or crept under shelter of the projecting rocks. From these hiding-places they were quickly dislodged by the garrison, who from the heights above flung showers of shells, hand grenades, and stones, while, as they were driven from their concealment, a murderous fire was opened upon them from the Tiger and the Dursley. They at length succeeded in effecting a retreat, but not until they had suffered immense losses. Having thus dearly discovered his weak point, Las Torres repaired his error, and threw up a powerful battery of 10 guns to command the anchorage off the eastern shore. Notwithstanding the opposition of the Tiger and Dursley, the work was quickly finished, and so well was it served that in a few hours after the guns opened the ships were driven off and compelled to return to the bay.

The attack during this siege was directed exclusively against the north front and defences of the Rock,

from the extremity of the old mole to Willis's battery.

The defences along this line consisted of the Land Port curtain, Willis's, the castle battery, north bastion, and the guns on the old mole. Most of the ordnance was old and worn out, and more casualties occurred during the siege from the bursting of the guns than from the enemy's fire.

On the 25th the first parallel was completed.

Notwithstanding the heavy fire from the fortress, the Spaniards rapidly increased their works. A battery was constructed on the western beach, which opened on the old mole head; another of eight guns, near the old wind-mill, which was directed against the principal wall of the Land Port, and also swept a portion of the bay; and to the left of this was a most powerful work containing eight guns and 12 mortars.*

During these operations the losses on both sides

* The daily guards and pickets mounted by the garrison during the siege averaged 1200 rank and file, stationed at the following posts.

Rock Guard,	Water Port,
Middle Hill,	Land Port,
Willis's Battery,	New Mole,
Signal House,	Europa Advance,
South Port,	Great Europa,
Castle Gate,	Quarter Guards,
Main Guard,	King's Lines,
Line Wall,	Prince's Lines,
Esplanade Picket,	Castle Picket.

were small. The enemy had but nine men killed in the 24 hours, and the casualties within the walls were insignificant.

The siege works were pressed forward with remarkable rapidity; 1000 men were constantly labouring in the trenches, and on the 3rd of March the second parallel was completed. On the same day a battery mounting 22 guns was unmasked, 200 paces nearer to the Rock; and at 300 yards' distance from the King's Lines a powerful mortar battery was completed.

The first of these works was directed against the Land Port curtain, between the bastions of San Pedro and San Paul, and was commanded by the Conde de Mariani.*

A steady fire was maintained by the garrison and great injury was done to the enemy's place d'armes on the western point of their works by the explosion of small mines at the summit of the Rock, which hurled masses of stony fragments into the intrenchments below.

The troops, who had suffered but little, were busy mounting ordnance and strengthening their works; one officer only, Captain Holman of the artillery, had been killed, and a few guns destroyed; the garrison working parties consisted of 1000 men, formed into

*"Correct Journal of an Officer during the Siege," British Museum. Montero, *Hist. de Gibraltar*. James, *Hist. Herculean Straits* (1775). *Official Journal of the Siege, Madrid, 1727*.

two divisions, one of 500 for the day, the other for the night. These men received sixpence per diem extra pay, and were assisted by the Jews, who were employed in taking ammunition to the batteries and clearing the ditch of the rubbish beaten down from the upper works by the enemy's shot; these unfortunate Israelites received no pay, and for some time were utterly useless, being paralysed with terror when under fire. The working parties were overlooked by officers of the line, acting as assistant engineers; the latter received 2*s.* 6*d.* a day, and were exempt from all other duty. They were relieved every 12 hours, and it was their business to see that the orders of the chief engineer were properly executed.

On the last day of February, the fleet under Sir Charles Wager put to sea and sailed to the westward. On the next morning, when scarcely clear of the Straits, the admiral fell in with a transport bound for Gibraltar, and having on board two companies of Colonel Haye's regiment; fearful lest the vessel might fall into the hands of the enemy's cruisers, Sir Charles shifted the troops on board a man-of-war, and waited a favourable opportunity to send them forward. A few days afterwards, while cruising outside the Straits, a prize, mounting 28 guns, and laden with wine, oil, brandy, and iron, was captured. The troops were again transferred to this ship and sent on to Gibraltar.

During the first week in March, heavy rain set in,

which damaged the trenches and hindered the works of the besiegers. The enemy now began to experience the difficulty of maintaining their communication with the interior and regulating the arrival of supplies. Ammunition had to come from Malaga, over roads which in stormy weather were almost impassable. Gunpowder was conveyed in waggons, each waggon drawn by 10 mules. Cannon-shot manufactured at Barcelona reached Malaga by sea, and from thence had to be dragged across the mountains to the camp.

By the 10th of the month the batteries were approached within 100 paces of the Rock, and from a work mounting 12 guns a heavy and damaging fire was kept up upon the north bastion and old mole. At this time information was received from a deserter that the enemy was attempting to run a mine into the Rock under Willis's and Queen Anne's batteries. The fire from these works had caused the greatest annoyance to the enemy, situated as they were upon a commanding height facing the north, and having an extensive range over the lines and trenches. Taking advantage of a natural cave, capable of holding about 20 men, Las Torres proposed to excavate a mine under the batteries, and thus to destroy them.

When the nature of this limestone rock is considered, it is impossible to exaggerate the folly of this attempt. After long and dangerous labour, the mine had advanced but a few feet, and although the work

was continued till the end of the siege, it was never made use of.

About the middle of the month, the enemy threw up another battery within musket-shot of the Land Port gate.

On the 17th, the Colchester man-of-war arrived, bringing a company and a half of Colonel Haye's regiment, and on the 26th, a frigate of 42 guns, captured by the Royal Oak, came in. The same day two of our men-of-war and a frigate anchored on the east coast near the Tower of Chullera at the mouth of the river Guadiaro, and fired upon the barges bringing fascines to the camp. Fearing that we intended to seize the post, from whence we might have set fire to the stores of gabions and fascines, the Spaniards sent two companies of Grenadiers and a detachment of horse to prevent a landing.

By the 31st several most formidable works were completed. But an entry in the official journal of the siege at this time shows that the Spaniards were beginning to experience the difficulties of their position :—*

“Desertion,” it says, “becomes very considerable, the troops greatly diminished by sickness. Some fresh troops are coming from Malaga to ease those in camp, who are greatly fatigued by hard duty; no sally yet made from the town, as the constant rains

* Official Journal of the Siege, Madrid, 1727.

have hindered the advance of our works, and it is supposed they thought their artillery sufficient to check our progress. We have yet dismounted only three of their cannon on the curtain, and deserters say they have not had above 15 men killed yet."

On the 7th April, the *Torbay*, 80 guns, came into the bay, bringing Colonel Middleton's and six companies of Colonel Haye's regiment. Several ordnance store-ships came under her convoy, laden with provisions and bringing many officers for the garrison. The same afternoon Sir C. Wager arrived with his fleet. About this time a terrific storm arose, with heavy rain, which destroyed much of the enemy's work, carrying away the traverses, inundating the trenches, and even tearing down in the mighty torrent that flowed from the mountain the strongest parapets of the batteries.

The effect of this deluge was disastrous to the besiegers. The trenches were untenable, their guns dismounted, and their cover destroyed. For some days the enemy were engaged draining the trenches, repairing the damaged works, and labouring to cover their men from the heavy fire of the mortars. Taking advantage of the confusion, General Clayton ordered every gun to open, and so harassing was the fire that their working parties were compelled to desist from labour by day, and carry on the saps after dark.

On the 21st April, the *Solebay* arrived with four transports from Minorca, having on board Colonel

Cosby, Lieutenant-Colonel Montague, Major Leighton, and a detachment of eight captains, eight lieutenants, eight ensigns, and 485 men to recruit the garrison.

Up to this time no sortie had been made upon the enemy's works, the heavy rains and consequent damage to the trenches, and the slackness of the fire, rendering it unnecessary. On the 28th April, however, General Clayton, considering that it would be possible to inflict great loss on the enemy if he could induce them to leave the trenches, arranged that a feint attack should be made at night upon their lines, while at the same time a tremendous fire should be opened upon them from all the north batteries.

Accordingly, that night when the moon was full, two parties of 10 men, each in charge of two sergeants, left the covered way at Land Port, and marched, one party along the western beach, the other under the foot of the Rock. These men had orders to discharge their fire-arms at a certain point, and then to retreat as rapidly as possible back to the covered way.

It was expected that the Spaniards hearing the shots would apprehend a sortie from the garrison, and would rush to arms and advance from the trenches, when upon a signal from two howitzers below the north bastion, every gun or mortar was to open upon them; unfortunately, however, the bombardiers in charge of the howitzers fired without orders, and be-

fore the two parties under the sergeants had discharged their pieces; consequently, though all the batteries on the Rock facing the north front poured in a heavy fire, the enemy kept under cover and only lost three men.

On the 1st May the Prince Frederic arrived bringing Lord Portmore, Governor of Gibraltar, Lord Mark Kerr, a battalion of the first regiment of Guards under Colonel Guise and Colonel Clayton's regiment. Several volunteers accompanied Lord Portmore, among whom were Lord James Cavendish, Lord Henry Beauclerk, Lord Charles Hay, and Viscount Coote. The old Earl of Portmore, who for 40 years had held the rank of colonel, was in England at the time the siege commenced, but hearing that the operations before Gibraltar were likely to be protracted, he chivalrously declined to plead his age and infirmities as an excuse for evading his duty, but prepared to sail and take up his command. He left Portsmouth in March, in the "Prince Frederic," 70 guns, accompanied by the "Yarmouth," 70 guns, the "Torbay," 80, and the Pool fire-ship, and arrived, as we have seen, on the 1st May.

On board the transports were 10 companies of the first foot Guards (who had been drawn by lot), under command of the following officers,—Colonel Price, Colonel Hastings, Colonel Meyrick, Colonel Pearson, Colonel Duncombe, Colonel Gurwood, Colonel Treby, Colonel Brown, Colonel Oughton, and Colonel Wil-

liamson. Colonel Treby, it is related, did not embark, preferring rather to resign his commission, and his place was supplied by Colonel Onslow. These reinforcements raised the number of troops in the garrison to about 5000 men, composed of the following regiments.

	Strength.
Gunners	200
1st regiment of Guards	672
5th or General Pearce's regiment ..	432
13th or Lord Mark Kerr's	434
14th or General Clayton's	640
20th or Colonel Egerton's	415
25th or Colonel Middleton's	394
26th or Colonel Anstruther's	396
29th or Colonel Disney's	358
30th or Major-General Bisset's	379
34th or Colonel Haye's	388
39th or Brigadier Newton's	293
Detachment from Minorca	480

Making a total, inclusive of non-commissioned officers, of 5481.

During the ensuing week, the enemy having completed four gigantic batteries, armed with the finest brass artillery, a terrific fire was opened all along the line; so magnificently grand was this bombardment, previously unequalled in the history of artillery, that

“for some time,” says an eye-witness, “we seemed to live in flames.”*

Attempts, feeble in comparison to the resistless storm of shot and shell that tore over the walls of the fortress, were made to check this murderous fire in vain, guns were everywhere dismantled, and as quickly as they were replaced were again destroyed. In vain the men with undaunted courage threw themselves upon the ramparts and worked to repair the shattered parapets, the heavy shot tore away whole tons of earth and buried the guns beneath the ruins. Butts filled with sand and bound with fascines, were heaped together as some covering for the artillery, but they were no sooner in position than they were swept away. For fourteen days 700 shot per hour were thrown into the fortress, and 92 guns and 72 mortars were in constant play. †

To this formidable armament, the garrison could oppose only 60 guns; viz. 21 on the Grand Battery, 23 on the Old Mole, nine at Willis's, and five in the battery at the side of the Moorish castle. There were 135 mortars and cohorns in the place, but only

* Journal of an Officer (1727).

† It is curious to observe the difference in the power of artillery 130 years ago and of the cannon of the present day. In 1727, nearly all the guns in Willis's were six-pounders, and in the journal of the siege it is mentioned that a three-pounder in Queen Anne's battery did great execution in the enemy's works.

a portion of these could be brought to bear on the enemy's lines.*

By the 20th the enemy's artillery began to experience the effects of this rapid firing. The brass guns drooped at the muzzle, and the iron ordnance in many instances burst. The fire then slackened rapidly, until at length only 19 guns were in play. Taking advantage of this respite the governor employed the garrison day and night, restoring the shattered defences, clearing the ditch at Land Port, filling in the breaches, and repairing the embrasures. So efficiently and rapidly were these works executed, that in a few days 13 new guns were ready to open, and upwards of 100 mortars were brought to bear upon the most formidable of the enemy's batteries. While the English had thus successfully met the crushing bombardment which had been expected to command a surrender, and were preparing for a final struggle, the Spaniards had shot their last bolt, and found themselves in a position of the greatest difficulty and danger. Their artillery and ammunition had been recklessly exhausted. The roads of the interior were impassable, and no reinforcement could reach the camp. Provisions were becoming scarce, the weather was inclement, and they were threatened with a destructive cannonade from the fortress. Impressed with the hopelessness of continuing the siege, all

* Out of the 60 guns in position at the commencement of the bombardment 23 were dismounted in seven days.

the general officers united in a representation to the Conde de Las Torres, that unless His Catholic Majesty would reinforce the army to the number of 25,000 men, Gibraltar could not be taken.

Observing the embarrassment of the Spaniards, the governor harassed them with a fire which almost equalled the terrible bombardment of the enemy. A supply of ammunition opportunely arrived from England, and by the end of May the guns of the garrison had gained a complete ascendancy over the besiegers.

In the "Journal of an Officer, kept during the Siege," are some amusing anecdotes of occurrences within the walls. Referring to the expeditious manner in which it was necessary to bury the dead, to prevent their "being offensive or infectious," he says:—

"But we had like to have been a little too hasty with a private man of Colonel Clayton's regiment, who going off duty fell down on the way to his quarters, and seemed to all appearance dead; a few hours after which we wrapped him in a cloth or blanket, or what first came to hand, as the custom was, and had him away to the sands, that warm repository of all his fellows. We had dug the hole and were just tumbling him in, when, not liking his usage, he fell a grumbling, upon which we immediately opened the wrapper, and giving him air he revived. Upon this he was lugged back to the hospital, and he

lived for four-and-twenty hours after, when, being sure of him, we reconsigned him to his former apartment and heard no more of him."

The famous Duke of Wharton joined the Spaniards during the siege.

"Being come to the camp," says the officer, "they persuaded him to go into the trenches, which one day he ventured to do, having prepared himself by something more than his usual quantity of liquor, and he met with an accident that determined him not to run a second risk of that nature. A piece of shell took him upon his instep and laid his foot open to the very heel. This was a desperate wound, and 'twas once thought would have cost him his foot."*

Here is another anecdote, of a soldier more than ordinarily particular regarding the disposal of his remains.

"One of our private men had been so frugal as to muster up 20s., and he was the only one among the deceased who had the favour of a coffin allowed him; he begged hard for it, indeed, with his dying breath, and, the will of the defunct being fulfilled for 17s. 6d., his brother executor generously spent the remaining 2s. 6d. among his comrades in honour of the testator. He had prayers said over him by a parson too, being a man of substance. Had he been a poor rogue he might have been slipt in without, or at most been obliged to an Amen-man for it."

* Siege, 1727. Journal of an Officer. British Museum.

By the beginning of June the Earl of Portmore had perfected his arrangements for the final bombardment of the enemy's lines.

One hundred guns were in position, and countless mortars occupied commanding situations on the heights.

On the 3rd of June, this mass of ordnance opened upon the Spanish batteries, and so crushing was the fire that not a single gun replied. Early in the day the trenches were a heap of ruins, the parapets were in flames, and the magazines blown up. Amidst these disasters there were instances when the enemy displayed a noble courage; a rocket from Willis's having set fire to Valdasor's battery, the gabions were soon a mass of flames, and the magazine was threatened. The artillerymen seeing the danger fled, but a captain of cavalry, Juan Manrique, who was in the trenches as a volunteer, called a few men together, and, regardless alike of the scorching blaze and the showers of grape poured in from the guns of the fortress, rushed into the work, and heaping the loose sand upon the burning parapets succeeded in smothering the flames. Although the first day's fire had driven the enemy from the forts, the bombardment was still unremittingly kept up, until the whole line of batteries was completely destroyed. Numerous deserters found their way into the fortress, and gave lamentable accounts of the sufferings of the troops. Sickness was

carrying off its thousands, and each day increased the horrors of want.

Such was the state of the besiegers, when on the 23rd of June a courier arrived in the camp of San Roque, bringing despatches for the Conde de las Torres and a letter for the Earl of Portmore, which latter was conveyed into the garrison by Colonel Lacy of the Irish Brigade.

At 10 at night the colonel left the advanced trenches, and on being challenged replied that he had despatches for the governor of the fortress, but the officer at the guard refused to admit him, and threatened to fire on him if he did not instantly retire. Shortly afterwards he again appeared at the head of the trench, beating a drum, sounding a trumpet, and displaying symbols of a truce. He was then admitted into the town, when he announced the important intelligence that a suspension of hostilities had been agreed to, and the preliminary articles of peace signed by the plenipotentiaries of the several powers. The following morning Colonel Roche proceeded to the camp at St Roque to confer with Count de las Torres, and on his return to the town a suspension of arms was declared, in the following terms.

Article I.

That there shall be a reciprocal suspension of arms between the Spanish army and the English garrison of Gibraltar till the preliminaries of a general

peace (which it is hoped will be brought to a successful issue) are ratified.

Article II.

The garrison shall continue in the town without any correspondence with the Spanish troops, who till further orders shall continue to mount the trenches without committing any hostilities.

Article III.

The colonel of the guard in the trenches shall be permitted to go into the town to see that no reparations are made during the suspension of arms to the works that are ruined, and that no new intrenchments are made.

Article IV.

An officer of the garrison shall have permission to view the trenches, which shall remain in the condition that they now are.

Article V.

No person shall be allowed to go to the coast of Perigil, and any person so doing will be fired upon both from the forts of the mountains and the trenches.

Article VI.

No person whatever shall be permitted to go into the country without a passport from the captain-

general of the Spanish army or of the lieutenant-general on duty in the trenches: and all correspondence shall be forbidden by sea as well as by land.

During the progress of the siege a conspiracy was detected among some Moors and Jews within the walls, to seize upon the gates, and by a preconcerted arrangement open them to the Spaniards. Narrating the story of this treachery, an officer says, "Two Moors, the chief agents of the Spaniards, were found guilty, and were put to death and afterwards flayed; their skins were then nailed to the gates of the town, where they appeared in the same proportion as when alive, and being large, gigantic fellows, as the Moors in general are, they were horrid ghastly spectacles.

"The best part of them were remaining when we came away. Nature had sent them into the world with their hides tanned, so that the heat of the sun, which is very intense at Gibraltar, could add but little to their original dusk; but it had so hardened them that they soon seemed equally solid with the gates themselves. After the siege they were much lessened by the curiosity of our people, who cut out a great many pieces of them to bring to England, one of which, to gratify our readers, may be seen at Mr Warner's, the publisher of this treatise."

The losses experienced by the garrison during the siege were comparatively small; viz.—

Five officers killed and wounded.

Rank and File.

Killed, 69; wounded, 207; died of wounds and sickness, 49; Total, 361. Deserted, 17.

The casualties in the Spanish army were,—
Officers.

Killed, 15. Wounded, 42.

Rank and File.

Killed, 346. Wounded, 1119.

Deserted, 875.

Died of sickness, or invalids, upwards of 5000.

The ammunition expended by the garrison during the siege was as follows:—

Guns.	Rounds.
32-Pounder	3,370
24 ,,	3,142
18 ,,	7,063
16 ,,	800
12 ,,	8,175
9 ,,	547
8 ,,	28
6 ,,	10,602
4 ,,	11,502
3 ,,	6,534
2 ,,	1,181
1 ,,	6
	<hr/>
Total	52,950
	<hr/>

23 mortars were rendered unserviceable; 14 being

of brass, the rest of iron. 73 guns were destroyed, seven of which were brass.

The events of this siege established the fact that, on the land side at least, Gibraltar was impregnable. During the early part of the operations the defences suffered considerably, and the fire from the garrison was consequently weak and comparatively harmless; but as the siege progressed, the energy of the English developed itself, and so many fresh works were projected and completed, so many guns mounted, and such a store of ammunition collected, that, as long as the enemy made no diversion by sea, any attack from the land was futile.

When the armistice was agreed to, the fortress was provisioned and prepared for a prolonged and vigorous defence, whereas the Spaniards, who had long been losing heart, experienced the greatest difficulties in maintaining their ground and bringing up their guns to reply to the fire from the Rock.

Their ordnance, which was mostly of brass, rapidly became unserviceable, and it was impossible to replace it. Ammunition too had been squandered, and the hospitals were encumbered with the sick who had succumbed to the effects of exposure in the trenches during the inclement weather. Some Spanish historians have flattered their country with the assurance that the besieged were in the last stage of starvation and want, and that a hasty armistice

was concluded at the earnest solicitation of the English Government in order to save the garrison from the alternative of a surrender. We can pardon such historic fables, if we remember that when Spain lost Gibraltar she was deprived for ever of the brightest jewel in her crown.

CHAPTER XI.

1727—1729.

THOUGH hostilities ceased on the 23rd June, and Spain had apparently agreed to a suspension of arms, the king showed such an evident disinclination to execute the preliminaries of peace, that upwards of two years were spent in bickerings and disreputable and shifty diplomacy, before the articles were finally agreed to by the treaty of Seville. Every species of quibble was raked up at Madrid to prolong the dispute.

At the commencement of the war, the "Prince Frederic," a trading ship belonging to the South Sea Company, with a valuable cargo, had been seized at Vera Cruz. The restoration of this vessel was now insisted upon by England, and as steadily refused by Spain. The little sore opened by this misunderstanding soon spread to a gangrenous wound. Besides this impediment to peace, the Spaniards refused to quit their ground before the Rock, maintaining that they were not required to do so until the preliminaries had been executed. Added to this, the government resorted to the most contemptible devices

for insulting British feelings, by intercepting correspondence and opening despatches. Negotiations were rendered more complicated by the absence of all the foreign ministers from Madrid, except the Dutch Ambassador M. Vandermere, who therefore became the only channel of communication with the court of Spain.

From the line of conduct pursued by Philip, or rather by his queen, for throughout this transaction she was the principal agent, and dictated the course of action, it was evident that Spain had accepted the preliminaries, not for the purpose of ending the war, but to gain time for the preparation of greater armaments. One great object that she had in view was the junction of her fleet, of which one portion was at Corunna, the other at Cadiz. With powerful British squadrons hovering on the coasts, this junction could not be effected, but when a truce had closed their guns, it would be easy to take advantage of the opportunity.

Towards the end of July, suspecting that all correspondence with the government at home was intercepted in Spain, Sir C. Wager intimated his suspicions to the Duke of Newcastle, and represented the iniquity of such a system. At the same time he wrote to Don Francisco de Ribadeo, then in command of the Spanish camp, on the subject, and proved that four letters which were written to M. Vandermere had been stopped.*

* Sir C. Wager to Don F. Ribadeo, July 21, 1727.

Complaining of this injustice and of the unreasonable conduct of the Spanish Government, he said :—

“ If it be expected not only that the garrison should be reduced, but that the squadron under my command return home and leave Gibraltar besieged (the relief of which was the only cause of our coming), all the world must think that it is the most extraordinary explanation of the articles that ever was heard of, and I am sure will never be so understood by me except I receive orders from the king my master so to understand them, which I dare say I never shall. And as my letters and papers are either intercepted or stopt, or else not permitted to pass freely, I cannot but suspect that His Catholic Majesty has no inclination to continue even the present cessation, especially as I have never received from Admiral Castagneta any assurance that he has received orders to observe the cessation.”

This remonstrance produced but slight effect : Ribadeo replied, disavowing any knowledge of the alleged breaches of good faith, and insisting upon the anxiety of the king his master to comply punctiliously with the sense of the preliminaries. A month had scarcely elapsed before a fresh cause of complaint arose, which might reasonably have resulted in a renewal of hostilities.

In August Sir Charles Wager received information that the Spanish fleet, taking advantage of the armistice, had sailed from Corunna, with the intention



of forming a junction with the squadron at Cadiz. Immediately this intelligence reached him, he sent remonstrances to Ribadeo, who in reply gave the most solemn assurances that the ships had gone to Cadiz for the purpose of being disarmed. Notwithstanding the cessation of arms, Sir Charles was in doubt whether he should not intercept the fleet on its passage; he contented himself, however, with cruising off Cape Spartel, and sent Captain Falkingham, in the "Prince Frederic," to look into the Bay of Cadiz, and watch the movements of the Spanish vessels.

Captain Falkingham reported that a fleet of 19 sail of the line lay at anchor, including seven ships from Corunna, that a French squadron of 12 sail was also ready for sea, and that rumours were in circulation of a secret expedition being prepared. Alarmed at this intelligence, Admiral Wager again wrote to Ribadeo, reminding him of the positive assurance which he had made upon his word of honour that the Corunna squadron would be disarmed upon its arrival at Cadiz. Too late the admiral discovered that he had been duped by a premeditated and deliberate falsehood, and it was in vain that he pressed upon the Spanish general the obligation of a plighted honour. Such flimsy ties were neither recognized nor understood, and the fleet remained at Cadiz, ready prepared for sea.*

While the Spanish Government pursued this irritat-

* Correspondence of Sir C. Wager. King's MSS.

ing line of conduct before Gibraltar, the people of England were becoming clamorous for some decisive termination to the precarious truce. An armistice which required the continuation of immense armaments, was even more expensive to the nation than an active war, and such an outcry was raised against the vacillating conduct of Spain that the English cabinet was driven to take prompter measures to bring about the settlement of a treaty. With this object Mr Keene was sent to Madrid, charged with a mission to the king, while France, also anxious to heal the differences between the two Bourbon courts, despatched Count Rottembourg, to complete the reconciliation between Philip and Louis, and at the same time to employ the influence of his good offices in arranging the treaty between Spain and England. The general instructions to the two envoys were communicated to each other, and they were specially enjoined to insist upon the termination of the blockade of Gibraltar, the restoration of all captures, and the distribution of the property brought by the flota.

Upon their arrival in Madrid, the feelings of the Court towards the two countries they represented were most unmistakeably declared. Rottembourg was instantly admitted to an audience, treated as a friend, and encouraged in his mission. Mr Keene, on the contrary was not permitted to see the king for nearly three weeks, and, when at last he delivered his credentials, he was received with freezing coldness.

The king, at this time in a state of infirmity approaching to imbecility, was completely under the influence of the queen, whose hatred of the English knew no bounds. So ungovernable were her feelings on this point, that during her frequent audiences with De Rottembourg, she more than once forgot the dignity of her position and gave vent with unfeminine impetuosity of manner to violent denunciations of the detested nation.

For several weeks the whole conduct of the negotiations was in the hands of the French plenipotentiary, who, finding himself unshackled by any interference on the part of Mr Keene, conducted the business as he chose. At his first audience, and even before he had alluded to the interests of England, the queen displayed the violence of her hatred towards that nation. Twenty times she exclaimed, reproaching the alliance between France and England, "You have sold yourselves to the English, who lord it over you as your masters."*

Before proceeding to his second audience, De Rottembourg had gained over the influence of the queen's two confessors, and he had received their assurances that everything would be done for France and nothing for England. In his subsequent interview, he explained to the queen the orders with which he was charged, viz.—

* Coxe. Memoirs of the Kings of Spain.

First. To express the king his master's regard for their Catholic Majesties, and his great joy at the reconciliation. Secondly, to entreat them to execute the preliminaries. And thirdly, to assure them of the king's readiness to concur in the establishment of their family.

He was impatiently interrupted by Her Majesty, who asked, "What is required from us?" and upon his replying, The execution of the preliminaries, "What," exclaimed the queen, "do you mean by the preliminary points?"

"The restoration of the 'Prince Frederic,' and the distribution of the effects of the flota," answered De Rottembourg.

"Did I not say so?" she broke out; "see these English, these masters of the world, how they explain all things as they will!"

"Were the ship your master's," she continued, "he should have it, but the English shall never have it." The diplomatist urged the point.

"Well," exclaimed the queen, "who is to judge of this satisfaction? the king claims the vessel as his, for a thousand contraventions of the Asiento; the English pretend that it belongs to them; let the Congress decide. But if nothing more were necessary than to ask, give us Gibraltar, and we will give the vessel."

"Were Gibraltar in the hands of my master," replied De Rottembourg, "he would sacrifice it, but it

is not the time to stipulate new reciprocities, after the signature of the preliminaries which restored all things to the same situation as before 1725."

"Sir," replied the queen, "do you know why we acquiesced in this date of 1725?"

"To facilitate the peace, by smoothing the difficulties which could not be settled until the Congress of Cambray," remarked the envoy.

"I shall give you," she rejoined, "other reasons." She asked the king for the key of his casket; he gave it, and she went towards the head of the bed to open it. Still searching in the casket, she continued, "You in France are nothing but English; you were not enemies to the emperor till since his alliance with my husband."

At length she found a letter from the King of England, promising the restitution of Gibraltar, and dated the first of June, 1721. Giving it to De Rottembourg, she remarked as he was reading it, "Perhaps it is forged;" on his replying that it was no doubt original, she exclaimed, laughing, "I was glad to furnish you with such an excuse; see, Sir, the principal reason for admitting the terms of 1725. Let your allies fulfil their part, we will fulfil ours. Let them restore to us what they have. With what right do they come to blockade our ports?"

Interrupted for a moment by De Rottembourg, she continued, excitedly, "Mr Walpole is your master in France. I wish I had Mr Walpole and the

Cardinal here, we would see whether my arguments would not preponderate."

Returning to the subject of the "Prince Frederic," she proposed to put the vessel in sequestration with the King of France until the question could be decided by the Congress; and agreed to distribute the effects of the flota and to withdraw the troops from before Gibraltar when the English squadrons retired from the coasts of America and Spain. De Rottembourg explained that these propositions would not be satisfactory, and hinted that it was impolitic to evince so little consideration for the English, who were joint guarantees of the succession to the Italian States, in favour of Don Carlos. At this the queen exclaimed, "You are come again to your successions. I voluntarily abandon them, if Gibraltar is restored to the king. You see by what I say in his presence that it is his glory and his interests only that affect me."*

We must turn for a moment to the state of affairs at Gibraltar. While these negotiations were slowly progressing at Madrid, the Spaniards continued to assume a defiant attitude before the Rock. Notwithstanding the conditions expressly laid down in the articles for a suspension of arms, that no alteration or repairs should be made in the batteries or trenches of the enemy; the Spaniards commenced to rebuild a formidable work known as Tessé's Battery, and to

* Letter from Count Rottembourg (abridged). Coxe's *Mems. of the Kings of Spain*.

renew its armament. This act, which was a distinct infraction of the terms upon which a suspension of arms had been agreed to, elicited firm but temperate remonstrances from Lord Portmore and Sir Charles Wager. But the Condé de Montemar, then in command of the army, denied that any violation of the treaty had been committed, and the works were continued. Doubting what course to pursue, unwilling to be the author of a renewal of hostilities, and yet believing that it was his duty to interrupt the unlawful proceedings by force if necessary, the admiral wrote to the Duke of Newcastle, put him in possession of the facts, and asked for instructions.* In this letter he expressed his belief that the Spaniards had no intention of maintaining the peace; but it was his impression that they had agreed to the armistice only to gain time, and having lured into their ports the British merchant-shipping, to renounce the suspension of hostilities and seize the vessels.

“Were it not,” he said, “that they have so many of our ships in their ports, nothing would hinder me from firing upon them. If the Court of Spain have a sincere intention to continue the cessation, and come into a sure and lasting peace, as the Condé says, I should be very sorry by anything that may be called rashness in me to be the occasion of a new breach, but the Spaniards do act in such a manner that it is very dif-

* Wager to Duke of Newcastle, September 17th, 1727. King's MSS.

ficult (I believe for anybody) to guess at their intentions. Their fleet are all kept in a seeming readiness to sail, their army here, though said to be ordered into quarters, do yet continue in camp, and they relieve their trenches every day as they have done ever since the cessation, so that we are obliged to be continually on our guard."

Almost at the same time that Sir Charles Wager sent this letter to the Duke of Newcastle, he wrote also to the Condé de Montemar, remonstrating with him against the proceedings at Tessé's battery, and expressing his regret that so little disposition was shown to preserve the suspension of arms. To this Montemar replied:—

"At the time that the Earl Forbes, captain of one of His British Majesty's ships, arrived and delivered to me the favour of your Excellency's letter, I was paying my regards to you by acquainting you of my being come to command this army. . . . One of the principal directions I have from the king is to keep religiously what has been agreed between the Earls of Portmore and De las Torres; and for my part I have used and shall use all suitable means to preserve the suspension of arms under that rule. But the said rule does not forbid me to maintain the batteries and other posts that are now on the seaside, west-ward and east-ward, and which only tend to the guarding of the coast that is under my care; for as that coast is so near Africa, and the insults of those people are very

common upon our shore, I must take what precautions are possible to hinder them. The battery of Tessé was raised, as well as the others on the sea-side, westward and eastward, 20 days before the siege of Gibraltar was begun, and at a time when the fleet under your Excellency's command was in this bay, and the Governor of Gibraltar had undoubtedly a suspicion that we might attack his town. As a sovereign cannot be hindered from fortifying his coasts, so neither your Excellency nor the said governor took any notice of it, because, without doubt, you both of you well knew that reason, and that it was neither directly nor indirectly repugnant to the 10th article of the Treaty of Peace agreed between Spain and England on July 13th, 1713.*

“The Earl of Portmore has directed that the correspondence with the town should be carried on by letters carried by drums. This I have done since I came to this army, and as I may take the same care of this camp and coast as the Earl does of his town, I beg your Excellency, when you shall hereafter have anything to command me, that you would do it by the means desired and directed by the said Earl, for the like shall be done on my part.” †

* Our moderation and anxiety to avoid a war, by silently permitting these encroachments, were thus afterwards adduced as evidence against us.

† Condé de Montemar to Sir C. Wager. San Roque, Sept. 25, 1727. King's MSS., British Museum.

This equivocal and unfriendly reply, and the glaring falsity of the statement regarding the objects for which Tessé's battery was re-armed, served to convince Admiral Wager of the hostile intentions of the Spaniards. His feelings are best expressed in his answer to Montemar:—

“I received the honour of your Excellency's letter yesterday by Colonel Lacy, and return many thanks for the compliments you are pleased to make me, both in the letter and by Colonel Lacy, who, since we have had any communication with the camp, has always behaved himself like a man of honour. I am sorry that sort of communication with us which has been carried on in that manner by officers since the beginning of the siege, should be disagreeable to your Excellency; I am not conscious of having done anything, on my part, to give any dislike, but, since you are pleased to desire it may be so, I shall give your Excellency no trouble at all that way, but, if I shall have anything to say (which I do not foresee that I shall), I will desire my Lord Portmore to do me the favour to send my letters by a drum,—that way of sending letters having never been practised at sea, that I know of.

“I have received the same commands from the king my master as your Excellency has done from His Catholic Majesty, religiously to observe the cessation agreed upon between the Condé de las Torres and my Lord Portmore. But I perceive you expect we should keep it on our part, when you profess you will

not do the same on yours; for I cannot but look upon the repairing of Tessé's battery to be contrary to that agreement, which was that no works should be carried on or repaired on either side; and I am very sorry to find that you have so mean an opinion of my understanding as to think that I can suppose that battery to be designed against the Moors. But I must repeat what I said in my letter, that as that battery was erected at first (though 20 days before the siege) for no other reason than to fire upon the ships in the bay, thereby to facilitate the siege of Gibraltar, so the repairing and re-mounting it with cannon now can be for no other purpose."*

The letter went on complaining of the total disregard of the articles of cessation, and saying that a sincere desire to continue the peace alone prevented Lord Portmore from resenting the conduct of the Spaniards; it called the attention of Montemar to the facts that the Spanish minister had given *his word of honour* that the fleet should be disarmed at Cadiz, but which had not been done; that the Spanish Government took an unfair advantage of the cessation and brought that fleet from Corunna; and further, that the South Sea Company's effects were unlawfully detained at Vera Cruz, and that everything done by Spain led to the belief that some great secret design was contemplated.

* Sir C. Wager to Condé de Montemar. Gibraltar, Sept. 26th, 1727. King's MSS.

The latter impression, which was strongly entertained both by Lord Portmore and Sir Charles Wager, was still further strengthened by intelligence from the Consul at Malaga, who in a secret despatch, dated the 24th September, reported that there were strong motives for believing that there was a project in course of organization at Cadiz, in favour of the Pretender; that six of the best sailing ships were appointed for that purpose; that all the principal men of the faction then in Spain, the Pretender, the Duke of Ormonde, and a number of Irish officers, were to embark in them; that 2000 Irish troops, then before Gibraltar, 14 field-pieces, and 20,000 small arms, would accompany them, and that the expedition would sail for Wales or some part of the British Channel.*

At Madrid, negotiations dragged wearily on, the queen incessantly starting fresh difficulties, and exhausting every expedient to gain time. The proposal to put the "Prince Frederic" in sequestration with the King of France was directly declined by Louis, and this comparatively trivial question gave rise to new complications, notwithstanding that the king deprecated the violent feeling of resentment which the queen exhibited towards the English, and entreated that, for the sake of maintaining the peace, the preliminaries might be immediately executed. Anxious to bring this unsatisfactory business to a

* Consul Holloway, Malaga, to Sir C. Wager. King's MSS.

close, the English cabinet offered modified proposals, which through Count Broglio, the French Ambassador at London, were transmitted to De Rottembourg. These propositions included the execution of the preliminaries in general and the restitution of the "Prince Frederic," but the question of contraband, which had recently been alleged by the queen and echoed by Philip, was to be left to a congress. In the mean time, popular impatience in England for a termination to this uncertain truce, either by the conclusion of a satisfactory peace or the renewal of the war, had rapidly increased ; and the government, fearful of the consequences, were driven to adopt a firmer and more effectual policy, and, as the sequel showed, with success. For a moment the queen wavered between war and peace, but on the 6th of March (N.S.), 1728, by an act of the Pardo, Philip acceded to the demands of Great Britain, and accepted the preliminaries.

On the 9th this intelligence was forwarded to Gibraltar and the fleet was ordered home.*

* "Duke of Newcastle to Sir C. Wager,

"Whitehall, March 9th, 1728.

"Sir,

"The declaration for removing the difficulties that obstructed the execution of the preliminaries being agreed to by all the powers concerned, signed by their several ministers at Madrid, on the 6th inst. (N.S.), and the king being informed by letters from my Lord Portmore that the Spanish

Although Philip was induced thus tardily to execute the preliminaries, yet in the subsequent discussions respecting the settlement of a definitive treaty, he still maintained his claim to the unconditional surrender of Gibraltar.

The difficulties which had attended the execution of the preliminary points threatened to shackle the proceedings of the congress at Soissons.

“I can see no daylight yet in the affairs of the congress,” writes Mr Poyntz, “only thus much, that after we carry the point of Gibraltar, the Spaniards will leave no stone unturned to hurt our commerce in order to distress us into a compliance on the other point. The Queen of Spain may have other views, but the Catholic King and the true Spaniards are animated against us by this single consideration.*

“God forbid that any British subject should think of giving up Gibraltar in the present violent situa-

forces which were employed in the siege of Gibraltar are marched off from before that place, their ammunition and other warlike stores sent away, and their batteries demolished, —so that the siege may be looked upon as effectually raised; His Majesty has commanded me to signify to you his pleasure, that upon the receipt of this letter you forthwith return home with His Majesty’s whole squadron under your command, leaving only two small ships to attend as usual the garrison of Gibraltar and Port Mahon.

“NEWCASTLE.”

* Stephen Poyntz to Lord Townshend. Paris, June 9th, 1728. Mems. of Sir R. Walpole.

tion of things and under the rough treatment we meet from Spain.

“But if the Spanish plenipotentiaries, instead of demanding it peremptorily, were to set forth in an amicable manner that they are ready to offer an equivalent for it, and only desire a promise that the consideration of this equivalent may be submitted to the king and his parliament, leaving our possession in the mean time on the foot of our treaties, I must own, in such a case, I should not think any injury done us. . . . Without something of this kind I fear no peace can be of long duration.”

In his reply to Poyntz (June 14th, 1728) Townshend said, “What you propose in relation to Gibraltar is certainly very reasonable, and is exactly conformable to the opinion which you know I have always entertained concerning that place. But you cannot but be sensible of the violent and almost superstitious zeal which has of late prevailed among all parties in this kingdom against any scheme for the restitution of Gibraltar upon any conditions whatsoever. And I am afraid that the bare mention of a proposal which carried the most distant appearance of laying England under an obligation of ever parting with that place would be sufficient to put the whole nation in a flame.”

In January, 1729, parliament met, and no treaty had been concluded. The king's speech admitted that the execution of the preliminaries, and the open-

ing of the congress at Soissons, had raised hopes of a speedy and general pacification, but declared that this tardy termination to the prolonged suspense was due to the uncertain policy of the Court of Madrid.

While urging the expediency of concluding a satisfactory peace, the king expressed his reliance upon the support of the country should war become inevitable.

On the 18th of March, a motion was brought forward in the House of Lords for the production of a copy of the letter containing a promise of the restitution of Gibraltar, which had been written by George I. to the King of Spain in 1721. The document having been laid on the table a warm debate ensued. A motion was made that the "King of Spain be obliged to renounce his claim to Gibraltar and Minorca. For the honour of His Majesty and the preservation and security of the trade and commerce of this kingdom, effectual care should be taken in the present treaty that the King of Spain do renounce all claim and pretension to Gibraltar and the island of Minorca in plain and strong terms."

The question was put and negatived by 84 to 31, but a protest enumerating in three articles reasons why the permanent possession of Gibraltar should be secured to the British Crown was drawn up and signed by seventeen peers, headed by the Duke of Beaufort.

This document declared that the place was of

such importance that it should be secured by more than general stipulations, that the Catholic King should be compelled to make his renunciation of it in words as strong as he has made his claim to it, especially as our plenipotentiaries had not been able to induce him to show any inclination to relinquish his pretensions to it; further, that there was every reason to believe that the allies of Spain were anxious to see it restored, and that were these decided measures adopted, they would deter any "wicked ministers even from the thoughts of giving it up, or purchasing, by the surrender of this most valuable possession, an inglorious peace."

In the Commons, Lord Malpas moved for the production of the king's letter, and as in the Lords an animated and bitter debate ensued. Severe reflections were cast upon those who had advised the king to put his pen to such a document, and to this act many of the members attributed the complications and difficulties with which England was then surrounded.

A resolution similar to that proposed in the Lords, with the addition of the words "that all pretensions on the part of the Crown of Spain to the said places be specifically given up," was moved, but eventually negatived by 267 to 111.

The publication of this celebrated letter, the debates in both Houses, and the violent comments

upon the whole transaction in the *Craftsman* and other periodicals, roused the temper of the nation. We have seen how throughout the progress of the negotiations relating to Gibraltar, the fear of the popular indignation and the consequent downfall of the ministry alone secured this most valuable possession to the British Crown. As the clamour increased and the uneasiness regarding the intentions of the cabinet extended, it became necessary to lull the excitement and to reassure the people.

A special mission to Madrid was resolved upon, and William Stanhope, who, from his knowledge of the Spanish character, and intimate acquaintance with all the technicalities of this delicate question, was admirably fitted for the post, was requested by the Duke of Newcastle to undertake the negotiation. At first the proposal was met by some difficulties; misunderstandings had arisen between Stanhope and Townshend, and the former considered that his previous services had been inadequately rewarded.

The promise of a peerage, the one grand object of Stanhope's ambition, decided his resolution, and he set out on his mission.*

* "However, his Majesty gives your Excellency leave to assure Mr Stanhope in his name, that in case he will undertake this commission, he will certainly make him a peer as soon as the negotiation with Spain is over." Lord Townshend to Walpole and Poyntz, August 12th, 1729.

His instructions respecting Gibraltar were vague and indefinite. Thus the Duke of Newcastle wrote to him :*

“ Sure it would be well if something explicit could be got about Gibraltar and Port Mahon, in order to please here, though it may by no means be advisable to push this point so as to hinder the conclusion, if it should meet with difficulties.”

Again, “ Get the effects of the galleons delivered and the cedulae given out as asked for by us, and, if I may add, the separate article agreed to.”

Arrived at Madrid, Stanhope commenced his task, and after a protracted and difficult negotiation, a treaty, whose terms were favourable to England, was signed at Seville on the 9th November, 1729. Contrary to general expectations, no mention of Gibraltar occurred in this treaty ; silently the King of Spain resigned his oft-repeated claims, and the fortress was permitted to remain in possession of the English.

Having now abandoned all hope of recovering Gibraltar, the king endeavoured to isolate it as far as possible from his dominions by constructing a powerful line of works across the isthmus from the east to the western beach.

This proceeding was viewed with distrust in Eng-

* Duke of Newcastle to William Stanhope, July 28, 1729.

land, and Mr Keene, who was then at Seville, was directed to remonstrate against the continuance of the works. But in this instance all opposition was vain, no persuasion could prevail against the king's obstinacy.

“As to the demolition of the works before Gibraltar,” writes Mr Keene, “I was assured if the whole universe should fall upon the king to make him desist, he would let himself rather be cut to pieces than consent, since he had maturely considered his right to the ground; and we might as well pretend to Cadiz, in virtue of our treaties, as to the spot where the line was: it was far out of point-blank cannon-shot, which was all we could justly ask.”

The historian Ayala gives a description of the Rock subsequent to the siege of 1727, from which we learn that since its capture in 1704 the English had made great changes and alterations in the city. The profession of Protestantism was no longer checked, manners and customs hitherto exclusively Spanish gave way to English habits, and the buildings of the town itself were so improved and restored, that the aspect of the place bore no resemblance to the Gibraltar of the Spaniards. Every other consideration was set aside for the more important one of maintaining the impregnability of the fortress; and every available spot on the Rock from which guns could be brought to bear on an enemy was occupied by

ordnance. Few Spaniards remained in the town, and the foreign population was composed principally of Jews and Genoese. The Franciscan convent, situated in a lovely garden near the line-wall and commanding an extensive view of the bay, was perverted from its original uses and became the residence of the governors of Gibraltar, who have successively occupied it to the present day.

To the horror of Ayala, the nunnery of Santa Clara was converted into a barrack,* the convent of San Juan de Dios into a store-house, and that of the Mercenarios into a dwelling for the admiral. The population at this time was about 3000 souls, exclusive of the military, and consisted of 500 English, 1000 Jews, and many Genoese.

“The Jews,” says Ayala, “for the most part, are shopkeepers and brokers, as much given to cheating and to lending money at exorbitant interest there as their brethren are elsewhere; they have a synagogue, and openly practise the ceremonies of their religion, notwithstanding the conditions of the treaty of Utrecht. . . .”

* The friars appear to have maintained the traditional conviviality of their order. James, in his second volume, *Hist. of Herculean Straits*, speaking of the monks of this convent, says,—

“They live well, and will drink freely, and enjoy the fair sex: and one for his too libidinous life was recalled into Spain in the year one thousand seven hundred and fifty-two.”

The Genoese were chiefly engaged in trade, fishing, and agriculture, especially gardening. In all matters of horticulture they were extremely intelligent, and to this day they are the best gardeners on the Rock.

CHAPTER XII.

PITT'S OFFER TO RESTORE GIBRALTAR, 1757.

IN 1754, disputes which had long prevailed between the Courts of France and England ripened into open acts of hostility. In North America, in Nova Scotia, and on the Ohio, conflicts had taken place, in which French and English were engaged. Off Newfoundland, Admiral Boscawen attacked and captured two French men-of-war, and a powerful fleet under Sir Edward Hawke was sent out from Portsmouth with instructions to capture any French vessel between Cape Ortegal and Cape Clear. No formal declaration of war had been interchanged, but the two countries seemed tacitly to understand the necessity of a rupture.

The first principal operation of the war was the siege of Minorca by the French.

During the controversies between France and Britain, and even subsequently to the outbreak of hostilities, Spain had evinced no desire to involve herself in the impending strife. That she would be

ultimately drawn into the vortex of the struggle there could be no doubt. It was therefore the natural desire of both the belligerent nations to secure at all hazards the promise of her alliance. Aware of the value that she attached to Gibraltar and Minorca, and of the preponderating influence the restoration of either of those fortresses would exercise upon her policy, France craftily proposed to seize upon Minorca, and to offer it, together with the promise of co-operation in the reduction of Gibraltar, in exchange for the ratification of a treaty with Spain.

In order to mislead the British Ministry, and to divert their attention from what was taking place in the south, vast preparations were ostensibly carried on in the arsenals of Dunkirk and Brest, with the avowed object of a descent upon the English coast; but at the same time a powerful fleet was secretly equipped and fitted out in the harbour of Toulon. The destination of this armament was Minorca. This island, which had been in our possession since 1708, was now weakly garrisoned, its governor, Lord Tyrawley, was absent, only 2800 of the troops were fit for service, and these were commanded by a general, who, though a brave and good soldier, was worn out and decrepit.* The cabinet at home, presided over by a weak and vacillating minister,

* General Blakeney was confined to his bed during the whole time the siege lasted.

refused to give credit to the general rumour, that the demonstration at Brest and Dunkirk was but a feint to lure the attention of England from the descent upon Minorca. Lord Tyrawley was permitted to remain on leave. Thirty-five officers of the garrison were absent, not a single superior officer of engineers was in the place, and the supplies were inadequate to a long defence. At length, but when too late, a squadron consisting of 10 ships miserably equipped, and utterly unfit for the service, was hastily sent from Spithead, under command of Admiral Byng, to ward off, if possible, the impending catastrophe.

Byng sailed from England on the 7th of April, 1756, and on the 10th the French fleet, consisting of 12 ships-of-the-line, and a number of transports carrying 16,000 troops, put out from the harbour of Toulon.

On arriving at Gibraltar, Byng learnt from Commodore Edgecumbe, who had just left Minorca, that the siege had commenced. His instructions gave him the option of taking a battalion from the garrison at Gibraltar, to reinforce General Blakeney at St Philip; but General Fowke, then governor of the Rock, refused to permit the troops to embark. For this alleged disobedience of instructions, Fowke was tried by court-martial, and being convicted of an error of judgment was sentenced to suspension from his command for one year. But the mob, roused to a pitch of fury by the loss of Minorca, and the gross mismanagement attending it, demanded a

severer punishment, and the king, exercising his prerogative, set aside the verdict of the court-martial, and dismissed Fowke from the service. Lord Panmure succeeded him as Governor of Gibraltar.*

Byng continued his voyage with all haste, and on the 19th of May came in sight of the French fleet. On the following day a partial engagement took place, and on the next morning the French were not in sight. Urged by some unaccountable impulse, Byng, disregarding the advantage he had gained on the previous day, called a council of war, and decided upon returning to Gibraltar, leaving Minorca to its fate.

Unable to hold out against an overwhelming force, the garrison, after repelling the enemy's assault, agreed to capitulate upon honourable terms; the fortress of St Philip was surrendered, and the troops having been allowed to embark were conveyed to Gibraltar.

The loss of Minorca was followed by an outburst of uncontrollable indignation in England; the ministry were driven from power, and Byng, accused of treachery by some, of cowardice by others, was sacrificed to popular fury and by sentence of court-martial shot.

In the midst of these turmoils Pitt succeeded to office, and was called upon to form a cabinet.† He

* Walpole's Mems. of George II.

† Hist. of England, from Peace of Utrecht. Coxe's Mems. of Bourbon Kings of Spain.

held in his hands the destiny of his country; and his energy and talents were not unequal to the moment.

Up to this time Spain had still remained aloof from the operations of the war. France, eager for her alliance and co-operation, exhausted every effort of diplomacy to gain her friendship; while England, no less mindful of the advantages to be derived from an intimate union with such a powerful state, and dreading the extension of French influence, was equally alive to the necessity of pressing negotiations upon the Court of Madrid. Having accomplished the capture of Minorca, France lost no time in attempting to lure Spain into a confederacy against England; and following the original path of her policy, a proposal was laid before Spain, offering the restoration of Minorca, with a promise of assistance in the reduction of Gibraltar. These overtures created the greatest sensation, both in London and Madrid. Sir Benjamin Keene, then ambassador to the Court of Spain, instantly perceived the danger of the situation, and endeavoured by every means in his power to prevent the acceptance of the offer.

“It would be tedious,” says Coxe,* “to develop all the artifices employed by the two Courts,† or to recapitulate all the letters, memorials, and representa-

* Mem. of Bourbon Kings of Spain.

† Vienna and Paris.

tions with which they endeavoured to draw from the King of Spain a tacit or partial approbation of the war against England. It must, however, be confessed that these articles, if not immediately successful, gradually made an impression."

French influence was gradually becoming diffused through the councils of Madrid, and every stratagem was used to create a misunderstanding between Spain and England. The popular voice was in favour of war, and no opportunity of irritating the English was disregarded.

French privateers countenanced by the Spanish navy constantly intercepted and seized British vessels carrying on trade between Barbary and Gibraltar. Remonstrances were made in vain, and when at length the British admiral rescued a prize on its passage into a Spanish port, the government at home, only fearful of a rupture, and regardless of the constant insult offered to the British flag, restored the vessel and recalled the admiral. Nor was this all; a French East-Indiaman, named the *Duc de Penthièvre*, having been captured by a British privateer off Corunna, was forced into Cadiz, while on its way to Gibraltar, by stress of weather. The Vice-admiralty Court of Gibraltar condemned the prize, but the capture was pronounced illegal by the authorities at Cadiz, and an order was issued for the immediate restitution of the ship. With this order the captain

of the privateer refused to comply, and two Spanish ships of war were employed to compel him to submit.*

Although war seemed inevitable, Ferdinand, still irresolute which side to join, hung back from the contest.

Affairs were in this complicated condition, when Pitt, who had regarded with alarm the sinister advance of French influence, resolved by one bold stroke to secure the friendship of Spain, and to bind her in an alliance against France. The question of Minorca still trembled in the balance, but there was a jewel which had been torn from its setting in the Spanish crown by the powerful hand of England, of ten times greater value than Minorca. Gibraltar, the one darling object of Spanish pride and envy,—still occupied by the British,—was a rankling thorn in the side of Spain, and many were the sacrifices which that country would have made for its restoration.

The moment seemed favourable for the experiment, and, with the consent of all his colleagues, Pitt, in a secret despatch, dated August 23rd, 1757, authorized Sir Benjamin Keene to offer to Spain the cession

* It would appear that the Spaniards, not content with threatening the privateer with an irresistible force, actually fired into the defenceless vessel, and caused loss of life. Sir Benjamin Keene refers to the transaction as "*the safe but cruel combat in the Bay of Cadiz.*" Keene to Mr Pitt, *most secret*, March 6th, 1757.

of Gibraltar, on condition that she would enter into an alliance against the French. This celebrated despatch, which is said to have cost Pitt three days' labour in its composition, is remarkable for the clearness of its language, and the anxiety it evinces on the part of the writer lest the full meaning of the delicate proposition regarding Gibraltar should not be understood.

The following extracts relate to the question of the restoration.

“ Mr Secretary Pitt to Sir Benjamin Keene.

“ Whitehall, Aug. 23rd, 1757.

“ Most secret and confidential.

“ Sir,

“ The most important and confidential matter which I have the honour of the king's commands to open in this despatch to your Excellency, and His Majesty's order and instructions herewith transmitted, cannot but affect you with the deepest sense of the great and particular trust which the king is most graciously pleased to repose in your known experience and long-approved abilities. It is greatly hoped that the state of your health will be found so well restored by the late use of medicinal waters as to leave nothing more to desire for the proper and ablest discharge of a commission of such high moment, and which peculiarly demands the utmost cir-

cumspection, vigilance, delicacy, and address. It is judged the most compendious and sure method of opening and consigning to your Excellency, with due clearness and precision, the scope and end of the measure, to refer you to the minute itself, unanimously approved by His Majesty's servants, consulted in his most secret affairs; and containing the sum and substance, as well as the grounds, of the king's royal intention in this violent and dangerous crisis.

“ ‘ Their Lordships having taken into consideration the formidable progress of the arms of France, and the danger to Great Britain and her allies resulting from a total subversion of the system of Europe, and more especially from the most pernicious extension of the influence of France, by the fatal admission of French garrisons into Ostend and Nieuport, their Lordships are most humbly of opinion that nothing can so effectually tend in the present unhappy circumstances to the restoration of Europe in general, and in particular to the successful prosecution of the present just and necessary war, until a peace can be made on safe and honourable terms, as a more intimate union with the crown of Spain.

“ ‘ In this necessary view their Lordships most humbly submit their opinion to your Majesty's great wisdom, that overtures of a negotiation should be set on foot with that Court in order to engage Spain, if possible, to join her arms to those of your Majesty for obtaining a just and honourable peace; and, namely,

for recovering and restoring to the Crown of England the most important island of Minorca, with all the ports and fortresses ; as well as for re-establishing some solid system in Europe ; and inasmuch as it shall be found necessary for attaining these great and essential ends to treat with the Crown of Spain concerning an exchange of Gibraltar for the island of Minorca, with the ports and fortresses, their Lordships are most humbly of an unanimous opinion that the Court of Spain should without loss of time be sounded with respect to their disposition ; and if the same shall be found favourable, that the said negotiation should be carried forward and ripened for execution with all possible despatch and secrecy.'

. . . . I am now, before I close this long despatch, to discharge His Majesty's particular command by recommending to you in the strongest manner to use the utmost precaution and circumspection in the overtures of this conditional idea with regard to Gibraltar, lest it should hereafter come, although Spain shall decline the sole condition of such an intimacy, to be construed into a promise to restore that place to His Catholic Majesty.

“ And you will take especial care, through the whole course of the transaction relating to Gibraltar, to weigh and measure every expression with the utmost precision of language, so as to put it beyond the possibility of the most captious and sophistical interpretation, to wrest and torture this insinuation of an

exchange on the sole terms above expressed, into a revival and renewal of any former pretended engagement with respect to the cession of that place.

“And for greater and clearer indication on matters of this extreme importance, I am, though unnecessarily, expressly to acquaint you that the king can in no supposed case ever entertain the thought of putting Gibraltar into the hands of Spain, until that Court, by a junction of their arms with those of His Majesty, shall actually and effectually recover and restore to the Crown of England the island of Minorca, with all its fortresses and harbours.”*

Happily for England the offer came too late. Spain was rooted to a neutral policy, and even the tempting offer of Gibraltar could not purchase her alliance. Sir Benjamin Keene, an able and far-sighted diplomatist, who was intimately acquainted with the temper of the Spanish Court, knew that the proposal came too late to fulfil its object.

When the despatch reached Madrid, he perused it with irritability and impatience; throwing his cap on the ground he exclaimed, “Are they mad on the other side of the water? What can they mean? it is now too late!”

With a foreboding heart, the ambassador proceed-

* Coxe, *Kings of Spain*, vol. iii. 210. *Corres. of William Pitt*, vol. i. p. 247.

ed to execute his mission. He sought and obtained an interview with the Spanish minister, and during a lengthy conversation on the differences existing between the two countries adroitly and delicately hinted at the restoration of Gibraltar.

“The weight of the business,” says Sir Benjamin,* “gained the attention it deserved. His lively imagination wanted no information of the wretched circumstances in which Europe was nearly overwhelmed, nor did his memory want to be refreshed by my recapitulating to him the noble maxims he purposed to follow when he came into office. After running through both these subjects with great precision, he replied to my insinuation relative to the conditional restoration of Gibraltar with a cool politeness—‘You know,’ he said, ‘I am a stranger in this country, alone, without support or aid from any of my colleagues, whose inclinations, as well as the general bent of the nation, are not, I believe, for entering into a war against France in your favour.’ He then accused England of ruining the credit he might have had with this nation if we had supported him with acts of justice and attention, though we should have strained a point to serve him; a credit, he said, which would have been warmly employed for the service of

* Sir B. Keene to Mr Pitt, Madrid, Sept. 26, 1757. Most secret and confidential. Coxe's Mems. of the Bourbon Kings of Spain.

both Crowns, notwithstanding all the suspicions which his birth and education might have exposed him to.*

“You will blame the length of my letter if I charge it with more particulars than are necessary for His Majesty to form a true idea of what has passed here. I shall therefore cut short in this place, since there needs no further addition to show Mr Wall’s resolution not to charge himself with, or mention, much less support, the adoption of the vigorous measures which the execution of this project requires. Neither did he give me the least room to think, but quite the contrary, that he would take notice of it to his master or his colleagues.”

This despatch terminated the proceedings of this attempt at negotiation, and Wall, ill in health, and tired of his office, contemplated resigning his post. By the command and entreaties of the king and queen this step was postponed.

The last public act of the British minister, Sir Benjamin Keene, was the conduct of this remarkable transaction.

Worn out by the pains of a lingering malady, worried by the uncertain policy of the late administration, and feeling acutely the neglect with which he

* The Spanish minister was a gentleman of Irish extraction, named Wall, who had previously done some service to Spain. In 1747 he was sent from Madrid to London, to negotiate a peace between the two countries.

had been treated, he died within a short time after he had written his despatch to Mr Pitt.

It is difficult to understand how such a statesman as Pitt could have been induced to entertain the notion of surrendering Gibraltar to Spain. The equivalent advantages to be given in exchange were no doubt important, but not sufficient to justify the loss of the most commanding position in the Mediterranean, and the forfeiture of the key of the Straits.

But it must be remembered that at this time a very general impression prevailed, that the value of the fortress had been over-estimated; and these opinions found vent in the publications of the day. The expenses of the place were enormous and constantly increased, and the maladministration of the local government was a continual source of complaint.

The Governor of the fortress, too, Lord Tyrawley, who was dissatisfied with his office, took care to under-rate its importance, and to represent the heavy burden it would ever be to the nation.

Writing to Fox, he says,—

“As to Gibraltar,* I take it for granted it will be extremely quiet, for I do not see that we do ourselves much good, or anybody else any hurt, by our being in possession of it. If anything tempt anybody to besiege it, it will be the fatherless and motherless de-

* This and the following letter were written to Fox, who, when he resigned the seals, handed them both over to Pitt.

fenceless state it has been suffered to run into; all which I have fully represented at home, where I thought it was most proper. I would conclude from all this that I hope I shall not be left in so idle a place. . . . I hope to receive orders to return to my staff and my regiment of guards.

“The sooner the better.”*

Again he says,—

“You will find I am not so thoroughly satisfied that Gibraltar is so formidable a place as the common cry thinks it; but that it would want money, time, and ability in the distribution of both to make it so. That Gibraltar is the strongest town in the world, that one Englishman can beat three Frenchmen, and that London-bridge is one of the seven wonders in the world, are the natural prejudices of an English coffee-house politician. I am doing some little matters here that I think add to the strength of it; but much more ought to be done that I cannot take upon myself to work upon without orders.

“I really grow tolerably weary of Gibraltar, which is in all respects upon the most scandalous foot that ever town was, that pretends to call itself *une place de guerre*; though so exactly consistent with our notions of this sort of things, that I assure myself it will never take any other form.”†

* Lord Tyrawley to Rt Hon. Henry Fox. Gibraltar, August 20th, 1756. Private.

† Lord Tyrawley to Rt Hon. Henry Fox. Gibraltar,

Writing on the 20th September, 1756, he says, "You will observe by it (a letter to Lord Barrington) that I look upon Gibraltar as in a manner dismantled by the last measures taken in respect to its garrison, and I thought it my duty to lay my opinion of this matter before the Duke, who I am confident could have no idea of things here being in so sad a condition, without such a representation as my letter contains. . . . I assure you I take it as no great compliment to be left here as storekeeper of Gibraltar, . . . and therefore, dear Sir, I beg you will make my mind easy in getting me the Duke's leave to come home."*

August 27th, 1756. Correspondence of William Pitt, vol. i. p. 203.

* "While at Gibraltar, Lord Tyrawley ordered great additions to the works, with no more economy than governors are apt to do who think themselves above being responsible. Lord George Sackville caught at this dissipation, and privately instigated Sir John Philips to censure the expenses. To their great surprise Lord Tyrawley demanded to be heard at the bar of the House in his own defence. A day was named. He drew up a memorial, which he proposed to read to the House. It attacked Lord George roundly on having avoided all foreign command. Thus alarmed, Lord George got the day of hearing adjourned for near a fortnight, and having underhand procured the report of Skinner, who surveyed the works at Gibraltar, to be brought before the House, without mentioning what it was, Mr Fox laid open the unhandsome darkness of this conduct, and Lord Tyrawley himself appeared at the bar and made good by his behaviour all that had been taken for vapour before he appeared there; for leaning on the bar he browbeat Skinner, his censor, who stood on his left hand, with such arrogant humour that the very lawyers thought themselves

The representations of Tyrawley no doubt had weight with Pitt, and led him to underrate the value of Gibraltar. In after years, however, he became fully alive to its importance, and strenuously insisted upon proper means being adopted for its safety.* But besides the effect of Lord Tyrawley's disparaging reports from Gibraltar, it is not improbable that Pitt was influenced in his estimate of that fortress by the many virulent pamphlets and articles that were published about that time, condemnatory of the alleged gross mismanagement and corruption that prevailed in the government of the place, and exhibiting the enormous charge the maintenance of the Rock imposed upon England.†

There is reason to believe that these statements were partially true, although in most instances the malice of the writers is evident, and the exaggeration of the representations apparent.

One cause, perhaps, of the rancorous feeling

outdone in their own style of worrying a culprit. He read his memorial, which was well drawn, with great art and frankness, and assumed more merit to himself than he had been charged with blame. Such tough game tempted few hunters. Lord George was glad to waive the sport, and the House dismissed the affair."—Walpole's *George II.*, vol. ii. p. 293.

* Vide Lord Chatham's speech on the 22nd Nov., 1770, on Spanish affairs.

† Lord Bolingbroke in a despatch to Lord Portmore, dated March 29th, 1712, complains that "at Gibraltar things have hitherto been in the utmost confusion and under the loosest management."

exhibited in these papers was the hatred of military government by persons engaged in commercial pursuits. But dissatisfaction was expressed also amongst the military themselves.

As early as 1712, Colonel Bennett, of the engineers, represented to the government at home the wholesale system of speculation existing among the authorities at Gibraltar; and "thereby," he says, "have drawn upon me the governor's displeasure, inasmuch as that he has threatened to hang me, to break my bones, and has given me the lye."*

Writing in 1749, an author says, "Colonel Congreve† set most of the bad examples which his successors have too well imitated. He forced some people out of their houses, others on various pretences out of the garrison, and then disposed of their possessions. . . . Cotton‡ was naturally an expensive man. He improved upon Congreve's plans in every act of oppression, and had, like the tyrants of old, his dungeons and other apparatus to drain the purses of the poor foreign inhabitants; . . . a spirit of rebellion broke out which had near dethroned him. The English who are not military are few, and those not submissive enough to be spunged out of what they get, and are therefore properly discountenanced, and in their place Irish Papists and such kinds of itinerary riff-raff find

* Remarks on Gibraltar. MSS. British Museum.

† Governor in the year 1713.

‡ Governor in the year 1716.

cordial favour. What the place costs us in point of reputation is hereby seen. . . .

“Godby followed Cotton, but retired. His successor, Bowes, plundered merrily for some time as Cotton’s deputy, and shared the plunder with persons at home. . . .

“In 1729 the emoluments of the governor were calculated as follows :—

“*The governor’s annual perquisites.*”

5000 butts of wine	\$ 10,000
1000 butts of brandy and rum	9,765
1200 ships anchorage, at \$3	3,600
60 Jews and Genoese porters	2,160
Christmas boxes from Jews, etc.	1,000
Permits for entering the town	1,000
Jews, hawkers, and pedlars	500
Wine licences	600
Ground rents	10,000
Mediterranean passes to foreigners	1,000
To occasional muneration and squeezings	2,000
As principal goat-herd	500
As cow-keeper and milk-herd	500
As head butcher	4,000
As poulterer	500
As chief baker	1,000
	<hr/>
Forward	48,125

Brought forward	\$ 48,125
As head gardener	500
As master fisherman	500
As tallow-chandler and coal merchant	2,000
Public jobs, wharfage, etc.	2,000
Miscellaneous	600
	<hr/>
	\$ 53,725

“Exclusive of his salary as general, and other perquisites, the aggregate total emoluments of the governorship of Gibraltar cannot be less than £20,000 per annum.”

The author continues :—

“The whole art of plundering is so magically conducted that it never comes to the ears of his Majesty, nor is laid before the legislature. If an officer complains, he is kicked out of the town; if a housekeeper, he is dispossessed; if a foreigner, he is dungeoned and stript; and if a Barbary Jew, he is transmitted to a brother bashaw at Tetuan, where perhaps he is hanged outright.”*

* Reasons for giving up Gibraltar. British Museum, 1749.

“This is but a short and imperfect account of the many insurmountable villanies which are daily transacting in this unhappy fortress; was I to enumerate but a third part of them it would take a volume, every page of which would draw tears from the reader's eyes, if he had the least feeling or humanity. What horrid outrages have there been acted! What scenes of

These statements no doubt had foundation on fact, and we can gather from them how wretchedly mis-governed the fortress must have been during the first half century after its capture.

The failure on the part of England to procure an alliance with Spain was followed by events which rapidly complicated the situation of European affairs.

In the month of August, 1758, the Queen of Spain died, and in the following year Ferdinand, whose grief since his bereavement had been poignant and inconsolable, also expired. He was succeeded on the throne by Charles III.

As the war between France and England proceeded, the successes of the British arms extended over land and sea. A French fleet under De Conflans was defeated by Sir Edward Hawke, the battle of Minden was gained, Quebec surrendered, and Canada was conquered.

It was after these brilliant achievements, and while fortune smiled upon the British cause, that negotiations were again opened with Spain, and again with ill success.

In 1761 the celebrated "Family Compact" was matured and signed by the three Bourbon monarchs, by the terms of which it was agreed that the enemy of either France or Spain should be regarded as the

misery have poor people been driven to, by the inhuman barbarity of a merciless, cruel, unrelenting tyrant! What numbers has he plundered under the cloak of justice!"

enemy of both, and it was further understood that, in case war continued between England and France in the spring of 1762, Spain would join in the contest in conjunction with the latter power.

On the 4th of January, 1762, the British cabinet, anticipating the intentions of Spain, declared war against her, and hostilities speedily commenced.

At the expiration of twelve months, during which the British arms were everywhere successful, a peace was signed at Paris on the 10th of February, 1763. By this treaty Minorca, Guadaloupe, Martinico, and St Lucia were restored to England; Canada, Nova Scotia, and Cape Breton were ceded to her, and subsequently Florida was added. The relinquishment of the Havannah (which had surrendered during the negotiations), without a more valuable equivalent than Florida, was a blot upon this otherwise favourable treaty.

CHAPTER XIII.

1763 to 1779.

ENGLAND had scarcely commenced to reap the advantages of the peace before she was threatened with the symptoms of rebellion among the North American Colonies. In 1765 the extension of the Stamp Act to those states aroused the resentment of the colonists, meetings were convened at which the measure was condemned in violent language, petitions and resolutions were drawn up, and, ominous for the future, the formation of a Republic was suggested.

The rising clamour terrified the ministry, and by the advice of Pitt the obnoxious Act was repealed within twelve months after it had become law. In the mean time the administration, with Lord Rockingham at its head, was dissolved, and Pitt was again called upon to form a cabinet. He accepted the task, claiming for himself the Privy Seal and a peerage, with the title of Earl Chatham.

The expenses of the recent Seven Years' War fell heavily upon the tax-payers of England; and any measure likely to relieve the people from the burthen

was certain to command popularity and establish the position of the ministry. Notwithstanding the recent display of temper by the colonists of North America, it was judged both just and politic that the colonies should contribute to the levies for the payment of the war expenses.

The reduction of the land-tax, a measure which owed its origin to the opposition, had deprived the revenue of £500,000, and in an evil hour it was resolved to impose upon the colonists a tax, small indeed, but sufficient to kindle the greatest and most successful rebellion in the history of the world. It is unnecessary to recapitulate all the circumstances of this æra in England's history.

No sooner had the tea-tax become law, than every disposition to oppose it was evinced throughout the colony. Riots and disturbances broke out, and, though smothered for a moment, burst forth again with greater fury. Fearful outbreaks ensued: the whole country was roused, an army was raised, and a terrible rebellion raged throughout the provinces.

As the civil war proceeded, disaster followed disaster to the English arms, until, on the 17th October, 1777, General Burgoyne, finding himself surrounded by the rebel forces at Saratoga, laid down his arms. From the commencement of this rebellion the American cause had received the sympathy of France, who, jealous of British power, and hating the British nation, had watched the progress of events with

evident satisfaction. Louis XVI. did not conceal his desire to recognize the independence of the revolutionary colonies, but, as for a long time the issue of the contest remained doubtful, he was restrained by prudence from giving effect to his wishes. Burgoyne's defeat, however, establishing as it did the supremacy of the rebel arms, relieved the king's scruples, and on the 6th February, 1778, a treaty of alliance between the two countries was signed at Paris.

While England was distracted with these dissensions in her colonies, Spain was busily engaged in profiting by the respite since the peace. Wall, having retired from office, had been succeeded by Grimaldi, who was ably assisted by the Count D'Aranda in restoring the energies of the nation. The army and navy were reformed and augmented, a new system of military tactics was introduced, discipline was re-established, the order of the finances restored, and the revenues re-adjusted. In secret concert with France, vast preparations were silently made for a contest with England, while the successful progress of the rebellion in North America whetted the ardour of the two Bourbon monarchs. At length the moment seemed to have arrived for the destruction of British power and influence.

While Spain was thus diligently preparing for the opportunity when she might descend upon an enfeebled enemy, England, apart from colonial disaffec-

tion, was a prey to faction, imbecility, and civil commotion. Her prestige, once the terror of Europe, had fallen to the lowest ebb, her representatives abroad were openly insulted in the streets without redress, and even the minor powers assumed towards her an attitude of defiance and contempt. Hated and despised by every European state, virtually without an ally, distracted by agitation at home, and engaged in an attempt to quell an irresistible revolution in a distant colony, the situation of England was critical indeed.

No sooner was the alliance between France and the rebels of North America announced, than a declaration of war was issued by England, and hostilities immediately commenced; 50,000 Frenchmen were ready to invade the British coast, vast fleets were fitted out, and a diversion was made in favour of the Americans by an expedition under D'Estaing.

For a time Spain seemed disinclined to join in the contest, and even made offers of negotiation between the belligerent powers. But she never sincerely contemplated peace, and the negotiation was only an artifice to gain time for her final preparations. After some months delay, during which she acted the farce of mediation, her arrangements were completed, and, throwing aside the mask of friendship, she declared war against England (1779), and allied herself to France.

The designs of King Charles, long secretly enter-

tained, were speedily developed ; a junction was formed between the French and Spanish fleets, a powerful army, already organized, was ready to take the field, and an allied attack, so powerful that it was deemed irresistible, was directed against Gibraltar.

Twice within the century, Spain, at an enormous sacrifice of blood and treasure, had attempted the recovery of this fortress, and on each occasion she had been compelled to retire with humiliation and defeat. But now the moment appeared to have arrived when the long-lost prize might be wrested from the grasp of the enemy and restored to its setting in the crown of Spain.*

* Anticipating the results of this siege, Ayala says,—“ In the mean time we may hope that the result of this undertaking against a place so strongly fortified, but attacked by such powerful forces, may correspond to the justice of the cause, to the intelligence and activity of the Duke de Crillon, and to the well-known valour of the Spanish troops.”

CHAPTER XIV.

FOURTEENTH SIEGE OF GIBRALTAR, 1779.

SINCE the siege of 1727, the fortifications of Gibraltar had been suffered to lapse almost into a state of ruin and decay. Very few guns were mounted, the parapets were in many places crumbling to dust, and the ditches at the north angle were choked with rubbish. The magazines were defective, the ammunition was scanty, and the provision stores were empty. Reports on the condition of the fortress had been constantly sent home, but no attention was paid to the remonstrances of the successive governors. At length, in 1769, a commission, presided over by the Master-general, assembled at the Board of Ordnance in Westminster, to deliberate upon the defective condition of the defences.

From the evidence of a principal member of this conference we gather some particulars of the state of the Rock at that period.* He tells us that most of

* Remarks and Observations made upon several of the Sea-ports in Spain and France, during a Journey in those Countries

the engineers whose opinions were asked respecting the mode of fortification best adapted to the Rock, proposed the adoption of Vauban's principles, while the minority were for rejecting the common book rules, according as the situation varied—conforming their designs to the nature of the ground and to the kind of attack to which each particular part would be subjected.

“It was my principle,” he said, “that when the lower power of attack only could be exerted upon any particular part, it was both needless and indeed a defect of judgment to raise works whose qualities were calculated to repulse the higher power of an army possessed of space enough to enable them to exercise and bring into play the reiterated assaults peculiar to the advantages of having a great spot of ground to act upon. Not such, indeed, does it appear to me is the character of the new works lately erected near the sea-side at Gibraltar. I apprehend that the importance and situation of Gibraltar, if well considered, should draw forth other modes of reasoning than such as have been frequently adopted with respect to fortified places differently circumstanced.

“It has usually been understood that when it is besieged our fleet may go to its relief, and if we were to be certain that it will be attacked again as

in 1767—1768. Performed by Major Hugh Debbieg, Corps of Engineers.—King's MSS. Brit. Mus.

in the two last sieges (1705, 1727), the only method by which it will never be reduced, that system might be adhered to with some degree of confidence. But we ought not to lose sight of its distance from home, separated from us by the continent of Europe, that our fleet may at some critical time have more necessary and indispensable employment at home than succouring places at a great distance at every alarm.” *

After pointing out the weakness of the defences towards the southward, and showing that the grand powder-magazine was situated on an eminence half a mile from the town, and exposed to the sea and to fire from shipping, he concludes,—

“Gibraltar is a fortress whose situation at the first sight thereof convinces the beholder of its great utility and consequence to Great Britain. It is the key of the Mediterranean from the ocean, and the strongest curb she holds over the power of her enemies.”

In 1770, the continuation of large armaments in France and Spain had aroused the suspicions and excited the fears of the English ministry.

Allusions were made in both Houses of Parliament

* The correctness of this officer's judgment was afterwards proved by the events of the siege, when the garrison was twice bordering on starvation in consequence of no fleet being able to sail to their relief.

to the state of the kingdom for war, and in a debate on the seizure of the Falkland Islands by order of the King of Spain, Lord Chatham delivered a remarkable speech, in which he alluded to the defenceless condition of Gibraltar.

“The third object,” he said, “indispensable as I conceive in the distribution of our navy, is to maintain such a force in the Bay of Gibraltar as may be sufficient to cover that garrison, to watch the motions of the Spaniards, and to keep open the communication with Minorca. . . . But how will your Lordships be astonished when I inform you in what manner they have provided for these great, these essential objects! We have one ship-of-the-line at Jamaica, one at the Leeward Islands, and one at Gibraltar. Yet at this very moment, for aught the ministry know, both Jamaica and Gibraltar may be attacked—and if they are attacked (which God forbid!) they must fall. . . .

“Two regiments of 400 men each, at a time like this, are sent to secure a place of such importance as Gibraltar! a place which it is universally agreed cannot hold against a vigorous attack from the sea, if once the enemy should be so far masters of the Bay as to make a good landing, even with a moderate force.

“The indispensable service of the lines requires at least 4000 men. The present garrison consists of about 2300, so that if the relief should be fortunate

enough to get on shore they will want 800 men of their necessary complement.”*

On the 11th of December the Duke of Manchester (at the suggestion of Chatham) † moved an address to His Majesty, praying that he would be graciously pleased to send a proper force to Gibraltar for its due and efficient defence. His speech exposed the insecurity of our foreign possessions and the peril of our ports at home. His statements were confirmed by Chatham, who added that he had received intelligence ‡ of a plan being formed to attack Gibraltar. “Having asserted,” says Junius, “that it was open to an attack from the sea, and that if the enemy were masters of the bay the place could not make any long resistance,” he was answered in the following words by that great statesman, the Earl of Sandwich; “Supposing the noble lord’s argument to be well founded, and supposing Gibraltar to be now unluckily taken, still, according to the noble lord’s own doctrine, it would be no great matter; for although

* Correspondence of Earl Chatham, vol. iv. p. 13.

† “I dissuaded calling for any papers, but suggested addressing the Crown to quicken all necessary succours for Gibraltar. This was liked.” Chatham to Lord Camden.

‡ “Your Ladyship and Lord Stanhope may have heard that an idea has prevailed strongly here of an attack upon Gibraltar; some intelligence on that head having reached me, I made use of it in the House of Lords.” Earl Chatham to Countess Stanhope. Hayes, December 16th, 1770. Pitt’s Correspondence.

we are not masters of the sea at present we probably shall be so some time or other, and then, my lords, there will be no difficulty in retaking Gibraltar.”*

These discussions concerning the safety of Gibraltar soon died a natural death, and the fortress was left almost defenceless to its fate.

In 1777, General George Augustus Eliott was appointed Governor of the Rock. This officer was born in 1718, and had passed with brilliant success through the school of war. In his early youth he was educated at Edinburgh, from whence he went to the University of Leyden, where he was celebrated for his proficiency in foreign languages. His educational career was completed with the study of tactics at La Fere. Having attained the rank of Lieutenant-colonel, he accompanied George II. to Germany, in 1743, as an aide-de-camp, and was wounded at the battle of Dettingen.

During the Seven Years' War he greatly distinguished himself under the Duke of Cumberland. He was a man of consummate military talents, great energy, and indomitable perseverance, qualities which the memorable events of the war tested to the utmost, and which served to guide the British arms successfully through one of the severest and most protracted sieges on record.†

* Junius, Vol. iii. p. 293.

† Anecdote of Sir G. Eliott, from Carlyle's Memoirs, p. 187. "Captain Lyon introduced me to his friends the officers

Elliott had no sooner taken up his command than he discovered the utterly defenceless state of the fortress. He found the fortifications badly adapted to the peculiar formation and contour of the Rock, and observed with alarm that both magazines and stores were insufficiently provided. Added to this, the garrison was numerically inadequate to perform the duties which even in time of peace were required.*

of the Horse-guards. . . . One I must particularly mention was Captain Elliott, afterwards Lord Heathfield, the celebrated defender of Gibraltar." Captain Lyon described him as a worthy and able officer, though singular and austere in his manner, and Carlyle remarks that he should have noted him as a man sour and untractable.

* On the 2nd December, 1777, the Duke of Richmond moved for the returns of the army and navy in Ireland and America. Upon this occasion the Earl of Chatham, in the course of a most able speech, alluded thus to Gibraltar:—

"Nothing has been offered which may lead to inform us of the actual state of the garrisons of Gibraltar and Minorca, those two very important fortresses which have hitherto enabled us to maintain our superiority in the Mediterranean, and one of them (Gibraltar) situated in the very continent of Spain, the best proof of our naval power, and the only solid check on that of the House of Bourbon. Yet those two important fortresses are left to chance . . . we hold them but by sufferance. . . . When I had the honour to be called into the councils of the late king, Gibraltar still remained in our hands, and the war in Germany, which Parliament thought fit to engage in and bind themselves to, before I came into office, —though we were carrying on the most extensive operations in America, though the coast of Africa and the West Indies required a suitable force to protect them, and though these kingdoms called for a proportionate army, not only to act de-

His anxieties were further aroused by the prevailing rumours of an intended attack upon Gibraltar, rumours which in the autumn (1777) had gained such credence in England that the ministry communicated their fears to the governor in a despatch in cypher, dated September, 1777 :—

“ Though the strongest assurances are received from the Courts of France and Spain of their intentions to preserve the peace at present subsisting in Europe, yet the great armaments making in each of

fensively, but offensively, on the coasts of our enemies,—notwithstanding all those previous services, my Lords, having the counsel of that great man (Duke of Marlborough) constantly in view, it determined me that whatever demands or how much soever such troops might be wanting elsewhere, that Gibraltar should never want a full and adequate defence. I never have had, my Lords, less than eight battalions to defend it.* I think a battalion then was about 800 strong. So that, my Lords, I affirm that Gibraltar was never trusted to a garrison of less than 6000 men. . . . Gibraltar is garrisoned by Hanoverians. I am told if any accident should happen to the present commanding officer, then that the care of the fortress and the command of the troops would devolve on a foreigner.† I do not recollect his name, but this is my information. . . . I am well authorized to say, my Lords, that such is the present defenceless state of Gibraltar, that there is not a second relief in case of attack, nor men sufficient to man the works while those fatigued with service go to refresh, eat, or sleep.”

* Had the Earl of Chatham forgotten the offer of William Pitt, to surrender Gibraltar to Spain in 1756?

† General de la Motte.

those kingdoms, and the large fleet at Cadiz, which on the shortest notice would be ready to sail, are circumstances that require the greatest vigilance on your part. I must add that a very large quantity of cannon of all calibre, with a very large quantity of balls for them, are now transporting from Dunkirk to Spain.”*

In his reply to this warning, the governor assured the cabinet of his never-ceasing vigilance, but declared that it would be impossible to withstand a siege with the inefficient resources he had at his disposal. Conscious of the difficulty and delay that would attend any attempt to carry out by correspondence the alterations and additions which he considered essential for the safety of the place, Eliott determined to send home a competent officer, acquainted with the wants and condition of the garrison, whose personal representations would have more weight in urging the necessity of providing for the security of the fortress than could be expected from a tedious correspondence. †

The officer selected for this duty was Colonel Green of the Engineers, a man in whom every confi-

* Townshend to Eliott. Cypher. Original in Colonial Secretary's Office, Gibraltar.

† “No vigilance on my part shall be wanting. In case of service the garrison must be increased considerably more than double the present number, especially artillery-men. . . . Not less than 8000 men, artillery included, will be sufficient.”—Eliott to Secretary for War. Cypher. October, 1777.

dence was placed, and who in the after events of the siege became celebrated for the talent with which he conducted the system of defence. Colonel Green carried with him full instructions respecting the objects of his mission, and was also the bearer of a confidential letter to Lord Townshend from the governor.*

* Gibraltar, Oct. 5th, 1777.

“My Lord,

“Colonel Green will have the honour to deliver this letter to your Lordship, the only officer who is, or indeed ought to be, in a condition to lay before you the exact state of our works, and the most minute peculiarities of this singular fortress, circumstanced in so many respects different, I believe, from any other in the known world.

“Col. Green, from close and repeated examination, is perfect master of the advantages to be taken from any recess or protuberance of this mountain, either horizontal or vertical, which grow daily more obvious, having become accessible to us by the communications made and making towards such parts of the Rock as may contribute to strengthen our defence. Your Lordship will find by Col. Green’s report that the King’s Bastion is now in such a state that, should a sudden and unforeseen emergency require it, with a few days’ notice, we might be able to place our artillery on temporary platforms, the chief engineer thinking the rampart not yet sufficiently settled to receive those of stone which are to remain. This noble work being now so far advanced, I think it now the most favourable opportunity for Col. Green to take your further orders in the prosecution of such plans as have been or may be adopted to complete our fortifications. This will be a tedious, expensive, but necessary work for maintaining the fortress, and added to it must be many internal accommodations in barracks, bomb-proofs, store-houses, hospitals, maga-

On the opening of the year 1778, the uneasiness that had prevailed at home, since the general arming of Spain and France, was no longer a matter of secrecy or doubt. Rumours of a secret treaty between Spain and Morocco were rife, and intelligence of the assemblage of a constantly increasing fleet at Ferrol, Cadiz, and Toulon added to the general alarm.

In February Mr Hardy, British Consul at Cadiz, communicated by cypher with the governor of Gibraltar, and gave information of the vast preparations that were going on in that port,—information which was immediately forwarded to England.

Besides the large navy already assembled, ships were expected from Carthage and elsewhere. 3,000,000 rations were ready for issue; all the most trusted pilots were ordered to be in readiness in 24 hours, and the troops were ever on the alert. Something extraordinary, said Mr Hardy, is in agitation, and many have given their opinion that your garrison is the object of attack.

General Elliott was naturally much disturbed at this intelligence, more especially as in the mean

zines; with all which this place, I do assure your Lordship, is so very indifferently provided, that the wants in most of these articles are by no means supplied proportionately to our present garrison. I submit it, therefore, what must be our situation in case of service, when our force must be at least tripled?

“I have the honour, &c.,

“G. A. Elliott.”

time no reinforcements or supplies had reached the garrison, nor, indeed, had he heard the intentions of the government on the subject. He again urged the necessity of immediately providing for the defence of the fortress, and wrote pressingly to the government for assistance.

Writing on the 2nd March, 1778, he says, referring to the arrival of a convoy without provisions, "It is my duty to be very pressing with your Lordship, that a supply of every kind be ordered without loss of time. Our present store of beef, pork, pease, and butter is scarcely the complement for five months. Flour, including biscuit, three months; oat-meal the same. Pardon me, my Lord, for once more repeating that no time must be lost in forwarding the supply from England. . . . My reports are confirmed, that the fleet at Cadiz is daily increasing, 19 first-class ships ready for sea in that harbour; nine more expected from Ferrol and other ports, a report current that arms and cannon are preparing at Seville, and 10 ships of the line expected at Cadiz from Toulon, under Count d'Estaing, who is to command the allied armament."*

In April, the rumour that the expedition, whose preparation had long attracted the attention of all Europe, was destined for an attack upon Gibraltar, had gained an ominous significance. It was no

* General Elliott to Secretary at War. Colonial Secretary's Office, Gibraltar.

longer doubtful that Cadiz would be the port of rendezvous for the combined fleets, and that the whole force of the expedition would be concentrated in that neighbourhood. The only conclusion to be drawn from the disposition of the armament was, an intention to attack Gibraltar.

General Elliott was convinced of the justice of this conclusion, and all his letters written at this time speak of an attack as imminent. He was, indeed, already preparing for the danger which he felt hung over the Rock. The regiments forming the garrison were carefully inspected, and reported thoroughly efficient, but too weak in number;—their vigour, said the governor, may be depended upon. The small numbers of artillery-men and the insufficiency of supplies caused him the greatest anxiety. He constantly addressed letters to the ministers at home, entreating them to give him the power of arming the defences, and forming dépôts of provisions in case of siege; and we find him urging the government to maintain a good understanding with the Emperor of Morocco, and pointing out the inestimable value of Barbary as a source of supplies for the garrison. These entreaties—we may almost say remonstrances—appear to have been scarcely noticed by the English government. No convoy arrived, no prospect of relief appeared.*

* “The several regiments in this garrison are good and are in the most perfect order. Their vigour may be depended upon, but their numbers in proportion to the service so very

In the mean time, Spain directed all her efforts to secure the friendship and alliance of the Barbary states. By means of bribery, and under pretence of gaining satisfaction for the siege of Melilla, the Emperor of Morocco was induced to send an ambassador, Ben Ottoman, to the Court of Madrid, and through the instrumentality of this personage a treaty was concluded, by which Spain obtained numerous advantages.*

The existence of this negotiation was not unknown to Elliott. On the 16th of April, a Jew in the service of the Emperor of Morocco discovered a letter from the King of Spain, in which overtures were made for the speedy settlement of a treaty between the two nations. The whole contents of this letter he forwarded to the general.†

small, furnishing at the very utmost one relief."—Elliott to Lord Grantham, April 6th, 1778. Cypher.

* "The assistance afforded by the Moorish prince would appear incredible had it not been seen. He opened his ports to the ships employed in the blockade of Gibraltar, permitted them to pursue and detain those of the enemy, facilitated the transport of provisions and assistance to our camp, and finally deposited in our power part of his treasures as a pledge of his sincerity. By his friendship we were enabled to leave our African posts with weak garrisons. Your Majesty comprehends better than any one how numerous would have been our troubles, if, from omitting to form this connection in due time, the English had instigated the emperor to undertake the Siege of Ceuta or Melilla, to disturb by his cruisers in the Straits the measures taken for the blockade of Gibraltar."—Florida Blanca's Representation. † Vide Appendix.

“We may look upon each other as friends,” said the king, “and, in case a treaty should be decided on, we shall send our respective ambassadors to each other, but I must first acquaint your Majesty that in one of the articles it must be stipulated that your Majesty must oblige yourself to give no assistance whatever to my enemies.” *

The apathy of the British government, the neglect of Gibraltar, and the absence of a British fleet in the Mediterranean, attracted the attention of Parliament, which was at this time sitting. On the 25th May, the Duke of Richmond brought forward a motion in the House of Lords, charging the Ministers with neglect in not having taken steps to meet the naval preparations of the French and Spanish Courts. This speech alluded especially to the absolute necessity of having a fleet in the Mediterranean, to protect Gibraltar and Minorca, and to prevent the junction of the French and Spanish navies. The Earl of Sandwich, on behalf of the government, denied that such a course was either indispensable or conformable to precedents; while Lord Bristol declared that the French would never have stirred or attempted to force the Straits if a squadron had been in the Bay of Gibraltar. †

On the same day a similar motion was brought

* Translation of original in Colonial Secretary's Office, Gibraltar. Mutilated.

† Parliamentary History.

on in the Lower House by Sir William Meredith and Lord North. Mr Fox and Mr Grenville spoke during the debate, Fox declaring "that the country was languishing under the torpor of a supine, senseless, incapable government."

On the 16th June, 1779, the Spanish manifesto was handed to King George III. by the Marquis D'Almodovar, the Minister to the Court of St James's. This document set forth the grounds of complaint against the British government, and declared that the Catholic King, entirely contrary to his wishes and inclinations, felt himself "under the disagreeable necessity of making use of all the means which the Almighty had intrusted him with, to obtain that justice which he has solicited by so many ways without being able to acquire it." The issue of this manifesto was followed immediately by hostile movements on the part of Spain.

On the 21st June instructions reached the general in command of the troops at St Roque, ordering him to cut off all communication with Gibraltar. Three days previous to this the governor, ignorant of the declaration of hostilities, rode, attended by his staff, to pay a complimentary visit to General Mendoza, who then resided at St Roque. It is believed that the Spanish general had, at that very time, a notice from the Court of Madrid in his pocket, apprizing him of the outbreak of war; his manner

and conversation during the visit were observed to be strikingly embarrassed and uncordial. On the return of the party to the Rock in the evening, the governor found Mr Logie, his Majesty's consul at Tangier, who had arrived in a Swedish frigate, waiting to receive him with intelligence of the rupture between the two countries.

Though startled by the suddenness of the news, the correctness of which he had no reason to doubt, General Elliott was prepared for an event which he had long contemplated. For nearly two years he had foreseen this crisis, and had exerted himself, under the oppressive cloud of neglect, to be armed for the occasion.

The government, so long deaf to his appeals, had tardily and inadequately reinforced and provisioned the garrison; but the measures were but half-measures, and the fortress was but ill prepared to stand a powerful and lengthened siege.

The garrison was composed of ten regiments, including the artillery and engineers, giving a total of 5382 officers and men. The artillery and engineers numbered only 534 men, a strength greatly inferior to the requirements of the batteries. The troops and staff were as follows,—

General G. A. Elliott,—Governor.

Lieut.-General R. Boyd,—Lieut.-Governor.

Major-General De la Motte,
Hanoverian Brigade.

	Rank and File.	
Artillery	428	Col. Godwin.
12th regiment	519	Lieut.-Col. Trigge.
39th regiment	506	Major Kellett.
56th regiment	508	Major Fancourt.
58th regiment	526	Lieut.-Col. Cochrane.
72nd regiment	944	Lieut.-Col. Gledstones.
Engineers & artificers	106	Col. Green.

Hanoverians.

Hardenberg's	367	Lieut.-Col. Hugo.
Redens	361	Lieut.-Col. Dachen- hausen.
De la Motte's	367	Lieut.-Col. Sclippergill.

A small naval force, consisting of "the Panther," three frigates, and a sloop, under Admiral Duff, lay off the New Mole.

Two days after the governor had been to St Roque he received a despatch from General Mendoza, commanding the Spanish troops in the adjoining district, officially announcing the declaration of war. On the receipt of this communication a Council of War was held to deliberate upon the state of affairs.

The first care of the governor was to provide measures to secure supplies for the garrison, and to establish a safe system of postal communication with

England. Both these objects were difficult to carry out, on account of the unceasing vigilance of the enemy's cruisers, which were already on the alert all along the coast.

Within the fortress everything was placed upon a war footing, the guards were reinforced, the Land Port barriers closed, pickets thrown out to watch the movements of the enemy, and gabions, fascines, and sand-bags prepared.

It was not until the 6th July that intelligence of the rupture between Great Britain and Spain reached Gibraltar officially from the government at home. The same day a proclamation was issued, declaring all Spanish vessels lawful prizes, and letters of marque were granted to numerous privateers. Beyond the suspension of all communication with the mainland, and the depredations of the enemy's cruisers, there were as yet no positive signs of an intention to attack Gibraltar. But in all her former wars with England during the present century, Spain had made Gibraltar the first object of her ambition; and there was no reason to believe that she would depart from her usual policy on the present occasion. General Eliott felt that his garrison was the object of attack, and prepared his measures accordingly.

Active operations were commenced by the English. Admiral Duff having had information that a valuable squadron of small vessels laden with provisions for the grand fleet at Cadiz was about

to leave Malaga, sent the "Childers" to the eastward to keep a look-out, and signal its approach. On the evening of the 11th the convoy hove in sight. The admiral left the Bay with the "Panther," 60 guns, and the "Enterprise" frigate, intending to intercept them.

During the night he came up with the expedition, and succeeded after a few broadsides in capturing several of the smaller vessels laden with wine and provisions, but the majority escaped and made their way to Cadiz. Two days after this skirmish a squadron, under Spanish colours, came into the Bay, and having taken up a judicious position off Algeciras, blockaded the port of Gibraltar.

Towards the end of July large bodies of troops and *materiel* of war began to arrive on the plains below St Roque, and a camp of considerable extent was prepared. The Spanish expeditionary army, which had long been organized, and which from its first enrolment had been destined for the siege of Gibraltar, was under the command of Don Martin Alvarez de Sotomayor, a general who had seen some service in the wars of Italy. Under him were, Lieutenant-generals Don Ladislaus Habor, and the Marquis de la Torre, Major-general Tilly, chief of artillery, the Marquis de Arellano, commandant of cavalry. The army consisted of two battalions of Spanish guards, two regiments of Walloons, and other corps selected from the regiments of Soria, Guadalaxara,

America, Catalonia, and volunteers from Aragon and Savoy. The artillery were 1000 strong, the cavalry composed 12 squadrons, four of which were dragoons. The whole army amounted to 13,700 men. The naval force was commanded by Don Antonio Barcelo, an admiral who had gained a considerable reputation. From the movements of the enemy, and from information received through the British consul at Tangier, General Elliott concluded that it was the intention of the enemy to preserve a strict blockade and reduce the garrison by famine. So inadequately had the fortress been provisioned, that even at this early period the scarcity of supplies was a cause of uneasiness, and foreshadowed the trials and privations which the troops were about to undergo. The rations of both officers and men were reduced one half, only 40 head of cattle remained, and forage had become so scarce that no person was allowed to keep a horse who could not produce a store of 1000 pounds of feed. The governor, initiating that admirable policy which marked his conduct during the siege, ordered one of his own animals to be shot, as an example of self-denial to his subordinates. Every encouragement was given to the small felucca-rigged vessels to run through the enemy's cruisers and bring supplies from Barbary and the coast, while, in order to prevent monopoly and extortion, the cargoes were invariably sold at auction to the highest bidder.

By the middle of August the preparations of the

enemy had become considerably advanced, their camp was full of activity, earthworks were thrown up and armed, and immense stores of ammunition had been brought from the interior. Every succeeding day, says Drinkwater, confirmed us in the opinion that their object was to distress us as much as possible ; the blockade became more strict and severe, their army was in force before the place, and their present plan seemed to be to reduce Gibraltar by famine.*

By the beginning of September the Spanish camp was completely formed. It consisted of two lines, extending from Punta Mala, the point of disembarkation in the Bay, in an oblique direction towards the Sierra de Carbonera, or Queen of Spain's Chair. The artillery park was nearer to the Bay, close to Punta Mala, a spot which had been selected from its advantages as a landing-place for guns, stores, &c. In the mean time the garrison had not been idle. The engineers had been busily engaged scarping the too accessible points at the King's Lines on the north-west face of the Rock, and strengthening them with palisades. The batteries open to an enfilading fire, were supplied with traverses, and a boom was thrown from the Old Mole head to the foot of Land Port glacis.

Hitherto the operations of the enemy had been carried on undisturbed by the garrison. Fort San Filipe had been completed and armed, a mortar battery was

* This was the original design of the Spanish Court.

nearly finished, and large masses of material were arriving daily at the lines, for the evident purpose of being employed in the construction of more formidable works. At length, on the 11th September, General Elliott convened a council of war, consisting of General Boyd, Admiral Duff, Major-general de la Motte, Colonels Ross, Green, and Godwin, and Sir Thomas Rich. At this council it was resolved to open fire upon the enemy, with the intention of impeding the advance of their works. Accordingly, on the following morning * at day-break the guns in Green's Lodge battery, Willis's, and Queen Charlotte's, opened upon the advanced guard and the lines; but at too great a distance to inflict any material injury upon the trenches. It had the effect however of alarming their working parties to such a degree, that they fled precipitately from the lines, and for some hours did not return. During the following week the firing continued, but was not answered by the Spaniards. Nevertheless, every precaution was taken by the governor to render the bombardment, should it take place, as harmless as possible. Most of the inhabitants had long since left the town and retired to the south, where, having constructed wooden huts, they lived out of reach of shot in comparative safety.

The governor, foreseeing the privations the garrison

* The wife of an officer discharged the first gun; General Elliott, who was standing by, gave the word "Britons, strike home," as the signal.—*Ancell's Journal*.

would have to undergo on account of the scarcity of provisions, ordered that a portion of the merchants' stores should be set aside for the king's service. This measure caused great discontent among the traders, who anticipated reaping a harvest by husbanding their goods and raising their prices at the expense of the lives of the soldiers.*

The guns mounted in Green's Battery, † 1000 feet above the level of the sea, having proved most destructive to the enemy's lines, attempts were made to arm another battery on the very summit of

* At the opening of the first bombardment, and when the troops were dying from famine, the stores of the merchants were found full of provisions which had been hoarded up for the purpose of raising prices.

† The Rock of Gibraltar runs in a direction nearly due north and south; and is entirely surrounded by sea, except at its northern extremity. Here it is joined with Spain by a narrow and low sandy isthmus, varying from 900 to 1750 yards in width. When the siege opened in 1779, a line of fortifications, threatening the Rock, ran across the isthmus, at about a mile distant from the barrier gate; this line was bounded by two forts, St Felipe on the proper right, and resting on the bay, Santa Barbara on the left, touching the eastern beach. The northern face of the Rock only was opposed to these lines, the principal batteries bearing upon them being Willis's, Green's, and Queen Anne's, situated upon a perpendicular eminence, several hundred feet above the sea level, the grand battery at Land Port, which swept the approaches from the north front, and the fort at the extrêmy of the Old Mole, which was immediately opposed to the guns of St Felipe. The galleries excavated out of the solid rock, which now form the most remarkable feature in the fortification, were not then constructed.

the northern apex of the Rock. This spot was so difficult to reach, even with guns of small calibre, that a zigzag roadway was cut out along the face of the hill, up which it was proposed to draw the cannon; but this method proved so tedious, and the officers of artillery were so impatient of delay, that an attempt was made to drag a gun up the rugged slope of the hill. This feat was successfully accomplished after some days' hard work, and a 24-pounder was placed in position. This piece of ordnance received the name of the Rock gun; though 1400 feet above the sea, it was dismounted several times during the siege.*

About the middle of the month the enemy unmasked three new batteries,—two, of 14 guns each, bearing on Willis's, and one, of seven guns, directed against the town and water-port. The cheerless prospect of the garrison, the scanty means of sustenance, and the hardships the soldiers had to undergo, induced some of the troops to desert, and several men got away and joined the enemy unperceived.

* The great length of range and the deep loose sand on which the Spanish lines were thrown up neutralized the effect of the mortars; when the shells fell they buried themselves so deeply that they exploded without damage.

Captain Mercier of the 39th regiment obviated this evil by suggesting that $5\frac{1}{2}$ inch shells with short, calculated fuses should be fired from guns. This practice answered so satisfactorily that it became general.

It is the first instance of horizontal firing with shells and calculated fuses on record.

As the year advanced the blockade* was kept with the strictest vigilance; the Straits were watched by countless cruisers, which stretched in an unbroken line from Ceuta to Cabrita and intercepted any communications between the Rock and the Barbary coast. Notwithstanding the privations which they had endured, the garrison remained healthy, until, at the end of October, some alarm was created by the out-

* *Strength of enemy's fleet at Algeciras.*

Vessels.	Guns.	Men.
1 ship	70	700
1 frigate	36	300
1 xebeque	32	250
1 ditto	28	200

At Ceuta.

1 ship	60	600
1 frigate	26	250
1 xebeque	18	200
1 ditto	20	180
1 ditto	14	80

Constantly cruising.

1 xebeque	16	100
4 small ditto		240
6 half galleys		1000
6 quarter ditto		450
20 armed boats		300

British fleet at anchor.

Panther	60	400
Enterprise	28	200
Childers	14	90
Gibraltar	12	40
Fortune	10	30

Ansell's Journal.

break of small-pox among the Jews, a class of people whose habitual filth was at all times sufficient to engender any malignant disease. Precautions were taken to prevent infection, and fortunately the disease did not spread. The store of provisions was now rapidly becoming exhausted. A small cutter had been captured on the 23rd laden with rice, which was disposed of to the Jews and Genoese at exorbitant prices. But beyond this handful of relief nothing had reached the garrison for months. Mutton cost 3s. 6d. per lb., veal 4s., ducks 14s. to 18s. per couple, and a goose could not be obtained under a guinea. Fish and vegetables were equally dear, and bread still scarcer. "At this time," says Drinkwater, "the governor made trial what quantity of rice would suffice a single person for 24 hours, and actually lived himself eight days on four ounces of rice per day. Sir George is remarkable for an abstemious mode of living, seldom tasting anything but vegetables, simple puddings, and water."*

The diary of the siege, whose dreary sameness shows how monotonously each day must at this period have passed away, contains here and there a red letter entry recording some remarkable event. Under the

* In spite of every precaution the merchants managed to conceal their goods and to sell them at exorbitant prices.

Fish and flour were the principal support of the inhabitants. Six small fish not larger than sprats sold for two shillings.—*Ancell's Journal of the Siege.*

head of Sunday, November 14th, wind N.W., blowing fresh, is the following brief but graphic tale of the gallantry and skill of an English sailor.

“Arrival—the Buck, English privateer,
Capt. Fag, commander.” *

“An English ship having appeared this morning from the westward, a red flag was hoisted on the Spanish watch-towers, being the signal for an enemy. Admiral Barcelo thereupon got under way with his whole squadron. The sloop being abreast of Cabrita Point, and very near a large xebecq, tacked and stood to the southward, several xebecqs and galleys in chase of her: She afterwards put about and stood for the Bay, and repeated this manœuvre again, which gained her the windward gage of all of them. A 50-gun ship and frigate then stretched across to cut her off from Europa Point; they also fell to leeward. Barcelo then stood from Cabrita Point (where he had anchored), and endeavoured to intercept the sloop, but was baffled in his expectations; she shot a-head of him, and arrived safe in the Bay, after receiving a broadside from the Spanish admiral and the 50-gun ship (which she returned to both), besides upwards of 40 shot from the other vessels of the squadron: one six-pounder only fell into her. The sloop proves to be the Buck, of Folkestone, G. Fag commander, 24 guns, nine-pounders.

* MS. Journal of the Siege. Colonial Secretary's Office.

“Barcelo and his squadron all fell to leeward, not being able to return to his station.” *

It was a matter of no small difficulty during this strict blockade to find a means for the conveyance of despatches safely to and from England. It was of the first importance that these documents should run no risk of falling into the enemy’s hands, and all sorts of shifts and devices were adopted to deceive and evade the enemy’s cruisers. On one occasion our consul at Tangier (Mr Logie), who was always active in procuring a channel for the transmission of despatches, † undertook to convey some papers of the greatest importance from Gibraltar to Barbary, from whence they could be forwarded home. The felucca in which he sailed was however chased by the cruisers, overhauled, and boarded. In the mean time, Mr Logie

* Drinkwater gives this anecdote with some difference of description:—

“At the entrance to the Straits Captain Fag met with three English cutters. The captain of one of them endeavoured to dissuade him from an attempt to get into Gibraltar, saying that it was impossible. Captain Fag jocosely asked if there was room for a coach and six to get in, and being answered in the affirmative, he rolled his quid two or three times and with an audible oath swore he would get in if Beelzebub himself gave chase.”—*Ancell’s Journal of the Siege.*

† November 24th. “Four Portuguese who had been privately despatched by the governor to fetch a packet from Faro returned safe: they had a small boat, which was carried on camels over rocks and mountains, being permitted by the Moors. They landed it in a creek under Apes’ Hill, and stole over in the night.”—*Ancell’s Journal.*

had concealed the papers in a loaf of bread, which he gave in charge of a trusty Moor, with an injunction to deliver it to the consulate at Tangier in case he should be discovered and taken prisoner; then, hiding himself beneath the flooring of the boat, he lay concealed while the vessel was searched. Fortunately he was not discovered, and the felucca was allowed to proceed on her way. On another occasion Mr Logie's ingenuity and resource in difficulties were even more remarkable. Having received despatches at Tangier from England for transmission to Gibraltar, he intrusted them to a faithful Moor, who was to carry them across the water as he best could. The Spaniards, having become aware of the consul's intentions, offered a bribe, amounting to £220, to the Moor if he would betray his trust. The man, too honest to be bought even for such a sum of money, which to him would have been a princely fortune, acquainted the consul of the circumstance, and was desired to promise the Spaniards that he would surrender the papers on receipt of the reward.

In the mean time, Mr Logie prepared false despatches in cypher, duly signed, sealed, and directed; these fictitious papers the Moor delivered to the enemy's emissaries, and received the money in return. Next day, the Spaniards being off their guard, the original letters were carried by the same man to a convenient part of the coast, from whence they were sent over to Gibraltar.

On the 27th of December the Spaniards opened an experimental fire upon the extremity of the king's lines. The garrison gardeners, who lived on the North Front, were obliged to retreat within the barriers, and a party of Genoese fishermen, in their hurry to escape, lost their boats and tackle.*

The year 1780 was not ushered in by any remarkable event. The constantly decreasing stock of provisions was however a matter of the gravest importance, and caused the governor the greatest anxiety. The supplies from Barbary were meagre, and rarely reached the garrison. Bread was becoming so scarce that the daily rations were served out under protection of a guard, and the weak, the aged, and the infirm, who could not struggle against the hungry, impetuous crowd that thronged the doors of the bakeries, often returned to their miserable homes, robbed of their share.†

The ordinary means of sustenance were now almost exhausted, and roots, weeds, thistles, and wild onions were greedily sought after and devoured by the famished inhabitants. Some died of starvation,

* Ancell's Journal.

† "Bread getting very scarce, enough only for two months. It is a terribly painful sight to see the fighting among the people for a morsel of bread at an exorbitant price. Men wrestling, women entreating, and children crying, a jargon of all languages, piteously pouring forth their complaints. You would think sensibility would shed a tear, and yet when we are in equal distress ourselves our feelings for others rather subside.—*Ancell's Journal.*

and the terrible prospect of a famine loomed in the future. To add to the despair which the contemplation of such a fate was likely to create, the fear of a bombardment, recently excited by the shots from St Felipe, was renewed by the guns from that fort again opening fire on the 12th January,* and doing some damage in the town. Though scarcely a dozen rounds were fired, the timid inhabitants, convinced that a general cannonade was about to commence, fled in confusion to the south, abandoning their houses, and subjecting themselves to aggravated and unnecessary privations.

On the following day all the field officers of the garrison assembled, by order of the governor, at the quarters of Brigadier Ross, to inquire into the condition and quantity of the supplies remaining. The result of this conference was the immediate reduction of the soldiers' rations—already barely sufficient to support life. No fresh meat remained, with the exception of an old cow, which was reserved for the sick. A goose was sold for £2 ; a turkey for £4.†

* "A shot struck the parapet of the Old Mole; a 26-pounder went through the roof of Mr Quartin's house, and drove a splinter into the heel of a lady, who was walking in the street; another went through a sentry-box in Land Port covered way. The enemy fired at a clergyman burying the dead."—*Ancell's Journal of the Siege*.

† "Want of supplies severely felt. Another bakery shut up. No more flour. Salt meat even scarce, and no vegetables."—*Ancell's Journal*.

The government at home had long been aware of the melancholy condition of the garrison at Gibraltar, and several schemes for its relief had been under consideration. But England's weakness at sea, and the many demands for the presence of her fleets in other quarters of the globe, had hitherto frustrated all the efforts of the ministry to send a convoy to the fortress.

Early in January, 1780, however, Admiral Sir George Rodney, having been appointed to the command of the West Indian fleet, sailed with a powerful squadron from Spithead, with orders to relieve Gibraltar on his way. He had been but a short time at sea, when, on the 8th January, he fell in with a convoy sailing from St Sebastian to Cadiz, consisting of 15 merchantmen, a 64-gun ship, four frigates, and two other vessels. The whole of these he captured. The greater number of the ships were laden with wheat, flour, and provisions; the remainder with bale goods and naval stores. The former were sent by the admiral to Gibraltar, and the latter were despatched to England. After this fortunate success Rodney continued on his voyage. But the seizure of this convoy was only the prelude to a greater and far more brilliant victory.

The admiral, having received repeated intelligence that a Spanish squadron, said to consist of 14 sail of the line, was cruising off Cape St Vincent, gave notice to all the captains to prepare for battle as they

approached that point. On the 16th January, at one p. m., the Cape bearing north four leagues, the fleet came in sight of the Spanish squadron under Admiral Don Juan de Langara. The "Bedford" immediately gave the signal for the line-of-battle abreast, and for a general chase, to engage as the ships came up by rotation, and to take the lee gage, in order to cut off the enemy from their own ports. The Spaniards, being inferior in force, endeavoured by every means to avoid an engagement, a manœuvre rendered more feasible in consequence of the tempestuous weather, the shortness of the day, and the danger of the coast.

At four o'clock the admiral, observing that the leading ships were very near the enemy, made the signal to engage and close. The four headmost vessels immediately began the action, and their fire was briskly returned by the enemy. At 40 minutes past four one of the Spanish line-of-battle ships blew up with a dreadful explosion, and every person on board perished. At six o'clock another vessel struck.

The action and pursuit continued with a constant fire till two in the morning, when the "Monarca," flag-ship, struck to the "Sandwich," and, all firing having ceased, the signal was made to heave to.

The weather continued so tempestuous, that it was difficult to take possession of the captured ships, and to transfer the prisoners. The British Admiral having adopted the hazardous expedient of fighting to lee-

ward of the enemy, in the vicinity of dangerous and rocky shoals, with the wind on shore, many of the ships were placed in positions of imminent peril. The "Royal George," "Prince George," "Sandwich," and many others, were nearly lost, and had to make all sail to avoid the shallows off St Lucar, nor did they reach deep water until two days after the action. The enemy fought with the greatest bravery at great disadvantages. Don Juan de Langara was severely wounded, and his ship, the "Phoenix," riddled before he struck.

Six ships of the line were captured, and one, the "St Domingo," 70 guns, blew up. Some of these vessels afterwards ran ashore and were lost, the rest were sent into Gibraltar. Arrived off Cape Spartel, Rodney despatched two frigates to acquaint the consul at Tangier of his success, and to request him to send forward a supply of fresh provisions for the garrison of Gibraltar. At sunset the same day the fleet and convoy entered the Straits.*

* Rodney's Despatch.—Lives of the Admirals.

It may appear a matter of surprise that Spain should have intrusted the blockade of the mouth of the Straits to so small a force as Langara had under his command, but the statement of the administration of Florida Blanca, addressed to King Charles III., explains this apparently culpable oversight. It was arranged that Don Louis de Cordova, with 16 ships, should form a junction with Langara at Cadiz, and that the fleet (having received the addition of another vessel from Ferrol), numbering 27 sail, should cruise off Cape Trafalgar. Misfortunes and mistakes prevented the two squad-

The position of the starving garrison in Gibraltar had, at this time, reached the culminating point of misery. For many an anxious day the wretched inhabitants had strained their eyes watching the western waters of the Straits, in hope that some friendly sail would bring relief, or at least some tidings of succour not far distant. They had hoped in vain—the cruisers of the enemy were the only ships in sight. Prolonged suspense, and expectations raised only to be disappointed, were followed by ungovernable despair. A death occurred from actual famine; the fatal incident aroused the people to a sense of the horrors of their future. Wild vegetables kept life in numbers of enfeebled bodies, and the emaciated aspect of others was appalling. Such was the condition of the fortress when, on the 15th of January, a small brig, with English colours flying, was descried off Cabrita Point, making for the eastward.

No sooner was it certain that the vessel was indeed British, and that she was steering for the Bay, than the news sped swift as thought through the garrison. Eager to satisfy themselves of the truth of the intelligence, the excited populace rushed in a body from the town to the southward, and crowded

rons combining; Cordova was obliged to go into Cadiz to refit; four vessels on their way from ports in Galicia were disabled by a storm, and thus Langara was left with only 11 ships to obstruct the passage of Rodney's fleet.

on to Europa Point, from whence they could see the little vessel out of reach of the enemy's cruisers entering the Bay. It was soon ascertained that she was a government ship, and one of the convoy destined for Gibraltar.

At this intelligence the despairing inhabitants gave vent to transports of frantic joy, cheers and shouts rent the air, and those who yesterday resigned themselves to the terrible fate of famine, were now seized with the uncontrollable emotions of men saved from impending death. But their sanguine hopes were damped by information from the master of the brig. He had parted company with the grand fleet under Rodney in the Bay of Biscay, and had passed at a distance the squadron of Don Juan de Langara, off Cape St Vincent. The strength of this squadron he was not able to make out, but he expressed his conviction that it was on the watch for the British fleet. The night was spent amid trembling anxieties for the morrow, and at dawn of day every eye was turned to the westward, in the hope of seeing the expected flotilla. At length a sail appeared, creeping slowly for the Bay, with a light westerly breeze. In a few hours she anchored safely, and proved to be the brig "Good Design." She brought news of Admiral Rodney, from the 8th of January, when he had captured the Carracca squadron off the coast of Portugal, but the result of the action off Cape St Vincent was still unknown.

Two days afterwards, the "Apollo" frigate came in, bringing intelligence of the victory over the Spaniards, and she was followed by the "Phoenix," one of the prizes, having on board the Admiral Don Juan de Langara.

On the 21st, the fleet and convoy were in sight, and Admiral Digby made the Bay with the "Prince George," 90,* "Invincible," "Resolution," and "Ajax," seventy-fours, "Triton," "Porcupine," and "Pegasus," frigates, with a number of transports laden with all kinds of provisions; one vessel, named the "United Grocers," carrying the heterogeneous cargo of beef, pork, butter, flour, peas, oatmeal, raisins, biscuit, coals, iron hoops, and candles.†

Rodney, with the disabled prizes, drifted to the

* Prince William (afterwards King of England) was at this time midshipman on board the "Prince George," Admiral Digby's flag-ship. Drinkwater relates the following anecdote respecting him:—

"The Spanish Admiral Don Juan Langara one morning visited Admiral Digby, to whose charge the prince was intrusted, and Don Langara was of course introduced to his Royal Highness. During the conference between the admirals, Prince William retired; and when it was intimated that Don Juan wished to return, H. R. H. appeared in his character of midshipman, and respectfully informed the admiral that the boat was ready. The Spaniard, astonished to see the son of a monarch acting as a warrant officer, could not help exclaiming, 'Well does Great Britain merit the empire of the sea, when the humblest stations in her navy are supported by princes of the blood!'"

† MS. Journal of the Siege. Colonial Secretary's Office.

eastward, near Marbella, but reached the Rock on the 25th of the month. Thus, when reduced to the extreme, and without a prospect of being able to hold out successfully against the impenetrable blockade which the enemy never for a moment relaxed, the garrison was amply relieved and reinforced with troops,* ammunition, and provisions. †

The advent of Rodney was the turning point in the siege, for had not relief arrived when it did the garrison must have surrendered. The arrival of the

* The 73rd regiment arrived at this time.

† “To Sir George Brydges Rodney, Bart., Admiral of the White.

“Gibraltar, January 25th, 1780.

“Sir,

“I am honoured with your letter of this day’s date, informing me that His Majesty’s squadron under your command, in its way to the relief of this fortress, had captured a considerable convoy, laden with provisions; and that the same, from a persuasion that the good of the public as well as the accommodation of the garrison of Gibraltar would be furthered thereby, are brought into this Bay.

“You are pleased, with the universal consent of the captors, to make me a tender thereof for His Majesty’s service, at a price to be fairly adjusted in preference of every other consideration whatsoever.

“I accept with the utmost gratitude and thanks this very generous and noble proposal, of so much importance to his Majesty’s service in our present situation.

“I have the honour to be

“Your most obedient servant,

“GEORGE A. ELLIOTT.”

fleet was celebrated by royal salutes, displays of flags, and general signs of rejoicing; for a moment all former distresses were forgotten. The governor, though apparently sharing the general gladness, was anxiously occupied by some ominous movements in the enemy's lines. He dreaded that the Spaniards, thwarted in their scheme for the reduction of the fortress by famine, at the very moment when victory was in their grasp, would revenge themselves by pouring in a terrible bombardment from the powerful batteries which were ready to open at any moment. Since the coming of the fleet, several new works had been unmasked, their guns were elevated, their working parties busy in the trenches, and there were significant symptoms of an approaching bombardment.

Mr Logie, the British Consul at Tangier, having received the message sent to him by Rodney, when off Cape St Vincent, to prepare supplies, cattle, &c., for the garrison, collected a considerable number of bullocks, fowls, fascines, and stores: these were ready for embarkation, and awaited only the means of transport across the Straits.

Three vessels therefore were sent over from Gibraltar under convoy of the "Bedford," but by a lamentable error, which was not discovered till too late, the naval authorities selected ships fitted for troops, already full of provisions, and without any capacity for stowage. Very few of the live stock, and

an inconsiderable portion of the fascines, only could be taken on board, before the wind turned easterly, and the ships had to return. This unfortunate mistake had no small effect upon the future provisioning of the garrison, as after Rodney's departure the Spanish cruisers regained the mastery in the Straits.

On the 13th of February, Rodney having fulfilled his instructions, and successfully relieved the garrison, got under weigh with his fleet, and sailed to the westward. The departure of such an imposing naval force was a great misfortune to the garrison. As long as the British fleet remained in Gibraltar Bay the navigation of the Straits was open to the English flag, and provisions of all kinds could readily be obtained from Barbary. The influence, too, that the presence of such a powerful squadron exercised upon the policy of the Emperor of Morocco was productive of much advantage, and delayed that outburst of vindictive feeling which afterwards led to the expulsion of all British subjects from Barbary, and the open declaration of an alliance with Spain. But the urgent necessities of the war rendered it impossible for the government to leave Rodney idle in the Mediterranean. The combined fleets of Spain and France were in the West Indies. The islands of St Vincent and Grenada had been captured, an action without decisive results had been fought between Byron and

D'Estaing, and all the British settlements on the coast of Africa had been destroyed.

The British fleet had scarcely rounded Cabrita Point before Admiral Barcelo, who, on the appearance of Rodney, had withdrawn his squadron within a formidable boom in the harbour of Algeciras, again anchored his ships in the roadstead, and renewed the blockade with his cruisers. Though a skilful and courageous seaman, the Spanish admiral appears to have treated his prisoners with a severity and inhumanity unworthy of him. In more than one instance his conduct drew indignant remonstrances from General Elliott.*

On one occasion a native of Gibraltar, Gasparo Grande, captain of a xebeque, who had been taken into Algeciras by the Spaniards, and had afterwards escaped, made a statement which led to a correspondence between the governor and Bar-

* "I am extremely sorry that there are allegations of Don Antonio Barcelo's treating his prisoners of war in a manner neither consistent with the customs of war, nor reconcilable to the brave character by which that officer has always been known to us." Elliott to Lieut.-Gen. Alvarez de Sotomayor, March 21st, 1780.—Naval Correspondence, Colonial Secretary's Office, Gibraltar.

"Your Excellency will admit that not only my Court, but those of all Europe, are interested in the good treatment of prisoners of war, and that I could not do less than I have done in the present instance." Elliott to Sotomayor, March 29th, 1780.—Naval Correspondence, Col. Sec. Office.

celo. Gasparo stated that an accredited agent of the Spanish admiral had induced him by bribes and other influences to go into Algeciras and give information respecting the condition of the English troops and defences at Gibraltar. Acceding to the temptation, he went over to Algeciras, and upon his arrival was immediately seized, and with his companions thrown into prison, upon the plea that at some former time he had given intelligence to the English of the movements of the Spanish cruisers. While in confinement the prisoners were grossly ill-treated and abused.

A protest against this conduct having been sent to Barcelo, he flatly denied the truth of the allegations, but the evidence was too strong to justify General Eliott in accepting the disavowal, and he wrote to Barcelo as follows :—“ You are pleased to think me too generous to believe, Sir, that you would use any indirect means to gain advantage to the armies of your sovereign, and observe that you are very correct in treating your prisoners according to the established rights of nations. Give me leave then, Sir, freely to offer it as my opinion, from what has come to my knowledge in the service, that it is not the custom of Europe to make any distinction in the treatment of those persons who by the fortune of war become our prisoners, on account of any act of hostility or criminality of which they may be supposed to have been

guilty prior to their being made prisoners. . . . And I must request an assurance from you, sir, that in future all prisoners taken by any under your command shall be treated with the same humanity as is customary between civilized nations, and which all British officers invariably observe, as well from inclination as from the positive injunction of our gracious sovereign."

And this was not the only complaint that General Elliott had to bring to the notice of the Spanish commander-in-chief. When the Admiral Don Juan de Langara was sufficiently recovered, he and his attendants were permitted to return to Spain, on the distinct understanding that there should be a mutual exchange of prisoners; but it was not until the commodore of our squadron intimated his intention of formally demanding the return of the admiral and the Spanish officers with him on parole, that the conditions were fulfilled.

Previous to this permission having been granted to Admiral de Langara and his companions, the Spanish Government* had behaved with such an entire

* Rodney to the Admiralty.

"Sandwich, Gibraltar Bay, Feb. 7th, 1780.

"I must desire you will please to acquaint their Lordships that every attention possible has been paid to the Spanish admiral and his officers; they are all extremely desirous of returning to Spain upon their parole of honour; but as I am informed that a great number of His Majesty's subjects are now prisoners in Spain I have declined giving them any assur-

absence of good faith in matters connected with the exchange and release of prisoners that Rodney had been compelled to refuse the repeated entreaties of the Spanish Admiral to be allowed to return to his own country. In one letter he says :—

“ Gibraltar, February 6th, 1780.

“ Admiral Rodney presents his compliments to Sr Don Juan de Langara, and will have great pleasure in complying with his desire relative to the release of the three friars belonging to the Capuchin mission for the province of Cumanna, if those friars are in the fleet. The admiral, whose inclination is ever to alleviate the misfortunes of war, by showing every respect and attention to those brave men who have done their duty to their king and country, is under the necessity of informing Sr Don Juan de Langara that the release of himself and the Spanish officers entirely depends upon Spain's immediately releasing all British prisoners now in her power. An equal number of prisoners shall be returned for those sent by Spain. Humanity obliges the admiral to offer those prisoners who are now sick, if they may be received by the

ances till the British subjects are released ; and having received yesterday, by the ‘ Shrewsbury,’ from Lisbon, a letter from His Majesty's Consul-general in Portugal, acquainting me that he had released 626 Spanish prisoners, and though frequent promises had been made, he had not as yet received one in return. This letter from Sir John Hook has confirmed me in the resolution I had before taken.”

Spanish General, but this shall be the last time, unless an exchange takes place.”

To this Langara replied, acknowledging that there had been some delay on the part of the Spanish Government, but repeating his assurance that every reparation would speedily be made. On that assurance he and his companions would have been permitted to leave; but the Spanish government continued to quibble and delay, and threats alone induced them to comply with their word of honour, an obligation which in Spain is not completely understood. To cut the matter short, Rodney, in conjunction with Elliott, gave orders for the removal of the Spanish Admiral to England, but on the very morning when the embarkation should have taken place, a message was received from General Alvarez de Sotomayor, saying that the English prisoners were on their way to St Roque, and that he had received positive orders from his sovereign to treat them with the highest respect and attention. Upon the receipt of this assurance Don Juan de Langara was permitted to return to Spain.*

After the departure of Rodney five vessels of war only remained in the Bay, “The Edgar,” “Panther,” “Enterprise,” “Porcupine,” and “Gibraltar.” The renewal of the blockade did not damp the reanimated spirits of the troops; hopes were high; it was believed

* Rodney’s despatches.

that the worst period of suffering was past ; the stores and magazines were plentifully supplied ; and England had shown that Gibraltar was not forgotten. Little did the garrison suspect the distress that was encircling them.

For some time before the place was relieved symptoms of scurvy had appeared both among the soldiers and the inhabitants. At first these symptoms had caused considerable alarm, but when the convoy had supplied the fortress these fears subsided, and it was confidently expected that an increased and more varied diet would subdue the threatenings of disease. But, unfortunately, such was not the case. A few weeks had scarcely passed before the reappearance of the disorder in a more malignant form aroused the attention of the authorities. Means were not at hand to stay its progress. The provisions in store, though ample, were exclusively salt, and no fresh meat could be procured. Lemons there were none, and fruit of every kind was so scarce, that it was reserved for the hospitals and the sick.

The victualling of the garrison, which to healthy men would not have been injurious, was ill adapted to check or ward off a tendency to scurvy. Scarcely a plot of ground on the Rock was available for the growth of vegetables, and terraces of earth were raised, banked up with walls, on which small quantities of lettuces or cabbages were carefully cultured. But in

spite of every care and foresight the disease advanced with slow and certain steps, until it attained a terrible virulence, and swept before it into destruction ten times more lives than fell from the fire of the enemy.

CHAPTER XV.

TOWARDS the close of the year 1779 a coolness, arising in some measure from the failure of the French invasion of England, had sprung up between the two Bourbon Courts of Spain and France. The melancholy condition of affairs in Great Britain, the almost hopeless contests in which she was engaged, and the necessity of interrupting, if possible, the amicable relations existing between the Courts of Paris and Madrid, induced the English ministry to grasp at the opportunity offered by the apparently favourable moment to renew negotiations for an alliance with Spain. Once more Gibraltar was put forward as an allurements to King Charles, and as a bait to secure the friendship of the nation. Commodore Johnson, then in command of the British squadron on the Lisbon station, having let fall some hints that his government might not be indisposed to treat for an alliance with Spain, and that the cession of Gibraltar would be the basis of negotiations, Count Florida Blanca, the Spanish minister, persuaded the king to test the feelings of the English

ministry by clandestine proposals. For this purpose he procured the services of Mr Hussey, an Irish priest, chaplain to the King of Spain, and then residing in England. Through the instrumentality of this person negotiations were opened with Mr Cumberland, Private Secretary to Lord George Germaine, Minister for War. The purport of these negotiations was an assurance that Spain was willing to renounce the French alliance, on condition of the restoration of Gibraltar, for which, however, she offered liberal concessions and equivalents. Impressed with the inestimable importance of a pacification so essential to the interests of the country, the ministers considered it unwise to reject the proposal, and Mr Hussey was accordingly directed to return to Madrid, charged with a letter addressed to him by Lord G. Germaine, and with secret instructions, tending to a mediation between the two countries.

The progress of these negotiations, alike dishonourable to England and to Spain, is so ably and minutely described by Mr Cumberland, that its history is best given in his own words.

“On the 5th of December, 1779, Mr Hussey took his departure, and reached Madrid on the 29th; his character and situation at that Court gave him instant admission to the minister, Florida Blanca. He exhibited to him the letter of Lord George Germaine, and he supported it with such professions on his own part as should best enforce the authority of his errand, and

the friendly disposition of this Court. He found the minister under the unfavourable impressions which he had received from Almodovar, all which he combated with arguments, as well from his own observations as from Lord George's instructions and conversation before his departure. In repeated interviews those unfriendly impressions abated; but it was objected to him that indiscreet and undigested overtures for the cession of Gibraltar had come from Commodore Johnson through the channel of a messenger from Lisbon, where he was stationed; the concealed design of which was to cover an attempt to create a suspicion and misunderstanding between that Court and France.

“Notwithstanding this impediment, Mr Hussey faithfully persisted in the purposes of his undertaking, and in the course of a conversation with Florida Blanca, took occasion to probe him upon the supposed engagement of Spain with France not to make peace without her participation and concurrence. The train took fire, as intended. Piqued at the suggestion, the minister rushed to his cabinet, took out his papers, put them into Mr Hussey's hands, declaring on his honour that those engagements contained the whole of what had been stipulated between the two allied Courts, and that no part of these could or ever should bind Spain in the manner he suggested. She was free to make peace with England independently, but he doubted the sincerity of the British Cabinet,



and added with emphasis, that *Gibraltar must be the indispensable basis of the negotiation.*

“Equivalentents were suggested, though without precision; large pecuniary allowances for stores and artillery within the Fort, privileges in trade accommodation with respect to America, and reciprocal cession of territory, were thrown out in conversation. In fine, a letter was written to Mr Hussey in Count Florida Blanca’s own hand, expressive of the like general pacific disposition with that from Lord George Germaine. At the same time private instructions were sent to Mr Hussey, on which he was to found his report to the British ministers, and he was dismissed with the stipulation that he should send back an answer or return himself before the expiration of February. All these proceedings His Catholic Majesty sanctioned with his entire approbation, and at parting gave his benediction to Mr Hussey, charging him to return with peace.

“On the 9th of January, 1780, Mr Hussey left Madrid, and reached London on the 29th. I saw him the very night of his arrival, and received from him the most candid and favourable communication of the various events of his visit to Madrid, with every minute circumstance relative to the situation of the Court, the temper of the nation, and their disposition towards France. No proof of his sincerity was on this occasion withheld; and I must have been insens-

ible to the truth if I had not yielded to the evidence of so much candour.”

The negotiations having assumed a sufficiently definite shape to be discussed by the British Government, the question was brought forward in four separate cabinet councils. “On this occasion,” says Coxe,* “a series of conditions appears to have been brought forward, which were intended to form the basis of the proposed accommodation.”

“The importance of Gibraltar,” it was observed, “is so great, and the national vanity is so interested in keeping so extraordinary a possession, that it seems impossible for any ministry to give it up without stipulating an equivalent. It appears on a general view of the subject, that as it would be very advantageous to bring Spain to a separate peace, Gibraltar might be yielded on the following conditions :—

“1st. Spain shall yield and guarantee to Great Britain the island of *Porto Rico*.

“2ndly. She shall also yield and guarantee to Great Britain the fortress of Omoa and its territory.

“3rdly. She shall likewise yield and guarantee to Great Britain a harbour and territory sufficient for erecting a fortress in the Bay, near Oran.

“4thly. She shall not only purchase at the full price all the stores and artillery left at Gibraltar, but shall also pay, before she is put in possession of it, a

* Bourbon Kings of Spain, vol. iii.

sum not less than £2,000,000 sterling, for what has been laid out on the fortifications since Great Britain first possessed it.

“ 5thly. She shall make a separate peace with Great Britain, shall renounce all engagements to France, as far as they bind her to take part in this or any other war against Great Britain, shall renew the treaty of Paris in every particular, except such alterations as are made by the above-mentioned articles.

“ 6thly. She shall engage in the clearest and most solemn manner not to assist the British Colonies in America, nor to receive any minister or agent from them, nor to suffer their ships to enter any ports in the Spanish dominions. She shall agree to assist Britain in reducing the colonies to obedience, or if this cannot be obtained, we should at least insist that Spain expressly bind herself not to harbour in her dominions any subjects of the king that are deemed rebels, but compel them to depart in a week’s time after the requisition shall have been made by the king’s ministers in His Majesty’s name. This stipulation to be mutual, and the king to make a like engagement with regard to the rebellious subjects of the Crown of Spain.

“ A cessation of arms to be agreed upon as soon as the above articles are signed and ratified; but the cession of Gibraltar on our part and that of Porto Rico on the part of Spain not to take place until the American rebellion is ended.”

“In the end,” Mr Cumberland tells us, “it was resolved that the secretaries of state should in person jointly communicate to Mr Hussey the result of these deliberations and the mind of the British ministry towards the proposed accommodation with Spain. This was done at the Earl of Hillsborough’s house, Lord Stormont being present. Mr Hussey was then told he might safely state the sincere disposition of the king and his ministers towards so desirable an object as peace and good understanding with Spain, that the war in which Great Britain found herself engaged was totally unprovoked on her part, and its conclusion was at all times in the breast of Spain, if she chose to revert to the basis of the Treaty of Paris.”

With respect to Gibraltar, not a syllable that could mislead Spain into hopes upon that article, which it was evident she had so much at heart, was suffered to drop. On the contrary, Lord Stormont (not without some vehemence of speech and action) declared to Mr Hussey, “if Spain would lay before him the map of her empire, to take his choice of an equivalent, and three weeks to fix that choice, he should not be able in that period to find in all the dominions of Spain what, in his judgment, would balance the cession of Gibraltar.”

Mr Hussey was further instructed to state that Commodore Johnstone had no authority whatever for the hints he had thrown out regarding Gibraltar, and

the cabinet "jointly and severally" disavowed the overtures which had been made. This reply, so different from what he had expected, staggered Hussey. Flushed with rage and irritation, he instantly sought Mr Cumberland, and with ungovernable violence accused the cabinet of duplicity and falsehood, and inveighed in unmeasured terms against the individuals who he imagined had combined to dupe him. Mr Cumberland attempted to reason with him in vain; but at length, assuming an air of authority, assured him that he might act as he pleased, that he might, as he threatened, send his opinion of the British cabinet to Spain, but that counter-declarations should go from authority by express commission; and he pointed out to him the position in which he would find himself "when it was understood in Spain that his want of temper had given a false colouring to a transaction of such consequence." Toward the close of the interview he became calmer, but remained under the impression that he had been deliberately duped by the cabinet. On the following day, a second meeting between Mr Hussey and Mr Cumberland took place, when it was arranged that a letter should be written to Florida Blanca, explaining the situation of the negotiation, but still holding out some hope that the cession of Gibraltar might be procured. This letter was written under the eye of Cumberland, who was fully aware of its contents, and who, indeed, made several alterations in its composition. There

can be little doubt that the purport of this document was communicated immediately to the cabinet.*

This letter was immediately transmitted to Madrid.

It reached Florida Blanca almost simultaneously with the news of the defeat of Don Juan de Langara and the relief of Gibraltar by Rodney. These two reverses acted with considerable weight upon the policy which the minister intended to pursue. It was now more than ever doubtful whether Spain would gain Gibralt-

* Mr Hussey to Count Florida Blanca.

“ Feb. 13th, 1780.

“ Upon my arrival here, which was 15 days ago, I reported your Excellency's instructions to me to the British cabinet. They considered the matter with assiduity for several days, but the tender of Gibraltar, as a previous and indispensable article of the treaty, is what the cabinet could not be brought to grant. They offer to treat upon the basis of the Treaty of Paris, and then Spain may start the subject under the title of Change of Territory. Great Britain will enter into the negotiations in this shape, and will in the issue convince the world of her sincerity in her wishes for an accommodation with Spain. If your Excellency think this a sufficient ground to open a treaty, Great Britain will appoint a person to transact the affair with secrecy and despatch,—Spain appointing one at the same time. And if your Excellency will allow me a conjecture on it as it stands, I really believe that they will cede Gibraltar upon terms; but for this I have no authority from the British cabinet, neither written nor verbal. The cabinet here disavow having given any commission or instruction to Johnstone relative to the proposals he made to Spain, and they say they hope his imprudence will not obstruct this negotiation.”

tar by force of arms, and the motive for securing it by negotiation received a fresh impulse.

Communications were therefore kept up by means of Hussey with the British cabinet, and ultimately Mr Cumberland was sent to Lisbon, where he was to wait until reports favourable or unfavourable respecting the prosperity of the negotiations could be sent to him by Hussey from Madrid. If favourable, he was to repair to Madrid, and conduct the transaction to an issue. After a short delay at Lisbon, Mr Cumberland proceeded to the Spanish Court, and had several interviews with Florida Blanca. The month of June had passed, and, notwithstanding vehement professions of a desire for a peaceful settlement of the question, no arrangement was concluded.

In July and August intelligence reached Madrid, which visibly affected the demeanour and policy of Florida Blanca. Exaggerated colourings of the Anti-papal riots in England magnified the freaks of Lord George Gordon into a general rebellion; and the downfall of the cabinet, or perhaps a more serious catastrophe, was contemplated. At the same time, a powerful French fleet, under d'Estaing, reached Cadiz with the avowed intention of assisting Spain in the conquest of Gibraltar, and England was threatened with additional opposition from the Northern Powers.

To relinquish the claim to Gibraltar as a basis of the negotiation appeared suicidal at such a moment,

especially as the co-operation of France rendered its reduction almost certain. Influenced by these considerations, the tone of Florida Blanca suddenly changed. Gibraltar was again insisted upon as the basis of a treaty.

“Gibraltar,” exclaimed the minister, “is an object for which the king my master will break the family compact and every other engagement with France.” Upon these conditions Mr Cumberland refused to treat, and Hussey was again despatched to London to probe the feelings of the cabinet ; but the government had decided upon arresting the negotiation, and Mr Cumberland returned home.*

* Coxe says that this negotiation was at no time a government measure. Literally this may be true, but it is impossible to suppose that the cabinet were not aware of the transaction, or that they did not give it the countenance of their support in its earlier stages.

“It was proposed,” says Coxe, “and continued by Lord George Germaine alone, with the tacit permission of Lord North, whose known pliancy of temper was overcome by the impetuosity of his colleague. . . . Mr Hussey, when on his journey to Spain, triumphantly observed to a friend that ‘he had Gibraltar in his pocket.’ In the course of conversation, he however admitted that although Lord George Germaine had decidedly and explicitly expressed his readiness to agree to the cession as the price of a separate peace, yet the case was far otherwise with Lord North, whom he had only once seen, and then received from him the declaration that ‘*Gibraltar*’ was a forbidden word which must never pass his lips.”

Coxe, page 427, vol. iii., says, “The negotiation was *thrown into the cabinet*, and a series of conditions were proposed as equivalents for Gibraltar.”

The history of this extraordinary transaction is most mysterious. Originated by the commodore of a coasting squadron, whom we may suppose to have been entirely ignorant of the ideas of the British cabinet, seriously entertained by the Spanish minister, though traceable only to the table-talk of an obscure individual, transmitted to England by the hands of an Irish priest, and brought to the notice of the cabinet through the medium of a spy, these proposals expanded into a serious and remarkable negotiation, a negotiation which, had it been completed upon the conditions which the government demanded, would have exercised an inconceivable influence over the destiny of the world. How deeply the British cabinet were committed to this measure it is impossible to conjecture; but that it was gravely entertained, and regarded as a means of freeing Britain from the crisis of her perilous situation, admits of little doubt. The progress of the negotiation was so sagaciously conducted, that although the cession of Gibraltar was known to be the basis upon which any treaty must rest, the cabinet were able in their reply to the overtures for peace from Madrid to ignore altogether all knowledge of any reference to such a proposal.

The conduct of Spain in the affair is less perplexing; having in view her darling object, the recovery of Gibraltar, she had entered upon the conferences with eagerness and sincerity; but when she beheld England struggling with accumulating difficulties, and found that

France was prepared to assist her in the attempt to subdue the coveted Rock fortress, she abandoned the idea of obtaining its cession by the grant of valuable equivalents, and preferred to attempt its restoration by force of arms. Thus the Cumberland-Hussey negotiation produced at least one of the effects anticipated by Florida Blanca—it stimulated France to more active proofs of her alliance with Spain, and forced from her a zealous co-operation in the attacks upon Minorca, Gibraltar, and Jamaica.

Whilst these negotiations between the Courts of London and Madrid had been in progress, Count Florida Blanca was secretly plotting with the Russian minister for the formation of a confederacy hostile to England. Europe had long witnessed with jealousy the vast naval power of Great Britain, and Russia was not mistaken when she assumed that any measure calculated to subvert that power would be readily acquiesced in by other states.

The principle that a friendly or neutral flag might carry on the trade, both coasting and general, of hostile nations, that, in fact, free ships make free goods, had never been recognized by England. The adoption of such a principle would, it was expected, ruin her commerce in time of war and irreparably injure her marine. To establish a new naval code involving this regulation was the scheme of Russia, instigated by the Court of Madrid.

If we are to credit the statement of Florida

Blanca, this measure took its rise in the cabinet of Spain; and the constant detention and seizure of neutral vessels conveying English property through the Straits of Gibraltar during the blockade was put forward as the exciting cause.

“To deprive,”* says the Spanish minister, “our enemies of every maritime alliance which might incommode us in case of a rupture, by the order of your Majesty I cultivated a good correspondence with the Court of Russia. . . .

“France entered into similar ideas, and we not only prevented Russia from uniting with England during the war, but even prevailed on her to send us *purposefully two of her frigates* charged with naval stores, at the time when the war prevented the transport of them, for the equipment of our fleet.

“We also succeeded in inducing the Empress of Russia to place herself at the head of almost all the neutral nations to support the honour of her flag. . . . Permit me, Sire, here to touch upon an intrigue employed to strike this blow, which, although attributed to Russia and firmly supported by her, took its rise in the political cabinet of your Majesty and in the maxim you adopted. . . . The execution of this article (the detention of neutral vessels carrying enemy’s effects), and the facility which we possessed by the blockade of Gibraltar to detain vessels conveying

* Florida Blanca’s Representations.

English property at the passage of the Straits, excited universal clamour among the maritime neutral nations. I was attacked by the ministers of Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Russia, Prussia, Venice, Genoa, and others, to put a stop to the injuries which their commerce suffered by the detention of so many vessels."

To these remonstrances Florida Blanca replied, "That if the English marine were permitted to seize the Spanish cargoes when under a friendly or neutral flag, Spain would imitate the example."

"The matter," he continues, "being thus prepared to throw the odium, as was just, upon the English, and to incite the neutral powers to the defence of their flag, Russia brought forward an idea, of which we dexterously profited."

This idea was the celebrated "armed neutrality," a confederacy which, although aimed apparently at all the belligerents, affected England alone. This measure involved three leading principles:— that free ships make free goods; that contraband articles are only such as treaty stipulates; and that blockades, to be acknowledged, must be stringent and effective.

For a moment Russia seemed to waver in her decision, whether or not to issue the declaration establishing this new naval code, but a previously concerted interference with some Russian vessels in the

Straits of Gibraltar, by the Spanish fleet, and an unfortunate collision between a Dutch and English squadron, determined the question.*

On the 26th of February, Queen Catharine issued the celebrated declaration known as the "armed neutrality."

Foreseeing in this measure the elements for the subversion of the naval superiority of Great Britain, the confederacy was eagerly recognized not only by the neutral states, but also by the great powers of Europe. Spain was the first to accede to the new code, the king stating in his manifesto "that to convince the neutral powers of his earnest desire to observe the same rules in time of war which he followed while neuter, His Majesty conforms to all the points contained in the declaration of Russia. It is, however, to be understood that with regard to the blockade of Gibraltar, the danger of entering subsists as

* "At length, however, two events contributed to fix the resolution of the Empress. The first was the detention of several Dutch ships under the protection of Admiral Beyland, who was compelled by a British squadron to strike his flag and permit his convoy to be searched. The second was the concerted opposition of the Spanish fleet to the passage of the Straits (of Gibraltar) by some Russian ships not laden with prohibited articles. Neither address nor activity was wanting to profit by the first impulse of resentment which the Empress felt on this occasion."—Coxe, Bourbon Kings of Spain, vol. iii.

determined by the fourth article of the declaration. This danger may yet be avoided by neutral powers, if they conform to the rules of prevention established by His Majesty's declaration of the 13th of March last, as has been communicated to the Court of Russia by his minister."

CHAPTER XVI.

THE spring of 1780 had passed away, and the enemy had not commenced active operations before Gibraltar. The system of a blockade was still adhered to, and, as it seemed, with prospects of success. Scanty supplies only reached the garrison, and sickness was doing its rapid work.

The small British squadron that remained in the Bay, though not powerful enough to cope with Barcelo's force, had in one or two instances succeeded in convoying small craft with provisions from Minorca into the harbour. Jealous even of this slight relief, the Spaniards determined to destroy the squadron, and thus to prevent the arrival of the smallest succour.

The scheme was organized by Admiral Barcelo, and the plan was well designed, but not equally well executed. On a very dark and dreary night, between the 6th and 7th of June, seven fire-ships full of combustibles, supported by a crowd of row-boats and galleys completely armed, set out from Algeciras.

The expedition was covered by the Spanish squadron under Barcelo in person, and as the wind and weather were favourable everything augured well for success. The preparations had been made with so much secrecy that the British sailors had no conception of their danger.

About one o'clock on the morning of the 7th, a vessel was observed approaching the "Enterprise," which lay off the new mole head. She was instantly hailed, and replied a "Provision ship from England;" the frigate hailed again but received no answer; in the next moment a mass of combustibles was thrown on board, and six fire-ships were seen bearing down in the form of a crescent. The captain of the "Enterprise" fired three guns and gave the alarm, all the boats were manned, and orders were given to seize and grapple the blazing vessels. This service was performed with the greatest gallantry amid showers of shells and fire-works, and the ships were run ashore in various places along the Rock. In the mean time, two large vessels were seen bearing down on the "Panther," but they were met with such a fierce fire that they soon ignited, and were consumed without doing any injury.

Immediately the alarm was raised, the batteries opened and kept up a heavy fire upon the boats and galleys. Nothing could exceed the courage of the seamen on this occasion. The night was so dark that the fire-ships were alongside almost as soon as they

were in sight, and had not the wind dropped to a calm, at the time when a breeze was wanted to carry them among the squadron, no efforts could have averted a catastrophe.

At day-break Barcelo's baffled squadron returned to Algeciras. During the conflagration of the fire-ships, the scene on the Rock was most imposing,—the flames, roaring from the ports and hatches, lit up the gloomy darkness for miles around, and cast a lurid glare upon the rugged precipices, the shells and combustibles spread and burst in showers, a hundred guns thundered from the batteries on shore, and re-echoed along the mountain-side. The stranded vessels were turned to good account by the garrison; fuel was scarce, and the hulls were broken up and sold for firing to the inhabitants.*

Baffled in their attempt to destroy the British squadron with the fire-ships, the enemy resorted to other schemes for the annoyance of the garrison. A fleet of gun-boats was organized, which, under cover of the dark nights, approached within gun-shot of the shore and fired upon the town and barracks. These gun-boats were strongly constructed, felucca rigged, with latine sails, and double banked for oars. Each carried a 26-pounder in the bow. Under oars they had great speed.

When they first came out the English navy

* A single rib, a few feet in length, fetched nine dollars.—*Ancell.*

derided and despised these bum-boats, as they were contemptuously termed; but they soon proved to be the most formidable enemies the seamen had yet had to deal with. As they always attacked at night, and generally chose the darkest hours, it was impossible, from the diminutive and ever-changing mark they presented, to bring the guns to bear upon them. Night after night these relentless torments threw their shot into every part of the fortress, driving the inhabitants from place to place without a moment's rest. Even the hospitals did not escape, and many of the sick were killed in their beds. These constant night bombardments harassed the troops more than any duty they had to perform. Sometimes by accident or skill the enemy got the exact range of a barrack or camp, and pouring in a heavy fire obliged the inmates to leave their rest and flee for shelter. At first the batteries attempted to check the gun-boats, and kept up a constant cannonade, guided by the flashes of the guns, but it was soon found that this uncertain firing was mere waste of ammunition, and the batteries relapsed into silence.*

A letter from General Elliott, written in August,

* In a "Lady's Journal of the Siege" there is a most touching account of the miseries these gun-boats caused. Describing her own sufferings, she mentions how she was driven night after night from place to place, until at length she was compelled to sleep with her children behind the rocks at Europa. Even here she was not safe; one night a round shot struck the stone beneath which she was crouching.

gives a view of the condition and prospects of the garrison at this time.*

“ Dear General,

“ The vessel which carries my letter of the 22nd inst. not sailing as intended, gives me an opportunity of thanking you for your very obliging letter of the 26th July (duplicate), brought by a boat which arrived here yesterday in eight days from Minorca, very properly laden both for our use and his own advantage. I rather think the small boats have the best chance of escaping, a thing not easy on account of the numberless cruisers of all sizes, from a 74 to a felucca, which spread across the Straits; at present our sea force can afford no protection. The patrons of the vessels are not allowed to bring anything of the provision kind for private persons, nor even for the governor, everything is sold in public. Before such regulations were made, at least one-third of each vessel's cargo was employed for selfish purposes; in our situation nothing could be so mortifying. What use the enemy proposes from gun-boats and fire-ships I cannot conjecture; the fortress is proof against an attack d'emblée, though assisted by a distant bombardment, as every soldier, except those on duty, will sleep in casemates or camp out of mortar reach. Where now placed, even our guards lie mostly

* General Eliott to Lieut.-general Murray, Minorca. Gibraltar, August 27th, 1780. Colonial Secretary's papers.

in bomb proofs. The rotten part of the town may suffer, but the damage will not be great; in this climate night alarms are in no way hurtful to the troops. We don't suppose Mons. de Ternay joined the Spaniards. Mons. O'Reilly did not go with them, but is in great favour and just made governor of Cadiz, in addition to Captain-general of Andalusia, a thing uncommon.

“Mons. d'Estaing, destined, as they say, for the Cadiz fleet, is at Madrid, but detained by a hurt from being overturned in a carriage.

“Our climate and yours, I believe, are much upon a par, but you have taken a longer spell than me.”

As the year (1780) advanced the sufferings of the garrison increased. Provisions became scarce, the salt meat turned bad, and the scurvy gained a fatal hold upon the troops. In the camp the enemy were active carrying large quantities of stores to their lines in covered waggons, strengthening and advancing their approaches, exercising their men, and adding to the park of artillery. The blockade had become more impenetrable than ever, countless armed cruisers swept the Straits from Tarifa to Tetuan, while at night the gun-boats and galleys formed a chain from Cabrita to Europa Point. Availing themselves of the darkness of the night on the last day of September, the enemy threw up a breastwork on the isthmus, between Land Port gardens and the Round Tower. This epaulment

was about 60 or 70 feet in length, and approached within 800 yards of the British lines. The same night the huts in the garden were set on fire and destroyed, and an attempt was made to burn the gates at Bayside and Lower Forbes's guard-house. The party told off for this service crept stealthily and undiscovered up to the palisades, upon which they fastened several bundles of combustibles and machines constructed with 12 tubes or barrels loaded with ball, which were fired by a fuze. These machines were so arranged as to sweep the road leading from the guard-house to the gates, and were intended to explode when the troops should endeavour to extinguish the flames. By an accident the fuzes did not burn to the powder, and the attempt to destroy the palisades was defeated.*

The rapid increase of scurvy, which as the autumn

* Ancell.

General Eliott to General Murray, Minorca. Gibraltar, September 30th, 1780.

“ Dear General,

“ I received your letter of the 30th August on the 18th inst. by a small vessel. I am much obliged to you for the honey shipped for me ; but had it arrived, it must have been sold with the rest of the cargo, as such is the regulation made since the blockade, that nothing shall be admitted of the provision kind either as a present or otherwise on private account. Before this order, at least one-third of the vessel was stowed with private presents and commissions, the public deprived of the benefit, and the patron of his profit.”

advanced had begun to make threatening havoc among the soldiers and inhabitants, now caused the greatest alarm. Fresh meat and vegetables could not be procured, and although Rodney had supplied the stores with as much as he was able, wine, lemons, brandy, and sugar were already nearly exhausted. Unchecked by efficient anti-scorbutics, the malady assumed the most virulent type, and threatened to hasten a capitulation which the fire of the enemy could not command. In this desperate position, Eliott deemed no risk unjustifiable in the endeavour to obtain fresh provisions.

On the 11th of October, while the boats of the British squadron were waiting to the southward of the Rock to conduct two Settees from Minorca into the Bay, a large Dutch convoy was seen approaching from the eastward, shrouded by a heavy fog. Singling out a Dogger, which in the mist had become separated from the fleet, the boats bore down upon her, boarded her, and carried her safely into the Bay. By an almost miraculous stroke of fortune she was laden with a cargo of lemons and oranges, a freight which at such a crisis was of more value to the garrison than tons of powder or magazines of ammunition. The lemons were immediately served out to the craving sick, who thirsting for the precious acid greedily devoured them. In a few days the salutary effects of this simple juice were apparent, and

men who but yesterday were hopeless cripples hanging to their crutches, returned to their duty invigorated and restored.

Hitherto the Emperor of Morocco, though in open alliance with Spain, had taken no active part against the English. In August (1780), however, General Elliott received information from Consul Logie that the emperor had declared in form, that he would give no protection to any of the powers at war, and that they were at liberty to carry on hostilities among each other either in his ports or upon his shores.*

This declaration was but the prelude to more hostile measures.† Aware of the advantages to be

* General Elliott to Lieut.-general Murray, Gibraltar, Sept. 4th, 1780. Colonial Secretary's papers.

“On the 30th inst., Consul Logie found the means of sending me a letter, to inform me that the Emperor of Morocco has declared in form that he will give no protection to any of the powers at war, and that they are at liberty to destroy each other in his ports or on shore. Several English vessels of different denominations were taken by the Spaniards under the guns of H. S. Majesty's forts, both prior and subsequent to this unexampled declaration.”

† General Elliott to Lieut.-general Murray, October 23rd, 1780.

“Dear General,

“On the 11th October I received your favour of the 18th September, and very much acknowledge your good intentions for our supplies, of which the little vessels that have got safe are an earnest. Cattle and poultry we don't expect from you; cattle are too bulky for so long a navigation. Poultry with us, tho' dear, is not scarce . . . The smallest vessel,

gained by the possession of the principal ports on the northern coast of Barbary, the Spanish government exhausted all the efforts of diplomacy to induce the Emperor of Morocco to renounce his passive policy, and to declare a more active alliance with Spain. Money commanded what diplomacy failed to procure, and the Spaniards having nominally purchased the ports of Tangier and Tetuan by a payment (or rather promise of payment) of £7500 annually, the Sultan withdrew from his neutrality, and ordered all British subjects to leave his dominions. This iniquitous arrangement was followed by acts of gross indignity and cruelty to the English residents in the Moorish ports. Mr Logie himself was attacked, whole families were driven from their homes, plundered of every article they possessed; women and children were brutally treated, and every kind of atrocity was perpetrated by the savage barbarians. There is only too much reason to suppose that this inhuman conduct owed its origin to the instigation of the Spanish government.

The two principal ports on the northern shore provided it is of a size to resist weather, is most likely to escape the enemy.

“It is very seldom we hear from Barbary, which used to be our channel for common news, therefore we are ignorant of what passes in Europe, except such hints as are communicated by our neighbours. These you may suppose are all per contra; however the year’s account is not closed yet. Let me beg you to send any old newspapers you have; since July everything will be fresh to us. Please make my best compliments to Sir William Draper.”

having thus fallen into the hands of the Spaniards, and the British Consul having been compelled to fly, all communication with Barbary was cut off, and a valuable channel of intelligence closed up.

Mr Logie had established a system for the collection and transmission of information which had proved most useful to the governor of Gibraltar; many faithful Moors were in his pay, and as a constant trade was carried on between Barbary and the Spanish camp, frequent opportunities were afforded to the spies for making observations and obtaining an insight into the affairs of the army. With the expulsion of the consul, this source of information was destroyed.

The new year (1781) was ushered in with the most gloomy prospects; no tidings of relief reached the expectant garrison, and even General Elliott himself looked upon the future with a despairing eye.

Writing to General Murray at Minorca, on the 27th of March, he says,

“ Gibraltar, 27th March, 1781.

“ Sir,

“ Enclosed I transmit copies of a letter from Captain Leslie, commanding the ‘Enterprise,’ with my answer, by which your Excellency will be fully informed of my reasons for concurring in the proposal to send the ‘Enterprise’ and ‘St Fermin’ to Mahon. This, though hazardous on my side, the exigency I hope will justify, as I will freely de-

clare to you *most secretly*, that a very little time will reduce us to the utmost straits, and I fear 'tis reasonable to apprehend (however determined the intentions may be at home) that no convoy from Great Britain can with certainty be depended on, considering the various and important services our fleet must be called upon to perform in opposition to such armaments as threaten from every quarter. I have therefore ventured for a time to deprive this fortress of an essential part of its defence, trusting that (by throwing in a supply of provisions, although ever so small) the advantage will overbalance the risk; this first step, I have taken; but, Sir, I must have recourse to you to render this step effectual for the public service, by requesting your influence with the naval commander to employ his whole squadron in coming down to our relief, and allowing such provisions as can be spared from the king's stores to be shipped on board the king's ships — taking under his convoy such trading vessels as will load with provisions for our assistance. By the character of Captain Curtis this service could not fall into better hands, as, by description, his ambition is to distinguish himself in the public cause. When the service is performed, there is not the least difficulty for any of the ships to take the proper opportunity of returning to Mahon. I hope and believe, both coming and returning, the ships will be exposed to no danger, as the enemy has only three bad sailing frigates and five

xebecks to the eastward, one xebeck and several gun-boats in our Bay. Now 'tis hardly possible to suppose these will cruise in one body, or be able to assemble to distress our squadron: so much for the naval department. Next, knowing well your heart is warm for a friend, and still warmer for your country, I beg leave to point out what occurs to me at this distance as likely to advance the supplies of this place. First, if you will be pleased to spare as much of your provisions in store as may be done with safety to the island, these to be shipt on board His Majesty's ships; then if you would order the ordnance store-ship (which I take to be a stout vessel) to receive and convey such provisions with proper super-cargoes, as the traders are desirous to send down free of all freight, I make no doubt that this would be so great an inducement, that probably she would be soon loaded without any additional burthen on government, as I conclude she is still in pay. Perhaps the correspondents of Messrs Anderson, Livingstone, Dalling, Warde, McKellar, Smith, or Abuderham, on this occasion may apply to your Excellency for leave to be concerned, if so, permit me to recommend them. This appears to me a practicable scheme and liable to no great danger for the squadron; at all events it is to be wished some attempt may be made for the national honour as well as the preservation of this garrison. These proposals, Sir, I lay before you for consideration, desiring you

would please totally to change, alter, amend any or every part, and substitute whatever else may better conduce to this great end with the utmost expedition, on which our existence depends. I herewith subjoin a list of the several articles, any quantity of which will prove a most seasonable succour. Whatever engagements your Excellency may think right to contract for these purposes, on the publick accompt, I shall most readily fulfil."

CHAPTER XVII.

RELIEF BY ADMIRAL DARBY.

As the spring of 1781 advanced, the situation of the garrison assumed the most distressing aspect. The few provisions which remained were bad in quality, and having been kept too long were decomposed and uneatable. The most common necessaries of life were exorbitantly dear; bad ship biscuit, full of worms, was sold at 1*s.* a pound; flour in not much better condition at the same price; old dried peas at 1*s.* 4*d.*; salt, half dirt, the sweepings of ships' bottoms and storehouses, at 8*d.*; old salt butter at 2*s.* 6*d.*; and English farthing candles cost sixpence a-piece. Fresh provisions commanded a still higher price, turkeys sold at £3 12*s.*, sucking pigs at £2 2*s.*, and £1 1*s.* was refused for a calf's pluck. The English government, aware of this condition of things, had for months turned their attention to the relief of the fortress;*

* Extract from a letter from a German officer at Gibraltar, December 19th, 1780.—Political Magazine, 1780.

“The Spaniards have increased their camp at St Roque with full five regiments of foot. They approach very near us

but the many exigencies of the war, and the extensive arena over which the operations were spread, caused so many demands upon the navy that it had hitherto been impossible to provide a fleet for the succour of Gibraltar. But the relief of the garrison was indispensable, and the honour of England required that it should be executed. Accordingly, during the first months of the year (1781) the government made extraordinary efforts to equip a squadron to convoy a flotilla of merchantmen to the Rock.

The grand channel fleet, under command of Admirals Darby, Digby, and Ross, was destined for this service, and the preparations were hurried forward with every despatch. It was divided into three squadrons, and counted in all 28 sail of the line. The fitting out of this fleet was watched with eager anxiety by France and Spain. In the harbour of Brest lay a squadron almost equal to it in power and numbers, while, at the entrance to the Straits, Don Louis de Cordova was cruising with 30 Spanish sail of the line.

with their works, which we demolish as fast as they build. Admiral Don Barcelo has been reinforced with four ships of 60 or 70 guns from Cadiz, as also with some frigates; the latter are perpetually cruising, and have taken several ships for our relief; yet *Dieu Mercie*, we are tolerably well provided. The privates have fresh victuals three times a week at 2*d.* per pound for beef, but poultry is very dear. If I indulge myself with a fowl at my own quarters, I cannot obtain it under two dollars. The governor has made the officers acquainted that a British fleet will soon relieve us."

The capture of Gibraltar had now become, if it had not originally been, the one darling object of this war, and no sacrifice was deemed too momentous, no treasures too precious, no labour too great, to attain a successful end.

Though the French government had it in their power to increase the difficulty of succouring Gibraltar by sending the fleet from Brest under the Count de Grasse to intercept Admiral Darby almost at his starting-point, yet France was already so deeply engaged with her affairs in the West Indies and North America, that it was doubtful whether she would be willing to risk her navy in an action with the English fleet. Spain therefore, aware of an inferiority at sea, and fearful that she might not be able to prevent single-handed the relief of the fortress, thought to intimidate the British government by loud and empty boasts. It was extensively published that Cordova's fleet was double its actual strength, and it was pretended that reinforcements were about to sail to its assistance from Toulon and other ports. But this foolish bombast failed in its anticipated effect.

On the 13th of March, 1781, the British fleet set sail from St Helen's with the East and West Indian convoys. They proceeded in the first instance to Cork, where the victuallers which had been got ready for Gibraltar were waiting, and here they were for some time delayed by final preparations. In the mean time, on the 22nd March, Count de Grasse put

out from Brest with 26 ships of the line, and sailed for the West Indies. It is probable therefore that, had it not been for the detention at Cork, the two navies would have met in action.

The sailing of the French fleet, unopposed by Admiral Darby, gave rise to questions which became the subjects of some discussion both in and out of Parliament; one party being of opinion that the destruction of De Grasse's force would have crushed the designs of France, and saved the North American Colonies; while, on the other hand, it was put forward that it would have been impossible to tell the exact time of the sailing of the French fleet, and therefore that De Grasse might still have escaped, and Gibraltar must in the interim have succumbed.

On the 28th March, Admiral Darby set sail from Cork with the three convoys, amounting in all to 400 sail. Having reached a certain latitude, the East and West Indian ships were sent on their way, and the British fleet with 97 transports, store-ships, and victuallers, continued its course for Gibraltar, and before the middle of April arrived off Cadiz. A vessel, having been sent to examine the harbour, returned with a report that the Spanish fleet was there at anchor, and showing no disposition to come out and engage. Being assured that he stood in no danger of being attacked, the admiral sent forward the convoy on the 11th April, guarded by one or two liners and some frigates.

On the morning of the 12th, as the day broke,

the fleet appeared in sight of the Rock, partially obscured by a dense fog, which, as the sun rose, dissolved away, and discovered the welcome convoy stretched over the entrance of the Bay. The wind blew lightly from the westward, scarcely filling the sails, and the flotilla advanced slowly and majestically towards its anchorage. The joy of the people at their supposed deliverance from the privations they had for so many months been suffering, was uncontrolled. As when Rodney relieved the place nearly 12 months before, the inhabitants testified their gladness by boisterous manifestations, so now the whole population hurried from the city to welcome the arrival of the convoy with shouts of exultation. Groups of excited inhabitants were absorbed with the feelings of the moment, and the recollection of all suffering was lost in the prospect of deliverance. Little did they anticipate the misery that awaited them. The excitement was still unchecked, the shouts of joy still rang through the air, when the deafening crash of a hundred guns and the roaring of a storm of shot aroused them from their transient dreams of happiness, and left them paralysed with fear. The bombardment, the long-threatened retribution, had commenced, and the city was doomed to destruction. Gathering their scattered senses, the frightened creatures fled to the southward, where under shelter of the cliff and beyond the range of the fire, they huddled together in trembling groups. Every gun in the enemy's

lines belched forth its fire, and salvo after salvo from 170 pieces of the heaviest metal and 80 mortars was hurled against the Rock. The batteries of the fortress replied with almost equal rapidity, and the very mountain itself shook with the terrible explosion. In a moment the town was in flames, and the crazy buildings crackled and burnt like firewood. No words can paint the feelings of the terrified inhabitants during the first weeks of this bombardment.

The women and children especially were subjected to the most dreadful trials and privations; no house was safe, and when at night the relentless gun-boats swept the whole face of the Rock, not a single spot was free from danger.*

* "April 12th.—A shell falling in Southport street blew an old Genoese woman out of the window, but did not hurt her beyond bruises.

"The inhabitants exhibit the most impetuous grief and apprehension, precipitately retreating to the southward of the Rock for shelter, like sheep destined for the slaughter-house. The Romans count their beads and worship their idols.

"Very distressing to witness the situation of the inhabitants at the south; only a thin piece of canvas to shelter them from the rain, and heat, and dew."—*Ancell's Journal*.

Extracts from a "Narrative of the Siege of Gibraltar by a Lady who was present on the spot."

"On the 12th of April last, at one o'clock in the morning, an English cutter came in with news of the fleet being within a few leagues of us. Extravagant was our joy, you may be sure; and while friends and neighbours were congratulating each other on the prospect of eating beef and mutton once more, the Spaniards about 11 o'clock began the most furious

For six weeks this tremendous cannonade continued without any intermission, 56,000 shot and 20,000 shells were in that time thrown into the place, but in spite of this heavy fire no more than 70 of the garrison were killed.

The town, now deserted by the population, became a prey to the excited troops. The shells breaking through the buildings and bursting the walls of the

bombardment ever heard of. Terror and consternation deprived me for a moment of sense and motion. I seized my children and ran with them to Montague's Bastion, which I knew was bomb proof. An officer of the 58th regiment met me, saying, 'For God's sake, madam, where are you going? do not you know that you are going nearer the enemy's fire?' Six-and-twenty pounders flew over my head without number. Fortunately I received no hurt, and I ran or rather flew into the soldiers' barracks. This was no time for the indulgence of pride, distinction, or even delicacy.

"Notwithstanding the vigilance of the officers and non-commissioned officers, many of the men were shamefully intoxicated. The town major and a party of soldiers were busily employed in staving all the casks of liquor they could find in the town. An order was given for all ranks of women to remove to the south. I was again in terror, but was obliged to obey. My husband carried my Charlotte, while my son Jack ran by my side. We got safe to the navy hospital, but when there, found it so crowded with wounded soldiers, we could not procure a place to lie down in, except an open gallery. I wept in silence."

"Having removed to a tent at Europa," she continues, "my husband was that night on guard, and I had no company but my children. The Spanish gun-boats were firing upon us with all the rage of well-directed artillery. A woman whose tent was a little below mine was cut in two as she was drawing on her stockings. Our servant ran in and endeavoured to encour-

store-houses, opened the vast accumulation of spirits, provisions, and stores which the greedy Jews and other merchants had hoarded up, waiting till distress should raise prices to an usurious standard. When the soldiers discovered these long-secreted hoards, and remembered the suffering and privation they had gone through for the want of the very supplies these warehouses contained, they gave unbridled license to their resentment, and, regardless of punishment, and infuriated with drink, plundered without restraint.

The governor, unable to check this defiance of discipline by the more merciful modes of punishment, was compelled to execute upon the spot every man detected in the act of pillaging. For a time at least this arrested the crime.

Immediately the enemy opened their fire, the governor removed the troops under the shelter of the casemated barracks. The 12th, 39th, and 56th regiments occupied Montague's Bastion and Water-port gateway casemates. A small camp was formed

age me. He made a kind of breastwork of beds, trunks, mattresses, bolsters, and whatever else he could find, and set me behind them. The balls fell round me on every side. Every time the gun-boats came I dragged my poor children out of bed, and stood leaning with them against a rock. The third night I was here, a ball struck the rock against which I leaned and covered us with dirt and stones. In a few minutes a shell burst so near us, I had scarcely time to run out of the way. It would have melted the hardest heart to see the women and children run from the camp without a rag to cover them whenever the gun-boats approached."

above the south barracks, and the 72nd regiment took up their quarters in the King's Bastion.

Throughout April the Spaniards kept up an unabated fire,—a fire, indeed, so rapid and powerful that its effects were almost as marked upon their own batteries as upon the defences of the fortress. Their embrasures were visibly shaken, the mortars in many cases destroyed, and the guns, worn out with the ceaseless cannonade, burst or drooped at the muzzle. Within the fortress the city was already almost entirely destroyed, scarce a house was habitable, and such as were left standing were pierced with shot and shell. But beyond this dilapidation, the effects of the fire had not been remarkable: the batteries were still in serviceable condition, and the loss of life had been singularly insignificant.*

* On the 22nd of May, a curious incident occurred which is vouched for by the authority of Drinkwater; early in the morning, a shell fell and burst on the Church Battery, and one of the splinters flying for more than 200 yards struck the apron which covered the touch-hole of the morning gun on the South Bastion, exploded the priming, and fired off the gun.

“April 15th.—Yesterday I met a soldier singing in the street with uncommon glee, notwithstanding the enemy were firing with prodigious warmth,

‘ A soldier's life is a merry life,
From care and trouble free.’

He ran to me with eagerness, and presenting his bottle, cried, ‘D—n me if I don't like fighting, plenty of good liquor for carrying away.’ ‘Why, Jack,’ says I, ‘what have you been about?’ ‘Faith,’ says he, ‘I scarce know myself. I have been constantly on foot and watch, half-starved and without money, facing a parcel of pitiful Spaniards. I have been fighting,

After the first few weeks of fury the enemy's fire slackened considerably, and it was evident that the Spaniards had been disappointed with the effect the bombardment had produced. Galled at the contempt with which their grand attack had been received, they lost no opportunity of harassing the troops and inhabitants of the garrison, by means of the gun-boats and mortar rafts ; in fact, throughout the summer they resorted principally to this irritating mode of warfare, until General Elliott mounted some long-range ordnance on the elevated batteries at the north front, and whenever the gun-boats opened upon the town, volleys of 40 to 50 rounds were thrown into the camp in retaliation.* This fire, which swept the very

wheeling, marching, counter-marching, sometimes with a firelock, sometimes with a handspike, and now my bottle.'

"A shell that instant burst, a piece of which knocked the bottle out of his hand. 'Jack,' says I, 'are you not thankful to God for your preservation?' 'How do you mean?' said he; 'fine talking of God with a soldier whose trade and occupation is cutting throats! Divinity and slaughter sound very well together, they jingle like a cracked bell in the hand of a noisy crier. My religion is a firelock, open touch-hole, good flint, well-rammed charge, and seventy rounds; this is military creed. Come, comrade, drink.'"—*Ancell's Journal*.

* On the 1st of June, 1781, a discussion took place in the House of Commons respecting the damage done to the British squadron by the Spanish gun-boats. Mr Hussey produced a letter, in which it was asserted that the powder used by the Spaniards was so superior in quality that, whilst their shot reached our frigates and did execution, the fire of our ships fell short and did none.

Admiral Darby replied, "That if such a fact existed, he

centre of the enemy's encampment, caused them very great annoyance ; and at length, finding that they were subjected to it only when the boats made an attack, they withdrew the cause, and the city was left at night in peace.

On the 9th of June, the enemy's laboratory, situated under the Sierra de Carbonera (Queen of Spain's chair), took fire with a tremendous explosion, succeeded by the bursting of shells, which lasted for nearly three hours ; the loss of ammunition was very great.

Since the opening of the bombardment, the blockade had been somewhat relaxed, but the cruisers were still vigilant, and endeavoured to intercept even the smallest vessel conveying relief to the fortress. On the 6th of August, the " Helena " sloop, carrying despatches, entered the Gut, and at daybreak had almost weathered Cabrita Point with a light westerly wind. Here she was discovered by the enemy, and

made no doubt it would have been reported to him. Sir John Ross had performed the service in the Bay of Gibraltar, but had not made any complaint of the quality of the powder. No argument could be drawn from the fact of the gun-boats reaching our frigates ; each of them carried a very long gun, an 18 or 24 pounder, and it was the length of the gun, not the superior quality of the powder, which enabled their shot to take effect. Our guns were shorter and would not carry so far. The gun-boats in a calm operated against our frigates by means of their oars and were secure from pursuit ; but as soon as a breeze sprung up, they were easily beat off."—*Parliamentary Debates*.

at the same time her perilous position was discerned by the garrison. As the sun rose the wind fell to a perfect calm, and the crew of the sloop set to rowing, hoping to escape the enemy's cruisers. Captain Curtis, senior naval officer on the station, who since he had taken up his command had exhibited the greatest courage and ability, seeing her danger, immediately took the "Repulse" and "Vanguard" gun-boats, with all the boats of the squadron, to assist her across the Bay. At the same time 14 gun-boats and several launches put out from Algeciras with the intention of cutting her off. These boats being swifter than the others soon came within half-gun-shot of the sloop, and began to rake her fore and aft, nevertheless she returned the fire with some effect, and still continued to use her oars. In a few moments most of the enemy's gun-boats had come up close alongside, and firing with great rapidity, almost buried her in a storm of grape and round shot. For a brief space she sustained a succession of volleys without assistance, but the "Repulse" and "Vanguard" having come within range, they began a steady and destructive fire upon the enemy's gun-boats, and a breeze fortunately springing up at the same moment, the sloop managed to reach the boats sent to her aid in spite of the attempts of the Spaniards to sink her. In two hours' time the enemy were driven off, and the sloop was towed in safety to the New Mole. Her masts, sails,

and rigging were cut to pieces, and her hull greatly damaged by shot, but, wonderful to say, only one man, the boatswain, was killed.* “The bravery, the coolness,” says Captain Curtis in his despatch, “and the judicious conduct of Captain Roberts, do him infinite honour; his officers and men deserve the highest commendation.” †

As the summer advanced the enemy became less active in their batteries, their fire gradually slackened, and the garrison, glad of the respite, did not provoke a fresh outburst from those formidable lines. During these months of comparative calm, the Spaniards devoted all their energies to the completion of new works and the repair of the old. Fresh parallels were opened, and powerful batteries thrown up. Confiding in their superior strength, and never for a moment supposing that the garrison would venture to risk any offensive movement, the enemy left their advanced works weakly defended, while their guards were negligent and listless. Spies and deserters

* Letter from Captain Curtis to the Admiralty, dated “Brilliant,” Gibraltar, August 7th, 1781.

† Extract from a despatch from General Elliott to Lord Hillsborough, August 8th, 1781.

“The particulars of Captain Roberts’ (of the ‘Helena’) gallant behaviour and his ship will no doubt be transmitted to you by Captain Curtis, but as he (Captain Curtis) is not a man to speak of any transaction so highly redounding to his own honour, on my part it is an indispensable duty to inform your Lordship that his zeal for the service is scarcely to be paralleled in forwarding every operation that can in any way contribute to our comfort or defence.”

agreed in their accounts of the indolent system which was pursued in the camp, and the defenceless state of the principal fortifications.

During the few months of quiet that followed the grand bombardment, General Elliott had leisure to reflect upon the many schemes he had in view for arresting the formidable progress of the enemy's works. At length in November, the Spaniards having, with immense labour and at enormous cost, almost completed the most stupendous and powerful lines of fortification, extending across the isthmus and reaching nearly to the foot of the Rock, the governor determined to take advantage of the false sense of security into which the enemy were lulled, and to destroy by one bold stroke the whole of those magnificent works.*

* In the British Museum there is a copy of an "Historical Sketch of Gibraltar, 1792," copiously margined with pencil notes, signed, *W. Booth*, containing remarks upon the correctness of the letter-press, and giving the writer's own impressions of scenes in which he took part. Referring to the origin of the sortie he says :

"General Boyd had heard through Lieutenant Seward of the Royal Artillery, my opinion of the practicability of the sortie, and after consulting with me on the subject he went out as far as the Devil's Tower to see if what I had asserted was true, viz. that of the approaches being without any works whatever to flank them, and that the batteries in the rear must of course strike the reverse of their own works. This was found to be true. The sortie was very soon after made, and the troops found themselves completely covered from the fire of the enemy's guns by their high and advanced parallels. My assertion was that we could get under the enemy's approaches clear of their fire, those lines not being flanked by anything."

The entire strength of the garrison at this time was 5952 officers and men, a force barely sufficient for the duties of the fortress, and certainly not so numerous as to justify the hazard of heedlessly imperilling the life of a single man.

Eliott had well weighed the risk to which he was about to expose not only his garrison but the honour of the nation; and he comprehended the fatal consequences which must follow on defeat. His plans were carefully and secretly laid, not a whisper of his intentions was suffered to pass from his council chamber, and the announcement of orders for the execution of a sortie on the night of the 26th of November fell like a thunder-clap upon the troops. It was after first evening gun fire, and when the gates of the fortress were closed, so that no communication could by any possibility be made to the enemy, that the instructions for a sortie upon the works of the besiegers, to be made that very night, were issued in the following evening garrison order :

“ Gibraltar, November 26th, 1781.

“ Countersign, ‘ Steady.’

“ All the Grenadiers and Light Infantry of the garrison, and all the men of the 12th and Hardenberg’s regiments, officers and non-commissioned officers, now on duty, to be immediately relieved and to join their regiments: to form a detachment, consisting of the 12th, and Hardenberg’s regiments

complete; the Grenadiers and Light Infantry of all the other regiments (which are to be completed to their full establishment from the battalion companies); one captain, three lieutenants, 10 non-commissioned officers, and a 100 artillery; and three engineers, seven officers, and 12 non-commissioned officers, overseers; with 160 workmen from the line (excepting the 12th and Hardenberg's regiments), and 40 workmen from the Artificer Company. Each man to carry 36 rounds of ammunition, a good flint in his piece, and another in his pocket. No drums to go out, excepting two with each of the regiments. No volunteers to be allowed. The whole to assemble on the Red Sands at 12 o'clock this night, and to be commanded by Brigadier-General Ross, for the purpose of making a sortie upon the enemy's batteries. The 39th and 58th regiments to parade at the same hour on the general parade, under the command of Brigadier-General Picton, to sustain the sortie if necessary."

All the officers belonging to this detachment then on guard were immediately relieved, and every preparation made enjoined in the order.

At the appointed hour everything was in readiness; the detachment was drawn up in three lines, the right column in the rear, and the left in the front; behind all were the workmen with tools to destroy the trenches, and on the extreme left were a body of naval pioneers from the squadron.

The force of the enemy in their lines and advanced works consisted of 50 or 60 cavalry and 600 infantry, composed of the Spanish and Walloon guards, artillerymen, Cassadores, and light troops, besides a body of armed workmen.

The Spaniards had never contemplated the possibility of an assault upon their works, their approaches were therefore undefended by any flanking fire, and their batteries in rear could only play upon the reverse of their advanced parallels.

Clear and stringent directions were given for the guidance of the officers commanding the columns. The right column was to lead and march through Forbes's barrier for the extremity of the parallel, keeping the eastern fences of the gardens close on their left. The centre to follow, marching through Bayside barrier, across the gardens, and against the mortar battery. The left column to march along the beach to destroy the gun batteries. The most profound silence was to be observed.

It was not until after midnight that all these arrangements were completed. Shortly before three o'clock, when the moon had nearly set, the detachment, about 2000 strong, moved forward in breathless silence from the barrier gates. The right column, under Lt.-Col. Hugo, was almost immediately discovered by the advanced sentries, and the alarm was given all along the line. The enemy, terrified and dismayed, rushed to arms, but the British troops in another

moment were upon them, and were quickly in possession of the principal batteries.

For a brief space the Spaniards kept up a scattered fire, but all was disorder in the trenches. An irresistible panic spread among the men, they gave way on all sides, and precipitately abandoned the whole line of works. Never was success more complete. The pioneers and artillerymen speedily levelled and destroyed the stupendous parapets, the gabions and platforms were kindled, and the fire spread with such rapidity that in half an hour two mortar batteries of ten 13-inch mortars, and three batteries of six guns each, with all the lines of approach, communication, and traverses, were in flames, and soon reduced to ashes. The mortars and cannon were spiked, and nearly all the magazines exploded. So paralyzed was the enemy, that during this terrific conflagration they stood almost silent spectators of the scene.

As had been anticipated, the guns in rear could not be brought to bear upon the advanced trenches, and mortars loaded with grape threw a dropping and ill-directed fire upon the assaulting columns.*

* The inactivity of the Spanish cavalry upon this occasion has been commented on. Booth (Notes in Heriot's Account) says:—

“About 40 of the cavalry did come out of the lines, but upon seeing such superior forces hurried back again as fast as their horses' legs could carry them. It was said they had not more than 1000 men in the lines, in fact they were completely taken by surprise.”

By five o'clock in the morning the troops had returned within the garrison, after having completely demolished the whole of the advanced works, which had been perfected at an incredible cost of time, labour, and expense.

Just as the rear column had passed the barrier gates on its return, the enemy's grand magazine blew up with a terrific explosion, scattering masses of timber and débris in all directions. The scene during the general conflagration was magnificently grand; the whole isthmus was one blaze of fire, and the highest peaks of the huge Rock were scarcely visible through the dense atmosphere of smoke. Notwithstanding the glorious result of this sortie, the loss of the detachment was insignificantly small; four privates only were killed, and one officer, and 24 non-commissioned officers and privates wounded. The success of this attack is mainly attributable to Brigadier-General Ross, who throughout the operations displayed the greatest judgment, prudence, and courage. But though Ross was entrusted with the command of the sortie, General Elliott was too deeply anxious for the result to remain within the garrison, and he accompanied the troops nominally as a spectator. His

Lieutenant Tweedie, 12th Regiment, was wounded in the thigh by a grape shot. A pencil note in Heriot's account of the sortie, says:—

“ This was a dropping shot from a mortar, which the enemy had loaded with grape, having no other means of firing on the troops in the sortie.”

conduct, in thus imperilling his own life, jeopardizing the fate of the fortress, and interfering with the responsibility of Ross, was the subject of some comment both at the time and afterwards. It was affirmed to be contrary to the rules of war for a general to leave his garrison while a hazardous and doubtful attack was made upon an enemy's lines with a third of the whole force, and it was reasonably asked, What would have been the consequence in this case had the 14,000 Spanish troops in camp advanced against the place while the sortie was going on? "What," says a critic, "did General O'Hara experience by leaving his garrison? He was made prisoner, and the place (Toulon) soon afterwards evacuated."

General Ross, too, appears to have considered General Elliott's presence with the column as an interference with his command, and he felt it implied an insinuation that he was not implicitly trusted.

After the works had been carried, General Elliott took up his position at a spot where the principal defence had been made, and here the ground was strewn with many bodies.* Orders were then given to destroy the intrenchments. Anxious that none of the wounded should by any accident perish in the flames of the burning batteries, the governor went into the

* When the troops entered the batteries, the written report of the Spanish commanding officer was found in one of the splinter proofs. It stated that "nothing extraordinary had happened during the night." An impression slightly premature.

trench himself to look round before the blaze was kindled. Among the bodies he found a wounded officer, whom by his uniform he knew to be a captain of the Spanish artillery. The general spoke to him with all kindness, and, promising him every assistance, ordered him to be removed, as the fire was now rapidly spreading to the spot where he lay. But the Spaniard, raising himself with difficulty, feebly exclaimed, "No, Sir, no, leave me, and let me perish amid the ruins of my post." In a few minutes he expired. It was afterwards found that he had commanded the guard of St Carlos's battery, and that when his men threw down their arms and fled he rushed forward from the work into the attacking column, exclaiming:—"At least one Spaniard shall die honourably," and fell where he was found, at the foot of his post.

The success of this sortie exceeded the utmost expectations of the governor, and a disastrous blow had been struck against the operations of the besiegers. For a time the Spaniards seemed prostrated with the misfortune they had suffered, and no attempt was made to reconstruct the damaged works; but in December they recovered from their stupor, great numbers of men were employed repairing the batteries, and it was evident that they intended again to assume the offensive.

An affecting story is related of a Spanish officer who was wounded and taken prisoner during the sortie. The Baron Von Helmstadt, an ensign in the

Walloon guards, was hit dangerously in the knee, and amputation became necessary. To this operation the Baron demurred, affirming as one reason that he was betrothed to a lady to whom he would never offer himself with a mutilated limb. General Elliott, hearing of his objections, went himself to see him, and urged him to submit to the opinions of the surgeon; pointing out to him that his affianced bride would receive him with the more affection for his having gained an honourable wound. The young officer yielded to the persuasions of the governor, and the leg was taken off. For a short time after the amputation there was every prospect of his doing well, but unfavourable symptoms set in, and on the 28th of December he died of an inflammatory fever. During his illness flags of truce were daily passing and repassing to inform his friends of his situation. On the 29th his body was carried from the hospital to the New Mole with all military honours, the Grenadier company of the 12th regiment, the Governor, Major-General de la Motte, and Captain Curtis, formed the procession, and the corpse having been laid in a boat three volleys were fired over it. The boat, preceded by a barge, in which were Sir Charles Knowles and the Adjutant-General, was rowed midway across the Bay, and there, being met by some Spanish officers, the body was handed over to the enemy.

Towards the close of December, the enemy had made considerable progress in their works, part of their

approaches were restored and strong epaulments raised. Notwithstanding the heavy fire from the garrison upon their working parties, these works were steadily proceeded with, and by the end of January the mortar battery of St Carlos, a most formidable redoubt, was almost entirely rebuilt. Throughout February the enemy displayed the greatest industry in the restoration of their batteries, but on the 31st of March, during a fierce fire from Willis's and Montague's Bastion, the parapets of the Mahon Redoubt ignited, and the flames were not extinguished until considerable damage had been done.

In this month intelligence was received of the fall of Minorca, and General Eliott not erroneously concluded that, relieved from the siege of St Philip's and Mahon, Spain would devote her whole energies to the conquest of Gibraltar. On the 11th of April, a boat arrived from Faro with despatches for the governor, and a private communication containing the most important intelligence. It announced that immense preparations were in progress at Cadiz and the Mediterranean ports for a combined and final attack upon the Rock. To the Duc de Crillon, the conqueror of Minorca, the command of this important operation was confided. Large reinforcements were ready to march to the camp, 10 sail of the line, besides floating batteries, gun and mortar-boats, under Admiral Moreno, were to assemble at Algeciras, and the most talented engineers in France and Spain had

been consulted upon the best measures for the capture of the place. During the month of May, the preparations for the grand event commenced in the vicinity of the Rock. A large fleet of upwards of 100 transports entered the Bay and anchored near Algeciras, and 9000 men were landed at the river Palmones; vessels arrived daily, laden with materials and warlike stores, and marvellous exertions were made to hurry forward the arrangements.

Active operations against the fortress from the lines almost entirely ceased, and the whole camp was occupied in preparing for the final blow which was to restore to Spain the long-contested prize.

General Elliott watched the progress of these preparations calmly, but with anxiety. The struggle, he felt, would be a terrible one, but he was not ill-prepared. His garrison now numbered 6000 hale and hearty men inured to danger and fatigue, nearly 100 cannon were mounted on the walls, and the stores and ammunition were abundant. So celebrated had the great siege become, that it now attracted the interest and attention of all Europe; distinguished men of all nations flocked to this theatre of the war, and a detachment of Corsicans, under command of Señor Leonetti, nephew to General Paoli, tendered their services to General Elliott, by whom they were most gladly accepted.

King Charles, whose temper was usually so sedate, shared the general ardour, and exhibited such eager-

ness for the success of the enterprise, that his first question in the morning was, "Is it taken?" and to the negative he never failed to reply, "It will soon be ours."

In the allied fleets and armies the excitement was far greater, and he was treated as a criminal who for a moment doubted of success. Spain spared neither treasure nor labour to insure the victory. Experience had told her that all attacks by land or sea, if conducted upon the regular principles of a siege, must end in failure and defeat. On the land side the isthmus was narrow and confined, and allowed but little space for the development of the attack, while the nearer the works approached the towering Rock with all its powerful artillery, the greater became the difficulties.

Piqued at the successful defence which for three years had baffled every effort of the nation, enraged at the destruction of the stupendous lines and batteries on the night of the sortie, and burning with the desire to wipe out the stain on the national honour, the Spaniards were urged on in this last struggle by all the impulses of pride, ambition, and revenge. The slow and regular operations of a siege having proved but labour lost against this stubborn Rock, rewards were offered to the most skilful engineers in Europe for plans to subdue the fortress.

Stimulated by these liberal offers, a thousand schemes reached Madrid, some bold to extravagance,

others too ludicrous to deserve attention. Amongst them, however, was one, the invention of the Chevalier d'Arçon, of such superior merit, that it instantly arrested the attention even of the king himself. His plan consisted of a combined attack by sea and land upon a scale so tremendously formidable, and assisted by such ingenious inventions of art, that it held out a prospect of certain success.

After a brief consideration the Court of Madrid announced its unqualified approval of the scheme, and orders were at once issued for its adoption. Not only was the reduction of the fortress now considered certain, but so vast were the powers to be employed, and so prodigious the armament to be brought against the walls, that the annihilation of every stone upon the Rock was not unexpected. The plan embraced two leading features; first, a bombardment from the isthmus, upon a scale hitherto unknown; secondly, an attack by sea along the whole length of the Line Wall. For this purpose floating batteries of such construction that they were to be "at once incombustible and insubmergible," were to be employed.

Each battery was clad on its fighting side with three successive layers of squared timber, three feet in thickness; within this wall ran a body of wet sand, and within that again was a line of cork soaked in water, and calculated to prevent the effects of splinters, the whole being bound together by strong wooden

bolts. To protect the crews from shells or dropping shot, a hanging roof was contrived, composed of strong rope-work netting, covered with wet hides, and shelving sufficiently to prevent the shot from lodging.

Not the least remarkable part of these vessels was a plan for the prevention of combustion from red-hot shot. A reservoir was placed beneath the roof from which numerous pipes, like the veins of the human body, circulated through the sides of the ship, giving a constant supply of water to every part, and keeping the wood continually saturated.

To form these powerful batteries, ten ships, from 600 to 1400 tons burthen, were cut down to the proper proportions, and upwards of 200,000 cubic feet of timber were used in their construction. Each battery was armed with from eight to twenty heavy brass cannon of new manufacture, with a reserve of spare pieces. The crews varied in number from 760 to 250 men. One large sail propelled each ship.

Besides this tremendous armament which was to annihilate the line of defence from the sea, preparations of no less magnitude were being made for the attack on the northern front. Not fewer than 1200 pieces of heavy ordnance were ready for use in the artillery park, enormous quantities of ammunition and warlike stores were in the magazines, and the reserve of gunpowder alone was reported at 83,000 barrels.

Immense works were being hurried forward on the isthmus, of a grandeur which eclipsed anything that had been previously constructed.

In 24 hours a flying sap was thrown out with a rapidity of execution unequalled. The parallel extended to a length of 230 toises, with a Boyau of 630 toises from the place where it joined the principal barrier of the lines. The construction of this Boyau required *one million six hundred thousand* bags of sand, and thousands of casks were used in forming the parallel. In a single night this enormous work was raised to the height of 12 feet with 18 feet of thickness, and it was supposed that during the seven hours in which it was erected 10,000 men were at labour.

To assist in the assault by sea, the combined fleets of France and Spain, amounting to 50 sail of the line, with 40 gun-boats, numerous frigates, and 50 mortar vessels, were to act in support. 300 boats, fitted with hinged platforms at their prows, were to accompany the expedition, and at the proper moment to land the troops.*

The outline of the attack having been arranged, the plan was drawn out by the Duc de Crillon himself, and submitted for approval, first to the Court of

* "On the 13th July a soldier of the 73rd regiment declared himself a prophet, and prophesied that within six weeks and six days and six hours, the garrison would be taken and the governor killed. He was taken to the Provost Ship, there to await the expiration of the time and then be flogged."—*Ancell's Journal*.

Madrid, and afterwards to the King of France. Subsequently the details were very materially altered, but the principle remained the same. The method originally proposed was as follows :

“The plan for taking Gibraltar, presented by Crillon, with the opinion of the minister, was imparted, by order of His Majesty, to France, by the hand of Aranda, and it being approved of, that Court offered 27 auxiliary ships. According to this plan the assault will be conducted in the following manner: Brigadier Don Ventura Moreno will command the fire of the fleet. The vanguard of the combined squadron will be commanded by Señor Cordova, and among the divisions that compose it will be included the 3rd of 12 fire-proof ships, which will anchor in Algeciras, until Señor Alvarez completes the 60 paces of intrenchment opposite the fortress. Our ships will then attack; four by the Europa Point, two by the New Mole, their fire being supported by that of the gun and mortar-boats and bomb-ketches, which will hold themselves in readiness to support where it may be required. At a given signal, the fire from our whole line will open with that of the intrenchment, which will not cease until a breach shall have been made at the Europa Point. The battering ships will not be allowed to quit their respective posts till they require relief, and they will then retire to

Algeciras, whence others will proceed to supply their places, taking up the same points. The officer who shall act counter to his orders will be removed from his post without its being referred to the king. The breach having been made, the commander-in-chief, the Duke de Crillon, will notify to the governor the surrender of the fortress; and should he consent to the capitulation, the preliminaries will be arranged, conceding to him military honours; if he persist in the defence, the operations will continue in the following manner. The fire by sea and land will protect the disembarkation of our troops on the flanks of the advance. The boats conveying them will be covered by large planks on hinges, which on unfolding will fall on the moles on the right, while on the left others will rest on the transports that follow, in order to link them to each other and adjust them to the breach, binding them firmly together, the first boat being attached to the ground by means of grappling irons, which it will carry for the purpose. The troops will advance along these in the following order: 11 companies of Grenadiers of about 70 men each, and as many more of Chasseurs, with three companies of Dragoons, the whole under the command of Señor Cagigal, General of the second column and his subaltern officers, the Brigadier Don Francesco Pacheco, Colonel of Seville, and Señor Aviles, Colonel of Villaviciosa. Two battalions of volunteers of

Catalonia will form the flying troops to form a support where it may be necessary, and to strengthen either flank, or profiting by any opportunity the enemy may offer of attacking him : this corps will be commanded by Brigadier Don Benito Panogo.

“The army will be formed into three divisions, its right commanded by Lieutenant-General Buch, its left by the Count de Cifuentes, and its centre by Marshal Burghesi. The best company of Grenadiers from each regiment will be detached to cover its respective corps, and when the disembarkation of the troops, or part of them, shall have been executed, the boats carrying the fascines, powder-saucisses, gabions, panniers, pickaxes, &c., will be sent forward in order that they may cover themselves as the disembarkation proceeds, keeping up at the same time a lively fire along with the rest of the army. Detached parties will scour with promptitude the Campo Nuevo in order to intercept the advanced guard and to cut off the retreat of the enemy to the mountain : which dispositions being well concerted, the enemy will be reduced to the extremity of either surrendering or being destroyed.

“The squadron of Señor Cordova will cover the mouth of the Straits, and the French will place itself as much within as circumstances may require. 200 Muheletes and 200 Artillerymen more have been asked for from the camp : those that are present

being required for the intrenchment. These have been sent for from their respective corps." *

The fame of the siege of Gibraltar had ere this spread to the remotest corners of Europe. The Count d'Artois, brother to the King of France, and the Duc de Bourbon, arrived in the camp in August, impatient to witness the fall of the invincible fortress, and they were followed by crowds of the nobility of Spain, eager to join in an enterprise which it was anticipated would result in a victory most glorious to their arms.

General Elliott regarded the progress of the tremendous armaments without despondency. He prepared for the coming storm, and made every effort to meet it manfully and with success. An experiment which had lately been tried with red-hot shot produced such effects, that he founded his hopes of destroying the enemy's battering-ships almost solely upon that expedient, and great numbers of furnaces for heating the shot were immediately prepared and placed in convenient positions within the principal batteries. The defences too were thoroughly repaired, the Land Port was more carefully protected, and un-serviceable guns were laid across the tops of the embrasures in many of the works, as a protection to the artillerymen when under fire. †

* From Spanish MSS. in British Museum.

† This circumstance is mentioned in a letter from General

The arrival of the Count d'Artois in the camp gave rise to an interchange of courtesies between the governor and the Duc de Crillon, and though the two chiefs were on the eve of a great struggle for the mastery, letters, couched in the most affable and peaceful terms, passed between them. The count having brought with him a packet of letters for some officers of the garrison, the Duc de Crillon took advantage of the opportunity, and when the parcel was sent in to the fortress, accompanied it by a letter from himself to General Elliott, in which he expressed the highest esteem for the governor's person and character, and assured him how anxiously he looked forward to becoming his friend; at the same time he offered a present of a few luxuries for the general's table. In reply to this courteous note, the governor returned his sincerest thanks for the gift, but begged that in future no such favour might be heaped upon him, as by accepting the present he had broken through a rule to which he had faithfully adhered since the beginning of the war, never to receive anything for his own private use, but to partake both of plenty and scarcity in common with the lowest of his brave fellow-soldiers.

Towards the end of August a grand inspection of

Boyd, written some time after the siege. He avers that the plan answered admirably. (Vide Correspondence in Colonial Secretary's Office.)

the floating batteries took place at Algeciras, at which the French princes were present. To exhibit the ease and simplicity with which they could be manœuvred, the vessels were put through various movements, to the admiration and surprise of the spectators. So satisfactory was this trial considered that it became the popular opinion that 24 hours would suffice for the demolition of the fortress, and the Duc de Crillon was made the subject of the greatest ridicule when he cautiously hinted that 14 days might elapse ere the place fell. Crillon, in fact, had no affection for the schemes of the Chevalier d'Arçon, and, as we shall presently see, he attributed his subsequent failure almost entirely to the blind confidence that was placed in the floating batteries.

As the time approached the greatest impatience was manifested not only by the troops, but throughout all Spain, for the commencement of the attack, and so loud was the clamour for immediate action that d'Arçon was ordered to hurry on the completion of the floating batteries with every despatch.

Late in August a council of war was held in the camp, at which the French princes were present, and it was then proposed that the command and direction of the floating batteries should be confided to the officer of the navy, Crillon taking upon himself the responsibility of the attack by land. Disputes had already arisen as to the proper dispositions for the bombardment, Crillon claiming an undivided

authority over the whole proceedings, while the minister of marine was anxious that the admiral should direct the movements of the batteries and their mode of equipment.*

When the before-mentioned proposal was conveyed to Crillon, he peremptorily refused to accede to it. Nor could any decision be arrived at regarding the most proper point of attack; the Old Mole, which at first appeared the weakest part of the fortress, was found to be covered by the guns of the principal batteries on the Rock, while the New Mole presented even greater difficulties. There was another matter too which became the subject of discussion up to the very moment of the attack, and this was, whether it would not be expedient to supply each floating battery with warp-anchors, and double cables, that they might withdraw in case of accident.†

* Florida Blanca's Representation.

† "When the battery 'Paula Prima' was proved for the attack, it was perceived that there was a deficiency of water for preventing the effect of red-hot balls. The general and commanding officers were informed of this defect, but they thought so lightly of it, that Don Cayetan Langara pleasantly said 'he would undertake to receive in his breast all the red-hot shot of the enemy.' Notwithstanding the pressing entreaties of Mons. d' Arçon that an essay should be made with red-hot balls upon this battery before opening it against the garrison, as he apprehended that the want of a constant circulation of water round the top would be found a very material defect, his request of an experiment was refused."—Historical Sketch of Gibraltar. Heriot, 1792.

These unfortunate disputes, which arose at a time when perfect unanimity was most essential, hampered the progress of operations, and destroyed that harmony which should have existed between Crillon and his subordinates. D'Arçon especially was offended and annoyed; he claimed for himself the merit of having invented the machines which were to annihilate the place, and insisted upon his right to have the sole direction of their movements. Crillon, on the other hand, perceived that if the command were divided, and the attack should prove successful, the glory of the triumph would be appropriated by the French engineer. In the many councils of war that preceded the bombardment, the duke did not care to conceal his jealousy of the Chevalier d'Arçon. On one occasion, deriding the propositions of the engineer, he exclaimed, "You have a fatherly love for your batteries, and are only anxious for their preservation. Should the enemy attempt to take possession of them, I will burn them before his face." On another occasion, when in the presence of the French princes, he said, "You were summoned into Spain to execute *my* plan for the attack of Gibraltar by floating batteries. *Your* commission is performed, the rest belongs to me." *

* Lord Mahon, Hist. of England, vol. vii. p. 286, says, "that the Duc de Crillon saw little prospect of prevailing on the land side, . . . but fixed his hopes on some floating batteries of new invention." Crillon always doubted the vaunted

While these discussions and misunderstandings were distracting the councils of the besiegers, a master hand was guiding the preparations for the defence within the fortress. Every emergency that might occur was provided for, every danger that could be foreseen averted, and the garrison itself reinforced by a Marine Brigade of 600 men under command of Brigadier Curtis. In the first week of September, the land works of the enemy had progressed with gigantic strides, immense batteries, some containing as many as 64 guns, only waited to be unmasked, and long strings of mules streamed hourly into the trenches, laden with shot, shell, and ammunition.

The advanced works were not, except in some instances, yet armed, and large masses of *materiel*, which had accumulated in their vicinity, cumbered the embrasures and rendered their parapets liable to destruction by fire. Seizing upon the opportunity thus afforded by the negligence of the Spaniards, General Boyd wrote to the governor, recommending the use of red-hot shot against these works. Though the distance was great, and the effect of heated shot had not then been thoroughly ascertained, Elliott acquiesced in the proposition, and Major Lewis, commanding the artillery, was ordered to execute the attack. On the 8th of September the preparations were completed, and at

power of these machines, and had no opinion of their efficacy.
—Vide his letter to Elliott, *post*.

seven o'clock in the morning, the guards having been relieved, a tremendous fire was opened from all the northern batteries. Throughout the day this fiery cannonade was kept up with unabated fury. By 10 A. M. the Mahon battery and another work of two guns were in flames, and by five in the evening were entirely consumed, with all their gun-carriages, platforms, and magazines. The effect of the red-hot shot exceeded the most sanguine expectations; the damage done was extensive, and for a time irreparable, the greater part of the communication to the eastern parallel was destroyed, and the batteries of St Carlos and St Martin so much injured that they were no longer serviceable. At one moment the works were on fire in 50 places, and the flames, lifted by the wind, spread with terrible rapidity; but by the prodigious exertions of the enemy's troops, who, notwithstanding the galling fire from the garrison to which they were exposed, displayed a reckless intrepidity, the work of destruction was arrested and many of the batteries saved from ruin. Irritated at this unexpected attack upon works which had cost him so much labour and anxiety, Crillon was precipitated into a premature bombardment, which, while it exposed to view the hitherto masked batteries, and thus gave General Elliott an opportunity of preparing counter-works upon the Rock, at the same time did considerable damage to the unfinished lines.

On the morning of the 9th September, a battery

of 64 guns opened at day-break, and a tremendous discharge from 170 pieces of cannon announced the commencement of the final bombardment. At the same time a squadron of seven Spanish and two French line-of-battle ships got under way at Orange Grove, and dropping slowly past the sea-line wall, delivered several broadsides against the south bastion and Ragged Staff, until they arrived off Europa. Then, having first formed line to eastward of the Rock, they attacked the batteries from the Point as far as the New Mole with some energy. On the following day this manœuvre was repeated, and the cannonade from the lines was renewed with all its fierceness, 6500 shot and 2080 shell being thrown into the fortress every 24 hours. Notwithstanding this overwhelming fire the loss in the garrison was exceedingly small.

On the 12th, the combined fleets of Spain and France, numbering 39 ships of the line, entered the Bay of Algeciras, and having formed a junction with the squadron already at anchor, raised the naval force to 50 ships of the line and two second-rates; nine vessels bore an admiral's flag.

General Eliott was conscious that the moment of trial approached, and so ably had he conducted his preparations that during the 24 hours preceding the attack not a single alteration had to be made, even in the most minute directions that had been given to the troops. Every man knew his place, each gun was

told off for one particular duty, simple and efficient arrangements had been made for a constant supply of ammunition, and every bastion was furnished with its fuel and furnace for the dreaded red-hot shot.

It was during the morning of the 12th, that the governor received information that the combined attack would commence on the following day. Calmly as this courageous man awaited the moment of trial, he could not but be influenced by the gravest anxieties for the result. He had witnessed the gigantic armaments that were preparing for the assault; and though ignorant of the exact force which was to be brought against him, he was aware that neither France nor Spain had spared labour or expense to accumulate a strength hitherto unknown in the history of sieges. On the land he was threatened by 246 pieces of cannon, mortars, and howitzers, and an army of near 40,000 men; while by sea 50 sail of the line, 10 floating batteries of a construction supposed to be indestructible, with countless gun and mortar-boats, and 300 smaller craft, were waiting only the signal for the attack. To this enormous armament, but 7000 men and 96 guns could be opposed. At a council of war held in the Spanish camp on the 4th of September, the final details for the arrangement of the grand attack had been settled, and it was decided to open the bombardment on the 13th of the month.

At this council Mons. d'Arçon vehemently protested against the precipitate haste with which the

preparations of the floating batteries had been hurried on, and vainly pleaded for a few days further delay, in order that some experiments might be made upon the vessels, and especially that the effectiveness of the water apparatus might be tested. His arguments were met by others equally cogent. Lord Howe with a powerful fleet was known to be on his way to relieve the fortress, and it was of vital importance that his arrival should be anticipated. The season was already far advanced, and the works on the land side, which had only just been repaired, were at any moment exposed to a second partial destruction by red-hot shot. All objections, therefore, were overruled, and the day was named.

At about seven o'clock on the morning of the 13th September, the enemy's fleet was observed to be in motion, off the Orange Grove, and shortly afterwards the ten floating batteries were under way, and with a crowd of boats standing for the southward with a light north-west breeze.

Shortly before ten o'clock they had reached their respective stations off the line wall, and the Admiral Don Buenaventura Moreno in the "Pastora," having taken up a position opposite the capital of the King's Bastion, the others anchored in admirable order on his right and left flanks, at about 1000 yards' distance from the walls of the fortress.*

* NAMES OF THE BATTERING SHIPS.

Pastora

21

Rear-Admiral Buenaventura Moreno

At this time the enemy's camp and the surrounding hills were covered with countless thousands of spectators, who had hurried from all parts of Spain to witness the fall of Gibraltar. The batteries had no sooner let go their anchors than a tremendous cannonade of hot and cold shot was opened upon them all along the line; at the same instant the ponderous vessels replied from all their guns, supported by the fire of 186 pieces of ordnance from the works on the isthmus.

Never before in the annals of war had a spectacle so magnificently grand been witnessed,—400 cannon belched forth their volleys of fire at the same moment, the whole heaven was obscured by the curling clouds of smoke which clung around the rugged peaks of the rock, while the misty gloom was fitfully illumined by the flashes of a thousand carcasses and shells. The whole peninsula was overwhelmed with a torrent of shot.

Talla Piedra	21	Prince of Nassau
Paula Primera	21	Don Cayeton Langara
El Rosario	19	Don Francisco Munos
St Christoval	18	Don Frederico Gravino
Principe Carlos	11	Don Ant. Basurta
San Juan	9	Don Joseph Angeler
Paula Segunda	9	Don Pablo de Cosa
Santa Anna	7	Don Joseph Goicochea
Los Dolores	6	Don Pedro Sanchez

142

Guns.	In Reserve.	Men.
142	70	5260

25 *

For two hours this terrible cannonade continued without intermission, and no impression had been made upon the floating batteries; so well calculated was their construction to withstand the effects of artillery, that the heaviest shells rebounded from their roofs, and the shot struck harmless on their sides. Upwards of 2000 red-hot balls had been thrown against them, and no symptoms of combustion appeared, except here and there a feeble flame, which ere it could spread was quenched.

At noon the enemy slackened their fire from the sea for a moment, but seemingly only for the purpose of amending the direction of their guns, which had previously been uncertain and too high; the pause was but for an instant, and the artillery again burst forth with a more powerful and better directed fire. Showers of every missile swept over the walls, and already the British troops, disappointed with the effects of the red-hot shot, and fatigued with the mid-day sun, began to look gloomily upon the issue of the fight. But about two o'clock slight wreaths of flame were observed issuing from the admiral's ship, and at the same time a strange confusion was remarked among the men on board the "Talla Piedra." On board this battery was the Chevalier d'Arçon, who was present in the action as a volunteer to watch the success of his own inventions. Several red-hot shot had struck this ship, but one alone gave any un-

easiness to those on board ; to reach the smouldering wood-work the guns were silenced, and the smoke clearing away left the vessel exposed to such a concentrated fire, that all efforts to arrest the progress of the flames were vain. The blaze rapidly spread, the crew were seized with a panic, and, fearful of an explosion, turned the water into the powder magazines. Thus one battery was rendered useless during the remainder of the action.

In the admiral's ship the flames were for some hours subdued, and her guns continued to play upon the walls till nightfall ; but the disorder which was immediately visible in the Talla Piedra and the Pastora soon affected the whole line of attack, and by seven o'clock in the evening the fire from the fortress had gained a commanding superiority.

At midnight signals of distress were made from all parts of the Bay. The admiral's ship was in flames from stem to stern, and others had been set on fire. The enemy now determined to abandon all the ships, and those which had hitherto resisted the effects of the red-hot shots were, by order of the admiral, set in flames.

As the grey morning dawned the scene on the waters of the Bay was sublimely terrible ; masses of shattered wreck, to which were clinging the drowning crews, floated over the troubled waves ; groans and cries for help reached even to the walls, or

were drowned in the thunders of the exploding magazines, while the glaring flames of the burning vessels cast a lurid light over the awful spectacle.

At two o'clock in the morning, Brigadier Curtis, who with his squadron of gun-boats lay at the New Mole ready to take advantage of any opportunity to harass the enemy, pushed out to the westward and with great expedition formed line upon the flank of the battering ships. This sudden movement completely disconcerted the Spaniards, who were engaged in removing the crews from the vessels, and they fled precipitately, abandoning the wounded and leaving them to perish in the flames. As daylight appeared two feluccas, which had not been able before to escape, were discovered endeavouring to get away, but a shot from one of the gun-boats killing five of their men, they both surrendered.

Hearing from the prisoners that hundreds of officers and men, some wounded, still remained on board the batteries, and must certainly perish, Captain Curtis, at the utmost risk of his own life, made the most heroic efforts to effect their rescue.*

* "This must unavoidably have been their wretched fate, had they not been dragged from amidst the flames by the personal intrepidity of Brigadier Curtis at the utmost hazard of his own life, a life invaluable to His Majesty's service. For some time I felt the utmost anguish seeing his pinnace close to one of the largest ships at the moment she blew up."—Elliott's despatch to Lord Shelbourne, Gibraltar, Sept. 15th, 1783.

Careless of danger from the explosions which every instant scattered showers of débris around him, he passed from ship to ship and literally dragged from the burning decks the miserable men who yet remained on board. With the coolest intrepidity he pushed his pinnace close alongside one of the largest batteries at the very moment she blew up, covering the sea with fragments of her wreck. For a time the boat was engulfed amid the falling ruin, and her escape was miraculous. A huge balk of timber fell through her flooring, killing the coxswain, wounding others of the crew, and starting a large hole in her bottom. Through this leak the water rushed so rapidly that little hope was left of reaching the shore, but the sailors' jackets being stuffed into the aperture, the hole was plugged, and the gallant men got safe to land. By the heroic and humane exertions of Captain Curtis and his boat's crew, 357 persons were saved from a horrible death.

Whilst these disasters were occurring in the Bay, the land batteries on the isthmus never for an instant slackened the tremendous fire that had been commenced on the previous morning; until at daybreak on the 14th the Spaniards, having become aware of the fate of their comrades on board the vessels, ordered the cannonade to cease.

Captain Curtis had scarcely completed his service of humanity before eight of the remaining ships blew up and one only remained unconsumed. At first

it was hoped that she might be saved as a trophy of the glorious action, but this was afterwards found impossible, and she was set fire to like the rest. The flag of Admiral Moreno remained flying until his battery was totally destroyed.

Desperate had been the struggle and great was the victory. During the hottest of the fire General Elliott took his station on the King's Bastion, exposed to the guns of the two most powerful battering ships. Nothing could exceed the coolness and courage of the troops during this trying day; the steady and incessant fire was never allowed to slacken, the guns were served, says the governor, "with the deliberate coolness and precision of school practice, but the exertions of the men were infinitely superior." *

The furnaces for heating the shot were found to be too few, and huge fires were kindled in convenient corners of the streets.

An immense amount of ammunition was expended on both sides; 320 of the enemy's cannon were in play throughout the day, and to these were opposed only 96 guns from the garrison. Upwards of 8000 shot and 716 barrels of gunpowder were fired away by the garrison.

When the unparalleled force of the bombardment is considered, the casualties among the troops were remarkably few, one officer, two sergeants, and 13 men only were killed, and five officers and 63 men

* Elliott's despatch.

wounded. The enemy's losses, on the contrary, were very great; on the floating batteries alone, 1473 men were either killed, wounded, or missing.*

By the evening of the 14th the Bay was cleared of the shattered wrecks, and not a vestige of the formidable armament, which yesterday had been the hope and pride of Spain, remained.

The contest was at an end, and the united strength of two ambitious and powerful nations had been humbled by a straitened garrison of 6000 effective men. With the destruction of the floating batteries, the siege was virtually concluded.†

* Copy of an official return in Spanish. Egerton MSS.

† An account of this attack and the causes of its failure are given by the Chevalier d'Arçon himself, in his "Memoire pour servir a l'Histoire du Siege de Gibraltar, par l'auteur des batteries flottantes, 1783."

Speaking of the destruction of the batteries, he says,—

"The Talla Piedra was moored at the same time with the Pastora, before ten; the fire of the two batteries began immediately; that of the enemy, at first extremely brisk and constant, slackened towards noon, but was again continued without intermission till three o'clock. Among the number of red-hot balls which had been extinguished one alone alarmed us.

"Our firing began to slacken, the enemy profited by this intermission, re-commenced a still more heavy cannonade, and gained a decided superiority, which frustrated all our efforts to arrest the progress of the flames.

"Now our apprehensions increased, and an order too precipitately given to wet the powder occasioned a total cessation of our cannonade.

"The only resource remaining was the retreat of the floating batteries (Talla Piedra and Pastora).

In Spain the news was received with consternation and despair.

The thousands who on the preceding day crowded upon the neighbouring hills, and with eager anxiety awaited the anticipated victory, returned to their homes disappointed and chagrined. They had been taught to believe that the attack would be crushing and invincible ; that the batteries were indestructible ;

“The progress of the conflagration was extremely inconsiderable. It was the same ball from which the smoke proceeded, at first from the outside, and afterwards through the interior joints. But this hidden fire, which could easily have been suppressed by removing to a distance from the constant fire of the garrison, continued in a smoking state for six hours, and did not become ungovernable till after midnight. The other batteries were yet entire, yet it was determined to involve them in the same fate as the Talla Piedra. They were all abandoned, and, as if the red-hot shot of the enemy did not do sufficient execution, the resolution was taken to set our own vessels on fire.

“This order being badly executed, several were absolutely set on fire before the crew had evacuated them, and four were entire at six in the morning, after having equally resisted the attempts to burn them and the red-hot shots of the enemy.

* * * * * At seven in the evening, Admiral Guichen offered the assistance of the French squadron towards preserving the batteries, and although affairs were in no very favourable situation, it was answered that all was well, and no assistance was required.

“The engineer continued on board the Talla Piedra till after midnight, when he repaired to request succour from the admiral. By him he was sent to the general, who had settled the whole plan with the commander of the floating batteries. On his arrival at head-quarters the general was absent, but he was informed of the order given to set the whole on fire.”

that the fortress must be annihilated by their overwhelming fire; but instead of these disasters they had seen every ship destroyed or sunk, with all their guns, and 2000 men of their crews either killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. In the first moment of consternation the inventor of those vast machines, upon the success of which the whole attack depended, could not restrain his poignant grief, and was led into confessions which he afterwards regretted. Writing to the French Ambassador, Montmorin, he said, "I have burnt the temple of Ephesus; everything is lost, and through my fault. What comforts me under my misfortune is that the honour of the two kings remains untarnished."

At Madrid the news of the disaster was received with dismay; and the king, who was at the palace of Ildefonso, listened to the intelligence in mute despair. The recovery of Gibraltar had been his unswerving aim, and with this repulse almost his last hope was extinguished. In Paris the intelligence was no less unexpected and unwelcome; so certain indeed had the fall of the fortress been considered that a drama illustrative of the destruction of Gibraltar by the floating batteries was acted nightly to applauding thousands.*

It has been before remarked that the Duc de Crillon never held that blindly confident opinion of the inventions of D'Arçon which had turned the

* Barrow's Life of Lord Howe, p.157.

heads of the two Bourbon courts. He had always urged the necessity of a complete attack by sea, in which the whole fleet should engage, and of which the floating batteries would form an integral part. The French engineer ridiculed this idea, and affirmed that the ships would be destroyed before they could inflict any damage upon the walls.

The result of the attack showed how completely D'Arçon was mistaken. During the day the assistance of the combined fleet was urgently required, but when its co-operation might have turned the tide of victory, an adverse wind arose, and the vessels could not beat up within range of the Rock.

The fate of the much-vaunted inventions did not greatly surprise Crillon. On the day after their destruction he wrote a hurried note to General Eliott, in which his opinion of those machines is clearly expressed. He says,—

“Les armes sont journalières. On m'a donné de mauvaises machines pour combattre un Général contre lequel on ne peut en employer de trop bonnes. Je m'en suis servi parcequ'il faut obéire commandes, comme vous le savez mieux que personne. Ce qui et (sic) doit exister entre personnes comme nous sont les bons procès.”*

The distinguished part which Captain Curtis had taken in the defence of the fortress ever since he

* Mons. de Crillon à Mons. Eliott, au Camp de Buena Vista, Septembre 15, 1782. Egerton MSS. Brit. Museum.

had joined the command drew from General Elliott commendations no less merited than sincere. Writing to Lord Howe on the 15th of October, he says,—

“Unknown to Brigadier Curtis, I must entreat your Lordship to reflect upon the unspeakable assistance he has been in the defence of this place by his advice, and the lead he has taken in every hazardous enterprise. You know him well, my Lord, therefore such conduct on his part is no more than you expect; but let me beg of you not to leave him unrewarded for such signal services. You alone can influence His Majesty to consider such an officer for what he has, and what he will in future deserve wherever employed. If Gibraltar is of the value intimated to me from office, and to be presumed by the steps adventured to relieve it, Brigadier Curtis is the man to whom the King will be chiefly indebted for its security. Believe me, there is nothing affected in this declaration on my part.”

Again, when on his return to England he was created Lord Heathfield, he expressed his indignation that Curtis only received the honour of knighthood and a pension of £500 per annum. “It is a shame,” he said, “that I should be overloaded, and so scanty a pittance be the lot of him who bore the greatest share of the burthen.”* Such was the unaffected modesty of this great man!

* Barrow's Life of Lord Howe, p. 159.

When the confusion arising from their disastrous defeat had subsided in the enemy's camp, a heavy cannonade was again opened from their lines and advanced works. The firing generally commenced about five or six o'clock in the morning and continued till noon, then for two hours the batteries were silent, but again opened till seven o'clock in the evening, when the mortars took up the fire till daybreak. During the twenty-four hours 600 shells and about 1000 shots were thrown into the garrison.

Notwithstanding the ill success which had attended the combined attack, and the signal proof the enemy had received of the impregnable strength of the fortress, the Spaniards did not entirely despair of eventually reducing the place by famine, could the arrival of Lord Howe's fleet with the convoy be prevented.

In August the English Government, being aware of the vast preparations which had been making in Spain for the siege of Gibraltar, had collected a fleet of thirty-four sail of the line, six frigates, and three fire-ships, under command of Admiral Lord Howe, which was to convoy a flotilla of merchantmen with relief for the garrison.

By the 11th of September, the preparations were completed, and on that day Howe set sail from Spit-head with 183 sail, including the convoy, under the command of Vice-Admirals Barrington and Milbank,

Rear-Admirals Hood and Hughes, and Commodore Hotham.

Hampered by the difficulty of keeping the merchantmen together, and baffled by contrary winds and violent weather, Howe's passage was unusually slow and tedious.

The Spanish Government, having gained intelligence of the approach of this powerful force, instantly took measures to attack the expedition before it could arrive at its destination. For this purpose the combined fleets of Spain and France which lay in the harbour of Algeciras were re-inforced, and dispositions were made for intercepting the British ships on their passage through the Straits.

These arrangements had scarcely been completed when, on the evening of the 10th October, a fresh westerly wind sprung up in the Bay, and towards night gradually increased in violence till it blew a hurricane. Soon the enemy's vessels were in distress, many were dragging their anchors, and signal guns were fired for help in rapid succession. Throughout the night the fury of the storm did not abate, and daybreak disclosed the havoc among the squadrons at Algeciras; a ship of the line and a frigate were ashore at Orange Grove, a French liner had suffered great damage to her masts and rigging, and the "St Michael," of 72 guns, was discovered close in shore off the Orange Bastion in distress. She was immedi-

ately fired at, and after having lost four men she was run ashore on the line wall, and taken possession of by Captain Curtis. Her commander, Admiral Don Juan Moreno, and her crew of 650 men were landed as prisoners. These misfortunes materially affected the ulterior movements of the combined fleets. In the mean time Lord Howe had on the 8th of the month arrived off Cape St Vincent, and a frigate was sent on from thence to gain information from the Consul at Faro of the enemy's dispositions. Two days afterwards she returned with the intelligence that the combined fleets, consisting of nearly 50 sail, lay at anchor at Algeciras.

Upon the receipt of this news a council of war was held, and clear and stringent orders were afterwards issued for the guidance of the masters in charge of the merchantmen, that the convoy might be conducted safely into the harbour of Gibraltar. On the 11th, the fleet passed through the Straits in three divisions, the third and centre squadrons in line of battle a-head; the second squadron in reserve; the Victory led a-head of the third squadron.

By sunset the van had arrived off Europa Point, and before nightfall four of the transports had anchored under the guns of the fortress.

By an unpardonable inattention to the orders they had received, the masters of the other vessels failed to make the Bay, and were driven away to the eastward of the Rock. To the astonishment of Howe,

who had looked upon an engagement as inevitable, the Spaniards did not attempt to intercept the convoy.

During the two following days the British admiral was engaged in collecting the transports to the eastward, and preparing for action, in case the Spaniards should attack.

On the 13th the combined fleets, consisting of 44 ships of the line, five frigates, and 29 xebèques, cutters, and brigs, got under way and stood to the southward, with the apparent intention of bearing down upon Lord Howe's force. But though the Spanish admiral had the weather-gauge, and notwithstanding his fleet was greatly superior in numbers to the English, he contented himself with the execution of some harmless manœuvres, and permitted the whole of the transports to be conducted safely into Gibraltar under the very muzzles of his guns. The stores and provisions were immediately landed, and two regiments of infantry (25th and 29th) were disembarked under the superintendance of Lord Mulgrave.

Having accomplished his mission and relieved the fortress, Lord Howe prepared to return to England.

On the 19th of October, taking advantage of an easterly wind, he formed his fleet in order of battle, and sailed through the Straits. At this time the combined fleets were cruising a few miles north-east of Ceuta, and in view of Howe's squadron, of which they had the weather-gauge.

The two fleets remained near each other during

the night, and on the following morning the wind having come round to the northward, the Spaniards still held the advantage, and could have closed for action at any moment. It was Lord Howe's desire, if possible, to avoid an engagement in the narrow and dangerous waters of the Straits, and to entice the enemy to accept battle in the open sea; with this object he continued on his course to the westward.

At sunset on the 20th, the combined fleets, greatly superior to the English in force and numbers, came up with the rear division, under Admiral Barrington, and a partial action commenced, but the enemy remained at such a respectful distance, keeping as near as they could haul to the wind, that the firing was comparatively harmless on both sides. The two Admirals de Guichen and Cordova led the enemy's van, and it was apparently their intention to cut off and destroy the rear division of the British fleet, but though they had the superiority in force and the advantage of the wind, they could not be induced to close, and soon after midnight the firing ceased. The next morning the two fleets were still in sight, but as the Spaniards evinced no disposition to renew the engagement, Howe, whose orders did not permit him to provoke the enemy, continued on his homeward voyage.

The successful passage of the British fleet through the Straits, in the face of the combined forces, was regarded in Madrid as a glorious victory for the

Spanish arms. The despatches of Don Louis de Cordova described the partial engagement as a complete rout, and Howe was made to flee with all press of sail from his brave pursuers.

Seizing upon this exaggerated intelligence as a counterpoise to the recent disastrous news from Gibraltar, the government extolled the valour of the navy, and spread ludicrously bombastic accounts of the "glorious victory" throughout the country. Pamphlets descriptive of the engagement were published and disseminated, in which the casualties of the English were put down in numbers imposingly enormous.*

Gibraltar having thus been again successfully relieved, the Spanish government relinquished all hope of securing its possession by force of arms; but the king still fondly retained some expectation of succeeding by negotiation. In order to conceal the actual hopelessness of the enterprise, and "to give a reasonable colour to the formal prosecution of the siege," † private instructions were sent to Crillon to continue the offensive. But the Spanish commander was in truth no less disheartened than the

* Egerton MSS.

Notwithstanding these official misrepresentations the people well understood the real state of the case, and the following lines became a popular chant in Spain,

"Entre OO. EE. NN. y SS.

Se escaparon los Ingleses."

† Florida Blanca.

ministers of his government, and with the exception of daily attacks by gun and mortar boats, seconded by a warm fire from the isthmus, active operations completely ceased.

On the 2nd of February, 1783, the news of the signature of the preliminaries of a general Peace reached the garrison by a flag of truce, and on the 12th of March the gates of the fortress, which had been closed for nearly four years, were once more thrown open.

The announcement of the peace was received with general joy throughout the garrison; and this feeling was most fully reciprocated by the disheartened and weary enemy. The two chiefs, who, since they had been opposed to each other as antagonists in a struggle which riveted the attention of all Europe, had learnt to regret that they were foes, now met with the cordial embrace of friendship, and no opportunity was lost which could tend to obliterate the remembrances of former rivalry. Friendly meetings were interchanged between them, and all memory of previous antagonism was buried in oblivion.

Being introduced to the officers of the Royal Artillery, through whose courage and ability his brightest hopes of victory had been destroyed, Crillon met them with praises of their noble conduct, and remarked that "he would rather see them there as friends than on their batteries as enemies, where," he added, "they never spared him."

One day, when inspecting the immense lines of fortification on the northern face of the Rock, all of which had been constructed during the progress of the siege, lost in astonishment at the magnitude of the works, he exclaimed, "This is indeed worthy of the Romans!"

Early in April, the Spanish camp having commenced to break up, and the lines on the isthmus having been dismantled, the Duc de Crillon handed over his command to the Marquis de Saya, and returned to Madrid.

Thus after a duration of three years, seven months, and twelve days, ended this memorable siege; a siege which, in the words of Lord North, "was one of those astonishing instances of British valour, discipline, military skill, and humanity, that no age or country could produce an example of." At length the devoted garrison was relieved from a situation of suffering, peril, and privation almost unparalleled in the annals of war.

Resolved to accomplish the subjection of the fortress and to regain possession of the Rock, Spain had brought into the field the most stupendous armament that the whole resources of the nation could produce; but finding that even these mighty efforts were insufficient to overpower the stubborn courage of the garrison, or to make any visible effect upon the impregnable defences of the place, she called in the aid of a sister nation, and organized a combined attack of such prodigious

magnitude, that its success could scarcely admit of doubt. But the skill, energy, and patience of one brave man, seconded by the unflinching gallantry of those he led, defeated even this terrible assault, and utterly destroyed the ingenious and formidable inventions which were to have annihilated every stone of the fortress.

The losses of the garrison from all causes during the siege were far less than might have been expected, when it is remembered that the troops were twice on the verge of famine, and that for one year and nine months the enemy's bombardment continued without cessation.

333 were killed or died of wounds, 319 discharged, 536 (exclusive of those who died of scurvy) were carried off by sickness, and 43 deserted.

For his services during this protracted and remarkable defence General Elliott was at first rewarded with a pension of £1500 per annum, the Order of the Bath, and the thanks of both Houses of Parliament.

The ceremony of the investiture took place on the 23rd of April, 1783, upon the King's Bastion, the post which the governor had occupied on the day of the final bombardment. The ceremonial was, by order of His Majesty the King, conducted with all the magnificence the garrison could afford; detachments from every regiment were drawn up in front of the dais upon which the knight elect was seated, the military commissioner, Lieut.-General Boyd, delivered

a complimentary speech, and a salute of 160 cannon thundered from the walls. On the same day the general addressed the troops, and communicated to them the thanks of the King and Parliament for their gallant conduct throughout the siege. "No army," he said, "has ever been rewarded by higher national honours, and it is well known how great, universal, and spontaneous were the rejoicings throughout the kingdom upon the news of your success. These must not only give you pleasure, but afford matter of triumph to your dearest friends and latest posterity. . . . I most warmly congratulate you on these united and brilliant testimonies of approbation, amidst such numerous, such exalted tokens of applause; and forgive me, faithful companions, if I humbly crave your acceptance of my grateful acknowledgments. I only presume to ask this favour as having been a constant witness of your cheerful submission to the greatest hardships, your matchless spirit and exertions, and, on all occasions, your heroic contempt of every danger."

In England the rewards conferred upon General Elliott were not generally considered to be in proportion to his services, and the intentions of the government had no sooner been made public than a motion was brought forward in the House of Commons by Lord Maitland (Feb. 14th, 1783), praying that a signal mark of honour might be conferred upon the defender of Gibraltar. "He had waited," he said, "till all

that ministers intended to do had been done, and he now considered it his duty and that of Parliament to interfere and advise the Crown to bestow a mark of favour on the General more in proportion to his merits." The motion was seconded by Lord Parker, who compared the defence of Gibraltar with other services, and while admitting that the Order of the Bath was an honourable distinction, averred that it had been given to so many undeserving officers that he believed General Elliott would decline so meagre a reward, and return it with contempt.

Mr Townshend and Lord Beauchamp opposed the motion on public grounds, and it was eventually lost by a majority of 92 to 18. Four years afterwards tardy justice was done to this great soldier, and he was raised to the peerage, with the title of Baron Heathfield of Gibraltar.

CHAPTER XVIII.

DURING the progress of the siege of Gibraltar, negotiations for a general Peace had been opened by the English Ministry under Lord Rockingham. The seat of this at first secret negotiation was Paris, and the agent employed, Mr Thomas Grenville, the personal ally of Fox. At the very opening, however, of the overtures for a pacification, a difficulty occurred with Spain, which was also shared by the sister Bourbon Court,—the restoration of Gibraltar was once more insisted on. Before the question could be debated, Lord Rockingham died, Lord Shelbourne became the head of the new Ministry, and Mr Fitzherbert replaced Mr Grenville in Paris.

The new diplomatist encountered no less difficulty than his predecessor in his pacific mission; and his embarrassment was aggravated by the artifices of the French minister, the Count de Vergennes, who, conscious that Gibraltar would at any time be the principal obstacle in the way of an amicable arrangement between England and Spain, was not desirous

to remove a source of irritation which constantly afforded an excuse for the exercise of French influence over Spanish counsels.

In the war which was then raging, King Charles had risked all the resources of the nation with the object of recovering the greater part of those possessions of which his country had been deprived; and he was unwilling to accede to any pacific proposals which did not comprise the restoration of those territories.

The cession of Gibraltar, then hotly besieged, was absolutely insisted upon, while Oran, a third-rate port on the African coast of the Mediterranean, was offered as an equivalent. So certain were the Spaniards of a successful termination to the siege, that the Count D'Aranda, who was conducting the negotiation with Mr Fitzherbert on the part of Spain, had the effrontery to affirm that if England did not choose to accept the terms offered to her, the king would never close the war until Gibraltar had surrendered.

“Oran and its port,” he repeatedly observed, “are more than an equivalent, and therefore ought to be accepted with gratitude. If England desires peace; this is the only means of procuring it, since the King my master, from personal as well as political motives; is fully determined never to put a period to the present war till he shall have acquired Gibraltar; either by arms or negotiation.”

This declaration met with the support of the

French Minister; and Dr Franklin, who was then in Paris as the accredited agent of the American Government, asserted that Portsmouth could be as justly claimed by Spain as Gibraltar by England.

Whilst these diplomatic difficulties arrested the progress of the conference, intelligence of the total destruction of the floating batteries and the failure of the grand attack upon the fortress reached Paris.

This disastrous news exercised a very great influence upon the tone of the Spanish minister's demands, but although the capture of Gibraltar was now more than ever doubtful, its cession for an equivalent was still insisted upon by Spain as the basis of a peace.

In the hope of more directly influencing the English Government, an envoy was sent to London from Paris to communicate personally with Lord Shelbourne, and to offer Porto Rico and Oran in return for the restoration of the Rock. That the minister was in favour of accepting this proposal there can be no doubt; and in consenting to surrender Gibraltar upon such terms, he was but adopting the views of Chatham, Townshend, and Stanhope. His colleagues, however, were divided in their opinion on this important question, and the Duke of Grafton, in particular, vehemently opposed the cession on any other terms than the exchange of a complete equivalent.

At an interview with Lord Shelbourne (November

25th, 1782) on the subject of a pacific settlement with Spain and France, he frankly expressed his opinion of the value of Gibraltar, in opposition to the views of his colleague.

“On finding this difference in our sentiments,” he tells us,* “I said that I was sorry to hear this from him, on which Lord Shelbourne observed that I never had wished that the cession of that place (Gibraltar) should stand in the way of a peace, provided an equivalent was found, such as Porto Rico. I replied, Understand me right, I shall always part with Gibraltar with the greatest reluctance, though I am still free to acknowledge that I think that a proper peace ought not to hang on this one point, in case a fair equivalent offered; but I said that I did not know sufficiently the value and circumstances of the island,—to say that I considered Porto Rico to be such an equivalent as would satisfy me. To this his Lordship replied, that I might be assured that, on the fullest inquiry, I should find, as he had, that the value would exceed my expectations.”

On the 3rd of December, Lord Shelbourne again sent for the Duke of Grafton, and handed to him the heads of the negotiation as proposed by Spain; and the next morning another message brought the Duke to the minister's house.

“I went to him,” says the Duke, “as soon as I

* Duke of Grafton's MS. Memoirs. Vide Lord Mahon's Hist. of England, vol. vii. Appendix.

had breakfasted, with a firm resolution to maintain my ground. He, in the first place, inquired of me where I had taken up the notion that a barren, uninhabited island was equal to or more valuable than West Florida, and afterwards whether I still continued in the same opinion. My answer was that I was clear, from the best information on the subject, that the greatest advantage, both for trade and power, might be derived from Trinidad; and that I professed an indignation that Spain should succeed in having her great object, Gibraltar, conceded to her, without giving up Trinidad, to be in addition to any cession she had proposed to us." Finally, the duke absolutely declined to sign the treaty in the shape originally proposed, and Lord Shelbourne left him, with the remark that however unpleasant it might be to differ with him, yet he must bear it, for he was resolved to stand by the King.

On the 5th of December, 1782, Parliament met, and in the speech from the throne allusion was made to the gallant defence of Gibraltar.

On the same day, in the Commons, Mr Yorke moved the address to the king, and in the course of his speech referred to the glorious termination of the siege. He announced that a treaty had been opened with the belligerent powers, and that so considerable a progress had been made, that a general pacification might shortly be expected. Mr Bankes rose to second the motion; and, after some preliminary remarks



respecting the defence of Gibraltar, thus proceeded amid the silence of the House,—“ A peace is the only thing that can save us ; and in making this, great sacrifices must be made, for national honour is national faith and credit, and our debts are, at all events, to be discharged.

“ Our ambition is not to stand in the way of a peace. We are not to hesitate about giving up this place or that place merely because it has a name, or has distinguished itself in a peculiar manner. If, in making a peace, sacrifices are necessary, sacrifices must be made. If there is any post which is kept as a post of honour more than a post of utility ; if there is any place which we have kept as a mark of superiority more than as a possession of advantage, a place which costs us more in keeping than it is worth ; if there is a place which in particular hurts the pride of the enemy, which is the object of their ambition and desire ; that which would instigate them to go to war, and provoke them to continue in it,—surely, that of all others is the place which, in such circumstances as the present, ought to be ceded.”

The hint thus thrown out was plain and intelligible, and was intended to sound the feelings of the House. Mr Fox instantly rose to reply ; with all the force of his eloquence he vehemently protested against the surrender of the greatest fortress in the world. He expressed his astonishment at the alarming hint which had been dropped by Mr Bankes, and earnestly trust-

ed that the honourable member spoke from speculation, not from authority. The possession of Gibraltar was invaluable to England, and even the American Colonies might have been saved had a fleet been stationed at Gibraltar to intercept the passage of d'Estaing.

“A sagacious ministry,” he said, “would always employ Gibraltar in dividing France from France, Spain from Spain, and the one nation from the other The fortress of Gibraltar was to be reckoned amongst the most valuable possessions of England. It was that which gave us respect in the eyes of nations; it manifested our superiority, and gave us the means of obliging them by protection. Give up to Spain the fortress of Gibraltar, and the Mediterranean becomes to them a pool, a pond in which they can navigate at pleasure, and act without control or check.

“Deprive yourselves of this station, and the States of Europe who border on the Mediterranean will no longer look to you for the free navigation of that sea; and having it no longer in your power to be useful, you cannot expect alliances.

“The hon. gentleman (Mr Bankes) talks of the cession of this important fortress on a principle the most delusive. . . . Ambition is a vice which grows, like avarice, from what it feeds on, and he must be strangely ignorant of the ambition, avarice, and lust of human governments, who thinks that the possession of Gibraltar, because it is the immediate object of

the Court of Spain, would prevent them from forming new desires which they would endeavour to gratify by new wars."

Lord North also condemned the policy of surrendering Gibraltar; and called the attention of ministers to the fact that the fortress had now been proved to be invulnerable, and where, he asked, could an equivalent be found?

He was followed by Mr Burke, who declared that "the fortress of Gibraltar was invaluable, because impregnable. No other post which the Spaniards could give us had that recommendation; and as a post of war, a post of power, a post of commerce, and a post which made us valuable to our friends and dreadful to our enemies; that which gave us the command in the district of ocean where it lay, that which was the incontestable evidence of our pre-eminence and power; that of all other places was what we ought with the most religious determination to maintain."*

Nor was the feeling of reluctance to part with a possession so dearly won confined to the members of the House; throughout the country the public voice was opposed to such a sacrifice, and the Ministry quickly perceived that the surrender of Gibraltar would be followed by their expulsion from power.

The proposal was consequently abandoned, and the negotiation was cut short by a despatch, wrung from the unwilling hand of Lord Shelbourne, by

* Parliamentary History.

which the Catholic King was informed that *no conditions whatsoever* would induce the British nation to cede the fortress to the Crown of Spain.

At the moment this despatch reached the king he was at Aranjuez (Dec. 1782), and great was his indignation when he learnt that his hopes were again blasted. In the first moment of anger he resolved to prosecute the war with still greater vigour. D'Estaing was sent for to Madrid to discuss a plan of operations, and an expedition of gigantic proportions was projected against Jamaica.*

Preparations for this vast armament had actually been commenced, when the British Government again proposed preliminary articles of peace; the cession of Minorca, an island of great value to Spain, was offered in lieu of Gibraltar, and other terms equally advantageous were tendered. At length, influenced by the French Court, the Catholic King consented to accede to these conditions, and on the 30th January, 1783, the preliminaries were signed. This treaty was alike advantageous to Spain and dishonourable to England. "Never," says Florida Blanca, "has such a successful treaty been concluded for two centuries past."

Minorca, next to Gibraltar the darling object of the king's ambition, was restored, the two Floridas were given up, and the Gulf of Mexico secured from the interference of foreign power. "From the

* Florida Blanca's Representations. Article 10.

beginning of the war," the Spanish Minister tells us, "these acquisitions and that of Gibraltar were the objects principally in view."

The promulgation of these preliminaries was followed by the instant downfall of the British Ministry, and the accession of Fox and Lord North to power as the leaders of the coalition. This change of administration defeated for the time every hope that Spain retained of recovering Gibraltar, as Fox, who had always steadfastly opposed the cession, immediately declared that the surrender of the fortress should never be allowed to become the subject of discussion.

This announcement gave the greatest offence to King Charles and his minister, Florida Blanca, both of whom, hoping against hope, had cherished a vain belief that the place would have been restored before the conclusion of the definitive treaty.

The speedy disruption of the coalition ministry and the formation of another administration under Pitt, who it was generally believed coincided in the policy of his former colleague, Lord Shelbourne, once more raised a feeble expectation at Madrid, and the restoration of Gibraltar was again demanded. The arrangement of the limits of the British possessions in Honduras afforded an opportunity for the introduction of fresh proposals regarding the exchange of the rock-fortress. Various advantages were offered, and the question of the settlement of the Honduras territory was purposely kept open with vexatious delays.

It was craftily represented that Spain was loth to grant any commercial favours to England in those seas, but it was added, "the prospect of Gibraltar may have a mighty effect on both the king and people." *

Discussing this subject, Florida Blanca on one occasion remarked,—

"I consider Gibraltar as a possession which, though overrated as to its solid importance and value, is a perpetual thorn in the side of Spain, and a great obstacle to the establishment of a complete cordiality. I have turned the subject long in my mind, and can see many ample equivalents in the eye of national wisdom; but there are national prejudices in England which supersede all other reasonings."

At length, baffled at every point, he acknowledged the defeat of the darling project for which he had toiled and plotted throughout his long administration, and with mortified pride exclaimed,—

"No British ministry of the present age will have the courage to look the question fairly in the face, and I will think no more of it."

Such was the termination of this the last negotiation in which Spain engaged for the recovery of a possession she loved so well. For nearly a century she had exhausted all her efforts of diplomacy; had lavished untold treasure; had sacrificed whole armies, in a cause which she had ever regarded as sacred to

* Florida Blanca.

her honour. But now she felt that all was lost, her armies were repulsed, her resources dissipated, her diplomatists baffled. The victory still remained with her enemy, and Gibraltar was sullenly relinquished, we may hope for ever, to the Crown of England.



O'HARA'S TOWN HEIGHT & CLIFF OF WIND MILLHILL .

CHAPTER XIX.

AFTER the failure of the negotiation narrated in the previous chapter, Spain seems to have abandoned her hopes of recovering Gibraltar. The fortress was permitted to remain in the peaceful possession of the English, and the question of its surrender was never afterwards agitated.

The outbreak of the French Revolution, in 1789, was followed in a few years by a declaration of war between England and France, and a fleet under Lord Hood was sent into the Mediterranean. In the first years of this campaign England and Spain acted in concert.

General O'Hara, then governor of Gibraltar, was sent with some regiments of the garrison to reinforce the allied troops at the siege of Toulon. Here the English and the Spaniards fought side by side till the evacuation of the place, an event which was hastened by the rashness of the British commander. But this alliance, which followed so closely upon a prolonged and bitter contest, wherein disappointment and

defeat had aroused the fiery animosity of every Spaniard, could not be otherwise than fragile and illusory.

In 1796 it was snapped asunder, and an offensive and defensive treaty against England was concluded between France and Spain, at the Palace of St Ildefonso.

As it was not unlikely that King Charles would once more attempt, under the then favourable circumstances, to gain by force of arms the one grand object of his life's ambition, the British Government took the precaution of supplying and reinforcing Gibraltar.

A convoy was sent from Portsmouth in charge of Commodore Nelson. Whilst doubling Cape St Vincent, a Spanish fleet of 27 sail of the line was descried in the offing. Nelson immediately communicated the intelligence to Admiral Jervis, who was cruising off the cape with 15 first-rates.

On the 14th of February, the two fleets fell in with each other, and an action was fought, which resulted in the total defeat of the Spanish squadron.

In the spring of 1800, rumours of an intended attack upon Gibraltar had gained ground, and it was affirmed that 50,000 French troops were to take part in the enterprise.

At this time the waters of the Straits and the Bay of Cadiz were watched by a small squadron (under command of Sir James Saumarez, Bart.), consisting of

			Guns.
The Cæsar	80
„ Audacious	74
„ Hannibal	74
„ Spencer	74
„ Le Pompée	80
„ Superb	74
„ Venerable	74
„ Thames Frigate.			

On Saturday the 4th of July, three French ships of the line and one frigate came round from Toulon on their way to Cadiz, and anchored in the Bay of Algeciras. The next day they formed in line of battle under the guns of the fortress, as if expecting attack from an enemy. The harbour was strongly protected both naturally and artificially, heavy batteries raked all approaches to the Bay, and dangerous sunken rocks, known only to experienced pilots, guarded the entrance to the anchorage. On the morning of the 6th, signal was made from the Rock that a British squadron of five ships under Admiral Saumarez was approaching the Bay. The squadron was led by the "Venerable," Captain Hood.

When this ship had rounded Cabrita Point and was making the Bay, the French squadron was discovered at anchor under the walls of Algeciras. Signal was instantly made to attack, and the squadron bore down within half cannon-shot of the French men-of-war. At half-past eight, a.m., the action began by

all the batteries and ships of the enemy opening a tremendous fire upon the English; the latter replied with great energy and rapidity, compelling the French vessels to haul in shore close under the guns of the forts. After two hours' constant cannonade, the *Cæsar* and *Pompée* were obliged to cut cables and retreat, disabled by the galling fire from the land batteries. The *Hannibal*, however, with the rest of the squadron, continued to fight, though the chance of success against such odds was small.

At length, about twelve o'clock, observing that the French admiral was in difficulties, Captain Ferris, of the *Hannibal*, determined to close with him, notwithstanding the danger of the channel and the overwhelming fire from the walls. The manœuvre was executed with a skill and courage that astonished the enemy, and a few moments would have brought the ships in contact, when, unfortunately, the *Hannibal* grounded on a reef. Being now exposed to a concentrated cannonade from all the batteries, Captain Ferris was compelled to strike, after having lost 131 of his crew. After this misfortune the squadron discontinued the action, and retired across the Bay to Gibraltar to refit.

Having taken possession of the *Hannibal*, the enemy, instead of making the usual signal of a capture by hoisting the French flag over the English ensign, merely reversed the latter, which being understood at Gibraltar as a sign of distress, four boats put off

to the assistance of the ship, and upon going alongside were taken by the enemy.

Though this smart and gallant action exhibited in no small degree the courage and temerity of the British seamen, yet it may be doubted whether Sir James Saumarez was prudent in attacking even an inferior force under such formidable batteries and in such a dangerous harbour.

The result was a disaster for which a victory alone could have compensated. Every ship of the squadron was severely damaged, and 361 officers and men were killed or wounded.

The enemy also suffered considerably; two vessels lost their captains, five Spanish gun-boats were sunk, and their casualties were published at 490 men.*

On the 8th, the three French line-of-battle ships were reinforced by a squadron of five Spanish ships of the line under command of Don Joaquin de Moreno, a French ship of 74 guns, three frigates, and a number of gun-boats.

At noon on the 12th, the whole force was observed to be under way and making for the westward. By evening the ships were rounding the point at Cabrita.

Admiral Saumarez, who during the past week had been working hard to repair his damaged ships, immediately made signals to chase, and, confiding in the zeal and courage of his officers and men, determined

* French, Spanish, and English accounts. Vide "Gibraltar Chronicle," July, 1801.

to obstruct the passage of the enemy to Cadiz. It was not until eight o'clock in the evening that the squadron was ready to sail, and even then the "Pompée" had to be left behind, being still without her masts. The night was dark and stormy. By half-past eight o'clock the ships* were clear of the Bay and following in the wake of the enemy's squadron.

At nine o'clock the admiral hailed the "Superb," 74, and directed Captain Keates to keep between the enemy and the Spanish shore, and to bring the sternmost ships to action. By eleven the "Superb," which was a fast sailer, came up with two Spanish three-deckers, the "Real Carlos" and "Hermenegildo." When within three cables length she opened fire and poured into both ships a succession of broadsides. In fifteen minutes the "Real Carlos" was in flames, and Captain Keates, having ceased firing upon her, took the "Superb" forward and engaged the "San Antonio," 74 guns, which struck after a short defence. In the mean while the two Spanish three-deckers, having mistaken each other for enemies, continued to fight fiercely, until the "Hermenegildo," thinking to sink her adversary, ran alongside; but at that very moment the "Real Carlos" blew up with a tremendous explosion, and the two vessels, with their crews of 2400 men, were hurled to destruction.

* "Cæsar," "Spencer," "Venerable," "Superb," "Audacious," "Thames," and "Calpe" sloop.

Only 40 souls were saved from this terrible catastrophe.

Had the Spaniards been actuated by the feelings of humanity which led the captain of the "Superb" to cease firing upon the "Real Carlos" when she appeared in flames, this disaster, which cost the nation more lives than the battle of Trafalgar, would have been averted; but the commander of the "Hermengildo" was no sooner aware of the calamity on board what he imagined to be an enemy's vessel, than he sought to aggravate the misfortune by a still closer cannonade.

Immediately the two three-deckers had blown up, the rest of the enemy's squadron, which had become dispersed by the tempestuous weather, made all sail for the westward, and when morning dawned only one French ship was in sight off the shoals of Conil. The "Venerable," then a-head of the English squadron, managed with some difficulty, being baffled by a failing breeze, to bring her to action, and she must inevitably have struck had not an unlucky shot carried away the mainmast of the "Venerable" at the crisis of the fight. The action was fought so close in shore that the mast had scarcely gone by the board when the ship ran a-ground, and the fore and mizen masts had to be cut away, leaving her a total wreck; in this condition she was towed off by the "Thames" frigate, and carried safely into Gibraltar.

For his brilliant services in this engagement, when

with an inferior force he destroyed two of the enemy's vessels and captured another, under circumstances of great difficulty, Admiral Saumarez received the Order of the Bath. The ceremony of investiture took place at Gibraltar, on the 16th November, 1801.

On the 24th of March, 1802, His Royal Highness the Duke of Kent was appointed Governor of Gibraltar, and on the 10th of May he arrived with his suite and took up his command. On the 17th, H. R. H. the Duke of Sussex landed from the "Mermaid" frigate, and joined his royal brother.

Almost the first public duty which the governor was called upon to perform was to conduct the civil business of the Session as presiding judge. On that occasion three Spaniards were indicted for feloniously stealing goods to the value of £500 from the dwelling-place of one James Hepper. The case having been clearly proved, a verdict of guilty was returned, and the duke sentenced the culprits to be hanged.

By a system as pernicious as it was mistaken, the salary of the governors of Gibraltar had for many years been principally defrayed by the income derived from wine-house licences. General O'Hara was at one time in receipt of £7000 per annum from this source alone.

To keep up this artificial revenue, and to ease the imperial treasury, every encouragement was given to the establishment of public-houses and the sale of wines and spirituous liquors. The consequence of

this mischievous policy in a crowded and confined garrison might easily have been foreseen,—the troops were disorganized with shameless intoxication, riot and debauchery reigned unchecked, and discipline was almost at an end.

The Duke of Kent, himself a strict and conscientious soldier, regarded the prevailing evil with alarm, and sought to apply a remedy by striking at the root of the disorder. Forgetful of his own selfish interests, he endeavoured to suppress the unbridled drunkenness: the number of canteens and spirit shops were reduced, while stringent and judicious regulations were put in force for the management of licensed establishments.

These admirable instructions form the basis of the canteen regulations of the army at the present day.

Unfortunately these efforts for reform were not supported by the authorities either in the garrison or at home. The troops, indignant at the slightest interference with the habits of licentiousness, into which they had been silently permitted to lapse, openly defied the orders of the governor, who, unsupported either by his second in command or the officer under him, found himself threatened with a general mutiny. An outbreak, indeed, did take place, and reports from the disaffected having reached home, the duke was sacrificed to party feeling, and recalled within a year after his appointment. The injustice of

this measure was aggravated by the conduct of the government, who ever afterwards refused to allow any investigation to be made into the circumstances which led to his removal.

In 1804, Gibraltar was visited by the first of those terrible epidemics * which afterwards at intervals swept the Rock. A fever of a most virulent type, and generally admitted to have been yellow fever, broke out in the month of August, and in a few weeks 5733 persons out of a population of 15,000 died of the disease. Subsequently on three different occasions the epidemic returned with violence, and at length in 1828 a commission was appointed to inquire into the origin and diagnosis of the disease.†

In 1805, the rising power of Napoleon and the rapid encroachments his victorious arms had made in Europe, excited general alarm; every state of the continent was threatened, but it was against England that the designs of the Emperor were chiefly directed. Since the declaration of war in 1803 between France and England, Nelson had been in command of the Mediterranean fleet, and in the following year had gone in search of the combined squadrons of France and Spain, from Cadiz to the West Indies, without being fortunate enough to come up with them.

* A destructive fever decimated the population in 1649. From a description of its symptoms it is believed by some to have been the yellow fever.

† This subject is referred to more fully, *post*.

In September, 1805, Collingwood,* who was watching the waters about Cadiz, sent intelligence to Nelson, who had just returned home from his unsuccessful cruise, acquainting him that the combined

* It would appear that in August, 1805, suspicions were entertained that the Spaniards meditated an attack upon Gibraltar; for on the 15th of that month, we find Admiral Collingwood writing to General Fox at Gibraltar, on the subject.

“Dreadnought,
“Off Cadiz, August 15th, 1805.

“I have received the honour of your letter, informing me of the great increase in the number of Spanish troops at the Camp of St Roque, with other circumstances, which cause a well-grounded suspicion that active hostility against the garrison of Gibraltar is in the contemplation of the enemy.

“I do not think it improbable that, urged by the French Government, the Spanish Court may be induced to order an attack, in which event every assistance which can be given by the ships that can be spared from the blockade shall be ready, and if, Sir, you will suggest any particular mode of employment for them as best tending to defeat the purpose of the enemy, I will be exceedingly happy to meet your wishes.

“The Thunder-Bomb is, I understand, now at Gibraltar, and I will write to Rear-Admiral Knight to keep her there while the prospect of attack appears near.

“For some days past the fishing-boats have not come out of Cadiz, as usual; on the receipt of your letter I thought it probable they might be fitting out as gun-boats, for which they are very well calculated, but from the best intelligence I can get, I learn it is the men only that are impressed to fit out the ships of war, to do which an extraordinary exertion is making, that they may be ready to join the Carthage ships expected here the first fresh easterly wind.”—Original in Military Secretary's Office, Gibraltar.

fleets of 35 sail of the line, under Admiral Villeneuve, had put into that port. Though impaired in health, the admiral instantly volunteered to join Collingwood's force, and on the 15th September he set sail on board the *Victory*, accompanied by the *Ajax*, *Thunderer*, and *Euryalus*. In 14 days he reached the fleet, which was then cruising between Cadiz and Cape St Mary's. Having made every disposition and arrangement in case of attack, he anxiously awaited the moment when the combined forces should come out of port and engage. But his enemy was in no haste to risk an action; for three weeks the ships remained at anchor in the harbour, and it is probable that Villeneuve would not have put to sea when he did, but for the taunts of the Spanish Government and the avowed sarcasm and displeasure of Napoleon at his alleged timidity. The *Moniteur* was permitted to charge him openly with incapacity, and his removal was suggested. "The French navy," said that paper, "only wants a man of undaunted spirit, of a cool and daring courage; this man will be found some day or other, and then people shall see what our seamen can do."

In the middle of October, Villeneuve heard that another officer was absolutely on his way to supersede him. Thus situated, he resolved to venture to sea, notwithstanding the remonstrance of the Spanish admiral, who foresaw the disastrous consequences which must ensue.

Since he had been cruising off the port of Cadiz, Nelson had been in constant communication with Gibraltar. It was to that harbour that he looked for refuge or relief after the approaching action, and it was there that he intended to refit his shattered ships.

On the 17th of October, four days before his death, he wrote the following letter to General Fox, who at that time commanded in the fortress:—

“ Victory.

“ October 17th, 1805.

“ MY DEAR GENERAL,

“ Lord Robert Fitzgerald landed safely at Lagos on the 13th (having had a narrow escape from paying a visit to his brother ambassador, Lord Elgin) to his very great joy; but I think from Mr Lloyd, of Diligents reports, that Sir Richard Strachan had got sight of the Rochfort squadron. I wish he was stronger, but he will certainly destroy their cruise, Cæsar, Namur, Hero, Courageaux, Bellona, frigate Indefatigable; French squadron, one first-rate, four or five two-decked ships, and three or four frigates, but as they have manned several prizes I will hope for the best success. I am sure that Sir Richard Strachan will do all that man can.*

* On the 2nd November, Sir Richard Strachan, while cruising off Ferrol, fell in with four French line-of-battle ships which had escaped from the battle of Trafalgar. After a warm

“Our friends at Cadiz, we flatter ourselves, will some day or other come forth, and I hope then that the fleet under my command will fulfil the expectations of our country.

“Your letter to the Duke of York and the others you sent me I forwarded in the Admiralty packet; the three regiments for your garrison may be expected every moment, and I shall thank you to tell me how long it will be after their arrival that the other regiments will be embarked, that I may have a convoy ready for them.

“I beg, my dear general, that you will give me your commands upon all points, and it will give me real pleasure to meet your wishes. Being, with the greatest respect, your most faithful and obedient servant,

“NELSON AND BRONTE.

“Honble Gen. Fox.”*

On the 19th of October, the enemy sailed from Cadiz in the direction of the Straits, followed by Nelson.

On the morning of the 21st the two fleets came in sight, and at noon precisely the action commenced.

action, in which the French sustained very heavy losses, the enemy struck. The Admiral Dumanoir le Pelley was wounded, and the captain of a seventy-four killed.

* Original autograph in Colonial Secretary's Office, Gibraltar.

It is unnecessary to repeat here the oft-told tale of this celebrated combat ; it is sufficient to record that the combined navies of France and Spain were utterly destroyed, and that by this brilliant action, which inflicted a permanent blow upon the overbearing policy of Napoleon, England was saved from a threatened invasion. At the conclusion of the engagement the shattered ships of the British fleet put into Gibraltar to refit.

On the 28th October the *Victory*, in tow of the *Neptune*, entered the Bay, with the body of Nelson on board. To preserve the corpse from decomposition it had been placed in a cask filled with brandy. During the detention of the *Victory* at Gibraltar the brandy was drawn off, and the cask refilled with spirits of wine.

In Spain cleverly manufactured reports were made to represent this battle as an engagement equally disastrous to the English as to the allies.

One number of the *Madrid Gazette* published an official statement of the condition of the British fleet after the action, according to which only 10 sail of the line were fit to put to sea, and in this list were included four vessels unknown to the British Navy ; 11 first-rates were described as sunk or burnt, which at the time the report was written were either ready for sea in the Bay of Gibraltar or on their way to England, and several vessels were reported completely crippled, which had not been within a hundred

miles of the battle. The intelligence of this victory was received with joy at Gibraltar. The governor instantly despatched a brief message of congratulation to Collingwood, and received the following letter in reply.

“ Queen.

“ November 1st, 1805.

“ SIR,

“ I have received the honour of your letter to me, and am much obliged by your (sic) for your kind congratulations on the signal victory obtained over the enemy’s fleet.

“ The severe gale of wind which we since experienced brought the ships both of the enemy and those of the squadron into extreme danger. The hulks were driven in all directions — three were (fortunate enough for them) forced by the storm into the entrance of the port of Cadiz, where they received such assistance as enabled them to get in. The *Nep-tuno* (one of them is since sunk), the *Saint Ana*, and *Algeciras*, still afloat. But in exchange for them two of the ships which came out with *Gravina* the second time were dismasted, the *Rayo* fell into our hands and is destroyed, the *Indomptable* wrecked, and, I am told, all perished. Under the unfortunate circumstances which the gale reduced us to, I found it necessary to order all the captured ships to be (destroyed?), except two or three which had suffered least. I inclose to your Excellency a list of the ships

which surrendered and how they are disposed of, which I think will satisfy you that the combined fleet as a fleet is annihilated.

“ I continued off Cadiz some days, not only for the purpose of destroying the captures, but to satisfy them that an English fleet was not to be driven from their station by their utmost efforts; and this circumstance seems to have had an effect of more surprising them than even the battle. I sent a flag to the Marquis Solano offering his wounded men to be given to their care, for which he expresses himself and the Spanish nation truly grateful, and in return offered his hospitals and his honour for the care and cure of our seamen if I had chosen to send them to him!” *

In 1808, Gibraltar, as a free port, derived great benefit from the influx of wealth and merchandise during the revolution in Spain; landed property increased immensely in value, and an era of commercial prosperity commenced. Since that time the Rock has been undisturbed by the influences of war: the interval of peace has been devoted to the improvement of the place, the constitution of civil laws, and the emancipation of the people from military rule.

In 1830, the first charter of justice was given to the city, a magistracy was established, and the advantage of civil liberty accorded to the inhabitants. Nor have its military interests been neglected: the

* Autograph in Military Secretary's Office, Gibraltar.

fortifications, always strong, have been vastly extended and improved, the heaviest ordnance has replaced the lighter guns of former days, almost inexhaustible stores have been accumulated, and immense quantities of ammunition crowd the magazines. The work of improvement is never still; every hour of the day hundreds of artificers are employed upon the defences, scarping too accessible cliffs, building new batteries, re-arming old ones, and strengthening weak points.

It has been recently urged that England is guilty of a political immorality in retaining possession of Gibraltar. The views entertained by some in favour of the emancipation of our colonies have led to discussions on the question of our legitimate right to occupy certain dependencies.

The particular phase of political affairs which led to and justified the capture and temporary retention having passed away, it is affirmed that England has no grounds for keeping Gibraltar, and that it would be only an act of justice were she to restore the fortress to Spain.

More than this; it is suggested that the power of Spain is rapidly reviving, and that ere long she may become sufficiently vigorous to wrest from us what we now hold by superior force.

Are these arguments and assumptions correct?

Has England not only no just claim to Gibraltar, but has she been guilty of a political sin in keeping

possession of it for a century and a half? Does the slow regeneracy of Spain justify the supposition that it will produce armies and navies powerful enough to wage war with England and retake Gibraltar?

This fortress first fell into our hands by capture. True, it was originally surrendered to the nominal sovereignty of the Archduke Charles, but seeing that he had no power of himself to keep possession of it, it was suffered to lapse into the hands of the English without opposition.

It was because the legality of the title of possession thus given to England was doubtful that the formal cession in perpetuity was insisted upon at the Conference of Utrecht.

When the cession was confirmed, the Rock was in the safe keeping of England; the 10th article of the Treaty of Utrecht therefore merely secured the possession of the fortress to Great Britain by an incontrovertible right. "The Catholic King," says that article, "as regards himself and *all his successors*, yields by this treaty to the Crown of Great Britain the city and castle of Gibraltar," &c. &c. We hold the place by virtue of legal grant, and it is no argument to say that, because Spain surrendered it in her weakness, she has a right to claim it in her regeneracy.

Spain surrendered Gibraltar "*absolutely, with all manner of right for ever without any exemption or impediment whatsoever.*" Can she now deny the gift,

or is England called upon to restore what has been solemnly granted in perpetuity ?

But apart from the question of legal retention, there is another consideration. The history of the past century and a half shows us that not only was Spain at no time strong enough to retake Gibraltar, but that she was unable to hold it against attack.

Restore the fortress to her to-morrow : how long would she retain it ?

Just so long as France might choose to leave her in possession of it.

Were England to give up Gibraltar she would be committing a far more serious political immorality than she can be guilty of by keeping it.

She would drop the apple of discord among the nations of Europe, and infallibly originate an era of war.

Gibraltar under the English is an impregnable position defying attack, and therefore not likely to be assailed. Gibraltar under the Spaniards would be a third-rate fortress, the ambition of every great maritime power, and the prey of the most unscrupulous.

Never since the Treaty of Utrecht has Spain claimed Gibraltar as a right ; every demand has been put forward on the footing of the grant of an equivalent.

It is true that Pitt the elder, Stanhope, and Townshend, at different times suggested the restoration of Gibraltar, but never on the ground of illegal possession.

Pitt offered it only to gain what he considered far greater advantages. In later days his opinions vastly changed, and, as Lord Chatham, he protested vehemently against the surrender of the place. Even the Spanish historians do not dispute that by the Treaty of Utrecht England acquired an incontrovertible right to Gibraltar.

Montero says, "This Treaty* was most burdensome for Spain, who lost almost all her possessions in Europe. By it Philip V. ceded to Great Britain on his part, and on the part of his successors, *the entire right of possession of Gibraltar.*

"By this means the insolent and violent usurpation by Admiral Rooke was rendered legitimate, and the king of Great Britain could from that moment call his own without a blush that magnificent fortress, which had previously been wrested (*arrancada*) from the Spanish Crown." †

To cede Gibraltar would be to renounce our freedom of navigation in the Mediterranean; our commerce in those seas would be paralysed; we should forfeit the safety of the overland route, depreciate our power in the East, and lose all influence in Morocco.

Are we called upon suddenly to make these sacrifices, which might perhaps adorn the inauguration of the millennium?

As to the second ground on which it is urged that

* Of Utrecht.

† Montero, *Hist. de Gibraltar*, p. 295.

England ought to restore the fortress, namely, because regenerated Spain will soon become powerful enough to wrest it from her,—it is a visionary apprehension.

Is it to be supposed that the next century will see Spain in a condition to assemble a more powerful army, a more formidable artillery, a more numerous navy, than she sent against Gibraltar in 1782?

Is it not on record that the siege of the Rock in that year was amongst the most celebrated undertakings in the history of warfare? The most distinguished leaders, an immense body of troops, a vast siege train, and stupendous batteries aided by a considerable navy, were brought against the fortress. The number of shot thrown into the little city equalled the ammunition expended by the English at Sebastopol. Yet all was vain against British courage and those stubborn walls. On that siege Spain lavished all her treasure and resources, but she was baffled. Are we to believe that she will soon be in a condition to renew those mighty efforts?

The Gibraltar of the present day is more invulnerable than it has been since its walls were first armed. Almost impregnable by nature, it has been rendered completely so by art.

When the floating batteries in conjunction with the armies of France and Spain attacked it in 1782, there were but 100 guns mounted on the Rock. Now 700 pieces of ordnance are in position.

Spain may indeed have turned the crisis of her

degeneracy, but what time must elapse before she can enter the lists with the military and naval power of England !

No fortress in the world is in such a state of defence as the Rock at the present moment ; and notwithstanding the opinion of the most learned scholars, we may rest assured that the day is far distant when regenerated Spain shall dictate to England the terms of its capitulation.

CHAPTER XX.

CONCLUDING DESCRIPTION OF GIBRALTAR.

THE Rock of Gibraltar, which forms almost the most southern extremity of the continent of Europe, is a bold headland promontory jutting insularly into the sea at the entrance to the Mediterranean.

The peninsula is of oblong form, and runs in a direction nearly due north and south, for a distance of about two miles and three-quarters from the main-land. Its greatest breadth does not exceed three-fourths of a mile, and its circumference is about seven miles.

On the north it is connected with the main-land by a low and sandy isthmus, which varies in breadth from 950 to 1750 yards, and is nowhere 10 feet above the level of the sea. The western face of the hill, at the foot of which the town is built, forms a rapid and rocky slope, broken here and there by an abrupt precipice, at whose base the ground again shelves to a level where the lower part of the city is situated, and the public walks laid out. The eastern side, which faces the Mediterranean, is an inaccessible



ORTH FRONT HEIGHT, 1350 FEET, . SHOWING THE TOWN LINES & EMBRASURES OF UPPER GALLERIES .

cliff bare of vegetation, and forming a series of rugged precipices broken only in one spot by an immense bank of sand 450 feet in height, the accumulation of many ages, which lies heaped against the Rock under the Signal Station Hill.

The northern face of the mountain rises abruptly from the sandy isthmus, and towers a perpendicular and unbroken cliff to the height of nearly 1400 feet, terminating in a narrow apex crowned with a powerful battery. Viewed from the isthmus the Rock is at this point magnificently grand.

From its crest, just visible to the naked eye, peer the muzzles of guns, almost lost to view in the airy distance; in an irregular line across its rocky face are dotted small dark apertures, which, though in the distance apparently not larger than pigeons' nooks, are the embrasures of the excavated galleries, all armed with powerful cannon.

From north to south along the summit of the hill runs a narrow, craggy, and irregular ridge, in many places only a few feet in breadth. The highest point of the Rock is about 1430 feet above the sea level.

The Rock is composed of compact limestone or grey dense marble, varied in some places by beds of red sandstone, and fissures of osseous breccia. On the western face, about half way up the mountain, is a precipice which runs parallel to the ridge along the summit, and at the base of this precipice lies a sloping

plain of stratified silicious sand, known always as the Red Sands.

This plain extends from the present Alameda to the north-western extremity of the promontory, and the town, or rather the lower portion of it, is built upon this sand formation. It is the general opinion of geologists that Gibraltar has undergone many movements of upheaval and depression, accompanied by violent ruptures of strata, landslips, and wasting action of the sea during the successive ages of its existence; and so multitudinous and destructive of former changes have these disturbances been, that it is impossible to obtain satisfactory evidence of the periods of their occurrence.

Describing the original formation of the mountain, a geologist says :*

“ Its geological history is instructive as an example of the extraordinary number as well as complicated nature of the movements which have caused the irregularities on the surface of the earth. We are apt to ascribe the presence of marine remains in elevated situations to some great convulsion by which they have been raised from the bottom of the sea, and to suppose that they have remained subjected to no changes but such as are caused by the diurnal action of the elements; but an examination of the

* The Geology of Gibraltar, a paper read before the Geological Society by James Smith, Esq., F. G. S., 1844.

mountain of Gibraltar forces us to admit that it must have undergone, not one, but many movements both of elevation and depression, some of them attended with rupture and dislocation of strata, others with mere changes of level; to these must be added the effects of chemical agents, landslips, blown sands, and the wasting action of the sea. Some of the disturbances must have obliterated every trace of preceding ones. . . We know from the marine remains contained in them that the beds of limestone must have been formed at the bottom of the sea during the secondary period, in a position nearly horizontal, and that they must have been lifted up to an angle with the horizon by some force acting from below, doubtless of an igneous nature."

The first period in the history of the Rock is that in which its beds were deposited at the bottom of the secondary ocean; the second is that which followed the first upheaval.

While in this condition fresh beds were deposited round its base, during a period of long duration. Whilst this operation was going on a second upheaval took place, which tilted up the beds 19 degrees more than they were at first, and as this movement was only partial and confined to the southern portion of the peninsula, the Rock must have been broken across, and the line of fracture may be seen well marked by the gap and ravines which separate the middle hill from the Rock Gun Height. In consequence of this

movement, the limestone beds were placed at an inclination of 38 degrees, and the new beds were subsequently formed at an angle of 19 degrees.

During the long continuance of the preceding epoch the wasting action of the sea had scooped out a cliff and terrace; upon this terrace horizontal beds of sand had been deposited, and upon these again newer beds were deposited sloping outwards. Finally, in one of the numerous changes of level to which the Rock has been subjected, the whole of these sands were lifted up and covered with the blown sands of Catalan Bay. These sands slope against the face of the eastern cliff at an angle of 30 degrees.

A third upheaval still further to the southward of Middle Hill again tilted the beds in that part of the Rock about 19 degrees, leaving the northern and middle hills as they were before, but inclining the strata to the south to 57 degrees. The line of division is marked by an indentation to the south of Signal Station Hill.

In the Sugar-loaf Hill, or O'Hara's Tower Height, the fourth epoch in the history of the Rock is marked. Here the secondary limestone, originally level, has been lifted up by repeated upheavals to an angle of 57 degrees; the beds formed at the base of the Rock subsequently to the first upheaval have been lifted up by the second and third upheavals to an angle of 32 degrees. Martin's Cave, situated on the eastern face of this

hill, is sea-worn, and must have been formed during the period between the second and third upheavals.

Still further to the southward is the extensive sea-worn plateau of Europa flats; its surface is almost entirely composed of bare water-worn rock. This plateau is backed by a second range of cliffs, in the front of which, at an elevation of 170 feet above the sea, there is an oyster-bed. From the general appearances of the Rock, it is inferred that the whole mountain up to its summit, a height of 1430 feet, has been submerged subsequently to the last of the disturbances.

This theory, extraordinary as it may appear, is supported by the opinion of that eminent geologist, Sir Charles Lyell.*

No general change of level has taken place during the historical or probably the human period. From the appearance of a cluster of fossil mussels, with both valves of the shells adhering, the animals must have been alive when the elevation took place. Mr Smith therefore infers that it was instantaneous.

One of the most interesting formations on this remarkable peninsula is the osseous breccia, resem-

* "Mr Smith's paper on the Rock of Gibraltar is by far the best I have seen. . . . It is full of matter well thought out, and the inferences as to rising and sinking rather startling, but not, I suspect, exaggerated, from what I know of the borders of the Mediterranean."—Sir C. Lyell to Sir W. Codrington, June 21st, 1860.



bling in character the breccia found in the limestone rocks of Antibes, Nice, Pisa, and Dalmatia.*

These concretions are met with in various parts of the Rock, in perpendicular fissures and open caverns. They are calcareous, of a reddish brown ferruginous colour, and enclose the bones of various animals. Cuvier, in a list of organic remains discovered in the Gibraltar breccia, enumerates the fossil elephant, cave bear, ox, deer, antelope, sheep, rabbits, water-rats, mice, horse, ass, snakes, birds, and land shells. Of these many agree with existing species, but there is no doubt that there are also bones of extinct kinds. The most celebrated deposit of this concretion is at Rosia, where masses of the breccia are exposed to view.†

Like all compact limestones the Rock abounds in caves, fissures, and pot-holes. The most celebrated caves are St Michael's and Martin's; the former, situated on the western slope, 1100 feet above the

* Edinburgh, Philo. Transactions, 1797.

† Mr Smith mentions that the bones of man have been found in these breccia, but Major Imrie and Cuvier affirm that no trace of them could be found.

“ I am satisfied that the formation of every variety of the Gibraltar breccia is a subaërial process; the rain-water percolating through the fissures which everywhere intersect the rock dissolves a certain quantity, but as the largest portion of the water is evaporated before it reaches the sea, it deposits the calcareous matter upon whatever it comes in contact with, and unites the whole into breccia, a process which cannot take place under water.”—Geology of Gibraltar, Smith.

sea, the latter on the eastern cliff, under O'Hara's tower. Martin's is sea-worn. The extent of St Michael's is still unknown. Many explorations have been made at various times, and, as on each occasion a further point has been reached, it is impossible to say where the cavern terminates. Some persons have affirmed that the east wind may be distinctly felt blowing through the aperture at the furthest known point.

The Rock can be ascended on its western side from various points, and by different roads, along which horses or mules can pass.

The mountain is divided by the circumstances of its original formation into various undulating summits, each of which has received a distinctive title. That which forms the extreme north is known as the Rock Gun Height, the next towards the south is Middle Hill. The Signal Station gives a name to the centre elevation, while the sugar-loaf shaped eminence at the extreme south of the mountain is distinguished by the old ruined tower that crowns its summit, and which was built by directions of General O'Hara, who in 1795 was Governor of Gibraltar.

The Signal Station, which, as its name implies, is a look-out from whence the Straits are watched and the movements of the shipping reported, is situated upon a ridge of the hill, at an elevation of 1250 feet above the sea. The building, which consists of a wooden shed and small stone tower, is occupied by a

detachment of artillerymen, whose duty it is to keep a constant eye upon the waters of the Straits and Bay, and to report by signal upon the flag-staff, the nation and character of the different vessels that steer for the Bay, or pass along the Mediterranean.

A battery of four cannon is situated a few feet below facing the westward, from which the morning and evening guns are fired throughout the year, as a notice for the opening and closing of the fortress gates.

The view from this Signal Station is extremely beautiful and extensive. Turning to the east you stand at the brink of a rocky precipice, whose giddy height is broken by a huge shelving mass of sparkling sand which, springing from the shore below, rests in an unbroken heap against the Rock. On the narrow beach, far away down in the still depths below, and washed by the waves, whose rolling crests seem to break almost at the very doors, are the fishing huts of Catalan Bay.

Beyond is the deep blue sea, whose azure brilliancy pales the unclouded skies above, and reflects as clearly as a mirror the outstretched shadows of the dark mountains that range along the Spanish coast. Over in Africa, far away in the hazy distance, and buried in rolling fleecy clouds, are the snow-capped ranges of the lofty Atlas; and nearer the foreground again, on a prominent headland, lies Ceuta with its bleached buildings glistening in the sunlight. Stretch-

ing to the westward, the shores of Barbary rise gradually in rugged cliffs and grey stony heights to the bleak summit of Mons Abyla, and descending again with grassy undulating hills, and valleys green with brushwood, recede till they are lost in the western horizon.

At the foot of the western slopes rest the unruffled waters of the deep broad Bay, bordered on the opposite coast by the purple mountains of Almoraima.

Though Gibraltar has traditionally held the title of a barren rock, its flora and vegetable kingdom are sufficiently rich and varied to occupy the attention of botanists.* The western slopes are covered with patches of vegetation, the gardens are filled with tropical plants, and even the rugged precipices on the eastern cliffs are dotted with the fan-shaped palm. On the steep declivities and in luxuriant hedge-rows the clematis, geranium, aloe, and rose, run wild; the myrtle, the locust-tree, the wide-spreading bellasombra, a variety of the cactus tribe, the vine, the fig-tree, the olive, almond, orange, and lemon, conceal with their welcome leaves the barren stony boulders.

There are 456 species of flowering plants and ferns indigenous to the Rock; and 44 which are cultivated or introduced.

These are classed as follows :

40 species generally distributed throughout Europe.

* Vide *Flora Calpensis*, Kelaart, F.L.S., F.G.S., 1846.

58 natives of South Africa.

63 common to Europe and Africa.

174 common to South Europe and Africa.

13 confined to Spain and Barbary.

96 common to Europe, Asia Minor, and North Africa.

12 confined to Europe and Asia Minor.

Among these are 140 species common to Great Britain. 170 species are found to grow in Madeira, and nearly as many in the Canary Islands. 160 species in Sicily, more than two-thirds in Malta, and 73 species are also indigenous to the Azores. One plant only is peculiar to Gibraltar, viz. *Iberis Gibraltaria*.

Few animals inhabit the Rock. Foxes and rabbits are numerous, and there are a few wild goats. Eagles and hawks are common. The monkeys, a tribe always associated with the Rock of Gibraltar, are now virtually extinct. Formerly they were seen in troops gambolling along the precipices, but their numbers have gradually decreased, till but four are believed to remain. They are of the Barbary ape species, and it has been a matter of discussion how they were transported. The simple solution of the question seems to be that they were brought over at different times from the opposite coast, and increased in numbers. An old paper in the British Museum makes mention of a great quantity of these apes having been sent into the

garrison in 1740, and refers to a poll-tax to which they were subjected.

The town or city consists of two distinct portions, one, which is the principal in importance, being situated at the north-western base of the hill, and the other at the south, on the slope under O'Hara's height. On the eastern side of the Rock, ensconced in a sandy nook called Catalan Bay, are a few houses occupied principally by fishermen of Genoese origin.

The principal town, which is dignified by the title of a city, extends from the Land-port line of fortifications on the north, to Charles V.'s wall on the south, and runs backward from the sea-wall up the steep slope of the hill to a considerable elevation. It is enclosed on every side,—on the north by the old Moorish wall and Land-port Curtain, on the west by the Line-wall and sea, and on the south by the wall which was erected in the reign of the Emperor Charles. The commercial portion of the city comprises two parallel and principal streets; one, Water-port Street, which consists mainly of small shops and retail houses; the other, Irish Town, where are situated the wholesale and merchants' stores. Both thoroughfares are badly built and inconveniently narrow.

In the centre of the town is a tolerably capacious space called Commercial Square, though the commercial transactions are confined principally to the extortionate transactions of the Jew pedlars, who cover the

pavement with their stalls of miscellaneous articles, varying from a bed to a button.

Gibraltar possesses one of the finest colonial libraries in the world. It is the property of the garrison, and was originated in 1793 by Colonel Drinkwater. The present building was completed in 1804, under the auspices of King George III. Pitt took a great interest in it. It now contains upwards of 26,000 volumes.

The abrupt slopes at the back of the town are thickly covered with houses, built tier above tier to the height of 250 feet above the sea. This district is termed the hill side. At its northern extremity is situated the Moorish castle, with its ancient wall, which has stood without decay the assaults of time and many famous sieges, though the battered masonry testifies that the enemy did not spare the battlements. The Torre del Homenage, which in all Moorish castles is the most elevated tower, is still in good preservation and almost intact. It is difficult to ascertain the exact date of this building, but from an inscription over one of the gates it appears to have been finished between the years A.D. 725 and 742. In Gayangos' Arabic translations mention is made of a fortified castle having been built on the Rock at a much later period.*

* "In the year 1160, the commander of the faithful, Abdúl-Múmen Ibn-Alí, after subjecting the whole of Eastern Africa to his rule, marched to Ceuta, where he embarked for Andalus.

The South Town, which is situated, as its name implies, towards the southern extremity of the Rock, is formed by a small and rambling collection of houses which stand on the slope of the hill below O'Hara's Tower. This suburb, which is disconnected from the city by the Alameda and public gardens, contains about 1600 inhabitants.

Above the South Town, and looking towards the African coast, is Windmill Hill, a nearly oval plateau surrounded on almost every point of its circumference by precipitous heights, which sink abruptly from its brink on to the lower terrace level formed by Europa flats. At Windmill Hill is a large barrack, casemated and enclosed within a crenellated wall which faces the south.

Descending to the flats through a staircase tower, commonly called Jacob's Ladder, you pass through the Europa gate, and proceeding southward, reach the ex-
He landed at Gebal-Tárik (Gibraltar), which from that day was called Gebalu-l-fatah (the mountain of the entrance, or victory), and ordered that a strong fortress should be erected on the top of it. He traced out the building with his own hands, and when, after remaining for two months there and providing for the government of Andalus, Abdú-l-Múmen returned to his African dominions, he appointed his son Abú-Said, then Governor of Granada, to superintend the building, and report its progress to him. One of the architects employed was Háji-Ya'ysh, the geometrician. This Ya'ysh, who was an excellent engineer, is said to have constructed some wonderful machines during his residence at Gebal-Tárik, and among others a large wind-mill, which stood on the very top of the mountain."—Gayangos. Narrative of Al-Makkari, p. 314.

treme southern point of the Rock, on which is placed the light-house. Exactly opposite stands Ceuta, distant about 11 miles. Following the road which here turns sharply to the north and leads along the eastern face of the Rock, a straggling and dilapidated building appears on the left, overhung with steep dark cliffs, which shield this summer residence of the governor from the burning rays of the mid-day sun. From hence the road leads on to various batteries, which to the stranger are forbidden ground, and terminates at a spot called Europa Advance, near the mouth of Monkeys' cave, where some guns are mounted. Further than this it is impossible to pass. The rock beyond forms a series of projecting and tremendous precipices, undermined with vast caverns, into which the sea rolls with thundering peals.

The population of Gibraltar, according to the census of 1860, was 25,179, including military, convicts, and aliens. The gross civil population was 17,647, including foreigners visiting the garrison for periods varying from three days to one year. The total number of resident inhabitants was 15,467. There were 15,107 persons to the square mile. The gross civil population was composed of the following races :—

British	995
Natives	9802
Native Jews	1385

Barbary Jews	240
Spaniards	1892
Genoese	782
Portuguese	525
Italians	90
French	53
Germans	27
Moors	9
Other nations	23*

For the safety of the fortress, to obviate an indiscriminate influx of people, and for the maintenance of order in the garrison, strict regulations are in force respecting the admission of foreigners into the city. Each entrance by which strangers can arrive is superintended by two police inspectors, who, when a foreigner asks admission, enter his name, nation, and occupation in a book, and give him a ticket of entrance valid for one day only. With this ticket he may remain without molestation for twenty-four hours, but if he intends to prolong his visit he must go to the police office, where he obtains what is termed a bond. This bond, which answers, under a penalty of £10, for his good behaviour, must be signed by some respectable native householder, after which it is taken by the applicant himself to the police magistrate, who decides whether a permit of temporary residence shall be granted or not. These permits seldom

* This return is taken from the Census of 1844.

exceed a period of 30 days or two months, but they can be renewed if necessary. If the applicant fails to comply with the terms on which the permit was granted, he is turned out of the garrison.

The average number of strangers who enter the garrison during a month on daily ticket for the purpose of trading and bringing supplies is 29,700; the majority of these are Spaniards. The fixed population of Gibraltar is of such a peculiar character that it is absolutely necessary to admit into this confined and crowded town a considerable number of foreigners. The natives are for the most part idle, dissolute, and phlegmatic; there are but few skilled artisans among them, and their demands for wages are exorbitant. Domestic service is almost entirely supplied by foreigners, the natives being quite unfitted for such duties. It would be difficult to instance a single possession under the British Crown where the material for general and domestic labour is worse than in Gibraltar.

Among the foreigners, the Portuguese, the Genoese, and natives of Galicia, are intelligent and hardworking people, and even the Andalusian, when working in competition with the "native," is a useful individual.

The admission of foreign labour into the town is watched with a jealous eye by the inhabitants. Nor is this repugnance to competition confined to the lower classes; an idea appears to prevail that a native birthright, however precarious, carries with it the privilege of protection, and that free trade, in any other

sense than that of monopolizing the market, is quite inadmissible.

The Jews form a large item in the population. It is an old adage that trade will always flourish where Israelites dwell; so, here they give life to commerce and carry on extensive transactions with foreign ports. Their industry and pertinacity are remarkable, and the Gibraltar Jew is by no means behind his fellows in other qualities peculiar to his race.

The Moors, so lawless among their native wilds, are here, strange to say, the most orderly and obedient of the whole population. They invariably conform to the laws and regulations, are always decent and respectful, and, in fact, set an example to their neighbours.*

In Gibraltar every article of consumption is exorbitantly dear and generally of inferior quality. The scale of prices is nearly double that of Malta and Corfu, house rent is ruinous, the rate of wages is excessive, and the character of the servants lazy and independent, to a degree that an experience of them alone can realize.

There are 42 schools in Gibraltar, attended by 3015 scholars; five are devoted to Protestant pupils, of whom there are 333. Twenty are supported by the Roman Catholic community, and educate 1660

* If these few observations upon the characteristics of the population appear meagre and superficial, it must be remembered that obvious reasons prevent the author from entering more into detail.

children. Two, belonging to the Wesleyans, are attended by 178 scholars, and the Hebrews have three schools for 173 children. Besides these there are 10 private schools, where no particular religious doctrine is inculcated. It is satisfactory to remark that education is progressing, the total number of scholars having considerably increased of late years.

The peculiar formation of Gibraltar, its steep and rocky slopes, its dry and unfruitful soil, and the very narrow limits adapted to cultivation,* preclude the possibility of producing supplies of any kind sufficient for the maintenance of the inhabitants. The population is therefore entirely dependent upon imported produce, and in consequence the price of provisions varies very considerably, according to the time of year, the state of the weather, and the condition of the country from which the principal supplies are brought.

At the north-western extremity of the town is situated a commodious market, open to natives and foreigners alike, and where every encouragement is given to importers. Here may be seen dealers of every class and clime. The Spaniard in his quaint costume, the Moor, sleepy and abstracted, wrapped in his burnous, and scowling on the infidel, whose money he grasps with greed. The Jew, from Barbary, from Algiers, or Spain bargaining with frantic gesticula-

* The total number of acres applicable to cultivation, and now occupied as garden ground, glaxis bearing grass, public walks, etc., is 79.

tions for the value of a farthing, and the wily native, who secretly curses the free trade that robs him of the enormous profits which monopoly would enable him to acquire in idleness.

The supply of meat throughout the year is generally sufficient, though in summer it is of inferior quality. Beef is brought from Andalusia, Galicia, and Barbary. From southern Spain and Galicia the bullocks are transported alive and slaughtered as required, but the fiscal laws of Morocco prohibit the exportation of live cattle,* and the meat, rudely cut into quarters by Moorish butchers, is conveyed in feluccas from Tangier. In the summer months Gibraltar is almost entirely dependent upon Barbary for the supplies of beef; and notwithstanding the disgusting mode in which the animals are slaughtered, and the passage across the Straits in closely-packed boats, the meat is tolerably good and cheap.†

* A special contract exists with the Moorish Government, which permits a certain number of live cattle to be exported from Tangier annually for the use of the troops at Gibraltar.

† The following is a return of the number of cattle slaughtered in Gibraltar from Feb. 1st, 1860, to January 31st, 1861.

Bullocks, 1275. Cows, 253. Calves, 81. Sheep, 6741. Lambs, 327. Total 8677.

Average prices.

	Summer.	Winter.
	<i>d.</i>	<i>d.</i>
Beef	4 $\frac{1}{2}$ per lb.	7 per lb.
Mutton	4	6 $\frac{1}{2}$
Veal	6	8
Lamb	4	6

The beef from southern Spain is poor, and much inferior to what is brought from Morocco, but the Galicia bullocks are as fine as the generality of beasts in England. They are imported in London steamers, which call at Corunna during the winter.

Great quantities of poultry are brought from the Morocco ports; they are conveyed in long cylindrical baskets of cane-work open at both ends, but secured by cord nettings. Each basket will contain nearly two dozen live fowls.

The number and variety of fish which were at one time caught in the neighbouring waters have rendered the market famous, but the supply has diminished during late years. Still many strange inhabitants of the deep may be seen flapping their uncouth flanks on the salesmen's stalls, side by side with others of delicate beauty. The tunny, once so celebrated as the source of immense wealth to the coast proprietors, and as an article of food for the lower classes, is now scarce, and is caught only in small numbers. Soles, turbot, John Dorees, mackerel, Sardine, mullets of both classes, gurnard, anchovy, and bonito, are still plentiful. But with the exception of the John Dorees and turbot, the fish lack flavour and firmness, and cannot be compared to what are caught in more northern seas.

Though the tunny fisheries, as a source of wealth and food, have long been extinct, some particulars of

their former magnitude and importance may be not uninteresting. Formerly the fish abounded in the neighbouring waters, which were carefully preserved, and rented at enormous prices.

The right of fishing along the coasts around Gibraltar belonged exclusively, in 1558, when the tunny were miraculously numerous, to the Duke of Medina Sidonia, whose descendants for many years subsequently retained the privilege. It is related that in the year 1558, 110,152 fish were taken, which yielded a revenue of 80,000 ducats, and as the average take of fish was over 100,000 annually, it is easy to understand the value of the property.

The tunny caught along these shores were celebrated in ancient times in Rome and Greece, and the coins of Cadiz and Carteia were commonly stamped with an image of the fish. Ayala, writing towards the close of the last century, mentions the rapid decline of the fisheries, and refers to Conil, on the coast near Cadiz, as the only spot where in his time the occupation was extensively carried on.

At that port there existed an establishment regularly provided with the necessary apparatus, and a captain, who with his assistants superintended the department and directed the operations. Upon the watch-towers along the coast experienced fishermen were stationed to observe the approach of the shoals, and report by signal the direction they were taking.

The men on shore, acting according to this information, launched their boats, laden with their semicircular nets, which, when the moment was favourable, were cast in rear of the tunny, and rapidly hauled in shore, while the frightened shoal was driven into the meshes by shouts and splashes.

Until the middle of the last century, no free market was established in Gibraltar; the garrison was supplied exclusively by contractors who were under the orders of the governor. This system led to gross abuses, an extensive method of robbery prevailed, till at length the corruption had reached to such a pitch, that stringent instructions were issued by the government for the regulation of the markets.

A contributor to the *Gentleman's Magazine* for March, 1757, acquaints us that when he was at Gibraltar, "the governor permitted but one butcher to exercise his calling in the garrison, and that in return for this monopoly, His Excellency's table was furnished with meat gratis, while the officers could not obtain even a quarter of mutton without first offering its equivalent to the governor. Nay," continues the writer, "if by great favour he had given leave to any officer of the garrison to keep a cow, a goat, or a sow, he would then forbid them to kill anything without first obtaining his permission for it, and threatened to break an officer and chaplain of the garrison for disobedience, because each of them had killed a sucking pig without his knowledge or con-

sent, so that, through the avarice or neglect of the butcher, mutton has been so scarce that what our servants would not eat in England sold for a pistole a quarter, and once for a moidore ; and of this I am very certain, that before the happy commencement of a free market all inferior officers suffered much for want of fresh provisions, for I with others have been 12 or 14 days without tasting either beef, veal, mutton, or lamb, and when it was our fortune to have any from the butchery they were refuse pieces."

This state of things caused so much dissatisfaction that a memorial was presented to the governor protesting against it, but the complaint was looked upon as a symptom of mutiny, and treated as such. Fortunately, however, the affair became known in England, and new articles of war were sent out, and a free market established.

The second section of article eleven provided that "No governor or officer, commanding in any of our garrisons, forts, or barracks, shall either themselves exact exorbitant prices for houses or stalls let out to suttlers, or shall connive at the like exaction in others ; nor by their own authority or for any private advantages shall they lay any duty or imposition upon, nor be interested in, the sale of such victuals, liquors, or other necessaries of life which are brought into the garrison, on the penalty of being discharged from our service."

This peremptory threat of dismissal appears to have

had very little effect upon the actions of the officials, for we are told that so apprehensive was the governor of that day lest arms and ammunition should be introduced into the garrison "in the bellies of live cattle or the crops of fowls, that he would not allow either to come ashore without a permit, which was oftener refused than granted."

His Excellency appears to have been especially careful to secure the choicest fish, and with that view no person was permitted to purchase any from the importers or fishermen until it had been first offered to the governor. A certain Captain Preston, however, of Fowkes's regiment, being one day on the Land-port guard, and having nothing better for his dinner than pease pottage, seeing a fisherman carrying a fine fat turbot into the garrison, was audacious enough to insist upon purchasing it, though the man protested that he was bound first to offer it to the governor. No sooner did this act of mutiny come to His Excellency's ears, than Captain Preston was placed under arrest, and subsequently tried by a Court-martial. Whether he was acquitted or convicted we are not told, but his defence when put upon his trial was so quaint that I have selected some extracts from it.*

"To the Honourable Court.

"Captain Preston of Fowkes's.

"GENTLEMEN,

"My defence is a sort of reason-

* I find he was cashiered.

ing which begins and ends with the same sentence, viz.—‘Necessity has no law.’

“Be pleased, gentlemen, to give me liberty to make a short narrative: I was released off Land-port guard, and confined for peremptorily disobeying the governor’s orders: and by the orders of yesterday this Court-martial is appointed to sit, and try me for forcibly taking a fish from a fisherman at Land-port, and peremptorily refusing the governor’s orders, when delivered me by the governor’s orderly serjeant, and afterwards by the Town Major, who came to me; the first was Serjeant Barry of our regiment, who came to me with an humble service to me from the governor, telling me that some of their fishermen had made a complaint against me, and that the governor desired to know what it was. I returned the compliment, and told the serjeant I had taken a turbot for my dinner, having nothing else but pease pottage. In a short time after, came Serjeant Jones of the governor’s regiment, with the like ceremonious compliment, and told me the governor desired me to send up the turbot, but not ordered me, as he says in his deposition. I returned the compliment, and told the serjeant, as I had done the former, that I would keep the turbot for my dinner, having nothing else but pease pottage. Not long after came the Town Major, who told me he was sent by the governor to ask me if I refused to obey his orders, and whether I thought any private captain had a right to be served before the

governor? to which I made no other reply than that I had nothing but pease pottage for my dinner, and would keep the fish.

“ Now, gentlemen, I hope I may have leave to answer the two queries, that the governor may know my opinion : the first is, whether I refused to obey the governor’s orders ? I protest I never did refuse to obey any lawful orders he has given, nor ever will ; but all his orders relating to fish at Land-port, as well as to the other provisions brought to the town, that I have seen, are evasive and fallacious : they may seem plausible at first sight, as if they were designed for the good of the public, but nothing less than that ; as they are purely calculated for being a sanction for carrying the best of the fish and other provisions to the convent,* from thence to be disposed of as the governor thinks fit, and are not sold in the public market as they ought to be, according to his own orders, which, he himself having broken through, are void of course.

“ The other is, whether I think any private captain has a right to be served before the governor ? I do not say he has, but affirm he has an equal right to be served at the same time with the governor in a public market ; and the king our master’s servants go to market as well as the cobblers, and I dare say, if any of them should presume to take the meat out of his mouth, he would not put up with it without com-

* The residence of the governor.

plaining of injustice. Mine is a parallel case ; I had the turbot for my dinner, the governor wanted it, I refused to give it to him, and am in confinement for it. * * * * *

“ I have answered these two queries, and if you please to observe, I make necessity my plea ; it therefore behoves me, in my own justification, to prove there is a necessity, and show from whence that necessity proceeds. The first is well known to you all, gentlemen, by the present scarcity and want of almost everything ; and the other, I say, is from the governor’s severity ; for have not all his orders a selfish view, and tendency to distress ? Has he not forbid bringing into town any provisions, but in such as he is interested, as we plainly see ? Has he not ordered all bundles and baskets to be searched at the gates for beef and mutton ? Is it not with the greatest reluctance he suffers any cattle to be landed for the use of the poor sick seamen in the hospital ? Has he not in a most shameful manner bereaved the whole garrison of the swine they bred and fed, which have always been our main supply in winter, forcibly taking them away by his myrmidons of the zoca (i. e. butchery) for little more than half their value ? Has he not inhumanly whipped a soldier of the regiment I belong to, for killing a sheep of his own, by sentence of an illegal court created by himself, called a garrison Court-martial, which deprives every commanding officer of the power of appointing regimental

Courts-martial invested in him by the 17th article of war? Would he suffer so much as a sheep to be brought ashore for any private family? and did he not turn away a Portuguese boat with some sheep a few days ago, because he would not sell them to the butchery at their own price, when he had little or no provisions in the garrison? Does he suffer any creature, even so much as a goose, to graze on the hill, which from the very beginning has been in common, for the benefit of the garrison, in order to distress us, and force us to buy meat at the zoca, or starve? Has he not lately refused an offer made to him of constantly supplying the garrison with cattle at a cheaper rate than he has for some time past? * * * *

“I am well aware, gentlemen, from what has been said, it may be intimated on this occasion, as has been done on another, that I am troubled with a spirit of mutiny; but such a thought I utterly detest. Yet I am too strongly possessed with a spirit of liberty to bear any brunt of oppression, and tamely suffer myself to be enslaved and trampled on by a fellow-subject: we may be saddled (as the term is) and hard ridden too, but is that any reason we should be ridden to death and devoured as the Tartars do their horses?

“But now, gentlemen, it is time to conclude. It is true I took a turbot at Land-port, not in contempt of or contrary to any lawful order, but in case of necessity, when I had nothing for my dinner but pease pottage: and I solemnly declare I will do the

same again, as often as I shall be in the same unhappy circumstances, when 'necessity has no law.'

"Gentlemen, what I have said in my defence I am fully persuaded will be duly considered, and of course have its due weight with you! so I humbly submit myself to your impartial determination."

CHAPTER XXI.

THE climate of the Rock is popularly considered to be pleasant and salubrious, but the high rate of mortality among the population suggests either local causes of disease or unhealthy atmospheric influences. the situation of the town and the almost total absence of sanitary precautions undoubtedly tend to raise the death rate.*

The city is composed of small and crowded dwellings, ill ventilated, badly drained, and crammed with human beings. Upwards of 15,000 persons are confined within a space covering a square mile.

Although great facilities exist for the construction of a complete system of drainage, no comprehensive plan has yet been adopted. Main sewers have been established, which empty themselves by means

* The Public Health Act does not apply to the Colonies. Here the only method of effecting the removal of nuisances is by the tedious mode of indictment at the sessions.

of iron pipes at some distance into the sea in various places along the line-wall, but the want of water renders them comparatively useless during the summer months. In many houses cesspools or accumulations of night soil exist, which, through the apathy of the inhabitants and the disregard for stench and filth, remain untouched for years, slow, smouldering hot-beds of disease. When they are emptied, a course usually resorted to in summer, when the fetid effluvium overcomes the callous tenant, their contents are carried in open barrels along the streets, spreading their deadly exhalations through the crowded dwellings. Another local cause of sickness is the want of water, a want which, considering the position of the town, might long ago have been supplied.

From the peculiar nature of the Rock there are no springs of pure fresh water.* To many houses tanks are attached, in which during the rainy season the water is collected, but rarely in sufficient quantities to last during the summer drought; in

* The following return recently compiled by the police department shows the state of the water supply.

Number of inhabitants, exclusive of aliens on short permits,	16,303.
Number of houses	959
Number of cisterns	532
Number of houses without water	213
Number of persons having neither well nor cistern	3124
Number of persons having to buy fresh water ..	5799

All the wells give brackish water.

many dwellings, especially among the poorer classes, no such convenience exists, and the poor creatures are dependent for the water they require upon the hawkers who distribute it through the city in small barrels carried on donkeys or mules. During some seasons, such, for example, as the summer of 1860, the sufferings of the poor are very great for want of this necessary of life. During that summer, when small-pox, the companion of uncleanness, was dangerously prevalent, and cholera was striking down its helpless victims, water became so scarce, and rose so considerably in price, that the poorer classes were in numerous instances reduced for days to a quantity barely sufficient to quench their thirst, much less to wash away their uncleanness. From a calculation lately made, it seems that nearly £3000 is annually expended by the public of Gibraltar on water alone, while for half that sum an efficient establishment might be maintained, which would supply the remotest districts of the city. This supply would be applicable to domestic wants only, the resources of fresh water being in no way sufficient to permit of its being used as an agent for flushing the drains and sewers.

For this purpose we have vast means at hand, and readily available; as salt water, which at a small expense could be conveyed above the town, is as well adapted for that object as fresh. The peculiar formation of the smaller dwellings is another enemy to health; these houses consist of square or oblong

buildings, enclosing a confined and ill-ventilated courtyard or *patio*, into which the windows open. Each floor is cumbered with a balcony, and is often occupied by many families. In these yards clothes are constantly hung out to dry, thus further impeding ventilation. All kinds of filth accumulate, while the drain, if such a luxury exist, is rarely trapped or kept in order.

House rent is excessively high, and the poorer labouring classes are compelled to occupy dwellings which are more fitted for animals than human beings.*

Most of the *patios* are crowded with lumber, water-butts, casks, and even animals; whole kennels of dogs and even mules and asses are sometimes kept in these yards. Such are some of the local causes of sickness, and it remains a question for inquiry, how far those causes may be considered to account for a high and increasing rate of mortality, apart from any atmospheric influences?

* An observant medical man (Dr Hennen, F. R. S. E.) writing on Gibraltar in 1826, says:—

“The ground for building is very dear and house rent excessive So long as ground rent is high, landlords will make the most of the space they possess, and when avarice is in full operation upon poverty, the wretched tenants will crowd together into small, dark, and ill-ventilated cellars, and corners of a similar character, which, so far from giving them accommodation, scarcely afford space for them to lie down. . . . The open street is much more desirable than many of the lodgings of the lower orders of Gibraltar.”

The climate of Gibraltar may be termed temperate throughout the year. From a corrected average it appears that the mean temperature is $64\cdot5^{\circ}$, the maximum generally occurring in July, the minimum in February. The average fall of rain, from calculations extending over 22 years, is $34\cdot53$ inches; the smallest amount collected being $15\cdot91$ in 1841-42; the largest, $80\cdot70$ inches, in 1855-6. Neither of these years was marked by any peculiar variation in the annual mortality.

In 11 years the first rains fell in October; in five years in September; in five years in November, and in one year (1841-2) as late as the 20th December.

Quoting the meteorological observations for 1859, 1860 (an average year), it appears that the mean temperature was $64\cdot9^{\circ}$, the mean daily range $13\cdot3^{\circ}$. The maximum was $92\cdot20^{\circ}$ on the 17th July, and the minimum $32\cdot6^{\circ}$ on the 15th February. The maximum of humidity was $\cdot979^{\circ}$ on the 30th September, the minimum $\cdot446^{\circ}$ on the 31st August, giving an extreme range of $\cdot553^{\circ}$. Rain fell on 92 days, total quantity $34\cdot874$ inches. During six months only $1\cdot237$ inches of rain were collected. During this year cholera and small-pox were prevalent.

The prevailing winds are west and east; or variations of those quarters. The wind seldom blows due north or south. From observations extending over ten years it seems that the wind is easterly, or

variations of east, on 177 days, and westerly, or variations of west, 188 days in the year. The easterly winds are most prevalent in the summer months. The westerly in the winter.

The influence of the wind upon the health of the people is a much-vexed question not easily determined. Some medical men affirm that a prevalence of easterly breezes is an antidote to sickness, while others declare that a Levanter causes a most unwholesome atmosphere. This wind which generally blows during the summer months, when thorough ventilation and fresh air are most required, is usually accompanied by a dense, lowering mass of cloud, which hangs over the Rock and precipitates a clammy and unpleasant moisture.

To understand the effects of this wind upon the constitution, it is necessary to experience the distressing and insufferable feeling it creates. Its presence is quickly recognized. Dull, aching pains creep through the bones, the tongue is parched and dry, while the atmosphere is saturated with a sticky dampness; appetite vanishes, energy leaves you, and an oppressive languor paralyzes both mind and body. And it is not man alone who suffers; animals move about uneasily, beasts of burden weary under their loads, dogs hide themselves, birds cease their song, even the plants and flowers wither under the influence of the distressing Levanter.

While the wind is from this quarter meat will not keep a day, persons suffering from sickness relapse,

and wounds or sores refuse to heal. It is certainly remarkable if these symptoms are evidence of a healthy atmosphere.

During the yellow fever years, 1813, 1814, the east wind prevailed for seven months out of twelve.*

The westerly breezes blow pure and fresh from the Atlantic, the air is cool and exhilarating, and both body and mind are invigorated. When, after a depressing Levanter, the wind suddenly changes, the sensation is one of inexpressible relief and pleasure.

The general character of the climate is agreeable during seven months of the year, viz. from November until May; the remaining five months are oppressively hot, the air is insufferably sultry, and the east wind prevails.†

* "Eight months in the year are disfigured with the Levanters that blow in whirlwinds round the hill, obscure the sky with mists and clouds, and render the atmosphere heavy and unsupportable; they cause such a dampness that all the furniture mildews and rots, steel and iron utensils rust, be they covered ever so close, and no provisions will keep a day." —Carter's *Journey from Gibraltar to Malaga, 1777.*

Ayala, *History of Gibraltar (1780)*, says that the east wind is the tyrant of the Straits, the west wind their liberator.

Dr Quarrier mentions that after the battle of Algiers in 1816, the wounded who were brought to Gibraltar did well, until an east wind set in, when the symptoms became so bad that the men had to be hastily removed. Dr Hennen, too, remarks that, "When the easterly wind blows, the sewers throughout the town emit the most offensive odours."

† Speaking of the climate of Gibraltar, an eminent physician says:—

"From the middle of November to March, the climate

The natives, or, as they are usually termed, the "Scorpions," seem to undergo very little inconvenience from the baking heat of the dog-days, but to those who labour under the misfortune of having been born elsewhere, a residence during the summer months constitutes a resemblance to purgatory, far too suggestive to be pleasant.

On several occasions Gibraltar has been visited by very fatal epidemics of the fever type. The historian Ayala refers to a virulent disease that broke out in the garrison in 1649, and carried off great numbers of the inhabitants. In 1727, it is recorded that 500 men of the troops died of a fever, but the character of the disease is not mentioned. Again, in 1798, a great mortality occurred in the 48th regiment, from a disorder which the medical men declared was precisely the same as yellow fever.

In 1800, the deaths from fever in the garrison were 257, the average annual mortality among the military being only 38. These unhealthy symptoms were followed in 1804 by the outbreak of a terrible

differs in nothing essential from that of England. June, July, August, and September, are constantly hot, the two last sultry; and in these months the garrison and inhabitants are subject to bilious and putrid disorders, but new comers seldom escape, and have them in a violent degree. In October and November are the autumnal rains, and fluxes and inflammatory complaints then take place. December and January are commonly dry. February and March continue cold. April and May are temperate and pleasant."

pestilence, which in a few weeks swept off 5733 persons out of a population of only 15,000. Sufficient is known of the symptoms and character of this disease to leave no doubt of its having been the yellow fever of the West Indies.

In 1810, 23 distinct sporadic cases occurred, and three years later 899 persons died of the same disease.

In August, 1814, it again broke out and carried off 246 individuals, and again in August, 1828, it re-appeared and caused 1677 deaths. The frequent and fatal recurrence of this fever in a climate not remarkably unhealthy, attracted the attention of the authorities, and a commission of inquiry was established to determine whether the disease was imported, or had its origin in local causes. An immense mass of evidence was laid before this board, but the President and members disagreed, and no conclusion was arrived at. There is no doubt however that the fever originated in Gibraltar. Previous to 1804 there had been symptoms of a tendency to yellow fever on the Rock during the summer months, and one distinguished medical man who, in 1798, had examined several cases, unequivocally pronounced the disease to be the fever of the West Indies. Again, the recurrence of sporadic cases is an argument against importation; and, indeed, Gibraltar must be accounted most singularly unfortunate, if this pestilence was accidentally imported on six different occasions dur-

ing 30 years. The fact is, that there existed exciting causes within the city, numerous enough, and of a character to originate malignant fevers, and even in the present day many of these causes have not been removed.

The ventilation of the town was essentially bad, the drains were ill constructed, and in no instance trapped, and almost every house had a gaping cess-pool beneath it. During the summer, masses of accumulated filth were pent up in the sewers, and horribly offensive odours rose from the open gratings. Added to this, there was never any regular and sufficient supply of water. Investigations which were made into the course of the disease in 1828, proved that the fever first broke out in a district notoriously filthy. In further proof of the pestilential state of the atmosphere during these epidemics, it is mentioned by an eminent physician that a great mortality prevailed at the same time among animals.

During the commission of inquiry into the causes of this visitation of yellow fever, the civil authorities made every effort to prove that the disease was imported and not endemic. It was felt that the prosperity of the community would be injured if it should be proved that the fever originated in the city. A predetermination existed that no such fatal theory could be admitted.

The military medical men, many of whom had considerable experience of the disease, were exempt

from this prejudiced feeling, and submitted it as their unanimous opinion that the fever originated from local causes. Dr (Sir William) Burnett, who proved himself an authority upon the subject of infectious fevers, completely disposed of the importation theory, and effectually disproved the allegations of Sir W. Pym, the president of the board of inquiry. He showed very clearly that on the occasion of the outbreak in 1810, there was not one tittle of evidence even to suggest the idea of importation, while, on the contrary, the sanitary condition of the garrison was sufficient to account for the prevalence of malignant fevers.

The drains in the lower part of the town had but little declivity, and became choked with the soil and filth from the upper part. The whole surface of the drains was covered with night soil, which the small supply of water could not carry off, and the offensive effluvia were disseminated through the whole town.

It was incontestable that the drains emitted the most foul exhalations, and a board of medical (military) officers, presided over by the Commanding Royal Engineer, reported that these exhalations were such as not only to pervade most houses, but universally to corrupt the atmosphere. With such prevailing local causes of sickness it was scarcely necessary to seek for the origin of this fever through far-fetched theories.*

* "In every clime," says Humboldt, "men fancy to derive

Meteorological variations appear to have exercised no influence over the origin of these diseases; during summers of the greatest heat no fever broke out, and those years were equally healthy during which an excessive or inconsiderable quantity of rain fell.

Considering the neglect of sanitary precautions in Gibraltar at the present time, it will be fortunate if the town continues to escape another visitation of malignant fever.†

The mortality among the population still continues far above the healthy standard, and it fluctuates in a very remarkable degree. It is especially observable that although the population has been gradually decreasing since 1840, the death rate has been gradually *increasing*. In the first ten years, 1840 to 1850, the average annual mortality was 401·5, while in the suc-

consolation in the idea that a disease which is considered pestilential has been brought from abroad. This belief flatters the national pride. To inhabit a country which produces epidemics might be deemed a humiliating circumstance, and it is more satisfactory to imagine the disease is a foreign one, and that its breaking out has been merely the effect of an accident, against which it will be easy to guard in another instance. From this has arisen that remarkable facility with which the doctrine of importation has been eagerly received by all classes.”

* The late Dr Baly, who visited Gibraltar in an official capacity in 1854, attributed the high rate of mortality to defective drainage, the want of water, and the *prevalence of the east wind*. He affirmed that the state of the town was such as to render it liable to an epidemic at any time.

ceeding ten years it rose to 484·6, being an increase of 83 in the annual average in ten years; though the census of 1861 shows a decrease of 361 in the total population since 1840. To what causes must this rapid increase in mortality be ascribed?

The statistics of 1859-60 exhibited a mortality at the rate of 27 per 1000, and in 1860-61 of 32·5 per 1000, an average scarcely equalled in the most unhealthy years, in the most pestilential fever haunts of the dirtiest cities in Great Britain.

In some years the number of deaths has exceeded the births. The most prevalent diseases are consumption, affections of the pulmonary organs, and fevers. Out of 548 deaths in 1860, 140 occurred from consumption, pneumonia, and diseases of the respiratory organs.*

The mortality among children is remarkable. Out of 548 deaths in 1860, 213 were children under ten years of age; and out of 566 children born in 1857, 180 died before reaching three years. Still-born births are frequent.

Several meteorological causes have been suggested as possibly having some effect upon the health of

* The average annual mortality per 1000 among the fixed population, taken from a calculation extending over 10 years, is 27·25. On two occasions during those 10 years the mortality exceeded 32 per 1000. The average mortality of London during the same 10 years was 24·12 per annum.

By the census of 1844, the total fixed population was 15,823. By the census of 1861, it had decreased to 15,462.

Gibraltar; it is affirmed that heavy showers which, falling early in the autumn, are not followed by the steady rains, stir up stagnant filth in the drains without removing it, and thus give rise to sickness; again, the late fall of the periodical rains, or when the quantity is below or above the average, is put forward as a source of disease, and excessive heat is said to have an influence upon the rate of mortality. But statistics show the fallacy of these suggestions. Some of the most healthy seasons have been those during which the thermometer has been highest.

During the yellow fever epidemics, the summers were remarkably cool, and it is recorded that in 1752, when the heat was so excessive that the inhabitants during the night fancied their houses were on fire, and birds forsook their nests, no epidemic took place.

Neither does the rainfall appear to exercise any influence over the sanitary state of the place. In the year 1841-42 only 15 inches of rain fell, and the mortality was not visibly affected. In 1855-56, 80 inches fell, and the death rate was less than in the preceding or following years.

But the facts remain that the present mortality is above a healthy average, and that the death rate has increased with a decreasing population.*

* Speaking of the climate of Gibraltar, Dr Kelaart says: "The climate of Gibraltar had been represented to me as equal to any in the south of Europe, but great was my disap-

pointment not to find it what I expected. The heat of summer is more oppressive than even the thermometrical observations would indicate, owing principally to the want of a free circulation of air, which is prevented by the height and configuration of the Rock; most of the winds blowing only in certain quarters of the Rock, and often when the wind is raging tempestuously on the eastern side there is scarcely a breath of wind in the town of Gibraltar. . . . The summer nights retain nearly all the heat of the day, there not being sufficient time for the Rock to become cool before the sun rises again. The reflected heat from the rocky surfaces of Gibraltar is of itself a great source of suffering to the inhabitants."

CHAPTER XXII.

FORTIFICATIONS.

THE fortifications of Gibraltar are among the most famous in the world. Since the days when the Moors first established themselves upon this rugged rock, and made it the threshold over which the great African invasion passed into Spain, till the present time, its defences, natural and artificial, have been considered the most formidable in the universe.

In the times when the bow and arrow, the battering-ram, and the catapult were the most destructive engines of war that man's ingenuity could invent, its walls and heights withstood successfully the desperate onslaughts of barbarian hordes, and treachery alone opened its gates. In later days, when war had become a science, and artillery, with its still unknown power, had thrust aside the rude inventions of our forefathers, and established a new system in the art of strategy, this impregnable Rock mocked the united efforts of two great nations to subdue it, though every

hostile resource that the skill of the besiegers could devise was employed against it.

The value of the Rock to England, a value which, since the introduction of steam into the navies of the world, and the necessity of protected coaling stations, is doubly important, has induced the Government to maintain the defences in such a state of formidable perfection as to render the fortress impregnable and attack futile.

Within the last few years especially a vast amount of labour and expense have been lavished upon the works, and the fortifications have attained a strength capable of resisting the most arduous siege.

Precautionary prohibitions forbid that the fortifications should be described in this work. Though Lord Chatham * likened the studied secret policy of the engineers to the timorous ostrich which, hiding from his enemy, thrusts his head into the sand and fancies that the rest of his body is invisible, there can be little doubt that it is unadvisable to enter into a minute description of this celebrated fortified position. I may remark, however, that the defences of Gibraltar are not constructed upon any particular system. Advantage has been taken of a naturally strong position, and of the peculiar features of an almost inaccessible rock.

The fortifications may be classed under three different heads, first, a sea wall with its system of

* Governor in 1820.

curtains, flanks, and bastions, extending at broken intervals round the western base of the Rock, and covering every accessible spot from the north-western angle of the town to the southernmost point at Europa.

Secondly, the retired batteries, armed with the heaviest ordnance, situated in obscure but commanding positions, with difficulty discernible from the sea, and comparatively safe from the fire of shipping. The most formidable of these are Jones's battery under the Moorish Castle, Gardner's above the Alameda on the Upper Road, and the Civil Hospital Battery over the town.

Thirdly, the excavated galleries, blasted and hewn out of the solid rock on the northern and north-western faces of the mountain; the heavy ordnance in these celebrated galleries commands, at an elevation of 600 feet, the north front, neutral ground, and part of the Bay.

Every spot upon the Rock from whence a gun could be brought to bear with advantage upon an enemy is occupied by cannon. Wandering through the geranium-hedged paths on the hill side, or clambering up the rugged cliffs to the eastward, one stumbles unexpectedly upon a gun of the heaviest metal lodged in a secluded nook, with its ammunition, round shot, canister and case piled around it, ready at an instant.

The shrubs and flowers that grow on the cultivated

places, and are preserved from injury with so much solicitude, are often but the masks of guns which lie crouched beneath, concealed within the leaves ready for the port fire. Everywhere, all stands ready for attack. Huge piles of shot and shell built up with many thousand rounds are crowded into convenient spaces screened from an enemy's fire, long rows of spare guns are extended under the shelter of impenetrable walls, and sentries posted at every turn narrowly watch the movements of every passer by.

After midnight, military patrols occupy the streets, no civilians can move out without a pass, and the silence is broken only by the doleful "All's well," as the cry is passed from post to post, from bastion to bastion.

It may be said that in this great fortress every other interest is sacrificed to its military importance. Even private property is liable to confiscation upon payment of compensation should the site be required for a battery, a magazine, or any military work, and all building leases are confined to the shortest periods.

At the northern angle of the town, which faces the neutral ground, and where the road from Spain enters the city, the defences are complicated and of immense strength. It was here that the heavy fighting took place during the sieges of 1705, 1727. The walls are still pock-marked with the imprints of the storm of shot they have withstood. The town is entered here by two ways, one over a drawbridge, leading

from a narrow causeway for foot passengers and horses only, the other passing along the edge of Land-port ditch and running under Water-port gate.

The grand battery or Land-port curtain sweeps the approach from the north front. This battery is protected by a deep dry ditch, 50 feet wide, formed by the erection of a glacis before it. This glacis extends to the causeway and inundation. The latter work, which is situated between the Rock and causeway, serves as a strong protection to the city at this point. It is an artificial excavation formed from an old morass. It covers nine acres of ground, and is intersected by eight transverse ditches, 12 feet deep, and a line of palisades. The water is from four to six feet in depth.

The most remarkable and interesting features in the fortifications of Gibraltar are the subterranean excavated galleries and lines. Those termed the upper galleries commence near the Moorish Tower, and, following the contour of the tortuous cliffs of the Rock on its northern face, terminate at a curious prominent peak or pinnacle, the interior of which at the summit has been extensively excavated and heavily armed.

The long line of galleries is pierced at intervals with embrasures or port holes blasted out of the solid rock. Through these rugged openings peer the muzzles of the guns.

Below this upper line of galleries are others far

more vast and wonderful in their construction ; these too have been hewn and blasted out of the tough limestone, and are of marvellous size and strength. Upwards of 1350 men could find shelter in them. These magnificent works are not surpassed by any in the world.

On the very apex of the precipice that overhangs the north front, and 1350 feet above the sea, is the Rock Gun battery armed with mortars and heavy ordnance. Guns were dragged up to this height during the last siege, and considerable damage was done to the enemy's lines from this work. Notwithstanding its elevation above the sea, the Spaniards shelled it successfully on more than one occasion.

The total number of guns now mounted on the Rock is 700 : of these the greater portion are 68's and 32's. The garrison consists of 5600 men.

CHAPTER XXIII.

COMMERCE.

As a commercial station Gibraltar is rapidly sinking into insignificance. Before the introduction of steam, and when there was but little direct trade between Barbary and Great Britain, the place acquired some importance as an intermediate port of commerce; and gained an unenviable notoriety as an extensive smuggling *dépôt*.

Since it became a free port in the reign of Queen Anne, until the introduction of steam, its trade progressed in such a remarkable degree, that in 1822 and 1824 the value of the imports of cotton and woollen manufactures alone amounted to a million and a quarter of money. Subsequently to 1824 this extensive commerce gradually declined.

The fiscal policy of Spain, which taught that Gibraltar was a plague-spot upon the commercial prosperity of the country, and the excessive and indeed prohibitive duties levied upon all classes of English manufactures exported from the Rock, soon paralyzed

fair and open trading, and originated the demoralizing smuggling system.

In 1831, the value of the Manchester goods imported was reduced to £263,527, and a recent return shows that in 1854 the worth of *every class* of merchandise, including British and Irish produce, exported from Great Britain to Gibraltar, was only £754,000. It is at first sight remarkable that, though trade has so rapidly diminished, the amount of shipping which enters the port has enormously increased. But this augmentation is due to the extension of mercantile transactions all through the Mediterranean, and has no bearing upon the direct trade with the Rock. Formerly, in the days of sailing vessels, Gibraltar formed the great entrepôt for goods which were intended for distribution not only along the neighbouring coasts, but to the remotest corners of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Now steam and ships of larger tonnage carry cargoes direct to the port of destination without transshipment.

In 1820, 29,775 tons of English shipping entered the port; in 1831, only 14,349 tons were registered, but in 1860, the tonnage had increased to 583,647. In this latter year 4400 vessels of all nations anchored in the Bay, and of this number more than 1000 were propelled by steam. As a station of legitimate commercial importance, Gibraltar has declined, but as a port for the protection and convenience of the mer-

cantile marine trading with the Mediterranean, Spain, and Morocco, it is more than ever of importance.

The smuggling trade, which was for so long a source of constant irritation between Spain and Great Britain, has now almost entirely ceased. It is true, that on some occasions small cargoes of Manchester goods or tobacco are taken as a venture, but as a trade, smuggling has expired. Spain, however, still maintains a rigid vigilance over the sea-board in the neighbourhood of the Rock, and revenue boats are constantly on the alert. The captures made by these revenue cruisers are not, however, confined to smuggling craft alone. By an unjust and untenable assumption, which England has not yet ventured to dispute, Spain claims the right of jurisdiction over the water of the Straits within six miles of her shores, and she asserts her right to board any vessel under 200 tons that sails within that distance of her coasts. As the Straits are on an average about twelve, and in some places but eight, miles in breadth, Spain thus claims the right over more than half these waters, and virtually commands the navigation of the Gut. In consequence of the peculiar influence of the current, the sudden changes of wind, and the narrowness of the channel, it is impossible for vessels navigating these Straits to avoid sometimes anchoring within a short distance of the Spanish coast, but if they do so they are liable to be boarded by armed revenue boats at any moment, their contents overhauled, and their papers

scrutinized, and if any discrepancy can be discovered between their manifest and the cargoes, the Spanish Government justify the seizure of the ship. On two occasions in the last 12 months, British vessels have been captured within sight of Gibraltar, and in one instance within gunshot of the walls. The case of the "Julian," taken in the month of October, 1859, was a gross act of illegality, but it met with no redress. Endeavouring to make her way to Tangier, she was compelled by contrary winds to lay to within three miles of the Spanish shore, when she was boarded, seized, and taken into Algeciras as a prize. There she was quickly condemned by the Admiralty Court, and sold for the benefit of the captors. There was no tangible pretext for this outrage; but information had been given to the Spanish authorities that the ship was laden with contraband of war (the Spanish army was in Africa), which on an inspection of the cargo proved to be false. The captors, enraged at having been thus foiled, with little difficulty discovered a discrepancy in the manifest, and thus a pretext was established for the seizure. Another instance of illegal capture, attended with greater audacity, and even more inexcusable circumstances than the last, occurred in January, 1861.

On the evening of the 7th of that month, a small British vessel, the "Louisa," set sail from Gibraltar laden with various merchandise belonging to 19 different traders. She had also on board two bales of

tobacco, which did not appear in the manifest. She was bound to Tetuan, a free port on the coast of Barbary, which had lately come into possession of the Spaniards. The vessel had scarcely cleared the Rock, and was still within gunshot of the batteries, when she was boarded and seized by an armed Spanish revenue boat in English waters, conveyed to Algeciras, the crew and passengers imprisoned, and the ship condemned. After a vexatious delay the prisoners were released, but the cargo and vessel were declared lawful prizes. This act of piracy, for no other term is applicable to such a case, perpetrated in our own waters, under the muzzles of our guns, and upon a British vessel with her flag flying, caused, as may be supposed, the greatest consternation among the mercantile community, and led to firm but temperate remonstrances on the part of the local government. A demand was instantly made for the restoration of the ship and cargo, with full indemnity for all loss incurred. At the same time the circumstance was referred to the Government at home. The Spaniards however obstinately refused to comply with the demand put forward, and insisted upon the legality of the capture, on the grounds that the cargo contained two bales of tobacco not entered in the manifest, and that the vessel was within the prescribed maritime fiscal zone, viz. two leagues from the Spanish coast, the bay of Gibraltar itself being only five miles in breadth. The English Government, convinced

that an outrage had been committed upon the British flag, and sensible of the effect that such daring seizures would have upon the trade in these parts, insisted upon the immediate restoration of the "Louisa" and her cargo, demands which were reluctantly complied with to a certain extent. After a delay of nearly six months the vessel was returned in an unseaworthy condition, and some portion of the cargo was also given up. This latter however was greatly damaged, and diminished by one-half. A demand for a full indemnity has been made upon the Spanish Government, but it is as yet refused.

The effect of these seizures upon the trade between Barbary and Gibraltar may easily be conceived. The Spanish Government claim, in their own words, "That any vessel, whether national or foreign, of a less burthen than 200 tons, which may be found standing off and on within the maritime fiscal zone (six miles) with unlawful merchandise on board is liable to confiscation."*

The trade with Morocco is carried on almost exclusively by vessels under 200 tons, and in consequence of the rapid current which always sets through the Straits to the eastward, the sudden changes of wind, and other peculiarities in the navigation of these waters, it is, in nine cases out of ten, impossible for these traders to work through the Straits without

* Royal Decree, Madrid, April 17th, 1860.

anchoring or laying to within the maritime jurisdiction claimed so arbitrarily by Spain.

It is to be remarked also that British vessels alone are molested, the French flag being invariably respected. The impression that these insults to England are liable to make, and indeed do make, upon the merchants and traders of every clime and nation who congregate in Gibraltar is marked, and detrimental to our hitherto acknowledged supremacy in the Mediterranean, especially at a time when France is pushing forward her interests on the Barbary coast with gigantic strides.

APPENDIX.

General Elliott to Lord Grantham. Nov. 1777.

(*Cypher.*)

“MY LORD,

“By my desire the Emperor’s* Jew secretary sent me a copy of a letter from Count Florida Blanca, dated October 26th, acknowledging the receipt of a letter from Sumbell,† containing compliments on the Count’s new appointment, professions of the Emperor’s personal regard for His Catholic Majesty, and offering satisfaction for injuries, with overtures for a reconciliation.

“This the Count answers with full assurances for his zeal for the Emperor, and the King’s inclination to renew the peace, provided His Imperial Majesty will make the proposal under his own hand, and give satisfaction for public injuries. The person who sent me this letter promises I shall have the answer, and says mysteriously, he knows the meaning of the Spanish paragraph. If this place should be threatened, an immediate and ample supply of troops, artillery, ammunition, stores, and money will be wanted.”

* Of Morocco.

† The Emperor’s Jew secretary.

General Eliott to Lord Grantham. April 16, 1778.

(*Cypher.*)

“This instant I am informed that the Moorish ambassador is returned from the French Court with a present of 50,000 cobs (dollars).”

Sir George Eliott to the Right Honourable Thomas Townshend, Secretary for War.

“Gibraltar, August 6th, 1782.

“As the officers employed on my staff have most diligently, faithfully, and constantly exerted themselves with very great fatigue, and not the smallest emolument whatever, I do therefore make it my humble request that such steps may be taken as you shall judge proper for the said payment to be made, and that you would be pleased to pardon my being very earnest on a subject where the interest of so many deserving officers is concerned, whose claims are well authenticated by their unremitting labours and services of long continuance. My solicitude is the greater on their account, as it would seem that hitherto I am the only person who has reaped the benefit of any pecuniary advantage from the king’s most gracious favour.”

Sir George Eliott to General Conway.

“Gibraltar, March 19th, 1783.

“SIR,

“I was favoured with your very obliging letter of the 1st January, by the ‘Thetis’ frigate, on the 10th inst.

“Congratulations from you, Sir, are of the utmost value; they are not mere compliments. It has ever been my good fortune to receive your countenance in the various services when under your command; upon the present occasion your opinion absolutely decides, so well acquainted as you are with every part of this place, and the principal works erected upon your own plan, which I foretold would one day speak for themselves. They have now undergone the severest tryal, and proved without a fault; hence the public owe you much. We of the garrison are more especially indebted, as by our information you first moved in the House of Commons for this great national honour, their thanks; these have been made known to the whole, but I propose doing it with proper military form as soon as Lieutenant-General Boyd comes out from an attack of the gout, as he wishes to be present.

“The adjutant-general of the forces here will have the honour to deliver this letter at the same time with the Review (?) returns. He is so perfectly intelligent, that he will be able to answer fully as to any particular you please to require. He is a very good soldier, and well deserves any honour you shall please to bestow on him.

“He has no riches but his integrity. . . . I recommended the quarter-master-general, Major Hardy, and adjutant-general for brevet rank (as customary), but received no answer. The first of these, Major Hardy, is of the Flanders war—none ever was superior to him either in courage, talents, or constant application to the most fatiguing and difficult undertaking ever known of so long duration.

“By his uncommon spirit and exertion many thousand pounds are saved to the public, and perhaps the garrison by his means may have been preserved from mortal sick-

ness and starving by hunger. I may venture to give my word of honour, this officer never made one single penny perquisite public or private. The adjutant-general in his line has been equally active and disinterested. These officers with a very few more will be the only ones I shall personally interest myself for.”*

* From Papers in Colonial Secretary's Office, Gibraltar.

PREPARED BY LIEUTENANT WARREN, R. E.,
FOR THE AUTHOR.

METEOROLOGICAL OBSERVATORY, ROYAL ENGINEERS,
GIBRALTAR.

Latitude North, 36° 6' 20". Longitude West, 5° 20' 53".
Height above mean-water level, 50 feet.

ABSTRACT,

Showing the total amount of rain collected during the years 1838—1860,
together with the dates of the first heavy showers and heavy rains :
also the Mean Temperature from 1852—1860.

Year.	Date of first heavy showers.	Amount collected.	Date of first heavy rain.	Amount collected.	Total amount.	Remarks.
1838-9	26 September	0·58	28 September	1·34	27·58	
1839-40	2 September	0·11	3 October	1·51	39·34	
1840-41	29 October	0·42	3 November	1·04	31·19	
1841-2	29 August	0·18	20 December	1·20	15·91	
1842-3	26 September	0·94	11 October	1·77	31·02	
1843-4	2 September	0·32	17 October	0·92	24·51	
1844-5	22 September	0·75	22 October	1·69	45·13	
1845-6	9 September	0·12	5 October	0·96	27·34	
1846-7	5 October	0·10	18 October	0·90	26·36	
1847-8	11 September	0·59	19 October	1·35	24·48	
1848-9	24 September	0·15	27 September	1·85	35·01	
1849-50	12 September	0·11	4 November	2·31	24·66	
1850-51	16 September	0·47	14 October	4·48	28·36	
1851-2	1 October	0·46	31 October	2·22	26·70	65·9
1852-3	3 October	0·43	9 October	1·80	34·89	63·3
1853-4	1 September	0·92	27 October	1·72	40·84	64·0
1854-5	{ 8 August	1·72	15 November	4·11	66·61	62·8
	{ 4 September	0·27				
1855-6	7 September	0·10	16 September	3·01	80·70	64·3
1856-7	3 September	1·72	3 September	1·72	23·50	64·8
1857-8	23 September	0·11	4 November	1·22	37·33	65·8
1858-9	13 September	0·45	26 September	3·30	28·16	64·6
1859-60	4 October	0·20	13 November	2·01	39·98	64·9
Means					34·53	64·5

RETURN OF THE OCCUPATIONS
OF THE
FIXED POPULATION OF GIBRALTAR, 1860.
From a Census taken by the Police Magistrate.

Employed under the Local Govt.	In Professions.	Commerce.	Trades.
132	72	681	1297

Agriculture.	Miscellaneous.	At school.	Unemployed.
28	5565	2633	4994

Paupers.	Total fixed Population.
60	15,462

Revenue of Gibraltar for the year 1861.

£31,597 11s. 3d.

£14,889 19s. of the total revenue are derived from duties on wines and spirits, and rents of public-house licenses.

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